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The Morality of Strikes.

ALTHOUGH the strike epidemic may break out again even before this is published, for the present, at least, it has suffered a temporary abatement, and already the heat of passion, which raged so fiercely consequent on the recent dislocation of traffic and partial paralysis of industry, has subsided sufficiently to admit of an unprejudiced examination of this distressing modern phenomenon. During the past few months the question of strikes has been very much in the air, and everywhere, in speaking and writing, a distinct note of hopelessness has been painfully evident. Our industrial system appears to have come perilously near a catastrophe. To let things develop as they have been developing for some time seems to be yielding ourselves up to chronic unrest, industrial anarchy, labour domination, and innumerable other unspeakable horrors. On the other hand, it seems impossible to devise a method of arresting this development that will be at the same time practicable, effective, and fair to all concerned. Methods have been suggested in abundance, but for the most part so puerile, or so patently unfair, as to show clearly that their authors were simply panic-stricken or ludicrously blind to the true significance of the situation.

I do not say that the situation, even as conceived by those who are feverishly misinterpreting it, is really hopeless. It only appears hopeless to them, which is a different thing altogether. Even if the ordinary pessimistic diagnosis of our industrial condition were correct, and if the future did really appear doubtful and dangerous, we might still console ourselves with the reflection that the future has always shown a disposition to belie our prophecies. However that may be, it is by no means reassuring, when one is impressed with the idea of disastrous consequences from an impending industrial revolution, to be made to feel that the industrial system is no longer subject to conscious direction. Chance or special Providence may save us yet. We may blunder along without experiencing the dreadful evils that have been predicted for us. But we may not. Instead, we

may blunder on horrors worse than anything that has been anticipated.

It is a source of much security and satisfaction, therefore, to feel that there is no real ground for these dismal forebodings; that the present industrial unrest is neither revolutionary nor catastrophic. The present tendency to strikes marks a crisis in our industrial development, but a crisis which will not precipitate us into revolution and disaster, but which will rather set us on the way to more general happiness and prosperity. Profound changes in our industrial system will ensue, but none of us can have been so enamoured of everything at present connected with that system as to regard every profound change in it as necessarily an evil. Unfortunately, it must be admitted that the crisis is likely to be severe, and may be greatly protracted; possibly it may entail a vast amount of bitter suffering. Being a crisis, too, it involves a considerable amount of danger. Probably the attachment of many influential labour leaders to immoral and utopian schemes may for a long time confuse and imperil the true issue. It is, possible, moreover, that measures may be adopted against the workmen which, while insufficient to defeat their efforts, may, by inflicting grave hardships on them, exasperate them to acts of violence and destructive retaliation. But all these things can only serve to prolong the conflict, and intensify its own severity and the temporary evils it must occasion; the final issue appears to leave no room for doubt or misgiving.

It is not strange that the present industrial unrest should appear startling. We cannot immediately reconcile ourselves to principles and practices which cut straight across an established order which we have always been accustomed to look upon as necessary; nor can we foresee anything but anarchy and disaster, if labour claims an effective voice in determining the conditions of industry. But a little reflection will show us that there is no ground for alarm, that the order we are so solicitous for is in no way necessary, and that the pretensions of labour are quite compatible with industrial and social harmony.

Unrest is not bad in itself. When things are at their worst there is rest, a broken-spirited, helpless rest. Unrest shows that there is a force at work, which threatens the

stability of the unsatisfactory position, and at least affords reason for hope of improvement. Absolute slavery, or complete subjection of the working classes, might secure a state of rest or peace in industry, but that would be a state of rest which none of us would deem desirable. Short of these we cannot expect absolute industrial rest as long as the conditions of industry are unsatisfactory from the point of view of any of the parties concerned in its maintenance. We are all agreed, I take it, that the existing industrial conditions are shockingly unsatisfactory, and should, therefore, be only pleased to find a force at work making for their modification, provided that the modification it aims at is a real improvement and the methods through which it operates are not immoral. That these two conditions can be verified in the case of strikes, which is the particular phase of industrial unrest with which we are now concerned, I shall attempt to show presently.

A strike may be defined as the preconcerted cessation from work on the part of a body of workmen, and the use of methods of persuasion recognised by law, to prevent others from taking up the positions they have vacated, with the object of making the conducting of a particular business impossible unless the employers accede to demands which they might be otherwise inclined to refuse. The morality of such a proceeding must be considered separately in relation to strict justice, legal justice and charity.

With regard to strict, or commutative, justice, a strike can be opposed to this virtue only if some one has a strict right that workmen do not leave off work in the manner described. The only parties who can be conceived as possessing such a strict right are the employers, the general public, and the workmen—both those participating in the strike, and those whom it is attempted to restrain from filling the vacant positions.

Employers have a strict right that all contracts expressed and implied between themselves and the men be carried out. But it is only rarely that strikes can be judged to violate contracts, and except in the rare instances in which this occurs, no right of the employer is violated by the mere refusal of the individual men to work. Apart from the effect of contracts, as between employer and workman, it is altogether a matter for the workman himself to decide when and

for whom he will work, precisely as it is a matter for the employer to decide whom he will employ, and whether he will employ anyone at all.

Similarly, the mere agreement amongst the men not to work except on stated conditions appears to be opposed to no right of the employer. If each man has a right as against his employer to refuse to work except on his own conditions, he has the right to refuse except on the conditions to which he and his fellow-workers have agreed. The fact of entering into an agreement cannot of itself be a violation of any right, if, as has been just pointed out, every party to the agreement has a right to do that to which he commits himself by the agreement.

Finally, the attempt to dissuade others from taking up the work which strikers have refused does not violate any strict right of employers, since employers certainly cannot have any strict right that the men abstain from such attempts at dissuasion. Surely, when men are striving for what they consider their just share of the proceeds of industry, no one would say that they have not a clear right to point out to others that interference on their part would be a hardship on themselves, a set-back to the cause of labour, and to urge such other similar motives as would be likely to dissuade them from taking up the vacated positions.

We are all familiar with the objection that agreements between men not to work except on stated conditions, together with the use of persuasion to prevent others from working for the employer with whom they happen to be in dispute, violates the employer's natural right to freedom of contract. This is an objection that is urged in various forms against the right of combination in every department of social life, and it is just the species of objection one finds it most difficult to answer convincingly, because it is based on a principle which is commonly accepted as an axiom without being fully understood.

The right to freedom of contract is extremely vague and subtle. When stated as a broad general principle, it is merely a commonplace, no one could think of denying it. But when it becomes a question of applying that principle to individual concrete cases, all its apparent simplicity disappears. It certainly does not imply an absolute right of freedom to contract on the most advantageous terms, which

would be violated whenever anyone made it difficult, or even impossible, for a man to enter into a contract to which he might be inclined. If that were so, then, for instance, a man who bought the last fish in the market would be guilty of injustice against all would-be purchasers of that fish. Nor does it imply that moral pressure might not be brought to bear on a man to prevent him from making a contract which, if left to himself, he should wish to make; otherwise, for instance, the people of Limerick are guilty of injustice when they urge their booksellers not to trade in immoral literature.

What, then, does the right of freedom of contract mean? It means simply that every man has a right to contract as he likes, and a right also that no one *unjustly* interferes with his opportunities of entering into favourable contracts. It does not mean that by just means—advice, persuasion, just fear, etc.—he may not be induced to change his liking for a particular contract, or that, by just means also, any one may not diminish his opportunities for entering into that contract. It is hard to see how acts that are otherwise just can become unjust merely because they interfere with the exercise of anyone's freedom of contract.

To apply this to the case of strikes, although undoubtedly the employer's freedom of contract is seriously hampered by them, and although it is the intention of the workmen that it should be, there is no violation of strict right, provided there is nothing unjust in any of the different acts by which the restriction of freedom is brought about. That there is nothing unjust in any of these acts—at least when strikes are properly conducted—has been shown already. To refuse to work, to agree amongst themselves, to use their powers of persuasion with others, are all acts in themselves perfectly just for workmen.

It has seemed necessary to mention that it is only when strikes are properly conducted that all the acts which go to constitute them are just, because it cannot be denied that there are numerous abuses, that sometimes fraud and violence play a considerable part, and when that is the case, strikes must be admitted to be unjust to the extent to which these unjust means are employed.

Again, it is frequently asserted that the strict right of employers is violated by strikes which men sometimes enter

on in support of extravagant demands, *e.g.*, unreasonably high wages, or impossibly favourable conditions of service. And it seems to be commonly assumed that every demand for remuneration of labour exceeding its current market price, provided that price afforded a means of reasonably decent living for the workmen, would be extravagant in this sense.

That injustice might conceivably be committed in this way, I am prepared to admit. But there has been no instance of it yet, nor are we likely to see one in the near future. Such injustice could arise only because men struck for a remuneration for their labour that exceeded the maximum just price. The demand could be unjust only when the amount demanded were unjust. But, surely, no one would say that the present market price of labour, even where it is equal to or slightly in excess of a reasonable living wage, represents the maximum that is just, so that a particular workman would be acting unjustly if he accepted more. The minimum just wage is fixed by the law of nature itself, and has been defined by Pope Leo XIII., but no one has yet defined the maximum. We must remember, then, that while the market price of labour, provided it does not fall below what is necessary to maintain the workmen decently, is just, it is not the maximum just price, and that it is not unjust for workmen to use means in themselves just in order to secure a higher price, or what comes to the same thing, to raise the market price. Until we are able to say what are the wages, and what are the conditions of employment which each workman would be unjust in seeking, we cannot determine when strikes would be unjust by reason of the greatness of the demands.

I suppose there is a point at which demands for higher wages would be unjust against employers. I take it that would be true when workmen attempted to appropriate to themselves all the proceeds of a particular industry, leaving nothing to the owner of *valuable* capital as a return for the efficiency of his capital. But, short of that, it is extremely difficult to say when, if at all, according to our present industrial organisation, the demands of workmen would be unjust. I do not think that it is possible to hold that the capitalist has a natural right to any fixed minimum price for the use of his capital, in the same way as the workman

has a natural right to a minimum wage. Certainly, the reasons on which we base the workman's natural right do not apply to the capitalist's returns.

It is easy enough to perceive that since capital and labour are both efficient and necessary partial causes of the produce of industry, some part of that produce should go to the capitalist and some to the labourer. But no law of natural justice determines the proportion in which the division should be made between the two. When two necessary and incommensurable causes of that kind combine to produce an effect, it is impossible to say how much of the effect should be attributed to each. I know that it has been said, again and again, that since labour of itself could produce nothing without capital, the entire product should go to the capitalist with the obligation of compensating the labourer. That, of course, is what usually happens, but it is arrant nonsense to say that it is a dictate of natural justice. We might just as reasonably say that, because capital can produce nothing without labour, the entire product should go to the labourer with the obligation of compensating the owner for the use of his capital. As a matter of fact, seeing that the owner is free to use or not to use his capital, and that the labourer is free to contribute his labour or remain idle, and seeing that no one can say that the result is due to one factor more than to the other, the only thing which strict justice prescribes on the point is that the produce should be divided according to free contract between the two, and it is, to say the least, just as consonant with this prescription that the labourer should take the entire product and pay the capitalist, as that the capitalist should take it and pay the labourer. That the latter is what actually happens in the ordinary course of industrial life, is due simply to the superior economic position of the capitalist, which enables him to have the best part of the bargain with the labourer.

It is hard to free ourselves from the prejudices wrought in us by our constant intimate association with the actual working of industry, which make us assume that it is the most natural thing in the world that the capitalist should be predominant in the industrial partnership. But a consideration of simpler and more elementary conditions will enable us to get a better perception of the natural relations

between the two. If we conceive two men landing at the same time on some lone island, one, *A*, let us call him, possessed of a certain number of agricultural implements and seeds, which can be used so as to make the land yield an abundant sustenance for the two, and the other, *B*, without agricultural stock of any kind, we shall have the simplest example of a capitalist and propertyless workman.

In all probability the claims of strict justice would not count for much in such circumstances. Very likely the capitalist in the case would forego all right to any special return for the use of his capital, and would be content that both should work in common and enjoy the fruits according to the needs of each. If they represented a less perfect type of humanity, he who was physically the stronger, be he the capitalist or the non-capitalist, would dictate terms to the other. But let us take it that each was determined to insist on his strict rights, and that the other was prepared to respect them. In that case we shall see that natural justice leaves the reward of capital and labour to be determined by agreement or contract between the two, and that the contract which will be actually made will depend almost entirely—assuming that each insists on enjoying the full advantage of his strict rights—on their relative economic strength.

If we take it that the capitalist is incapable of working, because he is suffering, let us suppose, from partial paralysis, and that his companion has no other means of gaining a means of subsistence than by using the agricultural implements and seeds, we may conclude that, the needs of both being equally pressing, they would agree that one should give the use of his capital and the other his labour, and that the product should be enjoyed equally.

But if we suppose that the capitalist was active, and on the whole rather an enthusiast about agriculture, he would certainly not receive the other on equal terms; he would insist on his performing the more menial parts of the work, and enjoying the less desirable parts of the produce, *i.e.*, he would make him a servant, pure and simple. On the contrary, if we assume that *B*, the non-capitalist, could live fairly well on the island without the use of *A*'s capital, or that he could leave it, and was not particularly keen on staying, while *A* could neither leave nor support himself by his

own exertions, their relative positions would be reversed. *B* would agree to remain and work only on condition of enjoying the best of the products, and would maintain *A* in the position of an inferior dependent.

It is easy to see that an economic advantage, whether existing from the beginning or arising in the course of time, as, for instance, if *B*'s boat had drifted away at the end of a month, so that he could no longer leave the island, and in that way be independent of *A*, might enable one man to reduce another to a state of the most abject dependence. Precisely the same thing has happened in our civilised society. But now, instead of two individuals, we have two classes. Here, too, the division of the produce of labour and capital is naturally a subject of contract between the labourer and the capitalist, and as far as the contracting parties themselves are concerned, it is quite natural and in no way against justice that the stronger economic party should prevail, subject, however, to an important reservation, the reason for which it is not necessary to go into here, viz., that natural justice always prescribes that a labourer's remuneration shall be sufficient to afford him a reasonable means of living. Moreover, in social life, it is the duty of civil authority to obviate these extreme consequences of economic advantages. However we explain its power, it is an incontestable fact that the civil authority is bound to moderate the sway of superior economic strength. It is bound to control the exercise of individual rights in the interests of the entire community. Heretofore, indeed, civil authority has not only failed to restrain, but to a great extent it has shown itself the ally of, superior economic strength. Those who have been stronger economically have been stronger also politically, and have not refrained from using their twofold opportunity to crush their rivals. It seems almost unnecessary to add that the stronger class was the wealthy, what we may now call the capitalist class. The mere workers were deprived of their rights in land and legally hampered in the disposal of their labour. Not only did the civil authority fail to secure equitable opportunities for the workmen, but it did not even secure them the minimum living wage, to which they had a right in strict justice.

The sequel has been the widespread destitution and demoralisation of the workmen. At last, however, the

workmen seem to have discovered a means of improving their economic position. The force of combination has enabled them to treat on more favourable terms with capitalists. But, strange to say, those who appeared to see no injustice in allowing economic strength determine, according to existing industrial legislation, the division of the fruits of industry between the capitalist and labourer, when capital was supreme, had control of the law, and had reduced the price of labour in many cases to less than the minimum prescribed by the law of nature, are grossly shocked that labour should use whatever increase of economic strength it has tardily acquired to press for anything beyond the barest essentials for decent existence, or the most paltry improvement on merely tolerable conditions. The idea of these people seems to be that existing relations should be stereotyped in justice, not only that capital was justified in using economic pressure until it arrived at its present position of supremacy, but that the position it has thus acquired should be made sacred for all time, forgetting, apparently, that if it has got into this position by economic pressure, it can also be justly got out of it by economic pressure on the other side. Recurring to the example that has been already used, we can see that it is a long time before modern workmen are likely to make such exorbitant demands of capitalists as *B* in the case would be justified in making of *A*, and, therefore, before their demands will be unjust as between labour and capital. And this is the point at issue here, for, if the demands are just, there can be no injustice in pressing them by just means; and the means in question have been shown to be just.

For two reasons strikes might be supposed to violate the right of the general public, first, because, to a great extent, the increased remuneration which workmen seek through strikes will have to be paid by the public in their capacity of consumers, and, secondly, because the dislocation of industry which every strike more or less occasions inflicts a considerable loss on the public. Both the facts on which this contention is based are sufficiently true to form a basis of argument. Although it would not be accurate to say that every increase of wages must be paid by consumers, since profits also and rents may be made to contribute, it is still true that an increase of wages has a tendency to raise the

price of the produce of the industry in which it occurs. And the recent railway strikes have shown us what manifold severe losses and hardships a strike may inflict on the public.

The weakness of the argument consists in this, that the public has no right in justice that the men should not enter on the course from which it suffers these hardships and losses. It is often confidently assumed that such a right exists, and people sometimes grow furious at the idea of its being so grossly disregarded. But where can we find any justification for that assumption? The essence of our present industrial system is that all parties concerned in it simply pursue their own interests, and the public has to be satisfied with the best value it can secure through the competition of different producers seeking its patronage in various departments. As a rule, this competition serves its purpose very well. Its sole right is to purchase in the cheapest market that is available, but it has no right that any particular producers serve that market. In another form, the industrial system is maintained not because of any moral relations between those engaged in it and the public, but because the producers, looking to themselves, find it profitable to provide what the public wants at a price determined by competition with others who are prepared to provide the same commodities.

In almost all industries there are two elements, capital and labour, which co-operate to produce the service for the public, and compete for the price which the public pays for the service. Ordinarily, the capitalist, either directly or through the medium of merchants, sells the produce of the industry to the public, having first decided how much of the price is to go as remuneration to the workmen, his motive being the profit which he expects to make in the transaction. The workman has no direct relations with the public. He consents to labour simply in return for the wages he receives, and, naturally, he tries to make the wages as high as possible. The public has no right that he should labour in order that it should be inconvenienced, nor that he should forego the use of any of his just powers of securing favourable terms from the capitalist in order that its interests should not suffer. We hear a good deal about the sufferings which strikes inflict on the innocent public, but we must remember that the public has no right that workmen abstain

from the acts to which these sufferings are attributed. If these sufferings resulted merely from the spontaneous and simultaneous cessation from work on the part of a large section of workers—as, of course, they should if such an unlikely event were actually to happen—there would be no shadow of foundation for the charge of injustice against these men. Neither can these sufferings prove injustice when they are due to a course which the men are otherwise perfectly justified in pursuing.

It is said that there is a great difference between workmen simply refusing to work, and combining to refuse and prevent others from working as well. I know there is in effect, but there is no difference as far as justice is concerned, unless there is some species of injustice implied in the means of combination, or in the influence brought to bear on others.

The greatest hardships in connection with strikes appear to me to be borne by the men themselves, and that almost equally whether they join the strike or not, perhaps especially when they are induced to strike against their own personal inclinations, and face appalling privations and anxiety from which they should be immune if they decided simply for themselves and elected to remain at work. At this point there seems to be the gravest danger of injustice being committed by workmen in connection with strikes. But, not even here, will there be injustice, unless the means adopted to induce workers to join the strike, and to prevent others from taking up vacant positions in the business against which the strike is declared, are unjust in themselves.

It does seem hard that men should be persuaded—to use a euphemism—to forego advantages or to submit to privations, which they would never think of doing if left to themselves. But that does not prove that the “persuasion” is unjust. No one, for instance, would say that persuasion would be unjust if a certain number of organisers, quietly, and without threats of any kind, convinced these workers that, for the sake of their own future prospects, and in the interests of their suffering class, they ought to submit to these privations, although the privations would really be the effect of that persuasion. Neither is there any ground for holding that the persuasion would be unjust if backed up by a certain amount of just fear, as, for instance, that

whoever remained at work after a strike had been declared, or whoever took up work which strikers had laid down, should be ineligible for membership in a particular trade union. It is difficult to fix minutely the limits of what would be just fear in this connection, but, in general, it may be said that men on strike can justly endeavour to persuade others to join them by working through their fear of any losses they could justly inflict on them.

The effect of just fear may be very considerable; men do not think lightly of being branded as traitors to their own cause, of being contemptuously stigmatised as "blacklegs," and of being denied the ordinary amenities and civilities of social life, to which, indeed, they cannot claim a strict right against anyone who wishes to withhold them, but which, however, people find it very disagreeable to be deprived of. We frequently hear it proclaimed as a really finishing argument, that men have a right to refuse to work, but that they have no right to prevent others from working. Of course, it all depends on the means by which they prevent the others. They have no right to prevent them by unjust means, but they have a perfect right to prevent them by just means.

Even when strikes do not violate any strict right, it is still possible that they may be against legal justice. Legal justice is a virtue which binds the members of a community to promote the good of the general body. The question, therefore, arises whether men, in entering on a strike, and in that way injuring the common good, are not violating this virtue. That depends on two other questions, first, to what extent a strike really injures the community as a whole, and, secondly, to what extent a man is bound to forego the use of his strict right in the interests of the community.

Notwithstanding the severe and widespread hardships which a strike may immediately entail, and notwithstanding that it appears calculated to inflict permanent injury on trade and commerce, still it is by no means clear that it must always seriously, or even in any degree, injure the community as a whole. Accredited exponents of economics assure us that the public interests will be best served when every individual and every class of the community do—of course, within the limits of their moral and legal rights—what they judge to be best for themselves. Whatever

qualifications may be necessary for that theory before it could be accepted generally, there is much to be said in defence of its application here. After all, the acute hardships attendant on strikes are but temporary, and the loss to trade and commerce ceases to be very noticeable when things have got time to readjust themselves, while, on the other hand, a successful strike may have the effect of lifting a large class of the community permanently above the marginal line of destitution. If we consider the enormous social demoralisation bred in a festering sore of squalid poverty, and especially if we remember that the workmen themselves form part of the community, and that, man for man, their well-being should count for as much as that of any other section in the community, we shall conclude that even from the standpoint of the common welfare a strike may be often more beneficial than injurious.

✓ But, of course, it is not merely from the standpoint of the common welfare that this question has to be decided. Even though a strike were certain to be detrimental to the community in general, it would by no means follow that that strike would be opposed to the virtue of legal justice. Legal justice binds citizens to promote the common good, but it is a question very difficult to answer how far it obliges men to do what they are not bound to do by any other virtue in order to promote the common good, or to refrain from doing what they are otherwise morally free to do in order to avoid injuring the common good. This is a question that cannot ever be mathematically determined. Instances will readily occur to the reader in which a slight sacrifice of personal right ought certainly be made in the general interests of the community, and concrete cases of exploitation of sweated labour, grasping landlords, slum owners, etc., will also occur to him, where such a sacrifice ought to be made, and is not. He will remark that in these instances there is little talk about the virtue of legal justice, and in consequence he will be disposed to make ample discount when its claims are urged in the case of combinations of workmen.

Although there is such a vast amount of vagueness about the incidence of the obligation of legal justice, we may take it as certain that strikes would be opposed to it in three distinct sets of cases; first, where there was no reasonable probability that the strike could be carried to a successful

issue; secondly, where the advantages that are expected from the strike could be secured by less drastic measures; and, thirdly, where strikes are resorted to frequently and for slight causes.

Apart altogether from the suicidal insanity of unsuccessful strikes, they are clearly against legal justice, inasmuch as there is no personal advantage to set off against and justify the serious general losses that are the invariable concomitants of a strike. Similarly, these losses cannot be justified when what is sought through a strike can be attained without them, and without others equally undesirable. Finally, if it once became accepted that strikes might be resorted to suddenly, and on every frivolous pretext, not only would industry be hampered, but the convenience, and even the necessities, of civilised life would become so precarious, and sometimes so impossible, that all classes, including the workmen themselves, should be permanently the sufferers.

A strike may be against charity whenever there is no adequate set-off against the losses which it inflicts on several individuals and classes. Here the same points must be taken into consideration which have been discussed already in connection with the virtue of legal justice. It is difficult to institute a comparison between the losses that are effected and those that are redressed by a successful strike. Again, in case the losses effected are greater, how far does the law of charity oblige a man, or body of men, to forego the exercise of their strict right? The practical conclusion must be formed here on the same lines as have been suggested for arriving at a practical conclusion in connection with the virtue of legal justice.

It will be seen, therefore, that strikes are not strictly unjust, unless when connected with abuses such as the use of violence, fraud, or unjust threats. But even where nothing can be suggested against the manner in which they are conducted, they may be against legal justice and charity. It may not appear to make a great deal of difference, if strikes are wrong, what virtue we say they are opposed to. But in reality it does make a great deal of difference. There is a vast and very perceptible difference between asking a man to give alms to a hungry neighbour and demanding that he pays the debt which he owes that hungry neighbour. If we

have a strict sight in this matter against the workmen, then we can reasonably demand as something due to us that they do not strike. But if they are bound by other virtues, such as legal justice and charity, then their fulfilment of these virtues is altogether a matter for themselves, and we can only try to persuade them to respect their moral obligations. The tone in which strikes are criticised indicates clearly the assumption that they are violating some strict right. We sometimes hear appeals made to the feelings of charity and public spirit of workmen, but our ears are far more familiar with strident demands for the strict rights of the employers and the public. Naturally, this only serves to irritate the workmen and make them less disposed to yield any point. Men might readily yield to an appeal to their charity or public spirit, when they would resist to the last extremity what was demanded as a matter of strict right.

But it may be argued that whatever can be said in defence of strikes in the abstract, in practice they are frequently immoral and unjust, while their prevalence on the enormous scale in which they have been witnessed of late threatens not only the prosperity, but the very existence of industry. On this account it might seem that they should be pronounced immoral because of their liability to abuse, and their direct tendency to impede peaceful social life, and even to render it impossible altogether. If these abuses and anti-social consequences were essential to strikes, I should readily admit that their practice would be immoral. But, as a matter of fact, they are not. Taking account of the large admixture of wickedness that is always to be found in human nature, we may assume that strikes will always be accompanied by a certain amount of violence and injustice. These things, however, are not essential to strikes; they are merely abuses, just as fraud and injustice are abuses common to free bargaining. As free bargaining, therefore, is not immoral because of the immoral practices that are associated with it, neither should strikes be considered immoral because of the immoral practices that are associated with them. Of course, the point is, whether the good effect anticipated from a strike is sufficient to permit the immoral practices that may be expected to accompany its operation. In many instances there is sufficient, and even abundant, reason in the hope of raising labour from

the state of helplessness and demoralisation to which the superior economic strength of capital has reduced it, and of enabling workmen to enjoy a more equitable portion of the goods which it co-operates in producing.

Nor do strikes constitute any really grave menace to the peace or prosperity of social life. At present, indeed, they are apt to produce a considerable amount of inconvenience and disorder, but that is purely temporary, due to the unskilful application of a new force by workmen, and the panic-stricken, unpractical efforts of coping with this force made by those who are as yet unaccustomed to feel its pressure. All parties concerned may be expected to learn wisdom from experience. Workmen will soon perceive, what they must be beginning to perceive already, that while the strike may be a very effective weapon in industrial conflicts, it is also a very expensive and dangerous weapon to use. The most selfish as well as the most generous considerations will make them slow to have recourse to strikes, unless there is a substantial point in dispute, no other means of gaining it, and reasonable hope of success.

If labour in the different trades remains independently organised, it will soon come home to workmen, that, however thoroughly they are prepared for the conflict, as a rule they will not be really successful in a strike except where they have been able to enlist public sympathy, and public sympathy will be on their side only when a strike is reasonable in itself and reasonably conducted. That has been shown to some extent in the recent strikes, where the men concerned were most eager to prove that their action was reasonable, and where they discountenanced violence and everything that would go to alienate the public sympathy.

If, as does not appear at all unlikely, there should be a general federation of trades unions, the influence of public opinion would be no less effective, although its operation would be considerably different. Labour would then be practically independent of the outside public, but the most considerable part of the public, from the industrial point of view, would be within the labour federation, and its opinion would have more power of controlling strikes than public opinion can have in the present conditions. If the different unions belonging to a federation pledge themselves to support one another in case of strikes, it is clear that

each must be consulted and give its consent before any one can declare a strike. It is not likely that the unions not directly concerned will sanction a strike, when to sanction means to support it at great cost and inconvenience, unless there is a serious cause and genuine necessity. A federation of labour, therefore, while it would make strikes many times more effective, would also save them from being capricious or tyrannical. Miners and dockers, for instance, would not sanction a strike on the part of masons—which might mean that they would be themselves involved in a contest in which they might suffer severely, both personally and in their union funds—unless they felt convinced that the demands made by the masons were reasonable. However close we conceive the federation of trades unions, there will always be enough of independence and healthy rivalry between the different unions to secure a salutary vigilance over the demands of each.

On the other hand, the probability of strikes, and the ruinous consequences of such as do occur, will be greatly diminished when the parties concerned, viz., the employers and the public, have learned from experience what a strike really means. Already we see sections of the public resolving to use their influence with both employers and workmen to restrain them from precipitating strikes until all other means of coming to an agreement have been found unavailing, and what is more to the point, resolving to take measures to save themselves from suffering grave losses through such strikes as they may be unable to obviate.

But the effect of experience on employers is of greater importance. They will learn that the power of labour combination is something to be considered, and that the conflict of a strike is not to be lightly faced. When the forces on the side of employers and workmen are recognised to be strong and well disciplined, and when it is, therefore, understood that a conflict would be severe and protracted, and would entail much immediate loss on both sides, the claims of reason are more likely to be attended to. Just as efficient armies and navies are the surest guarantee of international peace without the sacrifice of rights.

Many strikes would have been obviated in the past if only employers had possessed the wisdom which it is to be hoped they are now learning from experience. They would not

have postponed redressing the grievances of their workmen until concessions were wrung from them by the drastic method of strikes. If they have learned wisdom even now, they will be saved from making similar mistakes in the case of disputes which seem to be pending. We are too ready to assume that responsibility for strikes lies at the door of the workmen. As a matter of fact, it more often rests with the employers. It appears to be admitted with practical unanimity that the men, in the recent strike on the Irish railways, made a mistake in going out on the issue they selected, and that if they had gone out on the question of wages, they would have received public sympathy, and they would have been successful in their effort. In many cases it is held their wages are shamefully inadequate. If that be true, is not the conduct of the railway directors in keeping the wages at such an inadequate figure absolutely indefensible? If a strike is the bad thing we are led to believe it is, why do railway directors, who are supposed to be educated, and who, as holding a responsible semi-public position, might be expected to have at least ordinary concern for the public well-being, withhold equitable wages until they are compelled to grant them by a successful strike? And, worse still, why do they continue to withhold them simply because the men are supposed to be too much weakened and frightened to attempt another strike for some time to come? How can we with any show of decency appeal to men to abstain from strikes when such a condition is allowed to prevail? If we speak to them of the evil of strikes, they may tell us, justly enough, that they have no hope of improving their position unless they fight, and that the most effective means they know of fighting is through the strike. They may ask us, too, why there is no protest against the conduct of those who maintain the hard conditions that drive them to strike, and why all the patriotism and public spirit should be expected from them, if others are not merely to be called on to do nothing, but are even to be permitted to take advantage of their forbearance.

Notwithstanding all this, if it should still be believed that strikes would be gravely injurious to the general well-being, it would be quite competent for the public authority to make such provision for preventing or regulating them as would be deemed necessary to obviate their injurious or

dangerous tendencies. It does not belong to the scope of this article to discuss the merits of the various forms of regulations that might be proposed. On general principles it may be said that the State interference with freedom of contract should be as restricted as possible. The desire for arbitration, more or less compulsory, is very natural. The public, looking mainly to themselves, their interests and conveniences, think they perceive in it a most satisfactory means of gaining the end they have in view. It looks peaceful and orderly, besides which there appears to be no reason why it could not be made much more efficient and equitable than strikes, the result of which, after all, depends on the relative strength of the contending parties.

But apart from the grave objections against interference with the free exercise of individual rights which compulsory arbitration would employ against both employers and workmen, compulsory arbitration, except where clearly necessary, would be specially injurious to workmen for two reasons. In the first place, a man's labour is manifestly more personal and intimate to him than his property; and while it is easy enough to see that the law might make compulsory regulations about the disposal of property, it is hard for free men to conceive that they should be compelled by law to dispose of their labour in a manner contrary to their wishes. Anyone can see the difference between compelling an employer to pay a workman £1 a week, and compelling a workman to work for the £1, which would savour of servile conditions gone, it is to be hoped, for ever.

Secondly, now that labour seems to be in position to secure more favourable terms by free competition with capital, it would be scarcely fair to introduce the principle of compulsory arbitration, seeing that it was not introduced when labour was practically helpless, and was in consequence oppressed and degraded. As has been stated already, it is a long time till labour will have attained the position towards which it may justly aspire. Now that it is free and able to work its own way, there is no reason why it might not proceed, gradually and slowly perhaps, but surely on the way to that goal. It is not possible to hope that it would succeed equally well if compelled to submit its claims to arbitration. The inferiority of workmen is now taken for granted. We may be sure that

arbitration courts would think they were doing a great deal if they succeeded in remedying their palpable grievances. A competency in an inferior standard of living is the most that it would be deemed reasonable for workmen to aspire to. It would appear insolence on their part to aim at diminishing the distance that divides their position from that of their betters, as owners of property are supposed to be. Besides, it is very easy to make it appear that improvements in the position of workmen are dangerous to industrial prosperity, and arguments to this effect are certain to be listened to, once workmen have lost the legal right of insisting on the improvements, and leaving industrial prosperity to conform to them and provide for itself as well as it can afterwards.

J. KELLEHER.

The Synoptic Gospels and Our Lord's Divinity.

It is a favourite view with most of those who deny our Lord's Divinity that He Himself never claimed it, and that the idea that He was God arose only after His death. Devoted followers, pondering the remarkable things He had done, and the words of wisdom and goodness He had spoken, gradually came to persuade themselves that He was more than man, and eventually arrived at the conclusion that He was God. This faith in His Divinity attained to full growth before 100 A.D., and the fourth Gospel presents it to us as already a definite article of the Christian creed. But the fourth Gospel, we are warned, is not to be taken as history; it tells us not what Jesus taught nor what those who listened to Him thought, but the views of Christians in regard to Him about the end of the first century. If we would learn what Jesus really claimed to be, and how He appeared to His contemporaries, we are told to turn away from the fourth Gospel to the Synoptics, and there, notwithstanding the myths and legends which appear even in these earlier documents, we may find something more closely approaching the true portrait of the historical Jesus; not the Divine *Logos* of the fourth Gospel, lifted above man and participating in the nature of God, but, when due allowance is made for mythical embellishments, a mere man, with no higher claim advanced by Himself or recognised by His followers than that He was a special Divine legate.

It will be of interest, then, to examine the first three Gospels, and see whether they can by any possibility be made to square with this Rationalist position. But, first, in view of this theory of the evolution of faith in the most fundamental article of the Christian creed, it is necessary to direct attention to what we are told in the "Acts" regarding the faith of the Church in her earliest years. We learn from the "Acts" that within two months of Christ's ignominious death, St. Peter, on the first Pentecost, spoke of

Him publicly as "both Lord and Christ"; a little later he referred to Him as "the Author of life,"² "the Corner-stone,"³ "the only One in whom we can be saved"⁴; a few years after, as "the Lord of all,"⁵ and "the Judge of the living and the dead."⁶ It is to Him that Peter, like the other Apostles, attributes his miracles: "Aeneas, (the Lord) Jesus Christ healeth thee; arise, and make thy bed;"⁷ in His name Baptism was conferred;⁸ for His sake the Apostles "went from the presence of the Council rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus";⁹ in fine, to Him the dying St. Stephen commended his spirit: "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit,"¹⁰ even as Christ had commended His own spirit into the hands of the Father.

Unless the "Acts" be a tissue of falsehoods, these indications of the faith of the infant Church point to the conclusion that the belief in Christ's Divinity is not the growth of a later time, the result of an evolution of doctrine, but an article of the primitive faith preached and accepted from the beginning. They are such indications as lead one to expect that honest records of Christ's life, such as most of our adversaries admit the Synoptic Gospels to be, must contain evidence that He was more than man. Let us, then, examine the first three Gospels, and see how Jesus Christ is there presented to us. Is He represented merely as a great man endowed with remarkable powers and special knowledge of our Heavenly Father, or is He, while being true and perfect man, more than man, participating in a full and real sense in the nature of God? This is the question which we have to decide.

I shall first examine what evidence is afforded in connection with His conception, birth, and infancy; and in the next place, what is contained in the Synoptic story of His public life.

We read in the first chapter of St. Luke's Gospel, that after the angel Gabriel had announced to Mary that she was to bring forth a Son, he added: "He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Most High, and the Lord God

¹ Acts ii. 36. ² *Ibid.*, iii. 15. ³ *Ibid.*, iv. 11. ⁴ *Ibid.*, iv. 12. j ⁵ *Ibid.*, x. 36.
⁶ *Ibid.*, x. 43. ⁷ *Ibid.*, ix. 34. ⁸ *Ibid.*, ii. 38; x. 48; xix. 5. ⁹ *Ibid.*, v. 41.
¹⁰ *Ibid.*, vii. 58.

shall give unto Him the throne of David His Father, and He shall reign in the house of Jacob for ever, and of His kingdom there shall be no end."¹¹ And understanding the Blessed Virgin's perplexity, he added: "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee. And therefore also the holy thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God."¹²

You will note that here, before His conception, which is represented as supernatural, Christ is referred to by the angel as the Son of the Most High, the ruler of an eternal kingdom, the Son of God. Similarly St. Matthew represents Christ's conception as supernatural, and the angel, addressing Joseph, tells him that "Jesus shall save His people from their sins," and that "they shall call His name Emmanuel," which the Evangelist is careful to interpret as meaning "God with us."¹³ Again, when, after the Incarnation, Mary visited Elizabeth, the latter "cried out with a loud voice and said: Blessed art thou among women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb. And whence is this to me that the mother of my Lord should come to me? For behold as soon as the voice of thy salutation sounded in my ears the infant in my womb leaped for joy."¹⁴ And on that occasion the Blessed Virgin herself, in the sublime canticle of the *Magnificat*, declared: "Behold from henceforth all generations shall call me blessed, because He that is mighty hath done great things to me."¹⁵ Again, when the Baptist was born, his father addressing him says, "And thou child, shalt be called the prophet of the Most High, for thou shalt go before the face of the Lord to prepare His ways."¹⁶

When Jesus was born, an angel of the Lord appeared to the shepherds of Bethlehem, "and the brightness of God shone round them, and they feared with a great fear. And the angel said to them: "Fear not, for behold I bring you

¹¹ Luke i. 32, 33.

¹² Luke i. 35. We have quoted from the Rheims version, but the rendering of the Revised Version: "Wherefore also that which is to be born shall be called Holy, the Son of God," is preferable. Three verses before, I. 32 the qualificative precedes: *υἱὸς ὑψίστου κληθήσεται*. See also I. 76, II. 23, Matt. ii. 23, v. 9, 19, etc., for this construction. Thus the supernatural conception is alleged as a reason why the child shall be called holy, but the clause in apposition: "the Son of God," adds a new idea. It is as if it were said of any one: he shall be great, a king over his people.

¹³ Matt. i. 18, 23. ¹⁴ Luke i. 42-44. ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, i. 48, 49. ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, i. 76.

good tidings of great joy, that shall be to all the people, for this day is born to you a Saviour, who is Christ the Lord, in the city of David."¹⁷ And St. Luke adds that the angel who had made this announcement was suddenly joined by a multitude of the heavenly army, praising God,¹⁸ so that all heaven seems to have been moved at the birth of the Babe of Bethlehem. We know, too, how on the appearance of a miraculous star, wise men from the East came to adore the new-born King of the Jews, and it is difficult to explain their coming unless they recognised in Jesus more than an earthly king. The star, their long journey, their gifts, their adoration, point naturally to something more. Finally, when Jesus was presented in the temple, the aged Simeon cried out: "Now thou dost dismiss thy servant, O Lord, in peace, because my eyes have seen thy Salvation."¹⁹

What is the explanation of all this chorus of praise to an infant? Was ever a mere man introduced into the world with such wondrous testimony to his greatness? The Angel, Elizabeth, the Blessed Virgin, Zachary, the Magi and Simeon, all testify in extraordinary terms to the greatness of the Infant Jesus. I admit that most of these testimonies, if taken separately, might possibly be explained of one who, however great, was still no more than man. Thus "Son of God" was a title sometimes conferred upon men in the Old Testament,²⁰ and its application to Jesus does not at once prove His Divinity. So, too, it was possible that a merely human Messiah, with Divine authority, might have founded a kingdom of God that should last for ever. Nor does Christ's supernatural conception settle the question, for the Son of God in becoming man might have been conceived naturally, if the Almighty had so willed; and, on the other hand, it was possible that a merely human Messiah might have been conceived supernaturally. All this I admit, but I hold at the same time that the testimonies we have been considering, when taken together and viewed in their cumulative force, have their natural and adequate explanation only in the hypothesis that Jesus was more than man. Conceived supernaturally, He is spoken

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, ii. 9-11. ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, ii. 13. ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, ii. 29-30. ²⁰ *e.g.*, 2 Kings vii. 13, 14.

of by the angel as Son of the Most High, Son of God, the ruler of an eternal kingdom—nay, He is not merely the delegated ruler of this kingdom, but He is its Lord and Master, for the kingdom is His: "And of His kingdom there shall be no end."²¹ He is acknowledged by Elizabeth as her Lord; His mother Mary recognises that on account of her relation to Him all generations shall call her blessed; Zachary regards Him as Lord; and the prophet Simeon, as the Salvation of God.

I pass on to the Synoptic account of Christ's public life. I shall first note the views of others regarding Him, and then examine His own testimonies of Himself. We have already seen that He was referred to by the angel Gabriel as Son of God. This same title is given to Him in the course of His public life on many occasions and by very different authorities. At His Baptism a voice from heaven declared Him to be the beloved Son: "And behold a voice from heaven saying: 'This is my beloved Son (ὁ υἱός μου ὁ ἀγαπητός) in whom I am well pleased.'"²² So, too, at the Transfiguration.²³ On the sea of Galilee, after He had walked upon the water coming to the disciples, and had stretched forth His hand to save the sinking Peter, we are told that "They that were in the boat came and adored Him, saying: Indeed Thou art the Son of God."²⁴ Again, in the neighbourhood of Caesarea Philippi, when Jesus asked the disciples whom they thought Him (the Son of Man) to be, Peter confessed, and said: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God."²⁵ At the close of the tragic scene on Calvary, after the three hours' darkness, the loud expiring cry of Jesus and the earthquake, we are told that "the centurion and they that were with him watching Jesus, having seen the earthquake and the things that were done, were sore afraid, saying: Indeed this was the Son of God."²⁶ A little before, while Jesus was dying on the cross, "they that passed by blasphemed Him, wagging their heads, and saying: Vah, thou that destroyest the temple of God and in three days dost rebuild it, save thy own self: if thou be the Son of God, come down from the cross." In like manner also the chief priests

²¹ Luke i. 33. ²² Matt. iii. 17; Mark i. 11; Luke iii. 22. ²³ Matt. xvii. 5; Mark ix. 6; Luke ix. 35. ²⁴ Matt. xiv. 6. ²⁵ *Ibid.*, xvi. 16. ²⁶ *Ibid.*, xxvii. 54.

with the scribes and ancients mocking, said: "If He be the King of Israel, let Him now come down from the cross and we will believe in Him. He trusted in God; let Him now deliver Him if He will have Him, for He said: I am the Son of God."²⁷ On various occasions, too, he was saluted by devils, as Son of God. St. Matthew tells us that in the country of the Gerasenes [rather, Gadarenes] there met Him two that were possessed with devils, "And behold they cried out saying: What have we to do with Thee, Jesus, Son of God? Art Thou come hither to torment us before the time?"²⁸ St. Mark says that "the unclean spirits, when they saw Him, fell down before Him, and they cried, saying: Thou art the Son of God." And Jesus, instead of repudiating or explaining away the title, "strictly charged them they they should not make Him known."²⁹ So, too, St. Luke tells us that at Capharnaum devils went out from many crying and saying, "Thou art the Son of God."³⁰

Some of these testimonies may have meant no more than that Jesus was a man specially beloved by God, or that He was the Messiah, but still man. Such possibly was the sense of the centurion's exclamation, and such, too, the confession of the disciples on the sea of Galilee. As to the full sense of the words spoken by the voice from heaven, there can be no doubt in the mind of anyone who believes that Christ was the natural Son of God, but it is another question how far the real meaning of the words was apprehended by those who heard them, or how far the words avail to prove Christ's Divinity to those who deny it. But whatever may be thought of the force of the testimonies just mentioned, no inferior sense will exhaust the natural meaning of the confession of Peter. In language that could hardly be more emphatic, he affirms, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God" (*ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ζῶντος*); and not only does Jesus approve this solemn confession, but the words in which He approves it justify us in concluding that Peter confessed nothing less than Christ's Divinity. "Blessed art thou, Simon BarJonah, because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but my Father who is in heaven."³¹ That is to say, the truth which

²⁷ *Ibid.*, xxvii. 39-43. ²⁸ *Ibid.*, viii. 28, 29. ²⁹ Mark iii. 11, 12. ³⁰ Luke iv. 41.

Peter had confessed, he had not learned by his natural powers, but by revelation from the Father in heaven, that Father, of whom, as we shall see, Christ on another occasion said: "No one knoweth the Son but the Father." Now, if Peter had only confessed that Jesus was a man specially dear to God, or a merely human Messiah, surely in the last year of our Lord's public life, when the confession was made, he had seen enough of the wondrous power and knowledge and goodness of Jesus to enable him to make the confession without any revelation from the Father. Hence it is only on the hypothesis that Peter confessed nothing less than Christ's Divinity that the words of Jesus are intelligible. Something very great, certainly, Peter must have confessed, for Christ, in return for the confession, promised to make him the rock-foundation of the Church, and to give him the keys of the kingdom of heaven: "And I say to thee that thou art Peter [or, thou art rock], and upon this rock I will build My Church, . . . And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth," etc.³²

Thus far, we have glanced at what the Synoptists have preserved of the views of others regarding Jesus. I proceed now to seek in the same sources the nature of His revelation of Himself. In what light did He look upon Himself? How did He manifest Himself to men? What claims must He have been understood to make?

We have already seen Him solemnly approving Peter's confession that He was the Christ, the Son of the living God. On another occasion, when He was eulogising the Baptist, He interpreted of him the words contained in the Prophet Malachy: "Behold I send My messenger, and he shall prepare the way before My face",³³ but He altered the text of the prophet so as to make the messenger sent to prepare the way before Jehovah the precursor of Himself,³⁴

³² Matt. xvi. 17.

³³ *Ibid.*, xvi. 18, 19. It is indeed strange that this momentous promise is omitted not only by St. Luke but by St. Mark, the disciple of Peter. There is, however, no reason to doubt its genuineness in Matthew. John xxi. 15-17, and Peter's position in the early Church make such a promise probable, while all the MSS. of Matthew contain it.

³⁴ Mal. iii. 1.

³⁵ Matt. xi. 10.

thereby identifying Himself with Jehovah.³⁵ When, on the morning of the day on which He was crucified, "the High Priest said to Him: I adjure thee by the living God that thou tell us if thou be the Christ, the Son of God, Jesus saith to him: Thou hast said it."³⁶ Or, as St. Mark has it: "The High Priest asked Him, and said to Him: Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed God? And Jesus said to him: I am."³⁷ Son of God, therefore, He claimed to be even at the tribunal of His enemies, who were seeking a pretext to destroy Him. The claim was understood apparently in the sense of natural Sonship, for the High Priest, on hearing it, rent his garments and declared Jesus guilty of blasphemy. Where was the blasphemy unless He had been understood to claim Divinity, And if He were misunderstood, are we to suppose that He would remain silent and allow Himself to be done to death without attempting to explain away the misunderstanding? Nothing recorded by St. Luke, in the parallel passage, weakens the force of this argument. No doubt Jesus, when asked if He was the Christ, there replies: "If I shall tell you, you will not believe Me, and if I shall ask you, you will not answer,"³⁸ words which appear to mean that He deemed explanation useless and unavailing. Yes, it was useless if He claimed to be Divine, for the Sanhedrin would never have believed Him; but if He were merely man, or if, while being God, He were unconscious of His own Divinity, and were merely claiming to be a man specially beloved of God, or even a human Messiah, there was no reason why He should not have explained—nay, there was every reason why He should, both for His own sake and for the sake of those who, otherwise, were about to imbrue their hands in His blood—nor any reason why, in such case, His explanation might not have been accepted even by the hostile Sanhedrin.

Again, what is the meaning of the following passage, except that Jesus, besides being Son of David, claimed another and far more exalted Sonship? "And the

³⁵ The force of this argument is weakened by the fact that S. Mark i. 2 quotes the text of Mal. in the same way as Jesus. But it may be that the evangelist adopts the modification of the text that has been authorised by Christ.

³⁶ Matt. xxvi. 63, 64. ³⁷ Mark xiv. 61, 62. ³⁸ Luke xxii. 67, 68.

³⁹ Matt. xxii. 41-45; Mark xii. 35-37; Luke xx. 41-44.

Pharisees being gathered together, Jesus asked them, saying: What think you of the Christ? Whose Son is He? They say to Him: David's. He saith to them: How, then, doth David in spirit call Him Lord, saying: The Lord said to my Lord, sit on my right hand until I make thy enemies thy footstool? If David then calleth Him Lord, how is He his son? "39 There is absolutely no reason to doubt the authenticity of this passage, nor any reasonable explanation of it except that according to Jesus the psalm proved that Christ was to have another and more exalted Sonship than that through David, in virtue of which the psalmist spoke of Him as his Lord. Some Rationalists, indeed, have attempted to explain the passage as if our Saviour meant to deny that He was the Son of David, but such an explanation is utterly inadmissible. Had he not, a few days before, healed the blind man who had invoked Him as the Son of David,⁴⁰ and approved the plaudits of the children who were crying out in the temple: "Hosanna to the Son of David"?⁴¹ The passage means, therefore, that He claims another Sonship than that through David, and proves His claim from a psalm, which, even as the context here shows,⁴² and as we know otherwise, was commonly received by the Jews as Messianic. Thus He claims to be Son of David and Son of God; as St. Paul expresses it, in the Epistle to the Romans, made of the seed of David according to the flesh, but the Son of God in power according to the Spirit.⁴³ In the parable or allegory of the vineyard recorded by all three Evangelists,⁴⁴ Jesus contrasts Himself as Son of the Master of the Vineyard with the prophets, who were but his servants, and represents Himself as the Father's Heir, with natural and indisputable claims to the inheritance. The context shows, too, that the Chief Priests and Pharisees understood Him to refer to Himself, and to the treatment He received at their hands. I am aware that M. Loisy has questioned the authenticity of this parable,⁴⁵ but he does so without any sufficient reason. Space will not permit me to examine the reasons he advances; suffice it to say that they have been shown to have no weight,⁴⁶ and cannot stand for

³⁹ Matt. xx. 20-30. ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, xxi. 15, 16. ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, xxii. 46. ⁴² Romans i. 3, 4. ⁴³ Matt. xxi. 33-45; Mark xii. 1-12; Luke xx. 9-19. ⁴⁴ *Etudes Evangeliques*, Paris, 1902, p. 57. ⁴⁵ See Lepin, *Jesus Messie et Fils de Dieu*, Paris, 1904. ⁴⁶ Matt. xi. 27; comp. Luke x. 22.

a moment in the way of the acceptance of a passage vouched for as the word of Jesus by all three Synoptists.

There remains one saying from the lips of Jesus, preserved for us in two of the Synoptic Gospels, which establishes as firmly as any text of the fourth Gospel that He claimed full participation in the nature of the Divinity. S. Matthew gives the words thus : " All things are delivered to Me by My Father. And no one knoweth the Son but the Father; neither doth anyone know the Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him."⁴⁷ These words, so unlike the ordinary discourses of Jesus recorded in the Synoptic Gospels, have been not inaptly compared to an aerolite fallen from the Johannine firmament. They prove that Jesus laid claim to universal power and lordship, and to a nature as incomprehensible as the Father's, and to a reciprocity of knowledge with the Father.

You will ask me, how, in the face of such a text, can anyone deny that Christ, according to the Synoptic Gospels, revealed His own Divinity? The reply is that men, when they build up a favourite theory, are seldom deterred by an inconvenient text from maintaining it. In the present instance, some, like the German Professor A. Harnack, endeavour to explain away the obvious and natural meaning of the text; others, like M. Loisy, question whether it was ever spoken by Christ.

According to Harnack, Jesus here explains that " It is knowledge of God that makes the sphere of the Divine Sonship. It is in this knowledge that He came to know the sacred Being who rules heaven and earth as Father, as *His* Father. The consciousness which he possessed of being *the Son of God* is, therefore, nothing but the practical consequence of knowing God as the Father and as *His* Father. Rightly understood, the name of Son means nothing but the knowledge of God."⁴⁸ Thus, according to the German professor, Jesus claims to be Son of God, not because He is conscious that He shares in the Divine nature, but because He has a superior though limited knowledge of God, and that it is His vocation to communicate that knowledge to others; and His Sonship, instead of being eternal, was acquired on the earth by His knowledge of God as the Father.

⁴⁸ Harnack, *What is Christianity?* p. 128.

Perhaps I ought to apologise for introducing here this choice specimen of Rationalistic interpretation "made in Germany." I refer to it because of the fame of the author, and because of the prominence which the text with which it deals has lately received. It is hardly necessary to say that such an interpretation is impossible if words have any meaning. When Jesus says: "All things are delivered to Me by My Father," is it not wholly arbitrary and unreasonable to understand Him to mean merely that a certain limited knowledge of God was vouchsafed to Him? Again, is not the Son's knowledge of the Father aequiparated in the text with the Father's knowledge of the Son: "No one knoweth the Son but the Father, neither doth anyone know the Father but the Son;" and if the Sonship of Jesus were constituted by His knowledge of the Father, would it not follow that the Fatherhood of God is constituted by His knowledge of the Son? "Could it be said," wrote M. Loisy, in criticism of Harnack's view, "that the Father, who alone knoweth the Son, as the Son alone knoweth the Father, had also received a revelation from the Son of which He was to be the interpreter, and was only the Father through His knowledge of the Son?"⁴⁹ The text, then, if authentic, can mean only that Jesus as Son claimed to be equal in power and knowledge with the Father, "Lord of heaven and earth."

But M. Loisy, who agrees in rejecting Harnack's interpretation, seeks to destroy the force of the text by questioning its authenticity. "It is difficult," he says, "to see in it the literal and exact expression of a declaration made by Christ to His disciples"; and "it is fairly probable that, notwithstanding its occurrence in two Gospels, the portion of the text quoted by Herr Harnack is, at any rate in its actual form, a product of the Christian tradition of earlier times. It is always a valuable testimony as far as concerns the conception of Christ in the early age of the Church, but a critic must make use of it with the greatest care when it is a question of establishing the idea Christ in His teaching gave of Himself, His Divine Sonship, and His mission."⁵⁰

You will agree with me that strong and overwhelming reasons must be required to justify anyone in refusing to accept as the word of Jesus so important a text as this, put into His mouth by two Evangelists. Let us see what reasons

⁴⁹ Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*, p. 93. ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

M. Loisy advances. "It occurs," he says, "in a kind of psalm, where the influence of the prayer that closes the Book of Ecclesiasticus⁵¹ is evident, both in the general scope and in several details. Both passages begin with the praise of God, and there is in both a marked preference for the name of Father; the declaration concerning the mutual knowledge of the Father and the Son corresponds to the praise of wisdom; the appeal of Christ to the weary and heavy-laden seems inspired by the invitation that wisdom addresses to the ignorant in the last part of the prayer of Ben-Sirach. These correspondences are not accidental, and seeing that it is difficult to imagine that Jesus should have wished to imitate a passage of Ecclesiasticus in an oration or discourse apparently unpremeditated; seeing that the entire passage possesses a rhythm distinctly analogous to that of the canticles reproduced in the first chapters of Luke; and seeing that another passage can be found in Matthew⁵² where Christ appears to be identified with Divine wisdom, it is fairly probable that, notwithstanding its occurrence in two Gospels, the portion, including the text cited by Herr Harnack, is, at any rate in its actual form, a product of the Christian tradition of the earlier times."⁵³

This seems a formidable impeachment of the text; but let us examine the value of M. Loisy's arguments. That the character of the passage is unusual—I might say unique—in the Synoptic Gospels, may be at once admitted. St. Luke probably felt its peculiarity, for, in introducing it, he says: "In that same hour He [Jesus] rejoiced in the Holy Spirit, and said," etc. But the passage contains absolutely nothing that forbids us to believe that it was spoken by our Lord. First, as to form, it is not one whit more rhythmical than many other sayings of Jesus that are undoubtedly His and unquestioned by M. Loisy.⁵⁴ Nor is the alleged resemblance to the close of Ecclesiasticus at all real. In both passages, indeed, the Lord is praised and spoken of as Father, but the motive of the praise is quite different in the two cases. The son of Sirach praises God for having delivered him from some great danger; Jesus, on the other hand, on the occasion of the return of the seventy-two disciples from their mission, thanks the Father for having revealed to little ones what

⁵¹ Ecclus. li. ⁵² Matt. xxiii. 34-36; Luke xi. 49-51. ⁵³ Loisy, *loc. cit.*

⁵⁴ See e.g. Matt. vi. 19-23, vii. 7. 8; Mark ix. 41-49; L. vi. 39-45, xvi. 9-13.

He had hid from the wise and prudent. And that God is referred to as Father in both passages is not surprising if we bear in mind that He is so addressed in other parts of the Old Testament,⁵⁵ and that He is frequently spoken of under this title by Jesus.⁵⁶ Nor is there anything to justify the statement of M. Loisy that "the declaration concerning the mutual knowledge of the Father and the Son corresponds to the praise of wisdom," for there is really no correspondence. The writer of Ecclesiasticus praises wisdom in declaring how eagerly he sought for her, and how great are the benefits she confers on those who follow her; but nothing is said of wisdom that resembles even remotely that statement of Jesus that "No one knoweth the Father but the Son." In Ecclesiasticus wisdom is said to confer knowledge on men; in SS. Matthew and Luke, Jesus claims that He has knowledge of God.

M. Loisy says: "The appeal of Christ to the weary and heavy-laden seems inspired by the invitation that wisdom addresses to the ignorant in the last part of the prayer of Ben-Sirach." The allusion is to verses 23 and 26 of the Hebrew text of the last chapter of Ecclesiasticus (in the Vulgate the verses are 31 and 34), where we read: "Turn to me, ye fools, and dwell in the house of my discipline. Place your necks under her [wisdom's] yoke and let your soul take up her burden." The verses are an exhortation to the unwise to listen to the writer of Ecclesiasticus, and to pursue wisdom and carry out her teaching. And if this figurative way of referring to the submission of the disciple to his master, sufficiently obvious in itself, was in use among the Jews,⁵⁷ is it remarkable that the Master of all should make use of it, and is there any reason for saying that words in which it occurs are not the words of Christ? Lastly, there is nothing in the passage to show that Christ here refers to Himself as Divine wisdom. The resemblance between it and the close of Ecclesiasticus is, therefore, most superficial, consisting merely in the fact that in both God is praised, and spoken of as Father, and that the precepts and discipline of a teacher are referred to as a yoke.

⁵⁵ e.g. Ecclus. xxiii. 1, 4; Wisd. xiv. 3; Is. lxiii, etc.

⁵⁶ e.g. Matt. vii. 21, x. 32, 33, xviii. 10, 19, 35; Mark xiv. 36; L. ii. 49, xii. 29, 42.

⁵⁷ Matt. xxiii. 4; Luke xi. 46; Acts xv. 10; Ecclus. vi. 24-29.

It is clear from all I have said that there is no reason for doubting the authenticity of these texts in SS. Matthew and Luke, where Jesus declares that all things are delivered to Him by His Father, and that no one knoweth the Son but the Father, nor doth anyone know the Father but the Son and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him. But if the texts contain the words of Jesus, they prove as fully as any text of the fourth Gospel that Jesus laid claim to infinite power, and to a nature that could be known only by God, and to infinite knowledge reciprocal with the Father's knowledge; in a word, that He claimed true Divinity.

Thus far we have glanced at the chief statements of Jesus, occurring in the Synoptists, in regard to His own Sonship. Let us now enquire how far His works and the other claims He makes bear out the view I am maintaining, that even according to the Synoptists He revealed Himself not merely as a great man, as a legate of God, but as true Son of God, participating in the nature and power of the Divinity.

We all know the numerous miracles of Jesus recorded by the Synoptists, and it is sufficient to allude to them: how He stilled the tempest, walked upon the water, multiplied bread, commanded devils, healed all kinds of diseases of mind and body, raised the dead. All these miracles He seems to have wrought, not with a power that was merely delegated, but with a power that was inherent in Himself. When He went so far as to forgive sins—offences against God—and the scribes thought in their hearts: "Why doth this man speak thus? He blasphemeth. Who can forgive sins but God only?"—instead of disclaiming the power or explaining, He works a visible and tangible miracle to prove "that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins."⁵⁸ Nor does He merely exercise these powers Himself, but He delegates them freely to his followers. When He sent the Apostles forth on their first mission, "He gave them power over unclean spirits, to cast them out, and to heal all manner of diseases and all manner of infirmities."⁵⁹ In like manner, when he sent forth the seventy-two disciples, He commanded them to heal the sick, and we know that when they returned from their mission, they told Him how even the devils were subject to them in His name.⁶⁰

Again, let us consider the dignity of Christ's personality

⁵⁸ Mark ii. 3-12; Matt. ix. 2-7; L. v. 18-26. ⁵⁹ Matt. x. 1. ⁶⁰ Luke x. 9-17

and the magnitude of the claims He makes, as they are presented to us in the Synoptists. Such a consideration will help to throw light upon our question regarding the sense in which Jesus spoke of Himself as the Son of God. We saw already how heaven and earth rejoiced at His birth; how wise men came from afar to worship Him, and how saints and prophets, and even angels, vied in proclaiming His praise. During His public life, angels ministered to Him on various occasions. After His forty days' fast, during which, as St. Luke remarks, He ate nothing, "angels came and ministered unto Him."⁶¹ In the Garden of Gethsemane, during the Passion, "there appeared to Him an angel from heaven, strengthening Him."⁶² When He was about to be arrested, and one of the Apostles had drawn a sword to defend Him, Jesus said to him: "Put up again thy sword into its place, for all that take the sword shall perish with the sword. Thinkest thou that I cannot ask my Father, and He will give me presently more than twelve legions of angels?" Nor are the angels merely appointed by the Father to attend upon Him; He Himself claims that they are His. In the parable of the cockle, He says: "The Son of Man shall send *His* angels, and they shall gather from His kingdom all scandals;"⁶³ and in the eschatological discourse contained in the twenty-fourth chapter of St. Matthew, He says: "The Son of Man shall send His angels with a trumpet and a great voice, and they shall gather together His elect from the four winds, from the farthest parts of the heavens to the utmost bounds thereof."⁶⁴ Jesus, therefore, is represented in the Synoptists as being, and as claiming to be, the Lord and Master of the angels.

Consider, again, how, in His relation to the Father, "meek and humble of heart" though He was, He never sets Himself on a level with men, never once speaks of *our* Father, but always of *my* Father, implying, apparently, a different relationship, a different Sonship. The *Pater Noster* is no exception, for there the words are put into the mouths of His disciples: "Thus, therefore, shall you pray."⁶⁵

By His own authority He changes God's law: "It was said, . . . but I say to you."⁶⁶ He declares Himself

⁶¹ Matt. iv. 11; Mark i. 13. ⁶² Luke xxii. 43. ⁶³ Matt. xiii. 41.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, xxiv. 31. ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, vi. 9; comp. L. xi. 2. ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, v. 31-32.

to be greater than the temple,⁶⁷ greater than the Sabbath,⁶⁸ greater than Jonas,⁶⁹ greater than Solomon,⁷⁰ greater than David, who calls Him Lord.⁷¹ He declares that He will judge the whole world, and send men for ever to heaven or hell.⁷² Think how much is involved in this claim to judge the whole world; what power, what authority, what almost infinite knowledge it implies. During His risen life, He declared that all power was given to Him in heaven and on earth,⁷³ and He commanded the sacrament of Baptism to be administered in His own name as well as in that of the Father and of the Holy Ghost. Who but God could thus link His name with that of the Father and the Holy Spirit? He promised to send the Holy Ghost upon the Apostles,⁷⁴ and St. Peter could declare on the first Pentecost that the promise was fulfilled.⁷⁵

Consider, again, the sacrifices Jesus demands of His followers, and say if anyone who was not God could sanely and honestly make such claims. "He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me; and he that loveth son or daughter more than me, is not worthy of me. And he that taketh not up his cross and followeth me, is not worthy of me. He that findeth his life shall lose it, and he that shall lose his life for me shall find it."⁷⁶ "If any man come to me and hate not his father and mother and wife and children and brethren and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple. And whosoever doth not carry his cross and come after me, cannot be my disciple."⁷⁷

When did man ever make such claims? And what right had this man, if He were only man, to make them, and thus seek to supersede the natural claims of blood and friendship and affection? Who could justly set up such claims except Him who is the Lord and Master of men's minds and hearts? "It is, indeed, remarkable that our Lord's most absolute and peremptory claims to rule over the affections and wills of men are recorded by the first and third, and not by the fourth Evangelist. These royal rights over the human soul can be justified upon no plea of human relation-

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, xii. 6. ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, xii. 8. ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, xii. 41. ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, xii. 42.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, xxii. 45. ⁷² *Ibid.*, xxv. 18, 19. ⁷³ *Ibid.*, xxviii. 18, 19.

⁷⁴ L. xxiv. 49. ⁷⁵ Acts ii. 33. ⁷⁶ Matt. x. 37-39. ⁷⁷ Luke xiv. 26, 27. See also Matt. xix. 29.

ships between teacher and learner, between child and elder, between master and servant, between friend and friend. If, then, the title of Divinity is more explicitly put forward in St. John, the rights which imply it are insisted on in words recorded by the earlier Evangelists."⁷⁸

Thus, even when we abstract from the fourth Gospel, the Divinity of Jesus cannot be got rid of. No; there is only one alternative to the Divinity of Jesus Christ—an awful alternative, from which even Rationalists recoil. If He was not God, He was not even a sane and honest man. Honest perhaps He might still be held to have been, but only at the expense of His sanity. At best, He would have been a crazed enthusiast, dreaming dreams, and advancing wildly extravagant claims that had nothing to justify them.

Jesus died the humiliating death of the cross. The Synoptists do not hide the fact from us, but they tell us how He had predicted His death by crucifixion, preceded by mocking and scourging.⁷⁹ They tell us how he rose from the dead, as He had foretold; and two of them, SS. Mark and Luke, represent Him as ascending, glorious, into heaven in the sight of His Apostles. Thus, from the cradle to the grave, nay, from the Annunciation to the Ascension, everything connected with this unique Personality points, even according to the Synoptists, to His being more than human, while some things are incapable of explanation, as I hope I have proved, except on the hypothesis that He was really Divine.

It is true, the Divinity of our Lord is more clearly and more prominently put forward in the fourth Gospel, but the essential features of the doctrine, and, above all, the claims that logically suppose it, are unmistakably contained in the Synoptists. It would be strange, indeed, if it were otherwise. Before the Synoptic Gospels were written, St. Peter had preached in Rome, and St. Paul had probably written some of his Epistles. Now, St. Mark was a disciple of St. Peter, and St. Luke of St. Paul, and they cannot have been ignorant of the teaching of their masters regarding the Personality of Jesus. He, then, whom the masters held to be the Author of Life,⁸⁰ the Creator of all things,⁸¹ the

⁷⁸ Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, 1866, p. 252.

⁷⁹ Matt. xvii. 21, 22, xx. 18, 19; Mark ix. 30; Luke ix. 44.

⁸⁰ Acts iii. 15.

Son of God as well as Son of David,⁸² can have been no less than God to their disciples. If, therefore, these disciples were satisfied to leave us the more simple and more human portrait of Jesus, as we have it in the Synoptic Gospels, without any word of explanation, the reason must have been because they discerned no essential difference between the Christ of their story and the Christ preached by their masters.

If the view that our Lord did not reveal His own Divinity were correct, I venture to say that the Synoptic Gospels would be impossible works. It would be impossible, I mean, that men who, as I have just shown, must have believed in Christ's Divinity, should write the story of His life and teaching without formally attempting to reconcile their faith with the fact that He Himself had never claimed Divinity. If it be replied that they have furtively attempted to justify their faith by attributing to our Lord, in a few instances, language which He never uttered, my answer is that such an attempt would have been unworthy of honest men, and utterly inadequate to an occasion where there would have been question of a new and stupendous doctrine, while it would have been so clumsy that some Modernists believe they can still readily detect it.

On the other hand, if belief in Christ's Divinity was an essential and fundamental article of the Christian faith from the very beginning; if it was, as it were, a postulate of Christianity; and if, when the Synoptists wrote, no Christian dreamt of doubting it, we are helped to understand how it is that the Synoptic Gospels contain no thesis on the subject, but only some casual information bearing upon it.

Thus, the result of our inquiry is, that the first three Evangelists, without apparently meaning to establish the Divinity of Christ, do really supply us with grounds to establish it. The Christ of the Synoptists is seen to be no other than the Christ of the fourth Gospel, true Son of God, the Lord of angels and of men, equal in power and knowledge to the Father; while the faith of later times in His Divinity is shown to have been the faith of the infant Church, professed by the Apostles and revealed by our Blessed Lord Himself.

J. MACRORY.

⁸¹ 1 Cor. viii. 6.

⁸² Romi ii. 4.

The New Aramaic Papyri from Elephantine.

IN 1903 Professor Euting of Strassburg published three fragments of Aramaic papyri which aroused considerable interest at the time. The fragments seemed to have formed part of a complaint lodged by citizens of Elephantine, about the 14th year of the Persian king Darius II., against some Egyptian priests and a general named Waidereng, on account of certain acts of violence which the latter had done against the people of Elephantine. The complaints were made to the Persian authorities, and the plaintiffs were apparently of Hebrew origin for they called their God Yahweh.² In 1904 ten rolls of papyrus, covered with Aramaic script were offered for sale in Assuan. They were secured by English patrons of learning, and in 1906 were put before the public, edited in splendid fashion, by Sayce and Cowley.³ The provenance of these ten papyri could not be ascertained with certainty, but there is every reason for believing that they came from a house on the island of Elephantine. The papyri are business-documents from the archives of a Jewish family resident in Elephantine (Yeb). They proved conclusively what Euting's fragments had made almost certain, that there was a Jewish colony in Yeb during the early Persian period. All the documents are carefully dated according to the Jewish and Egyptian calendars, and according to the regnal years of the Persian kings, from Xerxes down to Darius II. The prophets Isaias (19th ff.) and Jeremias (24th; 44th ff.) refer to a Jewish Diaspora in Egypt. These ten papyri shed a new light on the prophetic sayings, and bring evidence from a very unexpected quarter of the accuracy of the Biblical outlook on ancient history. The earliest of the papyri

¹ Yeb, its old Egyptian name, is used in the papyri. ² In the text Yaho.

³ The fragments published by Euting and the papyri of Sayce and Cowley were published in a cheap edition by Staerk in the *Kleine Texte* in 1907. The best account of the literature that sprang up about them is given by Staerk in his essay *Die Anfänge der jüdischen Diaspora in Aegypten*, in a Supplement to the *Orientalische Literatur-Zeitung*, 1908.

brings us back to 470 B.C.; the latest brings us down to 410 B.C. The documents are contracts, written down and signed by witnesses on the date which stands on each document. They supply us with very ancient autographs therefore, and are an eloquent symbol of that progress of science which is linking times and places so closely together. The signatures put before us a very heterogeneous lot of names. There are Jewish names familiar to us from the Old Testament, and familiar especially from the Biblical documents of the Exilic and post-Exilic periods. But there are many other names as well—Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian, etc., etc. It is clear from the papyri that religious life among the Jewish residents of Yeb was strong. The majority of the Hebrews bore names of which the name of their God Yahweh (here Yaho or Ya) formed a part. There are clear traces that proselytism was going on, for we find an Egyptian taking a Jewish name when he becomes allied with a Jewish family. The Hebrews swore by Yahweh,⁴ and, what is of highest importance, there was a sanctuary of Yahweh among the Jews of Yeb [Pap. E.I.]. In face of these facts, the solitary case of a Jewess of the community swearing by an Egyptian deity in a legal process with an Egyptian [Pap. I.] loses its importance. Between the years 470-410 B.C., there was, therefore, a vigorously-maintained worship of Yahweh in public and in private on the island of Elephantine. The language of the papyri is the international language of the time—Old Aramaic. It is a language which was not known outside the Bible in any very extensive document. The publication of ten new considerable documents in Old Aramaic was, therefore, of very real importance for philologists. For the historian, the picture of life in a mixed community on the southern border of Persian power which the papyri presented was quite unique. For the student of ancient legal codes, the papyri presented models of contracts of the highest value. But perhaps for the Biblical student were the new papyri of greatest importance. For the history of the beginnings of the Egyptian Diaspora they supplied a new chapter. Out of the Jewish Diaspora in Egypt was to spring the Christian Bible, and everything which throws light on that

⁴ Cf. Ps. lx. 12; Dtn. vi. 13; Is. xix. 18.

Diaspora has the deepest interest for the Biblical student. Of the many problems which the papyri suggested, none was more vital for the student of Hebrew religion than the relation of Elephantine dogma to the dogma of Jerusalem. The papyri spoke of a Temple of Yaho which stood on the King's Way in Yeb. Was the temple a mere gathering-place for prayer? Was it rather like the later shrine at Leontopolis? What did the Jews of Yeb think of the 12th chapter of Deuteronomy and its law of one central sanctuary? The papyri supplied no answer to these questions.

It was with the keenest interest, then, that theologians and Bible-students read in 1907 an announcement that Dr. Rubensohn of Berlin, had secured a great mass of Aramaic papyri from Elephantine, and that at least three papyri of the new find referred to the Temple of Yaho at Yeb. These three documents were published by Professor Sachau in the Proceedings of the Prussian Academy in 1907.⁵ The three texts are from the archives of the Jewish community at Yeb. They are: (a) the copy of a first draft of a letter written by the priest Yedonyah, the head of the Jewish community at Yeb, and the community itself to the Persian governor Bagohi (= Bagoas), in Judæa; (b) the copy of a second and apparently better draft of the same letter; (c) an archivistic note recording the action of Bagohi on receipt of the letter. In the letter, which is dated the 14th year of Darius (*i.e.*, Darius II., 424-404), Yedonyah and his fellow-citizens pray for help from Bagohi for the rebuilding of their temple—the Temple of Yahweh. This temple, they say, was spared by Cambyses when he annexed Egypt in 525 B.C.; but now (410) it lies in ruins. The priests of the Egyptian god of Yeb-Chnum—assisted by soldiers sent by “a dog of a” governor named Waidereng, have broken down and looted their temple.⁶ The letter states further that the community had appealed for help some years before to the High Priest Yehohanan at Jerusalem, and to a man named Ostan, brother of Anani, and to the

⁵ *Vid.* account of the three papyri in an article in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, February, 1908.

⁶ The fragments published by Euting seem to refer to an attack of the priests and soldiers on the community of Yeb generally. The entire incident may be, as Prof. Sachau now suspects, illustrative of a phase in the breakdown of Persian power in Egypt.

Judæan nobles, but up to the time of writing to Bagohi had received no answer to their appeal. For four years their men have mourned, and have not anointed themselves with oil, nor drunk wine, and their wives have been like widows. They pray Bagohi, therefore, that he would give orders to have their temple rebuilt and its daily service restored. They tell him, further, that they are sending a petition in the same matter to Delayah and Shelemyah, the sons of Sanballat, governor of Samaria. The third document implies that Bagohi took the matter in hands and helped the Jews in Yeb to rebuild the temple and to re-establish, at least partially, its service.⁷

From the letter it is clear that the Temple of Yaho was a structure of importance. It contained pillars of stone, five portals built of hewn-stone, doors of bronze, a roof of cedar-beams. It was furnished with sacrificial vessels of gold and silver. There were offered daily in the temple food-offerings, incense and holocausts. Men who had brought cedar-wood from Lebanon for the roof of their temple in Upper Egypt, and had hewn stones to deck its portals, who had supplied it with rich vessels, and paid for the upkeep of an elaborate and expensive daily service within it, could not have been triflers with their faith. Their temple was the symbol and centre of their religious life, and the earnestness of that life is suggested by the depth of their mourning when their House was plundered and destroyed. That House had been left standing in 525 B.C., when the Egyptian temples were pulled down all around. It must have been erected long before that time. While the Exiles in Babylon were mourning their distance from Jerusalem, and refusing to sing the songs of Sion on a foreign soil, their brethren in Yeb carried on an elaborate worship in an imposing temple, and, no doubt, sang their sacred songs within and without its walls. Yet the Jews of Yeb saw in this no monstrous violation of a sacred law, and felt no sense of estrangement from their brethren in Jerusalem. If they had looked on themselves as heretics, they would scarcely have written for help to the heads of the priesthood and

⁷ It would seem from further petitions made by the Jews of Yeb that though the Temple was rebuilt the full service of sacrifice was not re-established (*vid.* Pap. 5 of the new Berlin publication).

nobility of the highly exclusive community which Nehemias and Edras had just reconstituted. That they received no answer from Jerusalem is no convincing proof that the authorities in Jerusalem wished to dissociate themselves from the Jews at Yeb. That silence might be explained perhaps by the failure of Yehohanan to influence the Persian officials to interfere.

These three texts published by Professor Sachau in 1907 are an invaluable supplement to the texts of Sayce and Cowley. They bring us into close touch with men of Bible story. Sanballat of Samaria is the important opponent of Nehemias, and Yehohanan is the well-known high priest of the name. These texts leave no doubt as to the nature of the temple on the King's Way. It was a temple in the fullest sense, equipped with all the outfit for sacrifice. It was no mere gathering-place (synagogue) or prayer-house, but a temple, not, indeed, of similar structure to, but erected for the same purpose as, the Temple in Jerusalem. The three papyri were, as has been said, but the first-fruits of a great harvest. Professor Sachau hoped in 1907, as he told me at the time, to have the great body of remaining papyri ready for publication within a year. But the work turned out to be of the most arduous kind, and to one who saw the papyrus-fragments of the Elephantine collection before they passed through the expert hands of Herr Ibscher, it is no wonder that four years rather than one have been needed for the work of editing them. The magnificent volume of transliterated, translated and commented texts, and the wonderful facsimiles of the original papyri which Professor Sachau has just published,* are a fine set-off to the weariness of waiting. Professor Sachau has put at the head of his volume the three temple-papyri already published, and he has wisely added to his publication the fragments made known by Euting in 1903. The publication is in every sense epoch-making. The texts published are nearly a hundred in number, and for those who know Professor Sachau's other publications it is needless to state that his editing is admirable.

* The title of the new publication is : *Aramäische Papyrus und Ostraka aus einer jüdischen Militär-Kolonie zu Elephantine. Altorientalische Sprachdenkmäler des 5ten Jahrhunderts vor Chr.*

We have seen that the Temple of Yaho which stood in Yeb before 414 B.C., and the theological system implied in it, are questions of deep interests for Biblical students. With these questions is closely connected another—that of the origin of the Jewish colony in Yeb. The enormous mass of new documents which are now accessible to all scholars throws much additional light on these questions. It raises, however, other questions which are not less difficult. The new texts set the community of Yeb before us in a very complete fashion. They supply us with huge name-lists of its members and all sorts of business-documents from their lives. They put before us large fragments of the literature in which the colonists sought for mental recreation.* Among the newly-published texts from the far-off Jewish settlement on the borderland of Southern Egypt, we find fragments of royal edicts that were issued from the heart of the Persian Empire. In this paper I can do no more than indicate a few features of the new documents which throw light on the origin and religious views of the community at Yeb.

The fragments published by Euting suggested that the colony in Yeb was chiefly a military settlement, divided somehow into a series of military divisions. The subsequent publications have made this military organisation more intelligible. The people—many of them, at least—are grouped round military standards (*degel*). In all the papyri which have been published there are six of these "standards," and the names of the six officers who presided over the six divisions are given. The names are in four cases Persian and in two Babylonian—symbolising the method of Persian military rule. Further, the whole colony is known as *Haila yehudaya*, which Professor Sachau translates *Exercitus Judæus*. Syene (*Assuan*) and Yeb were a frontier garrison against Nubia and the South at a very early period in Egyptian history. They will have served

* The papyri contain large fragments of the celebrated story of Ahiqar. This story stands in the closest relation to the Book of Tobias. A considerable part of the story is taken up with moral maxims and saws of every kind, which will have to be carefully compared with the sapiential literature of the Old Testament. The new texts include also fragments of the famous polyglot inscription of Darius which was carved on the rocks at Behistun.

the same purpose in the Babylonian and Persian period. The papyri mention, further, a military governor in Yeb, and a general in Assuan. Among the documents found in Yeb were a number of fragments of an Aramaic version of the celebrated inscription which Darius I. set up on the rocks at Behistun. It would be very natural to send a copy of this edict to a military colony in Yeb. It is fairly certain, then, that the colony in Yeb was a military settlement. When was it set up? This the papyri do not tell us. The colony had a flourishing temple in 525 B.C. Hence it was a pre-Persian foundation, and must go back at least into the Babylonian period (625-538). In this period fell the Deportation from Jerusalem and the subsequent flight of Jews with Jeremias into Egypt. But, long before the Babylonian period, Isaias refers to a Jewish Diaspora in Egypt. Is it not at least possible that Israelites made their way to Egypt in large numbers when the northern kingdom fell? It was because of its friendly leanings towards Egypt that Samaria was destroyed. But, even if we could show that there was a Diaspora of Jews in Egypt at the end of the eighth century, the problem would still remain: When was the military colony in Yeb established? Professor Sachau, relying on a statement in the letter of Aristeas, believes that the Jewish colony in Yeb was set up during the reign of Psammetich II. (594-589), during the campaigns of that monarch against Ethiopia. Though the foundation of the colony during the reign of Psammetich II. would satisfy all the conditions of our papyri, it must be noted that this view of Professor Sachau is merely a conjecture based on a document which scholars have seldom treated with respect. It is obvious that the question of the age of the colony is closely connected with that of its peculiar religious practices. On Professor Sachau's view of its foundation the colony would have been established long after the supposed publication of Deuteronomy in 621 B.C. If that were so, and if the Jews of Yeb were really orthodox, we should have to hold that the Deuteronomic law of the Central Sanctuary was not regarded as binding outside Palestine. But the Babylonian exiles seem to have interpreted that law much more strictly. Did the Jews in Yeb, then, differ really in belief from the exiles in Babylon, and, therefore, from the post-Exilic community in Jerusalem? The

new texts supply some further startling information on this problem.

Of the newly-published texts, one of the most important is Pap. 18. It is headed: "The 3rd Pamenhotep in the year 5. These are the names of the Exercitus Judæus which have given for the god Yaho 2 sheqels of silver per head." The king's name is not mentioned, but Professor Sachau is most probably right in supposing that the 5th year of Darius II. (624-404) is meant. The Temple of Yaho had not at this date been plundered. After the superscription follow six columns of names. The 7th column sums up the preceding six in this way:

The money which stood that day in the hand
of Yehohanan, son of Gemaryah, in the month

Pamenhotep,

was, in silver, 21 keresh, 8 sheqels.

Therein for Yahveh, 12 keresh, 6 sheqels;

For 'SM+beth'el, 7 keresh,

For 'Anatbethel, 12 keresh.

How are we to understand this collocation of Yahweh with two other beings which seem to be deities? The list, as stated above, is a list of those who gave 2 sheqels to Yahweh. Yet here, in the result, Yahweh is put on a level with other deities. It is true that possibly our papyrus contained a greater number of columns. Possibly there were two other preceding sections with the titles: "List of those who gave so and so much" for 'SM+beth'el and for 'Anatbethel, respectively. But even if the collections for the heathen deities were subscribed by non-Jews, it seems strange to find the Jewish priest and Ethnarch Yedonyah acting as treasurer of the moneys belonging to heathen deities. Besides, as Professor Sachau points out, if our papyrus was originally larger than it is, the other lists must have preceded the collection-list for Yahweh, which is immediately followed by the summary given above. Why, then, is Yahweh put first in the summing-up, and not last?

Are we to suppose, then, that the Jews of Yeb admitted three Gods in their temple, and that they subscribed to the keeping up of the cult of all three? Was Yahweh merely one of a triad, merely a *primus inter pares*? There is no doubt about the reading of the short passage translated above. I have examined it for myself very carefully in the

original at Berlin. It seems certain that two beings are put somehow on a level with Yahweh. The common element in their names, Beth'el, was already known as the name of a deity. In our papyri we have the name Beth'elnatan (33, 34, 5; 33, 34, 4). We have also the name Beth'el-'aqab (17, 17, 9), and Beth'el-TQM. In table 26, 27, 7, we have Herembeth'el. In the new papyri, therefore, Beth'el is a familiar divine name.¹⁰ In the papyri generally Beth'el is compounded with HRM, 'NT and 'SM. The combination HRM-Beth'el is expressly qualified 'alaha (god, *vide* 26, 27, 7). In Pap. 18, 'Anat-beth'el and 'SM-beth'el are co-ordinated with Yahweh, and we may, therefore, fairly suppose that they are to be treated as deities just like HRM-beth'el. 'Anat-beth'el is regarded by Professor Sachau as a combination of the well-known goddess 'Anat with Beth'el as the *πάρεδρος* of the latter. In Table 32, 32, 3, we have the perfectly analogous, but much more extraordinary, combination 'Anatyahweh, as name of a deity. A community which linked a heathen goddess as *πάρεδρος* with Yahweh must have held a very abnormal view of orthodoxy.

The analogy with 'Anatbeth'el leads Professor Sachau to hold that 'SM. in 'SM-beth'el is the name of an independent deity—possibly of Babylonian origin. Our papyri contain also the names, 'SM-KDRI, and 'SM-ram. There may be some connection between 'SM and the goddess of Hamath, 'Asima (2 Kings xvii. 30, in Sept. *Λοσιμαθ, Λοσιμαθ*) 'SM will have been, like 'Anat, a female deity and the *πάρεδρος* of Beth'el.

The problems of religious history suggested by the collocation of heathen deities with Yahweh will not be solved until more light is thrown on the religious mind of the Jewish colonists of Yeb. It must be noted, however, that the papyri supply no proof that these foreign deities had shrines in the Temple of Yahweh. It is possible that the Syrian and Babylonian elements of the community insisted on the upkeep of some form of worship for their own gods, and that the Jews, for reasons of policy, helped them in this. Besides an exercitus Judæus there were evidently exercitus of other nationalities in Yeb. Pap. 23 seems to give a

¹⁰ Notice how, in 33, 34, 5, Beth'elnatan (= Beth'el has given) is the son of Yehonatan (= Yaho has given), *i.e.*, certainly a Hebrew.

fragment of a Persian exercitus. The general impression of a very cosmopolitan society in Yeb which the previously published texts gave rise to, is intensified by the new documents. Some of the new business-documents present a most extraordinary medley of names—Assyrian, Hebrew, Persian, Egyptian (cf. especially Pap. 25 and 26). This mixture of varied nationalities in the island-garrison must have influenced the religious views of the Jews of Yeb. But it is doubtful often whether we can infer from a specific type of name the race of its owner. We find a father sometimes with a strongly Jewish name, while the son is named after an Egyptian god (cf. Pap. 20); and we find the converse also sometimes (*ibid.*). This fact should be a warning to writers who are ready at all times to build up a theory of religion on theophoric proper names. It is obviously less safe to set up hypotheses about religious views on the basis of the proper names of a cosmopolitan society than it is to infer from the names used by an exclusive people their views about God.

The Jews at Yeb were in the midst of a motley throng of strangers. Those strangers had their cults and their shrines. The Jews were far from Palestine, where alone the Deuteronomic law could be proved to be binding. What wonder was it, then, that they built a temple and set up within it a sacrificial worship of Yahweh? The names of the strangers will have grown more familiar daily to the Jewish colonists, till in the end, "Servant of Baal,"¹¹ or "Gift of Horus,"¹² "He of Chnum,"¹³ will have become mere meaningless identification-marks, which might be attached to a Jew as well as to a heathen. All this is readily intelligible. We may suppose the orthodoxy of the Elephantine Jews to have been of the most adaptable kind, and we may very rightly refuse to apply modern standards to ancient creeds. But, in spite of all this, the collocation of Yahweh with two heathen deities in Pap. 18 remains a problem which one cannot easily solve within the limits of the most accommodating orthodoxy. Possibly, however, further finds may redeem the Jewish colonists of Yeb from all suspicion of serious heterodoxy.

Among the religious documents of Professor Sachau's publication, Pap. 6 is of the highest interest. It is a frag-

¹¹ Ebedbaal.

¹² Petichor.

¹³ Pchnum.

ment of a circular sent by a Jew named Hananyah to Yedonyah and the Jews in Yeb, conveying to them in the name of Arsames, the Governor of Egypt, the royal permission to celebrate the Pasch as it was prescribed in Deuteronomy 16 and Exodus 12. The circular is dated the 5th year of Darius (419-418 B.C.). The fragment runs as follows:—

"[To my brethren] Yedonyah and his associates, the Exercitus Judæus, your brother Hananyah. The welfare of my brethren may the gods . . . : Now in this the 5th year of Darius a message has been sent by the king to Arsames; you shall now reckon: and from the 15th to the 21st of . . . be clean and take heed to yourselves. Work . . . drink not; and everything in which there is leaven . . . ; from sunset till the 21st Nisan . . . , and enter into your chambers and seal (?) between the days

"To my brethren Yedonyah and his associates the Exercitus Judæus, your brother Hananyah."

This papyrus is the only one which reflects directly the legislation of the Pentateuch. It seems to agree most closely with Deut. 16^{ff.}¹⁴ Is the royal permission to celebrate the legal Pasch connected somehow with the renewal of religious life which Nehemias and Esdras had effected shortly before 419 B.C. in Jerusalem? The papyrus indicates that the Exercitus Judæus felt itself to be a perfectly orthodox Jewish body. It suggests, too, the possibility that at some time the soil of Egypt may furnish us with a specimen of the fifth century Torah.

From what has been said it will be clear that Professor Sachau's publication will supply a battlefield for Biblical critics and historians for many years to come. It is not improbable that this immense collection of texts which depict so fully the lives and views of a body of Jews in the 6th and 5th centuries, may lead critics of Wellhausen's school to revise their presuppositions. It may fairly be expected, too, that writers on the History of Religion will be induced, by a careful study of these papyri, to adopt more cautious methods than they have been accustomed to employ.

P. BOYLAN.

¹⁴ The paschal circular seems to agree more closely with Deut. 16 than with Exod. 12. This circumstance leads one to think that Deuteronomy was well known in Yeb.

The Star of the Wise Men.

THE narrative in St. Matthew of the Magi and their star-guided pilgrimage has often supplied inspiration to artists, and has, not less often, served as a stimulus to fruitful thought for the Exegete. But even in our day there is no general agreement among scholars as to the meaning of the narrative. Some authorities maintain that the Star of the Magi was altogether miraculous; that it was produced by God solely to guide the Magi to the birth-place of the Redeemer. Other writers pass into the opposite extreme and maintain stoutly that the whole story of the Wise Men from the East is a mere myth. Dieterich, for instance, has tried to show that the journey of the Magus Tiridates and his friends to Rome in 66 A.D. to honour Nero as the god Mithra, and their return journey by a different route have served as the historical model for the "mythical" story of the journey of the Magi from the East. Others, again, have sought for prototypes of the "saga" of the wondrous Star in Buddhism, or Parsism, or Babylonian mythology.

Between these two extreme views—that of those who would explain the whole narrative in a purely miraculous sense, and that of those who relegate the story to mythology—there is a view which has recommended itself to a considerable number of theologians. These theologians maintain the historicity of the narrative, but endeavour to explain its incidents in a natural fashion. They set out with the assumption of a hermeneutical principle which seems to be sound and reasonable. The principle is:—Where the Sacred Text tells clearly of a miraculous event we freely admit an extraordinary interference of God; but where the Sacred Text does not definitely indicate the miraculous quality of its narrative we prefer the natural explanation of incidents which it records. Following this principle, a number of Catholic and Protestant exegetes have taken a middle course in regard to the narrative of the Magi, and have endeavoured to explain it by the help of Astrology. Professional astronomers have, moreover, given valuable scientific help to the theologians on the whole ques-

tion. It is, indeed, a very satisfactory sign of the times that, while in our time it has become with many a sort of habit to deny the historicity of the Redeemer, a great science, taking as fully proved the history of Jesus' life, has set about the task of bringing its own discoveries into direct relation with the narrative of His earthly career.¹

However, it was at first merely as a help in difficulty that Astronomy and Astrology were appealed to for a natural explanation of the episode of the Wise Men from the East. In itself the text did not compel such an explanation. But neither did the text force theologians to a purely miraculous explanation. Yet it was difficult to set up any satisfactory natural explanation. A special reason for appealing to Astrology for the understanding of Matt. ii., 1-12 lay in the fact that the inscriptions of neo-Babylonian kings sometimes speak of mysterious movements of the stars, and such references are obviously to be understood astrologically.

Quite recently the exegesis of the Magi-episode has made decided progress. Dr. H. Grimme, the well-known Orientalist of Münster, has brought forward important evidence to prove that the Greek word *magos* must be taken in the sense of Astrologer. In the Phœnician-Punic inscriptions the word "elim" frequently occurs. The natural translation of the word "gods" does not always, as Dr. Grimme noticed, suit the context. A comparison of the passages in which "elim" occurs showed that the best translation would be "astrologer of a temple," or "astrologer" simply. There is a remarkable passage in Acts xiii. 8, which speaks of a certain Elymas Magus, and adds *sic enim interpretatur nomen ejus*. It is clear that Magus is here the translation of Elymas. Now it is scarcely possible to doubt that the Elim of the Phœnician-Punic inscriptions is identical with Elym (-as is merely the Greek ending). From this it follows that magus means Astrologer. In view of this reasoning it cannot be regarded as unfair to look on the Magi of St. Matthew as Astrologers, and to make use of Astrology in the exegesis of Matt. ii., 1-12.

An important question, however, suggests itself at once: Is it in any way reasonable to suppose that Astrologers living in the far-off East could have succeeded in coming to any clear knowledge by their art, of an isolated fact such as the birth of the Redeemer in the unimportant land of the

Jews? This question is interesting enough to deserve a special treatment. The discussion of it will occupy us in this paper.

It is customary to regard the Magi as servants of Mithra, and this view is possibly correct. If we wish, then, to answer the question we have just set down, we must possess some accurate idea of the Astrology of Mithra-worship. This, unfortunately, we do not possess. We possess, however, a very useful and, for our purposes quite adequate substitute for Mithra-Astrology in the principles of astral interpretation taught by the wise men of the Land of the Two Rivers. For Nearer Asia and Europe Babylonia was the home of Astrology. It is a recognised fact, too, that the principles and rules of scientific star-lore, though based on mere superstition, were handed on from age to age with the most conscientious fidelity—a fidelity which implies the most reverent handling and most deep-seated respect. It is well known, for instance, that all civilised peoples have maintained with persistent fidelity a definite kind of divination based on the reflex twitchings of eyelids and fingers. This one can gather from quite a large mass of literature about the divination of twitchings. It would not be surprising, then, if the priests of Mithra, who were the immediate heirs of the Babylonian Astrologers, should have followed, in their efforts to spell the future from the stars, the principles of their teachers.

The omen-tablets which have come to light in considerable numbers during the excavations of recent years, shed a great deal of light upon the astronomical equipment of the Babylonian priests. They show us also how that astronomical lore was employed in the reading of the stars. It is true the Omens are not easy reading, and their text is dark in many places still. Yet we possess already secure information as to the nature of the Omens, and we are familiar with a large number of their principles of interpretation.

In Babylon there were many methods of studying the future. Unusual or mysterious phenomena were carefully observed; chance events of daily life were noted; oil was poured on water, and the fantastic forms and glidings of the oil-drops on the water were studied; dreams were interpreted. All these means of reading the future were

merely popular, and based on each man's observation. But over against such empiricism there was a "science" of forecasting. This was based on liver-study and on Astrology. Astrology was regarded as especially "scientific." This was what one might expect, for behind the Astrology of the priests stood the astral theology, the astral religion of Babylon. This astral theology was ultimately a theory of pre-established harmony between the stellar or heavenly and the earthly world.

The principle of pre-established harmony implied that the phenomena of the starry heavens indicate with accuracy the processes that take place on earth. To each incident of earthly history there serves as a prototype an incident of heaven; just as to the temples of earth there correspond temples of heaven, and to the temples of heaven temples on earth. We know from the history of Babel and Asshur that the stars were worshipped as divinities in those lands in the earliest ages. Ur of the Chaldeans was the home of moon-worship; the sun was worshipped in Larsa and Sippar, and the star of Venus in Erech. The heavenly bodies were not worshipped as if they were themselves divinities, but as if the divinities dwelt in them. Men watched the journeyings of the heavenly bodies, and, believing that heaven's history is but the model prototype of that of earth, they were easily led to hold that the gods used the movements of the stars to make known their will to men. From this follows at once the great importance of star-watching. The study of the stars was the search after the gods' good pleasure and the delving after the secrets of the future. So the stars are called the "script of heaven," and the planets are styled "interpreters, counsellors, messengers of heaven's commands to earth." It was in obedience to the star-revealed commands of heaven that Sargon of Agade and Naram-Sin undertook their astonishing campaigns in the distant West nearly three thousand years before our era.

For the ancient Babylonian world there was, therefore, a "scientific" and a religious basis for star-reading. There were also in Babylon precise rules for the guidance of the practical astrologer. In the long list of omens we can easily distinguish two methods of interpretation. The one

refers the heavenly phenomenon on the basis of some likeness to an earthly; the other aims at determining the precise details of the heavenly process. A few examples will illustrate the distinction. An omen says: "If the moon is bedecked with a crown when it appears, the king will attain the zenith of lordship." The ring of light which sometimes surrounds the moon was looked on as a crown, and thus formed the connecting link between omen and interpretation. The following instance needs no commentary: "If a court surround the moon, and Jupiter stands therein, the king will be shut in." Jupiter is admittedly the royal star. Another omen equally obvious is: "If the moon's horns are sharp, the king will burst in on the land of his foe." The picture is that of the wild ox, with which Assyrian kings were often compared.

This first method of interpretation is based, therefore, on a certain degree of natural resemblance; the second method is apparently quite artificial. It is based on a division and arrangement of place and time according to a constantly recurring scheme of the four lands, Akkad (= Babylonia); Elam: Amurru (= the Westland, including Phœnicia and Palestine); and Subartu (= Assyria). In the same order the twelve months of the year (beginning with Nisan) correspond to the countries just enumerated; similarly, there correspond to them the four quarters of the heavens, north, south, west, east, and the twelve signs of the Zodiac (beginning with the Bull). In like manner were the watches of the night, the planets, and apparently the days of the month, divided.

The existence of definite principles of star-interpretation points to the fact that the whole matter was taken very seriously. There was no question in it of mere guesswork or make-believe. The methods of astral study were regarded as scientific, and were believed in with genuine and sometimes enthusiastic conviction. There will often have occurred a dissonance between theory and actual experience, and the astrologer's forecast will have sometimes been unverified in the event. But, then, the system of the astrologer was so intricate, and serious observation of the stars was still so imperfect, that the astrologer will have had an easy task in justifying his interpretation however the facts might turn out.

It is to be noted that Babylonian astrology served the interests of the community, not of the individual. The omens bore no reference to individuals. To this, however, there was one exception, viz., the case of the king, who was, in a sense, as important as the community. The objects of the forecasts were especially war or peace, length of rule or downfall of the king, fertility of the soil, or want of it.

We have a very great number of astrological interpretations. These presuppose a certain amount of astronomic apparatus, and we find that the practice of astrology helped to widen the astronomical knowledge of the star-interpreters. It seems, however, that precise observations of the appearance of new moon and full moon, of eclipses of sun and moon, of solar and lunar courts, of conjunctions and oppositions of moon, sun, and planets, and of other phenomena in the starry heavens were a feature of the most ancient Babylonian astronomy.

We may now proceed to set out an answer to our question. Many scholars have pointed out that a triple conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn occurred in the Fish in the year 7 B.C., and that, possibly, this circumstance may have induced the Magi to journey westward to seek the newborn king of the Jews. The astronomical event was sufficiently striking and rare to secure the keen attention of the Magi, and we must now examine whether the astrologers of the East were really in a position to decide according to the principles of their science that the Redeemer of the world, that is, for them, a great king of the Westland, had been born. Let us here briefly follow the course of the threefold conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn in 7 B.C., and endeavour to interpret it by the canons of Babylonian star-lore.

At the close of the year 8 B.C., the two planets, Jupiter and Saturn, stood out clearly in the western sky. Both advanced on their path towards the sun, so that they were soon lost in his light, *i.e.*, set heliacally. This occurred in February, 7 B.C. Towards the end of March in the same year both planets had moved to such a distance from the sun that they became again visible, *i.e.*, rose helically. This reappearance will have supplied the Magi with the materials for an astrological problem and its solution. If we take the different phases of the heavenly process and intepret them on the analogy of existing omens and general

astrological practice, we find, firstly, that both Jupiter and Saturn are kingly stars. Both point, therefore, to a king. This circumstance of a double reference to an object will have made the omen important. Further, Saturn is expressly called the Star of the Westland. Again, since the two planets, after their heliacal rising in the west, stood in the sign of the Fish, the western position and the Fish both pointed to the Westland—*i.e.*, Phœnicia and Palestine. From this it was an obvious inference that the king whom the planets revealed should be sought in the west. But the main question here is : What did the planets tell of this king of the Westland? In other words : How was the heliacal rising of Jupiter and Saturn to be interpreted? In the Babylonian omen-tablets we find innumerable cases in which a darkening of some heavenly body is explained as pointing to the death of a king. A few examples will serve to illustrate this. An omen states : "If the sun grows dark on the 1st of Nisan, the King of Akkad will die." Hence the month Nisan points to Akkad. The sun, like the moon and Jupiter and Saturn, is a kingly star; when it grows dark, that must be regarded as a token of a coming royal death. And because darkening occurs in Nisan, the King of Akkad must be the king in question. A moon-eclipse, too, points to the death of a king. "If an eclipse of the moon occurs on the 14th of Siwan, the king will complete that year and then die." Because the eclipse happens on the 14th, and not on the 1st of the month, the king is allowed to complete the year—but then his fate overtakes him. Another omen says : "If Jupiter stands in the midst of the moon (*i.e.*, if he is covered by the moon), the king will die in that year." But even lesser gloomings of the stars, such as dull rising or dull appearance, were similarly interpreted. An omen of great importance for our purpose says : "If a darkening of sun and moon takes place, a great king will die." Hence, the more important the darkening is, the more prominent is the personage whose death it announces.

In view of the foregoing, it will not be difficult to ascertain the astrological meaning of the heliacal rise of Jupiter and Saturn. If a darkening among the stars points to death, a brightening must tell of entrance into life, of birth. We say here advisedly that the reference is to birth, not to conception, as von Oefele maintains. Von Oefele's reason-

ing is based on a misunderstanding of the cuneiform texts, which were known to him in translation merely. If brightening in heaven points to the birth of a personage of importance, the brightening of a king's star must point to the birth of a king. The simultaneous brightening of two king's stars must, then, point to the birth of a great king. The sun and moon rise every day in the same way, and their rising cannot, therefore, be thus interpreted. But the heliacal rising of a king's star seems to be specially suitable to serve as a token of a coming royal birth. When, then, at the beginning of March, Jupiter and Saturn rose almost at the same time heliacally, their reappearance in the West in the Sign of the Fish could not be otherwise interpreted than—"In the Westland a great King is born."

Possibly the Magi could infer still more from the phenomena in question. Darkenings in the heavens were not always regarded as pointing to death; they could also foretell misfortune, misgrowth, and similar calamities. Thus we find a darkening interpreted in this wise: "There will be a mighty inundation; Adad (the weather-god) will overwhelm the harvest of the field; a great army will be defeated. Even if the King of the city (Babylon) and his people take trouble and use all their resources there will be no flourishing of the field-produce." On the other hand, bright phenomena in the heavens are explained as pointing to good fortune and success. It is said for instance: "If Jupiter rises heliacally the gods will maintain peace; what is confused will become clear, what is dull will grow bright; (fruitful) rain and inundation will come; the harvest-produce in proportion to the cold will far surpass the intensity of the cold in relation to the harvest; the lands will dwell in peace; the gods will receive prayer and hear petition and will grant presages to the seer." We can suppose, then, that the Magi would have interpreted the simultaneous heliacal rising of Jupiter and Saturn in some words like these which actually occur on an omen-tablet: "A favourable omen, not merely for the master of the house, but for the entire land. Joy shall reign in the land; the evil-doer shall be brought to ruin; justice will rule, riches will flourish; the ruin of this master of the house depends on his justice; justice and joy shall reign in the land." The expectation of a Redeemer

from out the Jewish race was at the time widespread in the East. Would it not have been an obvious inference for the Magi that the King of Peace, whose birth in the Westland was astrologically certain, was the expected Redeemer, the Messiah?

It may be taken as certain that the heliacal rise of Jupiter and Saturn attracted the attention of the astrologers of the time. Kugler has published a cuneiform tablet which proves that the conjunctions of planets were studied with care. The tablet in question records a very great number of conjunctions in which all the planets and the moon were concerned, and which all occurred during six months of the year 523 B.C. This tablet is not an original, but a copy made to serve as a record for later times. Such copies of ancient tablets were made partly to serve purely scientific purposes. They will have been intended also to establish more securely cycles of similar events with which unusual interpretations were connected. A papyrus of Berlin Museum (P.8279) proves that the motions and meetings of the stars were studied at the time of Christ no less earnestly than at an earlier period. This papyrus is, like the tablet above mentioned, one of innumerable copies made for use in practical observation which were then current in Egypt. It furnishes us with dates as to the position of the five planets in the Signs of Zodiac during the years 14-21 of Augustus.

We may take it for granted, then, that the threefold conjunction in 7 B.C. was not unnoticed by the astrologers of the East. The dates of the three conjunctions have been frequently determined. Quite recently, Kritzingen has gone over the whole ground again. The days of conjunction seem to have been 28th May, 3rd October, and 4th December, 7 B.C. There is a slight uncertainty in the calculation, so that the dates might have to be shifted possibly two or three days. The Magi could not calculate so precisely as our modern astronomers. They watched the course of the planets towards the end of May, and could ascertain that the conjunction took place on the 28th. Heliacal rising was in itself an important incident, and hence the second conjunction which followed will have been regarded as important. We can form a fair idea of what the Magi would have thought in face of this second conjunction. To an

omen which narrates that a certain process was carried out by Jupiter and Regulus, and that it was again repeated, the interpretation is appended: "The land shall be twice laid waste." Thus to the repetition of the astral process corresponds a double occurrence of the same earthly event. The conjunction of two planets means simply their contiguity in space. The conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn in 7 B.C. was remarkable from the fact that the distances of the two planets differed but little. Thus the partial contiguity of the two planets implied, astrologically, the closest interweaving of the different factors of the conjunction. If, then, the heliacal rising of either Jupiter or Saturn alone would have pointed to the birth of a great king, we may suppose that the conjunction of the two planets must have intensified for the Magi the importance of the heliacal rising. The conjunction served to confirm what the heliacal rising had already indicated.

The second conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn took place on the 3rd October in the same year. This will have raised to the highest pitch the scientific curiosity of the Magi. They decided to start on the journey to the West to greet the new-born King. Their preparations for the journey will not have taken long to make. They will have scarcely required more than two or three weeks to collect the gifts to be offered to the King. Babylon is about 560 miles from Jerusalem. A good camel can easily travel about 60 miles in a day. Thus nine or ten days would have sufficed for a journey on camel-back from the Euphrates and Tigris to the Jordan. The Magi, however, will have needed much more time than this for the journey, for they could not take the direct route, but were forced to make the detour of the Syrian desert. Probably they took three or four weeks for the journey. About the end of November they reached Palestine. They proceeded at first, very naturally, to Jerusalem, for its name was familiar to them from history. As soon as they had made the necessary inquiries in Jerusalem, they continued their journey to the south. They were now again surprised by the appearance of the planet whose heliacal rising they had observed in Babylon. For Jupiter, after his conjunction with Saturn on the 3rd October, had been advancing steadily westwards, so that the Magi could

believe that he was hastening before them, as they proceeded from Jerusalem to Bethlehem, to point out to them the place where the Saviour-King had been born. At this point Jupiter remained stationary, in order to turn eastwards. This standing still the Magi accepted as a sign that the King whom they sought was near at hand. The Gospel says that the star stood over the place where the Child was. We may take this to mean that the Magi, in their joy and surprise at the wonderful guidance of Providence which they had had, believed that the star stood exactly over the place where Jesus was. In truth, however, the star, standing high in the midst of the firmament, would have seemed to stand over every house in Bethlehem. As the Magi had inquired for the birthplace of the new King in Jerusalem, it is probable that they inquired from the people of Bethlehem where the babe was to be seen,¹ and when they found the place, inferred that over it had stood their star.

This gives a reasonable explanation of the journey of the Magi to Palestine. The striking appearance of the heavens in 7 B.C. was, then, the cause which led to their journey and to their adoration at the crib. We must notice here, however, the objection which was long ago made by D. F. Strauss against the astrological explanation of the narrative. The objection insists that the Magi and the entire ancient world were believers in the influence of the stars, and that the Gospel story, if it were to be explained astrologically, would only serve to strengthen such superstition. But it cannot be supposed that God's Gospel would encourage superstition. The faith of ancient Christians met this objection by the explanation that God, in view of the

¹ Joseph, in the belief that the Messiah should spend His childhood and youth in the ancient town of David, had settled down permanently in Bethlehem soon after the Presentation. Except for the visit to Jerusalem for the Purification and Presentation and a brief stay at Nazareth following on the visit to Jerusalem, the Child will not have been absent from Bethlehem from His birth until the visit of the Magi. It is possible that Jesus was nearly a year old at the time of that visit. We can easily suppose then, that—even apart from the Angel's message to the shepherds—the Child was well known in Bethlehem, and that every one in the village could point out to the Magi the house in which He lived.

importance of the end to be attained, made a concession as it were to the standpoint of the astrologers; not to sanction the claims of astrology as a superstitious craft, but out of gracious condescension towards the Magi.

In conclusion, we must raise an important question. May we use the chronological data upheld in the above explanation of the Magi's pilgrimage to determine the year of Christ's birth? For the present, we should answer—no. Even if the passage, Matt. 2, 1-12, is to be explained astrologically, it cannot be maintained that the above interpretation of the threefold conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn is the only one possible. The Berlin astronomer Kritzinger recently maintained, indeed, that the striking phenomena of the heavens in 7 B.C. were the cause of the Magi's journey westwards. But, on the other hand, a group of scholars for whom H. Voigt¹ has spoken, lay stress on the striking astral phenomena of the year 6 B.C. In that year Jupiter and Saturn were twice together in the sign of the Ram (conjecturally in the months of June and December: astronomers have not yet quite fixed the dates). Voigt has undertaken to show that this heavenly phenomenon with its accompanying circumstances was the cause of the Magi's journey. Voigt explains these astral events according to the astrological views which can be shown from the writings of the ancients to have been actually held at the time of Christ. If then it be admitted that the Magi's movements were determined by astrological theories, it remains yet to be decided whether they were influenced by astral phenomena of the year 6 or of the year 7 B.C. Voigt relies on the interpretations of Graeco-Roman astrology to establish his theory, and, no doubt, the Graeco-Roman astrology stood nearer in time to servants of Mithra than did the astrology of Babylon. Yet the latter was spatially much nearer to the Magi. The question cannot yet be finally solved.

Our inquiry has shown, we believe, that the narrative in Matt. 2 is intelligible and historical even apart from any miraculous action of God. The modern unbeliever has no good reason for relegating it to the myths. Kritzinger has shown that the journey of the Magus Tiridates to Nero was probably suggested by a very remarkable astral phenomenon. In June, 66 A.D., Mars approached so closely

to Jupiter in the sign of the Ram that it was only with great difficulty that the two planets could be seen apart. They presented the appearance of a grand star that far surpassed all others in brilliance. If the journey of Tiridates was motived by a heavenly phenomenon, a similar reason may have caused the journey of the Magi. If there is no difficulty in accepting the story of Tiridates' journey as true, there is no reason for declaring the narrative of the Wise Men's pilgrimage to be unhistorical.

F. STEINMETZER.

Theodoret of Kurrhos.

FOR English readers, the good name of Theodoret has been restored by Cardinal Newman. I beg anyone who looks at these pages to read, if he has not read already, "The Trials of Theodoret," published by John Henry Newman in his "Church of the Fathers," and republished in his "Historical Sketches," vol. II. Upon Newman's presentment of the case, whatever I have further to say follows. The dates of Theodoret's life are, approximately, 388-458. For half that time he was Bishop of Kurrhos, a little city in Northern Syria, between Antioch and the Euphrates, now called Koros, not far from Aleppo. His works form five volumes of Migne's "Patrologia Græca," vols. 80-84. He may be called a Father of the Church : he came near being a Doctor and a Saint. The great error of his life was his attachment to Nestorius's person and blindness to his heresy, and the violent partisan warfare which he waged against the slayer of Nestorianism, St. Cyril of Alexandria. His intemperate language against that saint brought down the condemnation of the Fifth General Council (held A.D. 553, a century after Theodoret's death), not upon his person, but upon certain of his writings, forming but a small portion of his works. These limitations I shall argue from the words of the condemnation itself, from the testimony of Pope Pelagius II., and from the study of the Bishop of Kurrhos's own words. I shall argue him never to have been himself a Nestorian. His error was not formal heresy, but blind partisanship, and injurious language against a great defender of the Faith. He was, I consider, a good man, some of whose books, had he lived in later times, would have been put upon the Index as "ill-sounding," "offensive to pious ears," "pernicious," "rash," "suspected and savouring of heresy," for which, and other *notae theologicae*, see the Bull *Unigenitus* condemnatory of the Jansenist Quesnel. These judicial distinctions of various grades of unsoundness in doctrine were unknown in the fifth century. Nor could Theodoret rise from the dead to testify his acquiescence in the Church's condemnation of some of his writings. Enough

that he anathematised Nestorianism and Nestorius in the Council of Chalcedon.

These are the exact words of the condemnation passed by the Fifth General Council, A.D. 553, upon the celebrated "Three Chapters," so far as Theodoret is in any way implicated therein: "If any one defends the impious writings of Theodoret, those that are against the true faith and the first Holy Synod at Ephesus and St. Cyril or his Twelve Chapters, and all that he wrote on behalf of the impious Theodore and Nestorius, and on behalf of other men like-minded with the aforesaid Theodore and Nestorius, harbouring them and their impiety,—and in the course of these writings, be it observed, he calls the teachers of the Church impious, those teachers who held the personal union of God the Word with human nature.—so then, we decree, if any one does not anathematise the said impious writings, and such as have held or do hold the like opinions, and all such as have written against the orthodox faith, and against St. Cyril and his Twelve Chapters, and have died in that impiety, let him be anathema."

We have an authentic comment upon this condemnation in a letter of Pope Pelagius II. to the Illyrians (Pelagius Papa, p. 736, ed. Migne): "It is unwarrantable rashness to defend those writings of Theodoret, which he himself is known to have condemned in his subsequent profession of the true faith. So long as we accept the man himself, and repudiate those erroneous writings of his which have long remained unknown, we do not depart from the decision of the Holy Synod, because, so long as we reject his heretical writings, we with the Synod attack Nestorius, while with the Synod we express our veneration for Theodoret in his right confessions. His other writings we not only accept, but use against our foes."

Theodoret wrote against St. Cyril and the Council of Ephesus a pamphlet called the Pentalogion, which, happily for the author and for us, is lost. We have still the Twelve Anathemas of St. Cyril, with Theodoret's replies to these Anathemas, and St. Cyril's replies to Theodoret. The discussion is of high interest to the student of the history of the dogma of the Incarnation. Theodoret says many things reprehensible, many things rude and unjust to Cyril, but nothing, I think, to involve him definitely in the heresy of

Nestorius. As Jackson, the Anglican translator of his works, well says, "he (Theodoret) misunderstood Nestorius as completely as he did Cyril,"—the misunderstanding in the case of the former coming of the blind attachment of early friendship, while in the case of the latter it came of an hereditary quarrel. The quarrel of Kurrhos with Alexandria was not really doctrinal, but personal and racial.

Theodoret was Bishop of Kurrhos, but for some years he was virtually Patriarch of Antioch. He was a far abler and more distinguished man than John, the reigning patriarch, and so became, with John's entire concurrence, the leader of the Antiochene, or Syrian, party in the Church. Antioch and Alexandria had, not indeed inconsistent, but still different methods of explaining Holy Scripture. Antioch stuck to the literal sense, the sense which most commends itself to our Western minds; Alexandria delighted in mystical and allegorical interpretations, such as we find continually exemplified also in the Latin Doctors, SS. Augustine, Ambrose, and Gregory. But more than this, in the generation preceding that of Theodoret Alexandria had done Antioch a grievous wrong. The great Antiochene saint, whom we reverence as St. John Chrysostom, had been banished from his see of Constantinople by the uncanonical interference of Theophilus, Patriarch of Alexandria. And the Holy See had declared in John's favour, and condemned his deposition as unjust. When, then, a second Antiochene Doctor, he too seated on the throne of Constantinople, Nestorius, was threatened with deposition, and was finally in Council deposed by a second Patriarch of Alexandria, Theophilus's nephew, Cyril, the Eastern patriarchate was in a ferment of indignation. John of Antioch and his bishops had come too late to the Council of Ephesus. They found the matter settled in their absence, and Nestorius authoritatively deposed. Suspicious before, now they blazed out into anger. They got together a Council of their own, and both sides appealed to the Emperor Theodosius. It must be confessed that the proceedings of Cyril, and of his chief supporter, Memnon, Bishop of Ephesus, were not marked with those outward graces of sanctity which go to soothe an irritated and humiliated opponent. The result was an unseemly quarrel between bishops. In the end the victory rested with Cyril

and the General Council of Ephesus, with Pope Celestine and the Emperor Theodosius, above all with the Holy Ghost, sweetly, as ever, overruling for good the working of imperfect instruments. Nestorianism, or the heresy of two persons in Christ, one divine and one human, which would make two Christs, was finally ruled out both from East and West; and Nestorius, deposed from his see, ended his days in exile among the sands of Egypt.¹ During this time Theodoret's heart burnt hot and fierce with anger. He thought his old school-fellow, Nestorius, hardly treated. He conceived a strong dislike for Cyril. John the Patriarch,—his patriarch and ecclesiastical superior, be it remembered,—had sent him Cyril's Twelve Anathemas to answer. He answered, not with the calm judgment of a theologian, but in the spirit of a retained advocate,—I had almost said an Old Bailey lawyer. After all, who was this Patriarch of Alexandria, he asked, that he should anathematise his brother-bishops? Cyril's anathemas are to us valuable, not because Cyril wrote them, but because the Church has accepted them, and that was not so clear in Theodoret's day.

ANATHEMA I.—Theodoret argues that the Word was not made flesh, in the sense of being converted into flesh, but assumed flesh. Cyril, here and elsewhere, pertinently replies that to quarrel with the phrase, "The Word was made flesh," is to quarrel with St. John the Evangelist. The phrase does not mean that the Godhead was converted into flesh. Nor does it mean that Christ had no soul, the Godhead taking the place in Him of a human soul, as the heresiarch Apollinaris taught. It means simply that God the Son became man.

"We also," writes Theodoret, "style the Holy Virgin *Theotokos*, not because she gave birth to God, but to man united to God." This sounds Nestorian, for every Christian in grace is united to God. How "united to God," is the question. As we shall see presently, Theodoret disliked Cyril's phrase, "personally united"; he thought it a novelty. Of course the Holy Virgin did not give birth to God, *as God*; she did not give birth to the Divinity; but she

¹ There he wrote the book, recently discovered, called the "*Bazaar of Heracleides*," which has set the learned of our age disputing as to what was the real mind of Nestorius on the heresy which bears his name.

gave birth to a Man, who was God. And that Theodoret would by no means deny. In a letter written about this time to the monks of Euphratesia, Syria, and Cilicia, giving an account of the campaign he was carrying on against Cyril, along with a confession of his own faith (Migne's Patrology, vol. 83, Ep. 151, pp. 1416-1440), he writes very satisfactorily on the word *Theotokos* :—"If the Child born of the Virgin is called Mighty God (Isai. ix. 6), with reason then she that bore Him is called God-bearing (*Theotokos*) : for the Mother shares in the honour of the Child born of her, and the Maiden is at once Mother of the Lord Christ as Man, and again handmaid of Him as Lord and Creator and God." Nothing could be better.

Dealing with the First Anathema, Theodoret puts forth a confession of faith which Cyril accepts, wondering what in the world the author of such a confession can find to quarrel with in the Anathemas. These are St. Cyril's words : "But, it seems, I am vexing myself to no purpose, and prosecuting an idle enquiry, having his own words and clear confession. These are his (Theodoret's) exact words : 'Therefore is the Child born called Emmanuel, as being neither Godhead separated from human nature, nor Man bare of Godhead.' Here he himself very clearly exposes the union (of natures in Christ), saying that God is not separated from human nature; and he further confesses that he recognises Christ as one in the union of the Incarnation (*καθ' ἑνωσιν οἰκονομικὴν*) to wit, the same God and Man together. Then how is it that he does not blush at finding fault with the expressions that we have used?"

Thus there was very nearly being no quarrel at all; and had the question been threshed out on grounds of pure theology, mutual explanations given, misunderstandings put away, and saving clauses introduced, there would have been no disagreement between Cyril and Theodoret. It was a party quarrel, a sad affair of personalities and ecclesiastical jealousies.

ANATHEMA II.—Cyril, in his Anathema, having insisted on the "personal union," *ἑνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν*, of the two natures in Christ, Theodoret replies : "We are wholly ignorant of the 'personal union,' as being strange and foreign to the Holy Scriptures and to the Fathers." What he objects to is not the doctrine, as commonly held by the

faithful, but the terminology employed to convey it, which he stigmatises as "new and superfluous." It is now the accepted phraseology of the Catholic schools. He does not attack Cyril's doctrine, otherwise than by perverting it, and investing it with an heretical sense, as though by "personal union" Cyril meant a "blending," *κράσις*, of the two natures, which was afterwards the error of Eutyches. To this perverse misinterpretation of his antagonist, Theodoret recurs again and again. Hence this portion of his writings has been justly branded by the Fifth Council as "impious," not because those writings explicitly formulate any heresy, but because it is an impious thing to father upon a holy Bishop and Doctor of the Church a heresy from which he is utterly removed, and which he has again and again in so many words repudiated. Theodoret thought that nothing good could come from Alexandria. Cyril, in his reply, says of his opponent with truth: "He is lost in his own conceit and loves boasting." *περιαντίζεται καὶ φιλοκομπεῖ*. He adds: "At first I thought that he was not himself unaware of the meaning of the Anathemas, but was feigning and assuming ignorance, by way of complaisance to sundry of his friends [John of Antioch, who had sent him the Anathemas to refute]; now, however, I find that he has been really ignorant himself." Cyril says here, not that Theodoret differs from him in doctrine, but that he has misunderstood his meaning.

ANATHEMA III.—The discussion throughout is one of words, except for a malicious construction put by Theodoret upon Cyril, to be noticed presently. Both agreeing in the union of the two natures in Christ, Cyril preferred to call this union *σύνωδος*, Theodoret's party called it *συνάφεια*. Cyril finally shows that he attaches no importance to this matter of words. Really *συνάφεια* suits his anti-Nestorian doctrine the better of the two.

Cyril having spoken of *ἔνωσις φυσική*, a "physical union," of the two natures, Theodoret heaps up much superfluous erudition to show that "physical" may mean "necessary," as the ordinary outgoings of nature are necessary, and as we distinguish the "natural" from the "voluntary." Thereupon he accuses Cyril of wishing to make the Incarnation a thing of natural necessity. Cyril calmly explains himself, *ἔνωσις φυσική, τουτέστιν ἀληθής* "a physical, that

is, a true union." He is careful not to say *ἔνωσις φύσεων*, "a union of natures."

ANATHEMA IV.—It is a common topic with theologians to distinguish in Christ two kinds of acts and incidental affections, one belonging to Him as God, the other belonging to Him as Man, yet both belonging to the same Christ,—in the language of theology, to the same *suppositum* or *persona*. Theodoret's Letter 151 to the monks of Euphratesia (p. 1425, Migne) gives a good list, with proper distinctions, of these two sorts of acts and incidents. Thus: "He (Christ) was hungry, and yet out of five loaves he satisfied the hunger of many thousands of men. This latter was Divine; the former human." Cyril anathematizes any who should push this distinction so far as to attribute these two sorts of acts to two different persons, *προσώποις δύοιν*. Theodoret, trained from youth in a masterful distrust of Arianism (Arius, by the bye, was a deacon of Alexandria), was shy of attributing to the Person of the Divine Logos any of those incidents of humiliation, so frequently recorded in the Gospels, and so pointedly insisted upon in the Epistle to the Hebrews, *e.g.*, that He *learnt obedience from the things that He suffered* (Heb. v. 8). "There," said the Arian, "the Logos learnt obedience: therefore He was inferior to the Father." "No," rejoined the Antiochene; "No," replied Theodoret, "it was not the Logos who learnt obedience: it was the Man Christ." Such a reply silences the Arian, but it has its dangers. Pressed too far, it makes the Logos and the Man Christ two different persons, which was the heresy of Nestorius. The Catholic doctrine, of course, is that the Man Christ is the Logos; He is the Word made flesh, God made man. When He suffered, and learnt obedience, and finally died, it was the Logos that suffered, and learnt, and was obedient even unto death, not, however, as the Logos, not in His divine nature, but in His human nature, and as man. All this St. Cyril held, and Theodoret (I consider) along with Cyril. Theodoret impetuously and rashly accuses St. Cyril now of Arianism, now of Eutychianism (or confusion of the human nature in the divine). Cyril retorts, with better show of reason, yet without wholly adequate cause, by taunting Theodoret with Nestorianism. What a pity the two bishops could not have stayed a week together, at the house of a mutual friend,—say Juvenal of Jerusalem,

—and, laying party spirit and rivalries of churches aside, have mutually given and received theological explanations! We might have been spared the unhappy affair of the Three Chapters, and the history of that unfortunate Pope Vigilius and the violence done him by the Emperor Justinian.

“To whom shall we ascribe,” asks Theodoret, “the cry, *My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?* and *Let this cup pass?*” Cyril replies with a magnificent exposition of the mystery of the Incarnation, which ought to have done Theodoret good. It is remarkable that under the head of this Anathema both Cyril and Theodoret agree, upon Mark xiii. 32, that Christ as Man did not know the time of the Day of Judgment. St. Cyril’s words are, *οικονομικῶς οἰκειοῦνται καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων*, “in the dispensation of His flesh He makes this defect also His own along with the rest,” that is, He chose to be ignorant of some things as He also chose to suffer.

ANATHEMA V.—Cyril lays it down that we must not call Christ “a God-bearing Man,” *θεοφόρον ἄνθρωπον*, and not rather God Himself. Theodoret replies that the phrase condemned is twice used by St Basil (*De Spiritu sancto*, and on *Psalms* 59). He adds: “We call him a God-bearing Man, not as though He were the recipient of any partial divine grace, but as having the whole Godhead of the Son united with Him,” upon which he appositely quotes Gal. ii. 9, *because in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporally*. One may allow that, with St. Paul and St. Basil to back him, Theodoret makes good his defence. Cyril, in his reply, unfairly slurs over the word *ἡνωμένην* united, whereby Theodoret keeps at arm’s length the Nestorian heresy. Nevertheless, the phrase, “God-bearing Man,” taken up, apparently, by Nestorius, although not invented by him, has not found favour with our theologians. It has very reasonably been banished from our vocabulary, inasmuch as any Christian in grace is “a God-bearing man,” being “the recipient of a partial divine grace” (to use Theodoret’s words), and *having the Spirit of God dwelling in him* (Rom. viii. 11; 1 Cor. iii. 16; 2 Tim. i. 14). Was not Ignatius, Martyr of Antioch, Theodoret’s native city, known as *θεοφόρος*? But Christ was much more. Heb. iii. 5.

ANATHEMA VI.—Nestorius having given out that “the

same was at once a Child and the Lord of the Child," and that "He that suffered was a merciful high priest (Heb. v. 1, 2), not the life-giving God of the Sufferer," Cyril declares under anathema that the Word must not be called "the Lord of Christ." Theology bears St. Cyril out. The Word is the Lord of the Humanity of Christ; but the word "Christ" denotes the *suppositum* or *person*; and the person of Christ, that is, Christ Himself, is God. He is simply Himself, not Lord of Himself. In his reply, Theodoret makes one most satisfactory and orthodox statement: "We acknowledge, therefore, as God even the Form of the Servant (Phil. ii. 7) on account of the Form of God united with it." This is saying plainly that the Man Christ Jesus is God, which is the very confession needed to disavow Nestorianism. St. Cyril must have been satisfied with this. His reply passes Theodoret over entirely, and is all directed against Nestorius.

The Seventh Anathema presents nothing to detain us.

ANATHEMA VIII.—Here St. Cyril anathematizes any one who says that "the assumed Man is adored along with (τὸν ἀναληφθέντα ἄνθρωπον συμπροσκυνεῖσθαι) God the Word, instead of honouring Emmanuel with one adoration." Theodoret, in reply, makes this profession of faith: "One is the hymn of glory (δοξολογίαν) that we offer to Christ our Lord; we confess Him one and the same, to be at once God and Man, for this the doctrine of the Union has taught us. At the same time we shall not shrink from asserting the proprieties (ιδιότητας)¹ of the natures: for neither was God the Word subjected to change into flesh, nor, again, did the Man lose what He was (ἀπώλεσεν ὁ ἦν) and become changed into the nature of God; thus then assigning in our confession what is proper to each of the two natures, we adore the Lord Christ." Against this declaration of Theodoret, St. Cyril takes no exception. He returns to the phrase that he had first objected against, no doubt a phrase of Nestorius's, and observes: "We do not say that 'a man has been assumed' (ἄνθρωπον ἀνελήφθαι) by God the

² In his dialogue *Immutabilis*, p. 8, Theodoret writes: τὴν γὰρ ὑπόστασιν καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὴν ιδιότητα ταῦτον σημαίνειν φάμεν. Here he identifies *propriety* with person. But a man does not always remember all that he has written. Theodoret expressly rejects the assertion of two persons (δύο πρόσωπα) in Christ.

THEODORET OF KURRHOS.

Word, or has been conjoined with Him (συνῆφθαι), but rather that He Himself has become man." The phrase, "man has been assumed," is certainly ill-sounding, as though the personality of man still remained. Theodoret himself seems to favour the phrase. In his Letter 151 to the monks of Euphratesia he writes correctly, "God assumed human nature" (φύσιν ἀνθρωπείαν, not ἀνθρωπον).

ANATHEMA IX.—The procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father *and the Son* does not touch the main subject of these Anathemas, which is the union of the two natures, divine and human, in the one Person of the Word. The procession of the Holy Ghost belongs to the theology of the Trinity, and not to that of the Incarnation. Sad to say, Theodoret denies the procession from the Son (the matter of the later *Filioque* addition), and he hereby enjoys the unenviable distinction of being the oldest extant Greek writer who clearly avows that denial, and modern Greeks appeal to him accordingly. These are his words, under this Ninth Anathema: "But if he (Cyril) speaks of the Holy Ghost as being of the Son, or as having His origin through the Son, we shall reject this statement as blasphemous and impious." This is the one unmistakably heretical utterance that I have found in the pages of Theodoret. Cyril does notice it with the severity that might have been expected. He disagrees, however, and argues that the Spirit is not "alien," ἀλλότριον, from Christ. I do not think Theodoret can be accused of formal heresy. The procession of the Holy Ghost is a recondite dogma, not luminously clear in Scripture, hard to discuss by reason; and in the fifth century, and for centuries after, till the days of Photius and Michael Cerularius, not definitely pronounced upon by the Church. In the Middle Ages holy men were found to impugn the Immaculate Conception.

ANATHEMA X.—This Anathema turns on Heb. v. 1-10, verses which were perverted to a Nestorian sense, especially verses 7,8: *Who in the days of his flesh, putting forth prayers and supplications to him that was able to save him from death, with a loud cry and tears, was heard for his reverence; and, Son though he was, he learnt obedience from what he suffered.* Theodoret shows up poorly in the discussion of this text, while St. Cyril is very admirable. Theodoret's phrase, spoken of Christ,—*"Having in Him-*

self the Word, that is, God of God, united to Him, and inseparably conjoined,"—is capable of a Catholic interpretation, and by no means necessarily implies a human personality in Christ, but neither does it sufficiently exclude such a personality. A Catholic does not say to his Saviour: "Thou hast in Thyself the Word," but "Thou art the Word." Contrast St. Cyril's grand utterance: "He (the Word) wept humanly to remedy your weeping. He was afraid in the dispensation of His flesh (*οικονομικῶς*), allowing His flesh at times to suffer the things incident to flesh, in order to render us thoroughly courageous. He put forth supplications and prayers, to render the Father's hearing accessible to you. All this, that He may be believed to have become truly Man, remaining what He was before, that is to say, God." There is nothing here but what Theodoret would have allowed, though he might have insisted on the *caveat*, "The Word wept as Man, was afraid as Man, prayed as Man, not in His Godhead," which, of course, is true, and none but a strong Arian could deny. Cyril continues, arguing inconsistency in his opponent: "But somehow they who pretend to speak of 'the one Christ, Son and Lord, the same at once God and Man,' do not allow that the Word, born of God, was called *High Priest and Apostle of our confession* (cf. Heb. iii. 1), when He became Man, fearing, I ween, lest by spurning the evil opinions of Nestorius they themselves be found orthodox."

ANATHEMA XI.—Theodoret vents his spleen in a groundless and impertinent charge of Apollinarianism against St. Cyril, as though, in speaking of "the flesh of the Word," Cyril had meant to imply that Jesus had no human soul, His Divinity taking the place of a soul. Otherwise Theodoret writes very well of the Incarnation: "But we call the soul-informed and rational (*ἐμψυχον καὶ λογικὴν*) flesh of the Word *life-giving*, on account of the life-giving Godhead united to it"—almost an echo of what Cyril had said: "Flesh became proper to the Word that is able to vivify all things." Which Cyril takes note of, speaking of his opponent, "Although acquiescing in what I said." The quarrel at this stage is really pitiful. Theodoret's part in it reminds us of the adage, "No case, abuse the other party's attorney."

ANATHEMA XII.—St. Cyril speaks of "the Word of God

having suffered in the flesh, and tasted death in the flesh, and been crucified in the flesh." Theodore attempts a correction: "So, then, the Form of the Servant suffered, there being along with it (*συνούσης αὐτῇ*), of course, the Form of God, this Form of God allowing the Form of the Servant to suffer, for the sake of the salvation engendered of those sufferings, and making the said sufferings Its own by reason of the Union (*οἰκειουμένης διὰ τὴν ἔνωσιν τὰ παθήματα*)."¹ Theodore takes, rightly enough, "the Form of God" (in Philippians ii.) to be the Nature of God, and "the Form of the Servant" to be the Nature of Man; and, accordingly, with sound theological judgment, he will not allow that the Form, or *Nature*, of God suffered. The *Person* of God the Son suffered in His human Nature. But with the distinction between Nature and Person, in its application to the Incarnation, Theodore was not familiar, though he knew it as applied to the mystery of the Trinity. It took time for the nomenclature of the theology of the Incarnation to grow. It grew faster at Alexandria than at Antioch. At Antioch they were not fond of subtleties, and the distinction between Nature and Person is a fine one. In his reply to the third Anathema, Theodore writes: "*Hypostases*, or *natures*," obliterating all distinction.

Under this twelfth Anathema, Theodore has here one most unfortunate sentence: "Thus, then, it was not Christ that suffered, but the Man of our stock assumed by God." Taken by itself, this is rank Nestorianism. The explanation seems to be that Theodore from his youth had been so accustomed in his conflicts with the Arians to insist on Christ's being God, that he sometimes uses the word "Christ" to signify "the Word of God." St. Cyril, in reply, aptly quotes 1 Pet. iv. 1: *Christ then having suffered for us.*

And thus much of the Anathemas of Cyril, Theodore's criticisms, and Cyril's replies. It will be apparent that Theodore's criticism of Cyril deserved condemnation. At the same time it is far from being a mere tissue of heresies; nay, it contains several correct expositions of the Catholic faith in the Incarnation.

¹ St. Cyril uses the same expression in his reply to Theodore on the twelfth Anathema, *οἰκειωσάμενος τὰ τῇ ἰδίᾳ σαρκὶ συμβαίνοντα πάθη*.

In his *Heretical Fables*, written in his later years, Theodoret speaks very unfavourably of Nestorius (iv. 12). There is also extant under his name a tract against Nestorius, containing these expressions: "The Word suffered in the flesh"; "How could the unhappy Jews be taken to task and called to suffer penalty, if it was not God that they crucified?" It is true that Marius Mercator assigns this work to Euthérius of Tyre, but the said Marius was bitterly hostile to Theodoret's memory. Photius's judgment in this matter of authorship is at least as good as his, and Photius assigns the tract to Theodoret.

Theodoret was a great letter-writer. About a hundred and eighty of his letters have come down to us. They make good reading.¹ The most interesting for our present purpose is that already quoted, Letter 151 to the Hermits of Euphratesia, Syria and Cilicia, written when the quarrel with Cyril was just beginning. In it he says, very unjustly, of Cyril, but (I think) in good faith, thinking the accusation a just one (he ought to have learnt better later, and got clear of the misunderstanding sooner than he did): "The very impassible and immutable Godhead of Christ he (Cyril) proclaims to have suffered and died and been buried." He explains Emmanuel to mean "God in Man," "God in our human nature." Quoting 2 Cor. xiii. 4, *for he was crucified of weakness, but liveth of the power of God*, he writes: "Let the name of weakness teach you that not the Almighty and Immense and Irreversible and Unchangeable One was nailed to the cross, but the nature made to live of the power of God died and was buried." These words have a distinct ring of Nestorianism, as though the nature nailed to the cross were the nature of another person than the Unchangeable God. It is not right to deny, it is right to affirm, so St. Cyril would have affirmed, that "the Almighty and Unchangeable One was nailed to the cross,"—not, however, as Almighty and Unchangeable in His divine nature, but in the weakness of human nature which He had assumed. It was this added qualification that Theodoret desiderated, and with it he would have been willing to confess that the Almighty and Unchangeable was crucified, as the following

¹ There is an English translation by the Rev. B. Jackson in the Library of Nicene Fathers, entitled "The Ecclesiastical History, Dialogues, and Letters of Theodoret," Oxford, 1892.

words of the same letter seem to prove: "We confess our Lord Jesus Christ true God and true Man, not dividing Him who is one (τὸν ἕνα) into two persons (πρόσωπα), but we confess the two natures to have been united without blending together (ἀσυγχύτως ἡνωσθαι). Thus in the one Christ through His sufferings we discern His Humanity, and through His miracles we understand His Godhead; for we do not divide the two natures into two Christs. . . . According to His flesh, Christ is the descendant of Abraham and David, and was invested with the same nature as they; but according to his Godhead He is the Son of God existing before the ages, the Word, born of the Father unspeakably and in a manner beyond human comprehension, co-eternal with Him as Effulgence and Impress (Heb. i. 3) and Word. . . . Confessing the two natures, we confess the one Christ, and pay Him one adoration. . . . Since His resurrection, even as Man, He enjoys impassibility and immortality and incorruption, and is circled with the effulgence of glory proper to God (τὰς θεοπρεπεῖς ἀφίησιν ἀστραπᾶς), without being changed according to the flesh into the nature of Godhead. . . . So, then, we adore one Son, but we see in Him each nature perfect, alike the nature that assumed and the nature that was assumed."

This Letter to the Hermits was not of a theological character apt to incur the Anathemas of Cyril. What a pity that it was not forwarded to the Patriarch of Alexandria! However personally offensive, it would have satisfied him on Theodoret's orthodoxy. There is much more to the same purpose, *e.g.*, Letter 146, to John the Economist: "There is no other Christ besides the only-begotten Son of God." Letter 138, to Bishop Timothy: "Recognizing the difference of natures, we must adore the one Son, and recognize the same to be Son of God and Son of Man, Form of God and Form of a Servant, Son of David and Lord of David, Seed of Abraham and Creator of Abraham."

Antioch, and Theodoret its spokesman, was orthodox. The great Syrian patriarchate, on the whole, faithfully upheld the unity of the person of Christ along with the duality and distinction of His two natures. Only it had not altogether assimilated the terminology of *μία ὑπόστασις*, so familiar to us. *Hypostasis*, as ecclesiastical antiquarians know, was a term that took long fixing in the sense of

person, as distinguished from *nature* and *substance*. Such a sense does not attach to the term as used in the New Testament (Heb. i. 3; iii. 14; xi. 1). Theodoret himself, in a later letter (Letter 145, to the Monks at Constantinople), as also in his "Dialogues," uses this word in the theological sense of *person*: "We confess one Godhead, three Persons (*τρῆς ὑποστάσεις*)."¹ He adds: "The Incarnation of the Only-begotten has not increased the number of the Trinity, but even after the Incarnation the Trinity remains a Trinity." This means that we must not invent a second *hypostasis*, or person, for the Man Christ, distinct from the Person of God the Son. It is, therefore, a recognition of the "hypostatic union," both as a fact and as a phrase. But in early years his terminology was not so clear.

I have no defence to offer for Nestorius. Nor am I concerned with Theodore of Mopsuestia, the trusted Antiochene expositor of Scripture, in whose school both Theodoret and Nestorius studied, and who, in the Fifth General Council, met with much severer condemnation than did Theodoret. I suppose Theodore's influence at Antioch and in the East was distinctly Nestorian. John the Patriarch and Theodoret were anxious to save the face of their master, though they would not go all lengths with him.

I admit, then, tendencies to Nestorianism at Antioch. But was there no tendency to an opposite form of heresy at Alexandria? Is it not significant that Cyril's successor and archdeacon, Dioscorus, fell straight into the pit against which Theodoret, however groundlessly, was ever warning Cyril, and taught the unity of nature in Christ, the heresy of Eutyches? I am not writing the history of the Council of Chalcedon, of the violent deposition of Theodoret from the episcopate by Dioscorus and his "Robber Council" collected at Ephesus, of Theodoret's appeal to Pope St. Leo, and his triumphal acquittal and restoration, effected by Leo, at Chalcedon. This is the best vindication of Theodoret, that the Roman Pontiff and a General Council eventually acknowledged him as orthodox. And when, a century later, in the affair of the Three Chapters, his writings against Cyril were condemned, the utmost care was taken at Rome to uphold the sentence of Chalcedon, to screen the person of Theodoret from the censure of heresy, and to leave the great bulk of his writings to pass without reproach. He was

wrong in attacking Cyril; but he expiated his offence by suffering a half-martyrdom at the hands of Cyril's evil successor, Dioscorus. The unity of Christ in the duality of His two natures is clearly confessed by Theodoret; while the duality of the two natures, impugned by Eutyches and Dioscorus and the Monophysites, has no stouter defender than the Bishop of Kurrhos. It is hardly too much to say that Theodoret (supported by Pope Leo) was against Eutychianism, what Cyril (with the support of Pope Celestine) was against Nestorianism, the champion of orthodoxy and pillar of the faith.

The letter already quoted (Letter 145, to the Monks at Constantinople) is especially interesting, as manifesting Theodoret's latter-day mind, after he had been confirmed in the faith by the teaching of Pope St. Leo and the Fathers of Chalcedon. The words that follow may be taken as a tacit admission that he had not sufficiently marked an important distinction in his old controversy with St. Cyril on Hebrews v. 1-10: "The Church, following the apostolic footsteps, sees in the Lord Christ both perfect Godhead and perfect Manhood; . . . for on this account is He termed our High Priest: that is to say, He is called High Priest, not as God, but as Man; *and Himself makes oblation as Man, while He receives the sacrifice with the Father and the Holy Ghost as God.*" The last sentence is a singularly felicitous expression of theological truth, exclusive at once of Monophysitism and Nestorianism. It is the teaching of Chalcedon and of Ephesus. In Letter 143, to Andrew, a monk at Constantinople, while expressing his abhorrence of Nestorianism, he doubts whether there are any Nestorians in his parts, εἴπερ ἄρα τινὲς εἰσιν, ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐκ οἶμαι.

Letter 146 shows Theodoret in retirement, apparently having given over the cares of the episcopate to a successor. "To me quiet is my heart's content, and a life free from cares. Therefore have I walled up the front door of the monastery, and avoid meetings with my acquaintances."

This reminds us of another Father of the Church, whom Theodoret in many respects resembles, St. Gregory Nazianzen. Both were lovable men, somewhat too impulsive and outspoken. Both were monks, then bishops, and, after stormy episcopates, both ended their days in monastic seclusion. Both were scholars and orators, and wrote admirable Greek. Both were learned in the Scriptures, and

are our masters in the mystery of the Incarnation. Both are known to us by their letters. Both suffered ill-treatment at the hands of Councils, but Gregory came the better out of the trouble, and deserved to do, for he behaved better. Gregory is canonised, Theodoret never will be. The Church sings of Gregory in her public Office, "*O Doctor optime, Ecclesiæ sanctæ lumen.*"

Well, what of Theodoret? The question will be asked as long as there are scholars to discuss it.

JOSEPH RICKABY, S.J.

The Cause of St. Columbcille's Exile.

HISTORIANS have not, as yet, agreed on the causes which led to the departure of Columbcille from Ireland. A few, led by Lanigan, ascribe his departure solely to the missionary zeal so characteristic of the Irish saints of that period. Others, however, are inclined to believe that the story of the penance imposed upon Colomba for his share in the battle of Cooldrevne, if not entirely true in all its details, has some foundation. The story is found in three different sources. Keating copies it into his "History of Ireland" from the "Black Book of Molaga," a manuscript now lost, and possibly of little authority. Ussher quotes another version from a manuscript by an anonymous writer. The chief authority for the story is O'Donnell, whose "Life of St. Columba," written as late as 1532, is a compilation, chiefly of all existing manuscripts and poems, but, to some extent also, of the traditions still extant among the O'Donnells. It cannot be doubted that he had manuscript authority for the story. According to the version given by O'Donnell, Columba, when on a visit to St. Finnian of Moville, at the latter's monastery of Dromin, Co. Louth, borrowed a manuscript from his host, and having a great desire to copy and multiply such manuscripts as much as possible, he, without the knowledge or permission of Finnian, sat up in the church at night, and transcribed it. Unfortunately, Finnian learned of the copy, and claimed it. They agreed to refer the matter to King Diarmuid at Tara. The monarch had never before decided a case of this kind, and felt that he was in a difficulty. Having searched the whole Brehon code for an analogy, he based his decision on the since famous sentence, *Le gac boin a boinín*, and granted the book and copy to Finnian. Columba thought that Diarmuid's decision was unjust, and, unfortunately, just at this very time, the right of sanctuary which he had granted to a prince named Curnan, was violated by Diarmuid. Columba might have condoned Dermot's unjust decision, but he refused to allow the privileges of the Church to be prejudiced, and, enraged to the last degree, he

openly defied Diarmuid. Through the good offices of the monks of Monasterboice, he eluded Diarmuid's soldiers and made his way northwards to his kinsmen, to whom he appealed for revenge. The result was the bloody battle of Cooldrevne, where Diarmuid was defeated with the loss of three thousand men. This terrible bloodshed, and the fate of the three thousand souls lay heavily on Columba's conscience, and, as a penance, whether self-imposed or enjoined by others is not clear, he resolved to convert to Christ as many souls as had fallen at Cooldrevne. In 563 he sailed from Derry to Iona.

The authenticity of this story has been a fruitful source of controversy. Against it are Lanigan, Moran, and Gougau; for it are Dalton, Healy, and Montalembert; while Drs. Reeves and Hyde relate it impartially without coming to any conclusion. Although the authorities are thus fairly well balanced, it appears to me that a careful and unprejudiced examination of the internal evidence leaves no reason to doubt the truth of the story. It is related by O'Donnell, who evidently was a careful historian; it is contained in other manuscripts; and nowhere is there found any information which would imply its falsehood. Even Adamnan gives circumstantial evidence, for he tells us that Columba was unjustly excommunicated by the Synod of Tailte, in Meath; that he was defended by St. Brendan of Birr, and that finally his innocence was manifested in a miraculous manner. There is, of course, no evidence of any connection between this synod and the present question; still it fits in very well with the account given in Keating. The Four Masters have this entry:—

—“17th year of Diarmuid—the battle of Cuilremhne. It was in revenge for the killing of Curnan, son of Aedh, while under the protection of Columbcille, and also on account of the false sentence passed by Diarmuid against Columbcille.”

The Annals of Ulster and the valuable Annals of Tighearnach have both the same entry. So much for the direct evidence.

Lanigan's objections to the truth of the story are very easily dealt with. He says that such conduct would be inconsistent with the high grade of sanctity attained by

both Columba and Finnian, and he is very indignant at O'Donnell for suggesting that Columba participated in such a discreditable incident. This argument has not much force. The old Irish saints, holy though they may have been, had Irish temperaments, and whenever they believed themselves to be in the right they did not hesitate to go to extremes. In the case of Columba, anyone who reads the whole authenticated story of his life, must admit that he, of all others, had his full share of native Irish impulsiveness. In addition, there is no difficulty in allowing the story to stand without making Columba guilty of any very serious fault.

Lanigan is also of opinion that the fact that Adamnan does not relate the story is positive proof against its authenticity. It is not true that Adamnan does not refer to the story, for he mentions the fact that, were it not for Brendan of Birr, Columba would have been excommunicated; but he slurs over the battle of Cuilidremhne in such a way as to show that Columba was not responsible for it. Evidently he suppressed it on the ground that it was not creditable to Columba's character. It is only one of the many examples of the secondary importance attached by him to historical narrative. Often his references to important historical events are merely indirect, or sometimes they serve as casual introductions to angelical manifestations, visions, miracles and such like. Otherwise they had not much importance in Adamnan's eyes. But, even in Adamnan's "Life," in addition to the threatened excommunication already mentioned, we have circumstantial evidence of the truth of the story. The battle itself is mentioned three times, and, once, the date of an event in Columba's life is reckoned by the number of years after the battle. Furthermore, Adamnan himself testifies that "in the dreadful tumult of war, Columba obtained from God, by his prayers, that some kings should be conquered and that other kings should come off victorious."

Some internal evidence can be brought forward against the truth of O'Donnell's story. The following incident is related in Book III., chap. IV., of Adamnan's Life:—

"*Alio in tempore, vir sanctus venerandum episcopum Finnionem, suum videlicet magistrum juvenis senem adiit, quem cum Sanctus Finnio ad se appropinquantem*

vidisset, angelum Domini pariter ejus comitem itineris vidit et ut nobis ab expertis traditur, quibusdam astantibus intimavit fratribus, inquit 'Ecce nunc videtis sanctum advenientem Columbam qui sui commeatus meruit habere socium angelum coelicolum.' Iisdem diebus sanctus cum duodecim commilitonibus discipulis ad Brittaniam transnavigavit."

If Adamnan's reckoning be correct, this incident occurred about the year 562, as the last sentence, "Iisdem diebus, etc.," shows, and the Finnian referred to must be Finnian of Moville, for Finnian of Clonard died in 549. If O'Donnell's story were true, it is scarcely likely that within such a short time after the Battle of Cuilbrehne the two saints would have been on such friendly terms, nor that Finnian of Moville would have so strongly testified his veneration for Columbcille. There is, however, a serious anachronism in the story. It is very hard to reconcile the term "juvenis," with the fact that, at the time, Columba was over forty years of age. Adamnan, as he admits, copied the story from Cumme ("ut nobis ab expertis traditur"), but in Cumme's version the last sentence, "Iisdem diebus, etc.," is omitted. Evidently, according to Cumme, the incident occurred while Columba was still a youth, and probably refers to Finnian of Clonard, who at that time merited the term "senis" more than did Finnian of Moville. Our conclusion regarding this quotation is confirmed by the account of another incident. Both Adamnan and Cumme state that at the instance of a certain Finnian, or Findbarr, he changed water into wine. Adamnan thus describes the circumstances of the miracle:—

"Alio in tempore, cum vir venerandus in Scotia apud Sanctum Findbarrum episcopum, adhuc juvenis sapientiam sacrae Scripturae addiscens commaneret, quadam solemnibus die vinum ad sacrificale, etc."

Cumme begins the story thus:—

"Hiisdem diebus, sanctus cum duodecim commilitonibus discipulis ad Brittaniam transnavigavit, quadam solemnibus die vinum ad sacrificale, etc."

Cumme here omits all mention of Findbarr, and he commences his account of the incident with the very passage,

"Hiisdem diebus, etc.," which Adamnan inserted at the end of chapter IV. It is evident, therefore, that Adamnan, either by mistake or for some reason of his own, transposed the circumstances of the two incidents. If the story, as related by Adamnan in Lib. III., chap. IV., stood alone, it would supply very damaging evidence against the truth of the story, but, fortunately, it not only contains a serious anachronism, but it is entirely at variance with Cumme's account, which is considerably older and free from any anachronism.

Another piece of circumstantial evidence in favour of the truth of O'Donnell's story is the fact that the famous Cathach, at present in the Royal Irish Academy, contains just what it was said by O'Donnell to contain—an accurate copy of the Psalter. The character and condition of this manuscript indicate extreme age. It was originally nine inches by six. All the membranes before the 31st Psalm are now gone, and the last membrane contains only thirteen verses in the 106th Psalm. It is popularly believed to be the celebrated codex copied by Columba at Dromin. The Northern clans recovered it at the battle of Cuilbreimne, and it became their shield and defence on the field of battle. Cathbar O'Donnell, in the eleventh century, had an elaborate shrine made for it; and in the reign of James II., Donal O'Donnell brought it with him to the Continent, where he fixed a new rim on the casket, with his name and date. In 1802, Sir Neal O'Donnell brought it back from the Continent. Shortly after Sir Neal's death the shrine was opened by Sir William Betham. His action was regarded as sacrilegious by a large number of people, and Sir Neal's widow brought an unsuccessful action in the Court of Chancery against him. The casket contained a wooden box, now lost, and inside this again was a single lump of hard vellum, the leaves of which, after careful treatment, came asunder, and were found to contain a copy of the Psalter of St. Jerome, as I have described above. A drawing of the cover can be seen in Sir W. Betham's "Antiquarian Researches." The fact that the manuscript really contains the Psalter, as described by O'Donnell, helps to strengthen our belief in the truth of the story told by that writer.

LAURENCE P. MURRAY.

Book Reviews.

Enchiridion Patristicum. Locos, SS. Patrum, Doctorum, Scriptorum ecclesiasticorum in usum scholarum collegit. M. J. Roueh de Journel, S.J. 8vo. Pp. xxiv. + 888. London and Freiburg: B. Herder. 1911. 10s.; cloth, 11s.

The great firm of Herder is certainly doing yeoman service towards facilitating the labours of ecclesiastical students. We were already indebted to it for many editions of Denzinger's most useful *Enchiridion*, or Handbook of the doctrinal teaching of Popes and Councils; again, we had recently from the same source Kirch's *Enchiridion Fontium Historiae Ecclesiasticae Antiquae*; and now in the work before us we have a most valuable collection of extracts from the Fathers bearing on all the great doctrines of the Church.

The extracts are given in chronological order, beginning with the *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* and ending with St. John Damascene. To obviate the inconvenience which would arise from this method owing to the fact that extracts bearing upon the same subject are not given together, a number is given on the inner margin of each extract, which indicates the number in the Theological Index at the end of the volume, where all the other extracts bearing on the same subject are referred to. Thus the reader has no difficulty in finding in a few minutes all the passages that relate to any given subject. The importance of this for the student, it would obviously be difficult to exaggerate. The extracts are not confined to those that support the Catholic doctrine, but a number of the more remarkable passages from which objections to it are usually drawn are also given. For the Greek Fathers the Greek text is given, accompanied by a Latin translation at the foot of the page, the translation being that of Migne, unless where it was deemed necessary to amend it for the purpose of greater clearness or fidelity. Extracts from S. Scripture are indicated throughout in the Greek text by the ordinary quotation marks, in the Latin by italics. In the theological and Scriptural indexes, the numbers that refer to passages from the Greek and Syrian Fathers are distinguished from those referring to the Latin Fathers by thicker type, and the numbers pointing to extracts that contain a real or apparent difficulty against the received Catholic doctrine are enclosed in brackets.

It will be seen from this hasty summary of the leading features of the work, that the learned Jesuit to whom we owe it has conferred a most precious boon upon all students. We earnestly hope it will have a large sale; and certainly no theological library can have any pretention to being complete without it. When we consider the size of the volume and the difficulties involved in it for the printer, we must admit that the price is moderate.

J. MACRORY.

A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians. By the Right Rev. Archibald Robertson, D.D., LL.D., Bishop of Exeter, and the Rev. Alfred Plummer, M.A., D.D., late Master of University College, Durham, formerly Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Oxford. 8vo. Pp. lxx. + 424. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1911. 12s.

This work belongs to *The International Critical Commentary* series. In the short Preface, which is written by the Bishop of Exeter, his Lordship says that more than fourteen years ago he promised to Dr. Plummer a commentary on First Corinthians for the "International" series, but various supervening interests of other kinds delayed the accomplishment of the task. He then goes on to say: "That the Commentary appears, when it does and as it does, is due to the extraordinary kindness of my old friend, tutor at Oxford, and colleague at Durham, Dr. Plummer. His generous patience as editor is beyond any recognition I can express: he has, moreover, supplied my shortcomings by taking upon his own shoulders the greater part of the work. Of the Introduction, also, he has written important sections; the Index is entirely his work. While, however, a reader versed in documentary criticism may be tempted to assign each *nuance* to its several source, we desire each to accept general responsibility as contributors, while to Dr. Plummer falls that of editor and, I may add, the main share of whatever merit the volume may possess." Thus, the work comes to us with the joint authority of two able and experienced scholars.

As might be expected from such a work, it has many excellent features: the Introduction, without being overloaded, is full and clear, the critical apparatus is very complete, what may be called the grammatical criticism is keen and exact, attention is usually paid to the latest evidence from inscriptions and papyri, and classical Greek is freely drawn upon for illustration and comparison. But, all this heartily admitted, somehow the work fails quite to satisfy. It is not merely that there are, as should necessarily be expected, many views advanced with which a Catholic cannot sympathise, as, for instance, on p. 64, where Bengel is quoted with approval as saying that the passage in 1 Cor. iii. 10-15 quite extinguishes the fire of purgatory, or on page 213, where "body," in the words "This is my body," is taken to mean the Church, of which each Christian is a member, or on page 229, where 1 Cor. xi. 3 is held to imply more than the inferiority of Christ's human nature, or on page 244, where, although it is not definitely stated, it is clearly implied that Christ is not received really but only spiritually in the Blessed Eucharist. Such views, or most of them, we were prepared to meet with. But there are other passages where no controversial issues are at stake, the interpretation of which seems to us more than doubtful. Thus, whatever be the true meaning of "the princes of this world," in 1 Cor. ii. 6, it is hardly fair to say of the view which understands it of the devils, that it is wholly incompatible with verse 8, or that it is "manifest" from verse 8 that demons are not meant. May it not well be, is it not in fact certain, that the

devils would not have instigated Christ's enemies to put Him to death, had they known the wisdom of God, that is, the mystery of Redemption through Christ's death, and all the restraint and humiliation for themselves that it involved? Again, is it right to identify, as our authors do, the *ψυχικός* of ii. 14 with the *σαρκικός* of iii. 1, 3, or is there not grave difficulty about believing that the Apostle would say of the Corinthian Christians, referred to in the latter passage, what he says of the *ψυχικός*, namely, that the things of the Spirit of God are *folly* to him? Is it not, therefore, much more likely that three classes are referred to in the end of chapter II. and the commencement of chapter III.; the spiritual man, the merely natural man, and the imperfect Christian? There are many other points in which we should feel constrained to differ from the learned authors, but considerations of space forbid our discussing or even alluding to them. The work is weakest on its theological side; some theological questions are treated very meagrely, and others almost seem to be evaded; but no doubt the present unsettled conditions of belief in the Anglican Church make it difficult for two leading divines to speak out quite frankly on many theological issues. One has to bear this in mind in any appreciation of such a work.

On the whole, notwithstanding such defects as I have mentioned, the work is an able one; and its two distinguished authors have placed all English-speaking Scriptural scholars under a deep debt of gratitude. They have given us a book that must have cost them immense labour, and that must long continue to be a standard work of reference on a most important and difficult Epistle. Messrs. T. and T. Clark have brought out the work in excellent form.

J. MACRORY.

Practical Handbook for the Study of the Bible and of Bible Literature.

By Dr. Michael Seisenberger, Royal Lyceum, Freising. Translated from the sixth German edition by A. M. Buchanan, M.A. (London), and edited by the Rev. Thomas J. Gerrard. 8vo. Pp. zii. + 491. New York: Joseph F. Wagner. \$2 net.

This work is meant to give a bird's-eye view of the Biblical question from the Catholic standpoint—such a view as will meet the wants of the ordinary layman, or even of the seminarist who is only beginning the study of Scripture. It is only a synopsis, but the student who desires to pursue any subject farther, will find here excellent and copious references for the purpose. The work begins with an account of the Holy Land and of the Jewish people; then follow sections dealing with the sacred places, persons, ritual, and seasons of the Jews; next, there is a section on Holy Scripture with a brief account of the Church's teaching on inspiration and a short history of the formation of the Canon; then comes a general introduction to the study of the Bible, followed by a special introduction to each of the books of the Old and New Testament; and lastly, there is a section treating of the interpretation of Scripture, or, as it is commonly called, Biblical hermeneutics.

It will be seen from this outline of the subjects touched upon that their treatment is necessarily very brief; but we are pleased to be able to testify that, though brief, it is clear and satisfactory, as far as it goes. Dr. Seisenberger is evidently a very competent Scriptural scholar and he has compressed here into most pithy form the results of wide and close reading. The work contains eight maps, representing the temple at the time of Christ, Chanaan as divided among the twelve tribes, ancient Jerusalem, environs of Jerusalem, journeyings of the children of Israel, the tabernacle, Palestine in the time of Christ, the journeys of St. Paul.

J. MACRORY.

The Eschatological Question in the Gospels and other Studies in Recent New Testament Criticism. By the Rev. Cyril W. Emmet, M.A., Vicar of West Hendred. Sm. 8vo. Pp. xiii. + 239. T. and T. Clarke, Edinburgh. 1911. 6s. net.

Besides the first essay, which gives its name to this volume, there are essays on "M. Loisy and the Gospel Story," "M. Loisy's view of the Resurrection," "Harnack on the Second Source of the First and Third Gospels," "Should the Magnificat be ascribed to Elizabeth?" "Galatians the earliest of the Pauline Epistles," "The Problem of the Apocalypse and its Bearing on the conception of Inspiration." All except the first essay have appeared in magazines before now.

The author sets forth and criticises, in the first essay, Schweitzer's view of the eschatology of Christ and the Gospels. The Strasburg critic holds that most of the New Testament writers, and even Our Lord Himself, believed that the end of the world was to come in the lifetime of those then living, and he maintains that this belief is the best key to the understanding of the Synoptic Gospels. Mr. Emmet rightly remarks, in reference to this view that, however its harsher colours be toned down, "it seems impossible that a Jesus dominated by an error and living for an illusion, can ever retain the reverence of the world." He prefers the straightforward liberalism of men like Harnack who deny Christ's Divinity, to the hybrid Christianity of eschatologists like Schweitzer. "Schweitzer and Tyrrell," he writes, compare the Christ of eschatology with the Christ of liberal, or Protestant, German criticism, and pour unlimited scorn on the latter. No doubt such critics as Harnack and Bousset do give us what Dr. Sanday has called "a reduced Christianity." But it is a Christianity which is true as far as it goes, and it is something on which we can build. They portray for us a Christ whom we can unreservedly admire and love, even if it is a little doubtful whether logically we ought to worship Him. The Jesus of eschatology it is difficult either to admire or to love; worship Him we certainly cannot."

The other essays contain nothing very new or striking, but they are all interesting, and carefully written.

J. MACRORY.

The Catholic Encyclopædia. Vol. XII. Philip-Revalidation. London: Caxton Publishing Company. New York: Robert Appleton Company. Pp. 800. Quarto. Price 27s. 6d.

The publication of the twelfth volume of the *Catholic Encyclopædia* is a reminder that the colossal work of the editors is nearing completion. It is hoped that by this time twelvemonth the whole work will be published, and English-speaking Catholics will have in their hands a most reliable source of information on all subjects having an ecclesiastical interest. When we remember that some encyclopædias, which were in course of publication before the American project was started, are still in the stage of infancy, we cannot but marvel at the rapidity with which this work has progressed. Rapidity necessarily means imperfections; but the imperfections of the *Catholic Encyclopædia* are so comparatively small, that they are lost in the great mass of literary and scientific perfections with which the work abounds.

In the present volume every class of ecclesiastical literature finds suitable place. Sacred Scripture is represented by such articles as "Psalms," by W. Drum, S.J.; "Prophecy, Prophets, and Prophetesses," by J. Calés, S.J.; "Book of Proverbs" and "Redemption in the Old Testament," by F. Gigot, S.T.D.; "Hebrew Poetry of the Old Testament," by Canon Barry; "Epistle to the Philippians," by Van Der Heeren, S.T.L.

Dogmatic Theology and kindred subjects are well treated in articles like "Predestinarianism," "Predestination," "Priesthood," "Regeneration," by J. Pohle, S.T.D.; "Purgatory," by Dr. Hanna; "Quietism," by Dr. Pace; "Demoniacal Possession," by Dr. O'Donnell; "The Pope," by G. Joyce, S.J.; "Divine Providence," by L. Walker, S.J.; "Redemption," by J. F. Sollier, S.M.; "Religion," by C. R. Aiken, S.T.D.; "Protestantism," by J. Wilhelm, S.T.D.

Ecclesiastical History in various forms claims the lion's share of the volume. "Pusey and Puseyism" and "Renaissance," by Canon Barry will be appreciated by his readers. The late Cardinal Moran wrote the article on Ven. Oliver Plunkett; it is sad that the great historian of our Irish martyr did not live to see the beatification and canonization of one who has "the brightest name in the Irish Church throughout the whole period of persecution." "St. Patrick's Purgatory," by Grattan Flood, will be of interest to Irish readers; as also will the articles on the "Order of the Presentation," by M. De Sales Whyte, and "Nano Nagle," by Florence Rudge McGahan.

Moral Theology and Social Sciences have many articles devoted to them. Dr. Ryan's "Theories of Population"; Science of Political Economy," by F. O'Hara, Ph.D.; and "Property," by V. Cathrein, S.J., will repay study. In writing the article on "Probabilism," the aim of Dr. Harty was, without taking sides, to give as faithful an explanation as he could of Probabilism and the other Moral systems.

There are a great many articles on various subjects which we would like to mention, but space prevents us from taking note of them all. So we shall merely call attention to Dr. De Wulf's article

on "Philosophy," Dr. Aveling's article on "Rationalism," Father Maher's article on "Psychology," Fr. Bewerunge's article on "Plain Chant," Father Thurston's articles on "Ecclesiastical Property" and "Reservation of the Blessed Sacrament," and Dr. Turner's article on "Plato and Platonism."

Three coloured plates are contained in this volume:—A Knight of Malta—Pinturichio, Aeneas Sylvius created Cardinal by Callistus III., and Presentation in the Temple—Cima. There are full page illustrations of Pius IX. and Pius X.

J. M. HARTY.

Tractatus De Conscientia. R. P. Reginaldus Beaudouin, O.P.
Tornaci Nerviorum: Desclée et Soc. Pp. xix. + 145.

This treatise on Conscience is the posthumous work of Father Beaudouin, O.P., who during many years was a professor in the Dominican College of Flavigny. The work is edited by a disciple, Father Gardeil, O.P., who is the author of several useful and learned volumes dealing with theological subjects. Of these we may mention, *La notion du lieu Théologique*, *Le Donné révélé e la Théologie*, *La Crédibilité et l'Apologétique*. Evidently his task of editing the treatise of Father Beaudouin was a labour of love, and students of theology will be grateful for the successful performance of the filial duty.

The work is divided into four Questions:—*De Conscientia ex parte objecti*; *De Conscientia ex parte assensus vel subjecti*; *De Conscientia dubia*; and *De Conscientia probabili*. Naturally the greater part of the volume is devoted to a discussion of the vexed question of Probabilism; of the 144 pages contained in the book, 80 are given to this intricate question. The author first treats of an opinion that is absolutely probable, *i.e.*, taken by itself without any opposing probable opinion, and lays down that such an opinion, if more than slightly probable, can safely be followed in practice. He then treats of an opinion that is relatively probable, *i.e.*, taken as opposed to another opinion which also enjoys probability, and teaches that it is never lawful to act on an opinion which remains probable or more probable; before lawful action can be taken it is necessary to put aside probability and obtain certainty by means of reflex principles. Afterwards, the author distinguishes between probability of fact and probability of law; the former concerns the truth of a proposition in itself, while the latter refers to the moral rectitude of an action. Thus the probability that such and such matter suffices for the validity of a sacrament is a probability of fact, but a probability that it is lawful to confer the sacrament with that probable matter is a probability of law. In regard to mere relative probability of fact, the author lays down that it is obligatory to follow the safer course. He concludes that, apart from necessity, it is not lawful to confer a sacrament with doubtful matter or form, that in

matters appertaining to the necessary means of salvation it is not lawful to use the less safe means, that a doctor is bound to adopt the surer remedy, that a judge is bound to pass sentence in accordance with the more probable opinion, and, universally, that it is not lawful to use a probable opinion to the spiritual or temporal detriment of another whose certain right is in possession.

Speaking of relative probability of law, the author holds in the first place that it is lawful to follow the less safe opinion which is also the more probable opinion; in the second place that it is lawful to follow the less safe opinion which is equally or almost equally probable with the safe opinion, if liberty is in possession; and in the third place that it is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion which is also clearly the less probable. He brings his treatise to an end by reviewing the various questions on which Catholic theologians agree and the various questions on which they disagree with one another.

It is evident from the foregoing brief sketch of the author's opinions that he is a pronounced equiprobabilist. He adds another distinguished name to the long list of recent theologians who have taken St. Liguori as their guide in the discussion of a question which, like the poor, will be always with us. It is interesting, indeed, to follow the historical career of Probabilism from the days of Medina to our time, to watch its periods of triumph and its days of depression. A few years ago, it seemed to have finally shaken off its foes, but time has brought new and powerful opponents into the field. The end no man can yet see.

J. M. HARTY.

Das dritte Buch Esdras und sein Verhältniss zu den Büchern Esra-Nehemia. Von P. Edmund Bayer, O.F.M. Gekrönte Preisschrift. Biblische Studien. XVI. Band. 1 Heft. Freiburg, 1911. Hedersche Verlagshandlung. M.4.40.

In the Alex. and Vat. MSS. of the Septuagint there are two books of Esdras called Esdras α and Esdras β . Esdras β is the same as Esdras and Nehemias of the Vulgate (= I. and II. Esdras). Esdras α is not in the Douay version. It is printed as an appendix in the Clementine Vulgate under the title *Tertius Esdrae liber*. Esdras α is known as the Greek Esdras. The present work is an investigation of the relations between the 3rd book of Esdras and the books Esdras and Nehemias. The investigation falls into four sections: (a) the textual relations of the two works; (b) the relations of their contents; (c) their chronological relations; (d) the relations between the Greek texts α and β .

The author reaches the following results:—3 Esdras is an independent work written originally in Hebrew and Aramiac, containing a history of the Temple from the reformation of Josias to that of Esdras. The pages' contest in chapters 3 and 4 is the work of the compiler himself. In point of time 3 Esdras is later than Esdras-Nehemias. It supplies valuable material for the textual criticism of Esdras I. and II., especially in the name-lists. The Greek of 3 Esdras is prior to, and better than, the Greek of Esdras-Nehemias.

The author treats his subject exhaustively, and has developed his views with success. The work will be valuable to apologists as a vindication of the Canon of the Latin Church, and a full answer to those who would put Esdras a, as the only vestige of the original Hebrew Esdras, on the Canon. It is encouraging to find Catholic scholarship at such a high level as it appears in this work.

P. BOYLAN.

Eine babylonische Quelle für das Buch Job? Eine literar-geschichtliche Studie von P. Dr. Simon Landersdorfer, O.S.B. Biblische Studien. XVI. Bd. 2 Heft. Freiburg, 1911. Herder. M.4.

The possibility of a connection between the now well-known poem from Assurbanipal's library called the "Poem of the suffering Just Man" and the Book of Job, has been often suggested. The Babylonian poem is known in four recensions—three of which are copies made by the scribes of Assurbanipal and the fourth is a Babylonian version found by P. Scheil in Sippar. The text of the poem is not complete, but its general sense can be ascertained. The comparative study of the Old Testament is now-a-days so important that every biblical student must feel grateful to Dr. Landersdorfer for having formed and carried out the plan of bringing together the best results of criticism on the cuneiform text in question, and comparing it in its thought and structure with the Book of Job. He has presented the poem in a well-executed transliteration and translation, and has explained it in a thoroughly scientific commentary. This part of the work will be very acceptable to students who are not Assyriologists.

In four chapters the author fully investigates the form and contents of the cuneiform poem and of the Book of Job, and discusses the possible relations of the two texts. He finds striking resemblances between the two works in problem, literary structure and language. But the problem—the problem of the just man's woes—is a problem of human life generally and not of Babylonian or Hebrew life merely. The pre-suppositions of the problem—especially that suffering is due to sin—are somewhat similar in the two documents. But the two poets have nothing in common in their notion of virtue nor in their idea of God. Their heroes are, after a time of wretchedness, again made happy, but their passages from blessedness to grief and from grief to blessedness have little in common except the similarity of sequence. For both, sorrow is the outcome of sin, and the sorrow, because it is a very human thing, is strikingly like in the two heroes; but for the author of Job sorrow is an instrument of grace and a touchstone of virtue, while for the Babylonian poet the just man's grief is altogether inscrutable and inexplicable. In literary form the two documents differ markedly. Job is a dramatic dialogue: the poem of the just man is a monologue. Linguistically there are many agreements between the two works. But they are such agreements as spring from a common Semitic culture. They do not imply dependence of one document on the other. The unprejudiced reader will

agree with Dr. Landersdorfer when he says (p. 138): "There is no reason for admitting any literary dependence direct or indirect of the Book of Job on the Babylonian poem. The similarities which the two documents display may be easily explained as due to the natural development of their narratives, and over against such agreements stand numerous far-reaching differences. Moreover, there is a complete absence of positive proof of any dependence of one document on the other."

P. BOYLAN.

Über Doppelberichte in der Genesis. Eine kritische Untersuchung und eine prinzipielle Prüfung von Dr. A. Allgeier. Freiburg, 1911. Herder. M.3.

In the 12th volume of the *Biblische Studien*, Dr. Alfons Schultz published an essay on Pentateuchal criticism called *Doppelberichte im Pentateuch*, in which he maintained the existence of doublets and hence plurality of sources in the Pentateuch. The author of the work before us has undertaken to refute the views of Dr. Schultz. As the title suggests, the work consists of two parts, a critical examination of alleged doublets in Genesis and a dogmatic inquiry into the compatibility of doublets with inspiration. In the first part Dr. Allgeier endeavours to show that the assumption of interwoven double versions is, in every case, due to misunderstanding. In the second part he finds himself compelled to deny to a Catholic the right of admitting the presence of doublets in the Sacred Text. The author has consulted a great deal of the best literature on his subject. His examination of the Biblical passages which he reviews is valuable, and will be very helpful even to those who refuse to accept his views in the second part. Not all Biblical scholars will be impressed by Dr. Allgeier's views on the dogmatic side of Scriptural study, and those who are not will probably console themselves by reflecting that the controversy between Drs. Schultz and Allgeier is, so far, merely a friendly dispute between two scholars whose writings have appeared with the full sanction of episcopal authority.

P. BOYLAN.

Mary Aikenhead. Her Life, Her Work, Her Friends. Giving a History of the Foundation of the Congregation of Irish Sisters of Charity. By S. A. Third Edition. Dublin: Browne & Nolan. 1911. Price 10/6.

The establishment of the Irish Sisters of Charity was important for the interests of religion in Ireland, and in nearly every land where Irish exiles have sought a refuge and a home. "As we look back through the century that has elapsed since Mary Aikenhead entered upon her novitiate at York convent in June, 1812," writes the Bishop of Canea in his preface to the present edition, "we cannot fail to be struck by

the marvellous fecundity of this particular grain of mustard seed. Ireland in several localities, England and the Colonies, have all made the acquaintance of the Irish Sisters of Charity. Then there is the additional marvel of the manysidedness of the work; the instruction of the poor and ignorant; attendance on the sick; breathing the last consolations to the dying; managing hospitals; sheltering the orphan; caring for the blind; rescuing the abandoned, and labouring for the social and industrial betterment of the whole population, as in Foxford. No form of privation and misery is foreign to their purpose, and thus they verify the words of their Foundress, when she put into language the promptings of her own heart in her letter to the Commissioners of the Poor in 1832: "I pray you to recollect that in any of the towns where the Sisters of Charity are established we are ready to lend our humble assistance in these works of mercy which may tend to alleviate the sufferings of our fellow-creatures of every creed."

The father of the future Foundress of the Irish Sisters of Charity was a Protestant, and her mother was a Catholic. According to the marriage agreement the children were to be reared as members of the Established Church. Mary was baptised by a Protestant minister and handed over to the care of a Catholic foster-mother, with whom she remained six years, and from whom she received her first training in Catholic principles and practice. On her return to her father's house, she accompanied him on Sundays to the Protestant church, but she could never fully rid herself of the lessons she had learned from her good foster-mother, Mary Rorke, and her sympathies were strongly Catholic. Before his death, her father was received into the Catholic Church, and in a few years Mary followed his example, was received into the Catholic Church, and received the Sacrament of Confirmation from Dr. Moylan, then Bishop of Cork.

The opening chapters give us a good view of the position of Catholicity in Cork in the last years of the 18th century and the early years of the 19th century, just as the succeeding chapters afford a great insight into the state of Catholicity of Dublin at the time when Mary Aikenhead removed thither from her native city. In Dublin Dr. Murray was her great patron and protector. It was at his advice that she determined to enter the Institute of the Blessed Virgin at Micklegate Bar, York, in order to prepare herself for the new congregation which her friends urged her to introduce into Ireland. She left Cork in order to enter her novitiate on Trinity Sunday, 1812, and returned in August, 1815 to take up her residence at the house in North William Street, where arrangements had been made by the Archbishop of Dublin for the reception of herself and her companions. In 1816 the Congregation was formally erected, Mary Aikenhead made her vows, and in the next year four postulants entered the convent. The work of the Irish Sisters of Charity was then fully begun.

From that time the new Congregation spread rapidly. Early in 1719 the Sisters formally took over charge of the House of Refuge in

Stanhope Street. Other branches of the Society were founded early in Cork and in Dublin. During the cholera invasion of 1832 the courage and devotion of the Sisters to the plague-stricken victims of this dread disease won the sympathy and applause of all classes of the community, and was a great assistance to Mother Aikenhead in the great work which she took in hand immediately after, namely, the foundation of a Catholic hospital in Dublin, where the poor might receive care and attention without any danger of interference with their religious convictions. Some of the Sisters were sent over to Paris to get trained in this new sphere of work, while, by the aid of generous benefactors, a house was secured in Stephen's Green, and the foundations were laid of an institution which has done so much for the relief of suffering in every form, and to which Catholic Ireland stands deeply indebted—namely, St. Vincent's Hospital, Dublin. In course of time, other houses were opened around Dublin, and also in Waterford, Tipperary, and at Benada Abbey, in Sligo, while a number of the Sisters were despatched to aid in the great work of building up the Church of Australia.

Mother Aikenhead suffered all her life from very poor health and for a long time before her death she was a helpless invalid confined to her own room. But sickness was unable to quench the ardour of her charity or diminish her remarkable powers of administration. Even to the last her faculties were perfectly clear and her counsel and motherly advice were of the greatest assistance to the heads selected by her for the new foundations. But she never allowed her cares or worldly troubles to interfere with her religious exercises or to prevent her from acquiring an intimate acquaintance with the young novices who were being trained to continue her work. The Foundress of the Irish Sisters of Charity was a saint, the story of whose life will appeal especially to Catholics of the present time, when the relief of poverty and suffering is being discussed with such eagerness.

The book is written in a most charming style. Nobody who is tempted to read the opening chapter is likely to put aside the book until the whole story is completed. No expense has been spared by the publishers to make the publication worthy of the subject. The price is 10/6, net.

JAMES MACCAFFREY.

Enchiridion Historiae Ecclesiasticae Universae. Auctore, P. Albers, S.J. Tomus I. (1-692); II. (692-1517); III. (1517—Hodiernum Diem). Malmberg, Herder. 1910. Cloth, 17/-.

The author of this volume is well known in Holland and outside it as an authority on ecclesiastical history. The little text which he published some years ago concise though it was and limited by the scope imposed upon himself by the author, showed that he was a man

who appreciated essentials and who kept himself up-to-date in the literature of ecclesiastical history.

The present work is a Latin version of a Dutch book published in 1905. The translation has been made from the second edition, but so many changes and improvements have been introduced that the present may be considered both as a new version and a third edition. It comprises a series of lectures covering the whole course of ecclesiastical history and bringing before the mind of the reader the striking points in the history and development of the Church. To the beginning of each chapter a list of the leading publications dealing with the matter treated of in the chapter is prefixed. As a rule these lists are drawn up with considerable care, and are likely to be of great assistance to a student who wishes to begin a closer examination of any particular incident or movement. It is unfortunate, however, that most of the Continental authors writing on ecclesiastical history do not seem to recognise that any great importance is to be attached to the Catholic Church outside of the Continent of Europe. Ireland, Great Britain, America and Australia are almost unknown lands, and would seem to be of no account to the man who derived his knowledge of the modern world from such ecclesiastical histories. As a consequence of this, the literature prefaced to such chapters is usually indicative of the author's knowledge of his subject.

The first volume deals with the history of the Church from the beginning till the year 692. It deals not merely with the external history of the Church during that period, but also with its constitution, its sacraments and religious worship, and with what the writer terms "*Scientia Ecclesiastica*." The second volume continues the history on the same general lines, and the third volume covers the space between the year 1517 and the present time.

In favour of the book it may be said that the exposition is clear and concise, the leading points are made to stand out prominently, probabilities are never converted into certainties, and the references supplied in the abundant footnotes are likely to prove at times highly instructive. Against it is the extreme brevity of treatment allotted to many of the important movements. In a work covering the whole field of ecclesiastical history and occupying only about 950 pages, it was inevitable that such a weakness would be noticeable, but the defect might have been rendered less apparent had the author omitted minor points and confined himself entirely to the leading movements. As an example of the incompleteness that is only too noticeable in the book, we might point to the writer's treatment of Holland and Belgium. We might excuse him for devoting such a limited space to the history of Ireland, England, Scotland and America, but in a book published primarily for Dutch Catholics, lay and cleric, it was something of a surprise to find that the author could afford only four pages for the history of the Church in Belgium and Holland since the French Revolution. The volumes may be purchased from Herder, of Freiburg and London.

JAMES MACCAFFREY.

History of Pope Boniface VIII. and His Times, by Dom Louis Tosti.
Translated from the Italian by Mgr. Eugene J. Donnelly. New
York. Christian Press Association. 1911. Price 2\$.

This History of the Life and Times of Boniface VIII. is likely to attract a large body of readers, if it were only on account of the importance of the subject and the period with which it deals. Boniface VIII. was unfortunate enough to hold the Chair of Peter at a very critical time in its history. Innocent III. had brought the temporal power of the Pope to its highest level, and for the greater part of a century this level was fairly maintained. But in the days of Boniface VIII. the world was changing rapidly. The nations of Europe were being consolidated by clever rulers who in the desire to secure absolute authority were anxious to enslave the Church and inclined to resent all interference on the part of the Pope. In this movement Philip the Fair of France led the way. On the other hand, Boniface the VIII. steadfastly shut his eyes to the change that was coming over the world, or at any rate determined that he would not abate one iota of the claims of the Popes even though he should incur the wrath of the rulers of Europe. In these circumstances it was difficult to avoid a conflict.

The story of the election of Celestine V., and of his retirement, are inserted as an introduction to the Life of Boniface VIII., and are necessary for the proper understanding of the relations between Boniface and his predecessor. All the charges that have been levelled against Boniface VIII. in regard to his treatment of Celestine, his attitude towards the Colonnas, his exaggerated idea of the Papal power, his treatment of Philip the Fair, are dealt with here and there throughout the book. The story is told in a popular way, and it is only too evident that the writer did not wish to cater merely for experts.

Mgr. Donnelly has done well in undertaking this translation, and has succeeded in presenting the story as told by the Benedictine, Tosti, in a most readable form, and he is indebted to the gratitude of the English-speaking world for having put such an agreeable book on such an interesting subject within easy reach.

JAMES MACCAFFREY.

The Religion of the Ancient Celts. By J. A. MacCulloch. Edinburgh:
T. and T. Clark, 38 George St. 1911. 10/-, net.

The historical Celt always moves in an atmosphere of weird magic. His rich and vivid imagination has invested even the most ordinary things with a halo which elevates them into the region of poetry if not of mystery. Nowhere, perhaps, among the *vestigia* of his greatness which it is the privilege of the Celtic scholar to investigate and interpret, are we brought so closely in *rapport* with this strongly-marked Celtic quality, as in the remains which speak—at least to the initiated—of the Celt's religion. To those interested in such matters,—and the history of Religions is always interesting,—the book before us will

be "a joy for ever." It is a scientific treatise on the subject, but the intensely attractive nature of the details brought together prevents it from deterring even those easy-going people to whom scientific treatises are taboo. To the scholar it will be a veritable treasure-house of myth and learned reference, a powerful aid to weave together into compact unity the scattered strands of previous knowledge, picked up here and there in the course of his reading, but never thoroughly synthesized and consequently never properly assimilated. The writer, Dr. MacCulloch, has evidently bestowed infinite pains on the production of the book. On almost every page there is proof of wide and careful reading, and the fruits of this reading have been elaborated into a system. The exposition is clear and forceful, the treatment of debated points is always critical, the writer is never carried away by the enthusiasm of the patriot, nor ever deterred from theorizing when the theory seems to be demanded by the facts. He aims at—and, we think, succeeds in—steering a middle course between the vagaries of the "mythological" school, on the one hand, who tend to see in the old stories "myths of the sun and dawn and darkness, and in the divinities sun-gods and dawn-goddesses, and a host of dark personages of supernatural character"; and, on the other hand, what we may call the "hyper-historical" school, who are unduly inclined to interpret the euhemerized accounts of the Annalists and others as facts of sober history. His task has been by no means an easy one. The interpretation of myths which have grown dim through the haze of centuried distance is always liable to be coloured by the bias, religious and otherwise, of the interpreter. Dr. MacCulloch, unlike some scholars we could mention, is singularly free from this fault. He is always willing to admit and give due credit to the spiritual elements in the Celtic character wherever they are in evidence. "Irish mythology," he says (p. 81) "is remarkably free from obscene and grotesque myths, but some of these cluster round Dagda." Celtic literature is to him "the product of a people who loved nature, romance, doughty deeds, the beauty of the world, the music of the sea and the birds, the mountains, valour in men, beauty in women" (p. 156). Again, on p. 6, we read: "Our knowledge of the higher side of Celtic religion is practically a blank, since no description of the inner spiritual life has come down to us. How far the Celts cultivated religion in our sense of the term, or had glimpses of Monotheism, or were troubled by a deep sense of sin, is unknown. But a people whose spiritual influence has later been so great, must have had glimpses of these things. Some of them must have known the thirst of the soul for God, or sought a higher ethical standard than that of their time. The enthusiastic reception of Christianity, the devotion of the early Celtic saints, and the character of the old Celtic church, all suggest this." Dealing as he is with matters in which ill-nature might easily lead to misinterpretation, we must be thankful to him for this sympathy and appreciation,—thankful all the more because we know that scholarship is not always loth to descend to the wilful aspersion of what is both clean

and noble. Many of the old stories scattered broadcast through our Irish literature he interprets as aitiological myths invented to explain existing customs or beliefs. In this no doubt he is often right. But when he connects certain Christian customs with rites performed in honour of Pagan deities, we are not sure that, in some cases at least, the proof of the connection is not wanting. Speaking of Brigit, an old Irish Goddess of Knowledge, he says (pp. 68, 69): "But her popularity is seen in the continuation of her personality and cult in those, of St. Brigit, at whose shrine in Kildare a sacred fire, which must not be breathed on, or approached by a male, was watched daily by nineteen nuns in turn, and on the twentieth day by the saint herself. Similar sacred fires were kept up in other monasteries, and they point to the old cult of a goddess of fire, the nuns being successors of a virgin priesthood like the vestals, priestesses of Vesta." There can hardly be any doubt that the Church in those days, unwilling to wrench from the new converts all their Pagan notions, sometimes tolerated, in a Christianized form, practices analogous to Pagan rites. But that these Christian practices may be justly spoken of as a *continuation* of the Pagan rites, or that nuns may be rightly described as *successors* of even a virgin, though pagan, priesthood we are inclined to deny. We are confident that Dr. MacCulloch had no sinister intentions in the passage quoted above, but such criticisms are availed of sometimes, in order to bolster up the preposterous contention that the Catholic religion is only an advanced form of Paganism, evolved from an earlier religious civilisation, and better suited to the needs of the age which saw its genesis. It is for this reason that we call attention to the passage in question.

Naturally the chapters dealing with the traces of ancient Celtic religion in Ireland are of most interest to us. But the scope of the work is much wider, embracing in fact the whole known Celtic area. There is a chapter on "The Celtic People," one on "The Gods of Gaul and the Continental Celts," and one on "The Gods of the Brythons." And in the various chapters on the details of religion, covering an extensive field of inquiry, he bases his conclusions on customs, beliefs, etc., prevalent among Celtic peoples in Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Britain, Gaul, Galatia, etc. There are twenty-four chapters in all (390 pp.) dealing with some of the most salient features of Celtic civilisation. The titles of some of these will show the breadth of treatment given to the subject: "The Irish Mythological Cycle," "The Tuatha Dé Danaan," "The Cúchulainn Saga," "The Fionn Saga," "The Cult of the Dead," "Primitive Nature Worship," "Animal Worship," "Cosmogony," "Sacrifice, Prayer, and Divination," "Festivals," "The Druids," "Magic," "The State of the Dead," "Elysium,"—all these are dealt with in a sane and critical manner. The chapters on "The Tuatha Dé Danaan" and "The Fionn Saga" are particularly well done. Misprints or mis-translations are very rare, the only example of the former that we noticed being the proper name, Iucharbar (p. 63, and Index, p. 395), unless Mac Ind Oc (p. 81) be also a misprint for Mac Ind Oic. We do not think the translation,

"Son of the Young Ones" can stand. On p. 64, note, the writer equiparates the Irish Sid, a fairy hill, with a supposed *sedos*, cognate with Greek *ἱερός* a temple." But *Sedos* can hardly have been the primitive form of Sid, on account of the i in the latter word. On p. 219, Cúrói is translated "Hound of Rói," as if "Rói" were a proper name. We have been accustomed to understand the word as "Hound of the battlefield." These, however, are but trifling blemishes in a work of such compass, and Dr. MacCulloch is to be congratulated on the degree of perfection which his book shows. A useful list of authorities is prefixed to the book, though it is not intended to be a complete bibliography on the subject. There is also a fairly comprehensive index at the end.

SEARÓID Ó nualláin.

Honoré Tournely und Seine Stellung zum Jansenismus Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Stellung der Sorbonne zum Jansenismus. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Jansenismus und der Sorbonne. Von Dr. Theol. Joseph Hild. B. Herder, Freiburg im Br. and London. 1911. Pp. xx + 188. Price 3s. 9d.

For this study the author has been awarded the Doctorate in Theology by the Faculty of the University of Freiburg in Baden, and it is published as the fifth *heft* in the *Freiburger Theologische Studien*. Its scope is fully indicated in the title. Let me say at once, that it is a model of painstaking research and orderly exposition and a valuable contribution to the history of the Jansenist controversy. Dr. Hild's list of *Quellen u. Literatur* runs to eight pages, and includes five unpublished sources, viz., a letter of Cardinal de Bissy to Tournely, three MSS. treatises by Tournely ("de sac. ordinis", 1707; "de sac. in genere," 1698; "de myst. Incarnationis," 1724), and a student's digest of his lectures at the Sorbonne. It was a comparatively easy task to describe Tournely's teaching in opposition to Jansenism, the materials for this lying ready to hand in his works; but, as Dr. Hild remarks, it was difficult to gather material for a connected narrative of his life and for a proper estimate of his influence in contributing to the defeat of Jansenism. See the author's remarks, *Introduction*, p. 1ff. Notwithstanding this difficulty Dr. Hild has succeeded in giving us a fairly full account of Tournely's activity, and in doing so has also achieved the secondary purpose he had in view of showing what was the attitude of the Sorbonne of that day towards Jansenism.

Two periods in Tournely's life-work against Jansenism are distinguished: (1) up to, and (2) after, the publication of the Bull *Unigenitus* in 1713; but the distinction is merely one of chronological convenience, no change of attitude being implied.

Born in 1658, Tournely made his studies in Paris at a time when Jansenism was under the ban of the theological faculty, but Gallikanism was coming to a head. Before obtaining his doctorate in 1686, he had to subscribe to the censure passed on Arnauld and his

friends in 1656, but to defend one of the four Gallican articles of 1682, and on his appointment as professor in Douai (1688) to subscribe to all four. To this divided allegiance imposed upon him in his youth Tournely was faithful to the end, an unwavering opponent of Jansenism on the one hand, and of Papal infallibility on the other.

During his four years as professor in Douai Tournely sustained the reputation he had won as a student in Paris, and was already noted as an anti-Jansenist when in 1692 he was appointed a professor in the Sorbonne. Probably the closer acquaintance he acquired during this time with the practical developments of Jansenism in the Netherlands served to strengthen his aversion. As professor in the Sorbonne he took an active part in the deliberations and debates of the Paris Faculty on the many questions submitted to their judgment, the most famous of which, during this period, was the case of conscience of 1701, involving the Church's infallibility in matters of fact (not revealed) and the sufficiency of "obsequious silence" in face of her judgments. Tournely denounced the "silence" policy in the strongest terms, and maintained the Church's infallibility in regard to *dogmatic* facts. At this time also there was trouble in the schools about the Cartesian philosophy, between which and Jansenism a certain sympathy and working alliance existed; and Tournely, with most other anti-Jansenists, strongly opposed Cartesianism. In 1704 he tried unsuccessfully to have Demontempuys, professor of Philosophy in the College Duplessis, and a known Jansenist sympathiser, disciplined for teaching Cartesianism.

Meanwhile Catholic criticism was at work on Quesnel's *Moral Reflexions*, and the condemnation of 1708 by the Roman authorities was followed in 1713 by the Bull *Unigenitus*. From this time till his death in 1729, Tournely's activity was specially devoted to the defence and vindication of the Bull. In the discussions of the French Bishops regarding its reception, he was one of the theologians called into consultation, and the author of a memorial advocating its unconditional acceptance. To his earnest and able advocacy it was chiefly due that the Faculty of the Sorbonne decided by a large majority (March 10, 1714) to register the Bull among the Statutes of the University in spite of the prohibition of the Archbishop of Paris. The Parliament had already accepted the Bull, and it seemed as if the struggle were at an end. But with the death of Louis XIV. in 1715 and the Regency of Orleans, the favour, or at least the toleration, of the court was extended to the Jansenist party whose adherents in the Sorbonne began a systematic campaign to secure the annulment of the decision of March 10, 1714. Tournely and his friends fought vigorously in the meetings of the Faculty and in published pamphlets for the Bull, but were finally overborne by the majority, and after an ineffectual appeal to Parliament were excluded from the Faculty meetings (21st February, 1716). Tournely was allowed to retain his professorship, but resigned it in 1717. It was probably he who wrote the *Relation fidelle des assemblées de Sorbonne* (1716) giving an account of the proceedings in connection with the *Unigenitus* from March, 1714, up to the time of

his expulsion. A new turn was soon given to the strife by appealing to a future general council against the Pope, and in this appeal not a few who were not Jansenists joined. Tournely, however, Gallican though he was, stoutly denied the legitimacy of this appeal, since the condition required by the Gallican articles to give finality (and infallibility) to the papal act, viz., acceptance by the Catholic world, had been fulfilled before any appeal had been made. The Pope had already withdrawn all papal privileges and powers from the Faculty (November, 1716), and in September, 1718, he excommunicated the appellants, without naming them. In the same year a protest against the conduct of the Sorbonne opponents of the Bull was signed by 500 Doctors and masters of the Paris Faculty; and by a proclamation of the Regent, subsequently accepted by the Parliament, the reception of the Bull by Louis XIV. was declared to have the force of law, and most of the appellants except out-and-out Jansenists withdrew their appeal. Penalties were inflicted on obstinate appellants, and by order of the Regent Tournely and the other Doctors expelled in 1716 were restored (January, 1721) to their places in the Sorbonne, and took their share henceforth in the deliberations of the Faculty. In 1724 the Sorbonne finally accepted the *Unigenitus*, but various phases of the Jansenist strife continued to engage the attention of Tournely, who was also busy during the last years of his life (1725-1729) with the publication of his *Praelectiones Theologicae*, which he did not live to finish.

I have indicated only a few of the stirring events (fully described in this study) in which Tournely played a prominent part. He lived through the most critical period of the Jansenist strife, and his brilliant service to the Catholic cause deserves a memorial like this. The wonder is he has had to wait so long for it. With the narrative of events is interwoven a detailed exposition of Tournely's refutation of the chief errors in the Jansenist system, and a general appreciation of his *Praelectiones Theologicae* is given. For this I must refer the reader to the work itself.

P. J. TONER.

The Truth of Religion. By Rudolf Eucken, Senior Professor of Philosophy in the University of Jena. Translated by W. Tudor Jones, D.Ph. (Jena). "Theological Translation Library," XXX. London: Williams and Norgate; New York; G. P. Putnam and Sons. 1911. Pp. xiv. + 622. Price 12/6 net.

Professor Eucken, to whom the Nobel prize was awarded in 1908, enjoys a high reputation, and this translation of his principal contribution to the religious question is likely to be widely read. The translator, whose own experience of the Professor's influence "is only a specimen of what is true of thousands of other students who have passed through his classes in Jena since 1874," has been moved, he tells us, to undertake the work by the affection he possesses for his old teacher and friend. But in addition to the difficulties necessarily connected with translation, he has "been painfully conscious of the

inadequacy of language to express many of the ideas presented in the book—ideas which seem inseparable from the religious experience of the living personality." I can quite understand this feeling, and so, I am sure, will most readers of the translation who try to grasp its main argument. Only most of them, I imagine, will find the cause of this inadequacy, not, as the translator implies, in the superior spiritual insight "of a prophet of religion who cannot be tied down either in thought or mode of expression to the level of the writer on exact subjects," but in the lack of tangible content in the ideas themselves. But more of this anon. As to the translation itself, making due allowance for the inherent difficulties, it may be allowed to be fairly well done, although a good many obvious Germanisms occur such as no competent teacher would allow to pass in a schoolboy's exercise. These appear sometimes as mere clumsiness of construction or impurity of expression, but sometimes they make downright bad syntax. I have marked a number of illustrative passages, but cannot spare space to quote them.

The book is divided into five parts: I. "The Universal Crisis in Religion"; II. "The Fundamental Basis of Universal Religion"; III. "The Opposition to Religion"; IV. "Characteristic Religion"; V. "Christianity and the Present"; and contains seventeen chapters. Of these only the first and second parts yield much that is clearly intelligible and capable of being summarised in the language of common sense. The rest is a kind of foggy, mystical metaphysic, on which it is sought to base a transcendental apologetic of religion in general and of Christianity in particular—or rather of that little in Christianity which the Professor considers to be of essential and eternal value.

In Part I. a distinction is made between "religions of law" and "religions of redemption"; certain "characteristic features of Christianity," which is a religion of redemption, are sketched; "the movement of modern times against Christianity" is exhibited in "the changes in the world of thought" (natural science, history, the spiritual life), and "the variation of the direction of life" that have occurred; the signs of a desire and an effort "upon the summits of modern life" to fight against the inroad of irreligious naturalism by reconsolidating religion are noted and welcomed; and the character and tendency of this counter-movement (with which the author enthusiastically identifies himself) are indicated. The intelligent reader can anticipate the general drift of what the Professor has to say about the modern warfare against Christianity; but he needs perhaps to be told that the battle is held to have gone decisively against the traditional system that has grown up around essential Christianity and been mistakenly identified with it. In the Professor's view, Christianity as a religion of redemption agrees with Buddhism in finding "the world full of misery and suffering," but differs from it in finding "the root of the evil, not in the nature of the world, but in moral wrong—in a desertion from God"; and such is the evil that "God Himself must come to man's rescue. He does so through setting forth a redemption

over against the fall of man; He does it through the inauguration of a kingdom of love and grace which bestows a new nature on man and puts its law within his soul. Through such a conversion man is securely raised beyond all suffering and trespass to Divine holiness and perfection" (p. 13). "Fall," "conversion," and "grace," it should be noted, are not used in their traditional meanings. "Further, the Christian life is especially rich in that it includes two stages—the belief of Jesus Himself, and the belief of the Christian community in Jesus Christ." In the former we find the proclamation of the kingdom of God upon earth" (p. 15); while, as regards the latter, "the personality of the Founder has become incomparably more to Christianity than the founders of all the other religions have become to their adherents. Christianity in this has a possession which cannot get lost—a possession that binds souls to the Founder, but a possession that protests against the caricature of the Church" (p. 17). Thus traditional Christology has only succeeded in producing a *caricature*, and Christianity, though it "appears in the whole of its effects and existence as the religion of religions" (p. 18), "on account of so much defacement, remains yet but a high ideal" (p. 21). "The first shaping of Christianity, consequently, could not remain incontestable. The first great counter-movement originated upon the ground of religion itself. This was the Reformation. . . . But, in spite of all the greatness of the Reformation, the whole matter stands in an unfinished state through the fluctuating tendencies between old and new modes of thought, and through the failure to come into terms with modern culture. There is thus nothing to prevent the appearance of a movement in our modern times which will not only call into question the ecclesiastical form of Christianity, but Christianity itself, and, indeed, call into question all religion, and so involve us in a struggle for life or death" (p. 23). Into this life and death struggle the Professor enters courageously, scorning timid counsels: "Religion in particular may protest against all such distressing fears; religion is merely a sanctioned product of human wishes and of pictorial ideas brought about by tradition and the historical ordinance—and, if so, no art, power or cunning can prevent the destruction of such a bungling work by the advancement of the mental and spiritual movement of the world; or religion is founded upon a superhuman fact—and, if so, the hardest assault cannot shatter it, but far more, it must prove of service in all the troubles and toils of man, it must reach the point of its true strength and develop purer and purer its eternal truth" (p. 71). Such courage, after all, is not heroic in one who begins the combat for Christianity by relinquishing the whole substance of the heritage known by that name, and merely asking to be allowed to keep the name; it is a far lesser courage than that of the ordinary Catholic believer who defends the whole faith for which the martyrs died; it is mere cowardice beside the courage of the Pope who condemned Modernism.

In Part V. the same ideas are taken up and emphasised. The "eternal in Christianity" which has been saved in the struggle is

distinguished from the "transient" which has been dropped, and men are called to rally around this rescued "nucleus" of the Spiritual Life, to draw guidance and inspiration from it for their own lives, and promote its influence in the world. To the transient in Christianity belong the Trinity and Incarnation, the Resurrection fact, the Sacraments, the Church, all the dogmas and institutions associated with its historical "existential form." The same relationship between the Divine and the human that was realized in Christ is to be realized in like manner in every Christian, and this in such a way that the new life this realization begets in the soul takes on a timeless character that raises it above the ever-changing conditions of its outer environment, and enables it to affect and transform that environment in each succeeding age without being itself injuriously affected.

As to the other parts of the book in which the Professor develops his Metaphysic of the subject, I must confess that, after trying my best, I have failed to understand it. I wonder if many readers will be more fortunate. The impression I have carried away from my attempt is that human life is assumed to be so full of contradictions, and human thinking so beset with antinomies—every distinction of aspects in an object or situation being exaggerated into a real opposition of nature and idea—that we can make no advance in the process of philosophic reflection towards unity and harmony without calling in the Infinite Reality (the Whole, the All-in-All, etc.) to tie up for us the diverging lines of our knowledge and reconcile its contradictions. Thus we have at least the idea of God given to us, and we can verify this idea and prove its truth and reality by the results of its application in science, history, art, moral conduct, and every department of life. We appropriate the Infinite and live our whole life (mental, moral, emotional) in, with and through It, and the conscious realization of this relationship, and the conscious and free adjustment of our lives according to it, is religion. Is this pantheism? Professor Eucken says that it is not a Metaphysic of the schools, but of life (p. 68) that he employs, and speaking of the "opposition of transcendence and immanence, of dualism and monism, of supernaturalism and pantheism," he says "the terms announce but little, and the mutual charges of heresy are wearisome" (p. 215). Probably he would refuse to be classed under any of the terms, and he often speaks of God as distinct from the world. On the whole, however, his conception is much nearer to formal pantheism than to Christian theism, and he can hardly complain if he is called a pantheist.

This is not a book, needless to say, to be read by Catholics. It must be a disappointing and discouraging book for Protestants who still retain any faith in traditional Christianity. It is not an original book; we have been listening to similar things for a good while now. It is not a profound book, unless the earnestness of painful groping in the dark by one who has lost his sight, and his pitiful hunger cry in the desert into which he has strayed, be mistaken for spiritual profundity. It may to a certain extent be an effective book for those who still

retain some loyalty to the Christian tradition, but it cannot have much effect on a generation to whom no definite Christian education has been imparted.

P. J. TONER.

Communion with God. The Preparation before Christ and the Realization in Him. By Darwell Stone, D.D., Principal of Pusey House, Oxford, and David Capell Simpson, M.A., Lecturer in Theology and Hebrew at St. Edmund's Hall, Oxford. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh. 1911. Pp. viii. + 212. Price 4s. net.

This is, what the authors wished it to be, "a clear and handy treatment of the subject for the use of those who are not experts." Hence "very much" is omitted "which would otherwise demand attention," and "many questions of criticism" (relating to the Old Testament) are ignored, "such as the comparatively secondary details of literary, historical and religious development, with which in a work on a different scale, it would have been necessary to deal at length." Thus the treatment is quasi-popular, just the kind of treatment the average intelligent reader needs to give him a clear general idea of what lies at the basis of all true religion. But, though there is no parade of critical erudition, one feels confidence in the scholarship of the authors, and is impressed by the simple moderation of their statements. The study is quite Catholic in substance and in tone, and I can recommend it to Catholic readers. I have not noticed anything in it that might not indeed have been written by one of our own theologians, but I think an expansion of the very brief "Conclusion" would be desirable from a Catholic viewpoint.

The authors distinguish (*Introduction*) between communion with God in the widest sense, as co-extensive with religion, and in the narrower sense "as that particular aspect of religion which concerns man's consciousness of the actual relations existing between himself and deity"; and taking the phrase in this latter sense, they purpose "to give a history of the search for God, and of God's self-revelation, from the time when man's conception of something beyond himself became living, and of such a kind that he was in conscious relation to it, until it found its climax in the Christian religion as illustrated in the actual lives of the earliest adherents of Christ shown in the New Testament, and its perpetuation in the system outlined in the concluding summary," i.e., the system of life to be followed in the membership of the Catholic Church. It is this last point I have noted as being insufficiently developed. At least a chapter of proportionate length with the others might have been given to it; but it only gets two pages.

Part I. is taken up with "the preparation for Christianity [on this subject of communion with God in the sense explained] in ideas outside revealed Hebrew religion." Chap. i. refers briefly to the idea of communion, or approximations to it, to be found in Indian, Savage, Greek and Roman religions, and in the Hellenic mysteries (especially the

Eleusynian). The yearning after the divine and other features in the religions of India "fail to supply abiding thoughts of religion, primarily and among other reasons, because of lacking belief in a truly personal God." The religious customs of savages, sacrifices especially, witness to movements towards deity that "have failed to attain any proper result." The legendary history of early Rome recognised the possibility of communion between the divine and the human, which is also supposed in the constant references in the Homeric poems to the interposition of gods in the affairs of men. Plato's "thoughts of communion with God, though sometimes of great beauty, are of little practical value," and the same is true of later Greek and Roman philosophers. "In the *Hellenic Mysteries* the idea was clearer and more emphatically expressed than anywhere else in Greece or Rome." Yet the mysteries failed in their high aims, "among other reasons (1) because the ideal they held before men was no higher than that to which the virtuous citizen already attained; and (2) they made no exclusive claim upon the allegiance of their devotees, who continued to worship the gods of Greece after their initiation, as before." Chap. ii. examines the Egyptian religion, in which "there were movements towards a fuller realization and expression in the present sphere of communion between man and deity, along with hope of attaining beyond the grave a more complete union of the human soul with the divine spirit." These movements being described, the conclusion is stated that "the long history of Egypt" in "some of its phases" witnesses "to a search after God as successful as any outside the pale of revealed religion. But the fact that it was far from really successful also witnesses to what is now a matter of history, that man by himself cannot find communion with God." Chap. iii. deals with Semitic religion in general, and in it are found "valuable indications of the idea of communion with God." It being remarked "that there can be no just appreciation of the ritual and rationale of Old Testament sacrifice, as a means to communion with God, apart from a knowledge of their background in Semitic heathenism," it is sought from the available sources (chiefly Arabian and Saracen traditions preserved by Herodotus and other writers, elements of natural religions reflected in the Old Testament narrative, Arabian and North Semitic inscriptions) to show "that the original god of the Semitic class was a *totem* deity—a sacred animal—who shared in the sacred life of the kin, and was bound to the human members of the kin by the tie of kinship or brotherhood," and that, however crass and crude the idea may be, real communion with the deity, which is the ordinary status of the tribesmen, was believed to be secured and sealed in the sacrificial meal by eating the raw flesh of the sacred animal and thus sharing in the life of the god. This is held to be the more primitive idea in Semitic blood sacrifices, the idea of sacrifice as a gift or tribute to the god, or as a sin-offering to appease his wrath, which is also found in Semitic religion, being later. In Chapter iv. the specialization of Semitic religion in Babylonia is considered, and it is found that

while "there is a burning sense of the power and guilt of sin, the struggles seem hopeless in default of any positive regenerating power within man helping him on to God."

Part II. deals with "the preparation for Christianity through ideas in the sphere of revealed Hebrew religion." Communion with God is studied as "mediated through Priesthood and Sacrifice" (chapter i.), "through Prophetic and Apocalyptic teaching" (chapter ii.), "through the wisdom literature" (chapter iii.), and "through the Philosophy of Philo" (chapter iv.), and as "immediate in Prayer" (chapter v.), "in Suffering" (chapter vi.), "in the experiences of Prophets and Psalmists" (chapter vii.), and "in the Psalms and Odes of Solomon." Space forbids my giving details of treatment, which will be found to be very good. And the same is true of Part III., in which (in seven chapters, one dealing with Prayer and the others with the New Testament writings) illustrations of Christian communion with God are given. This third part has already been published as a section of the article on "Communion with Deity," in the third volume of the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

P. J. TONER.

Amongst the Blessed. Loving Thoughts about Favourite Saints. By the Rev. Matthew Russell, S.J. Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1911. Pp. xii. + 215. Price 3s. 6d. net.

Father Russell has added another to the long list of his charming volumes of prose and poetry. This is a prose volume liberally interspersed with poetry, and adorned with eight illustrations, handsomely reproduced from famous paintings of the saints in question. It is a tribute of piety to certain favourite saints, a profession of faith in the communion of saints, a prayer that the writer's and reader's eternal lot be among the saints. Seventeen saints are commemorated, SS. Peter and Paul, Matthew, John, Christopher, Agnes, Monica (and Augustine), Patrick, Francis of Assisi, Dominic, Vincent de Paul, Ignatius of Loyola, Francis Xavier, and the three young Jesuit saints, Stanislaus, Aloysius and John Berchmans. Whether it is Father Russell himself who speaks or sings, or some other whose words he borrows, the biographical facts (or legends, as the case may be, e.g., about St. Christopher), are described, and the appropriate reflections expressed with a tasteful grace of style that enhances their power for edification. I am sure the Catholic public will extend a hearty welcome to the volume.

P. J. TONER.

"*De Administrativa Amotione Parochorum*," "*De Curia Romana*." Vol. I. Sac. Felin M. Capello.

One cannot fail to be struck with the clearness and conciseness which characterize the recent decrees of our Holy Father. If they may be taken as an index of what the new code of Canon Law will be like, and

undoubtedly they may, as they are mainly the work of the Commission appointed for making this new codification, then there is every reason for anticipating a great popularity for the study of Canon Law in the future. No matter how clearly decrees have been formulated, yet from the very nature of decrees some obscurity must always remain as to detail. Terminology, too, and references will have to be explained, and the practical application of decrees illustrated. Hence arises the necessity for commentaries. In the two works under consideration, Professor Capello has undertaken to comment on two of the most important of these recent decrees, viz., the decrees "Maxima Cura" and "Sapienti Consilio."

That he has done his work clearly and thoroughly is the impression which even a hasty glance produces, and this impression is confirmed by a more minute study. "De Administrativa Amotione Parochiorum," as its name implies, deals with the decree "Maxima Cura." It is divided into two chapters, and each chapter is sub-divided into articles. The first chapter deals with preliminary questions in connection with administrative removal, and amongst other things with the doctrine enunciated in the introduction to the decree, viz., that administrative removal was in existence long before the publication of the "Maxima Cura," and that this decree only laid down new rules for its application—a doctrine, by the way, which a good many people seem to have entirely missed.

The second chapter contains the commentary on the decree. In this commentary Professor Capello makes the fullest use of his extensive knowledge of Canon Law. He has not confined himself to a mere verbal interpretation, but has discussed often very fully matters merely suggested by the words of the decree: thus, for example, under the fifth cause for the removal of parish priests, he deals at some length with the question of prescription in criminal matters, and under the ninth cause he discusses the various obligations of parish priests. Hence, from a study of this commentary, one may acquire not only a clear grasp of the decree itself, but also a good deal of other useful canonical knowledge.

The second work under consideration is entitled "De Curia Romana," Vol. I., and deals with the Roman Curia "Sede Plena"; in the second volume, which has not yet appeared, the author intends to deal with the Roman Curia, "Sede Vacante."

The work is mainly a commentary on the decree, "Sapienti Consilio," and on the other recent legislation on the Roman Curia. It is divided into six chapters. The first and second chapters deal with preliminary and general questions in connection with the Roman Curia; the remaining four deal with the different organs of the Roman Curia individually. In dealing with these different organs, the author adopts a more or less uniform method throughout. He first discusses the origin, purpose, and historical development of the organ under consideration; then he deals with its competency and composition; and, finally, he solves a number of practical cases and gives a number of

formulae to be used when applying for faculties and dispensations. The most striking feature of the treatment is its completeness. The author has gone very minutely into his subject; he has given in full a number of decrees in connection with the matters under discussion; he has given references to a number of others; while to each article he has prefixed a very exhaustive bibliography.

The work cannot fail to be an invaluable aid not only to those who have practical work to do with the Roman Congregations, but also to those who are engaged in the deeper study of the Roman Curia. In a work generally so complete, one is not a little surprised to find some important questions very meagrely dealt with. Thus, for instance, in connection with the competency of the Sacred Penitentiary, the author deals with what he calls the vexed question of public and occult cases. His treatment, however, is incomplete and misleading. The only division of public and occult which he touches is that of public and occult "de facto"; of the other divisions he says nothing. The result is that one might be very easily led, for example, to the false conclusion that the Sacred Penitentiary can dispense from matrimonial impediments which are "de facto" occult but of their own nature public. When we find matters only remotely connected with the Roman Curia discussed at length, we naturally expect fuller treatment of the question of public and occult cases, a question the understanding of which is absolutely necessary to determine the competency of the Sacred Penitentiary.

In adverting to this point, it is not intended to detract from the general excellence of the book; of this excellence there cannot be the slightest doubt.

J. KINANE.

English Literature in Account with Religion (1800-1900). By Edward Mortimer Chapman. London: Constable and Co. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. Pp. 578. Price \$2.00 net. 1910.

Theology in the English Poets. By Stopford A. Brooke, M.A. London: J. M. Dent and Sons. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co. Pp. xii. + 275. Price (leather) 2s. net; cloth, 1s. net.

These two works, which are constructed more or less on the same plan and have much in common, will be a welcome addition to the library of everyone, priest or layman, who takes an interest in the development of religious ideas and principles as embodied in the chief works of later English literature. Mr. Brooke's work, a reprint of a volume published many years ago, covers a rather limited field. Two introductory lectures are devoted to the theological thoughts of the poets from Pope to Cowper: one is given to Cowper himself, one to Coleridge, three to Burns, and the remaining lectures, nine in all, to Wordsworth. Mr. Chapman's subject is much more extensive. It embraces nearly all the great literary works, poetry and prose, of the nineteenth century. Philosophers, poets, scientists, novelists,

even the contributors to the chief magazines, all find a place in his pages.

The religion of a writer may be known in a variety of ways: from his conversation and letters, from his formulation of his own religious beliefs when dealing with subjects frankly religious, especially of a controversial nature, and finally from his general attitude, in some cases almost unconscious, towards the broad truths that form the basis of all religious and theological systems. Both our authors seem to regard evidence of the first two kinds with a certain amount of suspicion, and to imply that it is only when indications of the third kind are forthcoming that we feel the writer's real devotion and have a clear clue to his genuine religious beliefs. And the tendency, in both works, is to eliminate the first two classes of writings as far as possible, and to determine the author's religious attitude from the almost unconscious position adopted in works not directly religious or, at all events, not polemical.

Mr. Brooke tells us, for instance, that he will not "seek in (the poets') letters or in their every-day talk for their theology." "For," he continues, "in their ordinary intercourse with men they were subject to the same influences as other men . . . In ordinary life their intellects would work consciously on the subject and their prejudices come into play. But in their poetry, their imagination worked unconsciously on the subject. Their theology was not produced as a matter of intellectual co-ordination of truths, but as a matter of truths which were true because they were felt: and the fact is, that in this realm of emotion where prejudice dies, the thoughts and feelings of their poetry on the subject of God and man are often wholly different from those expressed in their everyday life." Mr. Chapman does not formulate his principle quite so clearly, but his rather contemptuous treatment of the Oxford movement is a sufficient indication that religious controversy, even when rising to a high degree of literary excellence was, to his mind, unworthy of very serious consideration in a study of Religion in Literature.

Whether the principle be a sound one may surely be fairly questioned. To the ordinary mind, it seems to underestimate the importance of dogma, and implies a want of confidence in the sincerity of convictions underlying religious controversy. Why should it be taken for granted that a man's own *ex professo* statement of his theological beliefs should be left out of account in any attempt to estimate his real religious position? Have these beliefs no influence on his religious character, or must their scientific exposition be in all cases discounted as mere special pleading? A mere sentimental faith, as distinct from sound and reasoned religious conviction, is not a gift on which any well-balanced religious philosopher, at all events any Catholic, is likely to lay much emphasis. And while it may sometimes happen that a casual remark or "*ebiter dictum*" furnishes a better indication of a man's real beliefs than an elaborate scientific exposition, the contrary is much more often the case. The impulse of the moment requires

correction: the half-unconscious expression must yield to the fuller deliberate statement made after careful consideration of all the aspects of the problem.

As might be expected from the distaste shown for the scientific formulation of religious beliefs, the sense in which "religion" and "theology" are accepted in the works before us is very wide and undefined. Mr. Brooke's desire is to "rub out the sharp lines drawn by that false distinction of sacred and profane." "If every sphere of man's thought and action (he says) was in idea, and ought to be in fact, a channel through which God thought and God acted—then there was no subject which did not in the end run up into theology, which might not in the end be made religious." Mr. Chapman takes "religion" to mean "that faith or experience which should suffice to make life coherent and harmonious." "Religion not only links man to God: it binds the incidents of his experience into a vital whole—a true, "bundle of life," to use the quaint Scripture phrase. While taking account of all the phenomena of the inward realm of thought and the outward realm of conduct, it insists upon the possibility and the worth of a true consistency." Under these misty definitions, nearly every work may claim to rank as religious. Hence we need not be surprised to find that Mr. Chapman devotes many pages to works in which the religious element is so microscopic as almost to defy detection, and that his work in places is little more than a criticism of the purely literary characteristics of the men and writings that fall within his period. And there is another feature of his treatment that may be due to the same canon, though a hostile critic might be tempted to regard it as springing from intolerance and prejudice. The Catholic authors of the century, though their writings are often religious in the best and fullest sense, are treated with very slight consideration or respect. Wordsworth and Coleridge are given thirty pages, Byron and Shelley thirty-six, Carlyle alone has over twenty devoted to him, and even Darwin has sixteen: but some ten pages are deemed quite sufficient for the whole Oxford movement, and not more than three in all are given to Newman, whose works must certainly be classed as literature, whose "long life"—to adopt the words of an eminent contemporary critic not of his own faith—"has been a miracle of beauty and grace, and who has contrived to instil into his very controversies more of the Spirit of Christ than most men can find room for in their prayers." And all this in a work entitled "English Literature in Account with Religion."

From the literary point of view, both the English and the American work rank very high. And to anyone well acquainted with the literature they treat they cannot fail to be of absorbing interest as literary critiques, even when their value as contributions to theology in the strict sense does not, for the reasons already given, quite reach the standard expected by a scientific student of the science.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

Vollständige Katechesen. Von Gustav Mey. Thirteenth edition, improved and enlarged. B. Herder: Freiburg im Breisgan, London, St. Louis, etc. Pp. xi. + 476. Price 4s. 6d. (cloth).

Few will be inclined to quarrel with the statement often made that the effective religious instruction of children is one of the most difficult tasks that fall to the lot of the missionary priest. In the case of adults much may be taken for granted: arguments and illustrations that appeal to the teacher's own intelligence may be fully utilized: and the ordinary language of theology may be employed with at least a fair hope that its meaning will be fully appreciated. But in the case of children everything is different. The very first principles of knowledge have to be conveyed, and even the simplest matters must be explained. Special expedients in the way of repetition, question and answer, and the like, must be resorted to in order to keep their interest aroused and their attention fixed on the teacher and the subject. And the language must be of the clear, plain, simple kind that, as most of us find by experience, requires the most careful and thorough preparation.

Some few favoured mortals seem to know by instinct what will appeal to the youthful mind. The great majority, however, would be well advised to take a little instruction from a master in the art. The trouble is that very few of the masters have left us any record of their method or instructions. They seem to have laboured under a strong, and perhaps natural, conviction that some of the most effective discourses given to children would seem very trivial, and even silly, when committed to the cold type of the printing press. The result is that we have an abundant supply of printed sermons intended for adults, but very few books of instruction suited for the children of a catechism class.

We are glad, therefore, to direct our readers' attention to a work by Father Mey which goes far to supply our wants in this particular department. The author brought out his first edition forty years ago. Six years after its appearance he died, but his work was carried on by able hands, and the present edition (the thirteenth) represents the result of many years of careful revision. There is an introduction of about forty pages, giving some very useful hints on the catechetical method, and two series of notes, about one hundred pages, on the various subjects discussed in the lectures. The instructions themselves occupy over 300 pages, and are divided into two parts: the first concerned with the more general truths of the Christian revelation, the second in a special way with the life and writings of Christ. As giving a general idea of the subjects chosen, it will be sufficient to mention, from the first part, "God," "One God in Three Persons," "The First Man," "The First Sin," "The Commandments" (17-20), "The Our Father" (20-21), "Morning and Evening Prayer" (23, 25): from the second, besides the principal events in the life of Christ (1-29), "The Catholic Church," "The Holy Sacraments," "The Queen of Heaven," "The Last Things." Church hymns are given all through, in the

singing of which the children are, of course, expected to join. It would be difficult to praise too highly the charm and simplicity with which the truths of faith are set forth, and the care with which everything is chosen that is most likely to appeal to the child's fancy and intelligence.

For English-speaking readers there is just the defect that the work is in German. But the defect is minimized by the simplicity of the language. The introduction and notes are in the usual German style, but the instructions themselves are given in such simple words that they may conveniently be utilized by anyone with even an elementary acquaintance with the German language.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

With a Pessimist in Spain. By Mary F. Nixon. Pp. 360. B. Herder; London and St. Louis.

If one has a distaste for guide books or even formal histories, and would at the same time like to gather a little knowledge about the chief scenes of interest in Spain and the historical events with which they are associated,—doing it all in a holiday spirit, and coming into pleasant contact with the actual Spaniard of the day—he cannot do better than read this little volume, of which the third edition is now before the public. The “Pessimist,” by the way, is the authoress’s “most intimate friend”; and proves her friendship, as few friends do in real life, by putting questions at exactly the opportune moment, and in precisely the form and spirit best calculated to give her literary companion an opportunity of saying what she thinks of Spanish history, manners and customs, and the other numberless interesting themes that the very mention of Spain brings before the imagination. As to whether the questions were put in exactly the form recorded we may be pardoned for feeling a little sceptical now and then: things do not happen quite so conveniently even in the happiest combination of favourable circumstances. But what matter after all? The limits of artistic licence are not to be fixed too definitely. And the method is justified in its results. It enables the authoress to throw aside the rôle of dull narrator and to give us, in a bright and breezy conversational style, the story of a land that, from the historical, artistic, social or theological standpoint, need fear comparison with none in Europe.

The work, which includes over a dozen splendid illustrations, is well brought out by the publishers. The price is 4s. net.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

Notes.

Messrs. Pustet, of Ratisbonne, have published the first volume of a new edition of the *Manuale Sacrarum Cereemoniarum* of Martinucci. The editor is Menghini, the Pontifical Master of Ceremonies, whose name is sufficient guarantee that this third edition is thoroughly up-to-date. It is now thirty years since the second edition was published by Martinucci, and during those years many new decisions were promulgated; these decisions will be found in their proper place in this edition. The whole work will comprise two parts, the first of which deals with the ceremonies which concern inferior clergy and simple priests, and the second of which will deal with the ceremonies which concern Bishops and Cardinals. The first part will be treated in two volumes, the first of which has now been published. In this volume are contained preliminary explanations, the ceremonies of solemn and private Mass, the ceremonies of Solemn Vespers, the ceremonies of Holy Week, and the ceremonies of various other functions, such as Benediction of the Most Holy Sacrament and the administration of Holy Communion. The price of the four volumes will be 25/-.



We have also received from Messrs. Pustet *Vita D.N. Jesu Christi*, by J. B. Lohmann, S.J., translated into Latin by V. Cathrein, S.J.; and *Memoriale Vitae Sacerdotis*, by C. Arvisenet, V.G. We recommend both little books to priests, who will find in them suitable subjects for meditation. The price of each volume is M. 1.50.



Messrs. Sands & Co., Edinburgh, have sent us a new edition of Bishop Hay's *Sincere Christian Instructed in the Faith of Christ*, revised by the Very Rev. Canon Stuart. The centenary celebrations of Bishop Hay, held at Fort Augustus in September, were the occasion of the publication of this new edition of the immortal work of the learned Bishop, whose great aim was to add his "mite" towards the spiritual instruction of the people of his own and subsequent ages. The high esteem in which the "Sincere Christian" has been held by the Catholics of English-speaking nations is the best proof of the success with which that great object was carried out. Catholics cannot but be grateful that a new edition of so splendid a work is now on sale at the moderate price of 6/- net.



From the same firm we have received a copy of *Bishop Hay on The Priesthood*, revised and edited by the Very Rev. Canon Stuart. This little work was composed by Bishop Hay as a pastoral for his priests, and will be found as useful for the priests of our day as it was for those for whom it was originally written. The price is 1/6 net.

Messrs. Burns and Oates have sent us *The Holy Communion*, by John Bernard Dalgairns, Priest of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri, edited by Allan Ross, Priest of the same Congregation. The first edition of this well-known work was published in 1861 by James Duffy, Dublin. The second edition was published in 1865, and the third edition in 1868, by the same firm. The fourth to eight editions were merely reprints of the third edition. In view of the various decrees of Pius X. on the frequent reception of Holy Communion, the Rev. Editor has done a noble thing in giving us this new edition of the inspiring work of Fr. Dalgairns. These two volumes are sure to have a large circle of admirers, and no priest's library is complete without a copy.



Elevations to the Sacred Heart, translated from the French of Abbé Felix Anizan by A. Priest. has been published by Messrs. Washbourne. The book treats of the Nature and the Characteristics of the Sacred Heart, and is a storehouse of piety and learning. No one can read the pithy paragraphs and the soul-stirring chapters of this admirable book without been drawn insensibly towards the Sacred Heart. No better spiritual reading can be put into the hands of old and young alike. We strongly recommend the volume to our readers. Its price is 3/6.



Messrs. Longmans, Green & Co., have published the life of *Saint John Capistran*, by Fr. Vincent Fitzgerald, O.F.M. The volume is one of the "Friar Saints" series, of which Very Rev. Fr. Osmund, O.F.M., and C. M. Antony are the editors for the Franciscan lives, and Rev. Fr. Bede Jarret, O.P., and C. M. Antony for the Dominican lives. Already six volumes have appeared, at the price of 1/6 cloth, and 2/6 leather. The six volumes are: St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Vincent Ferrer, St. Pius V., St. Bonaventure, St. Antony of Padua, and St. John Capistran. We recommend the volumes to priests, nuns, and the Catholic public.



Positivisme et Catholicisme, by L. Laberthonnière, is a volume of the series published by Messrs. Blond et cie, Paris, under the general title of *Etudes de Morale et de Sociologie*. This present volume deals in a vigorous style with the invitation extended to the Catholics of France to join hands with the promoters of *L'Action Française* "for the triumph of the Church, if not in souls, at least in society." M. Descoqs approves of this alliance, but M. Laberthonnière condemns it as similar to the alliance which Auguste Comte proposed between the followers of Positivism and the Jesuits. The Jesuits rejected the proposal with scorn, and M. Laberthonnière condemns with all the strength at his command an alliance between Catholics and the Positivists who follow the teachings of M. Maurras. Price 3 fr. 50.



To the long catalogue of Fr. Benson's works we may now add *The Maid of Orleans*, a little play setting forth in five scenes some of the incidents in the life of Joan of Arc. [Longmans, Green & Co.: London,

New York, etc. 3s. net.] It need hardly be said that there are many beautiful touches in Fr. Benson's treatment of one of the most interesting and pathetic themes in human history. But candidly we do not think that the book will add much to his literary reputation. Though the dialogue runs into nearly a hundred pages, it might have been easily printed in a dozen. The whole treatment, in fact, is meagre and incomplete. The great dramatic points in the heroine's life, her departure from home, her victories over the combined generalship of the English, her marvellous power and resource in the presence of her judges, are either passed over completely or briefly glanced at in the dialogue of very secondary personages. A hint may, of course, be enough for anyone well acquainted with all the details of her life, but it can hardly be presumed that the ordinary reader will be sufficiently well-informed to appreciate mere passing references. To ignore the main events and fill one's pages with the gossip of soldiers, citizens and sacristans, implies, to our mind, a strange conception of dramatic art. Judging from the copious stage directions, which sometimes fill entire pages, we should say that the author depends to a great extent on stage management. Careful and sympathetic presentation may make the play a passable success, but its literary qualities give us little ground for hope that even such moderate success can be more than temporary. The drawings by Gabriel Pippet, with which the book is illustrated, give it a quaint, medieval colouring, and harmonize well with the old-world life and manners that the play brings vividly before us.



If the misfortunes of an author, and the troubles and trials he has had to endure before publishing his work, be allowed to plead in his favour, the reception awaiting *Some Plain Sermons*, by Fr. Thomas L. Kelly, of Warren, Rhode Island [B. Herder: St. Louis, London, &c. 1911. Pp. 319. 5s. net] should be of the very friendliest kind. In his Preface he tells us of a series of misfortunes that befel him in 1902, culminating in an attack of paralysis from which he has only very imperfectly recovered even yet. Notwithstanding his affliction, he has found means to bring out in book-form a number of sermons, one for each Sunday and principal Feast, which he had prepared when editor of the "Providence Visitor." They are clearly and carefully written, full of piety and sound learning, and, even apart from the consideration already mentioned, have every claim to be well received and highly valued. We wish the author a full and speedy recovery, and many years to exercise his fine literary gifts in the cause of the Church and of Catholic truth.



The publication of "*The Wonders of Ireland*" (Longmans, Green and Co., London, New York, &c.; M. H. Gill, Dublin. 1911. Price 2/6 net) adds considerably to the debt of gratitude which the Irish public owes to Dr. P. W. Joyce. The first seventy pages give us a collection of wonderful events associated in history or legend with crosses, wells, cairns, islands, etc., all through the country. Many of

them will arouse feelings of scepticism even in the most credulous, but they are all of great interest as object lessons in a study of the working of the popular mind. In the remainder of the book, nearly 200 pages, we find ourselves on somewhat solider ground. Chapters such as those on "Spenser's Irish Rivers," "The Three Patron Saints of Ireland," "Sir John De Courcy," "St. Donatus, Bishop of Fiesole," and "Some Puzzles and Peculiarities in interpreting Irish Local Names," may be taken as typical. They will be read eagerly by all who take an interest in the past of Ireland and in the work now being done to arouse in the people a higher appreciation of the wealth of historical and romantic lore that often lies buried in very commonplace surroundings.



A little pamphlet entitled "Poisoning the Wells—II." has reached us. It is written in support of the protest—to which we called attention in our last number—against the Eleventh Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica. The writer quotes some of the promises made by the editors, among them one "to obtain, impartially, such statements of belief in matters of religion and similar questions as are satisfactory to those that hold them." From an analysis of the articles published, he shows the amount of ignorance and prejudice that prevails among the contributors on Catholic questions, and, after copious quotations, concludes with a strong statement of policy. "No Catholic," he says, "should purchase the Eleventh Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica. No purchaser of it is bound to keep or pay for a work which falls so far short of the representation of the editors and publishers. It should be debarred from our public libraries, schools, and institutions. It should be denounced everywhere, in season and out of season, as a shameful attempt to perpetuate ignorance, bigotry and fanaticism in matters of religion." It may be too much to expect that even this vigorous exposure of the defects of the new edition—and the equally vigorous campaign carried on in the pages of *America*—will entirely break up the crusted Protestant prejudices of the editors and contributors, especially when we find their cause championed to a certain extent by a leading English Catholic journal; but it will, at all events, serve to warn Catholics generally against this so-called scientific scholarship and prevent them from contributing in any way to increase the number of its victims.



In *The Turn of the Tide*, by Mary Agatha Gray (Benziger Brothers, New York, Cincinnati, Chicago. 1910. Pp. 387. Price 4/- net) we have a "story of humble life by the sea," in which the villainy of an old miser, Silas Moncrieff, separates for a time, but not till the end, the two central figures, Hilda Norton and the young sailor giant, Jesse Amos. The Catholic atmosphere is felt from the beginning, the interest is well sustained throughout, and the whole story is beautifully written. It would be difficult to find a book more suitable for the enlightenment and edification of a Catholic household.

We have received from Duffy & Co., Dublin, a very small edition of the Ritual under the title, *Ritual and Funeral Prayers*. It contains all the various rites and benedictions which are ordinarily required by a priest engaged in missionary work, and the Funeral Psalms and Prayers are grouped together very conveniently in an appendix. The volume is a very tiny one. It may be carried in the vest pocket. It bears the Irish Trade Mark, and the price is two shillings. Messrs. Sands & Co. have favoured us with a neat, handy prayer-book, entitled *The Pious Christian*, the price of which is one shilling. It is compiled to a great extent from the famous *Pious Christian* of Bishop Hay. In the appendix are contained, both in Latin and English, the hymns and prayers used at Benediction and the Ordinary of the Mass. From the same firm we have received a little pamphlet dealing with the preparation of children for Confession and Communion, entitled *Suffer Little Children to come unto Me*, and written by a religious. Price Threepence.



The news that the Pope has been pleased to appoint the Archbishop of Westminster and the Archbishops of New York and Boston Cardinals of the Church was received with pleasure in these countries and in the States. It was felt that England should have some representative in the highest councils of the Church, and that a larger representation for the important Church in the States would be just and advisable. Cardinal Bourne is beloved by his own flock, whether they are English or Irish, Tory or Liberal, and he is respected by these who do not agree with him in faith. His whole-hearted devotion to duty, his well-known love of justice and straight-dealing, his aloofness from everything which could lend itself to factional interpretation, the boldness of his attitude on the Catholic demand in education, and the tact and firmness with which he acted during the Eucharistic Congress in London, have won for him a high place in the hearts of both English and Irish Catholics.



Cardinal Farley is the spiritual ruler of one of the largest and most important dioceses of the world. It is, besides, a particularly difficult one to deal with on account of the various nationalities of which it is composed, and the new demands that are constantly being made on the administration by the increase of the Catholic population. But the genial and kindly Archbishop is fully equal to his work. He is a man of untiring energy and perseverance, interested in every good work that is likely to promote the spiritual and temporal interests of his people, always glad to see any of his clergy who may come to consult him in their difficulties, and ready to give a friendly greeting to a stranger, even though his object may be to seek permission to collect in New York. Nor, in the midst of his cares as Secretary to Archbishop Corrigan, as Pastor of St. Gabriel's, or as Archbishop of New York, has he ever forgotten the claims of the land of his birth and of his early education. Irishmen are especially proud of the honour conferred on him by the

Holy Father, and they pray that he may be spared long to uphold the great traditions of his See. With three such representatives as Cardinal Gibbons, Cardinal Farley, and Cardinal O'Connell, among the Princes of the Church, the interests of the Church in America are sure to receive full discussion in the councils of the Pope.



In the October (1911) number of the *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, Père Martin, O.P., in the course of an article, *La Question du Péché Original dans S. Anselme*, refers to an article published in the *I.T.Q.*, October, 1908, on *St. Anselm's Definition of Original Sin*, and acknowledges that the writer of that article "a tres bien montré comment S. Anselme réfute telle autre conception du péché original [than the privation of original justice], celle notamment, que l'on prête à S. Augustin et qui eût cours pendant tout le XIIe siècle."



But, in regard to another point maintained in the article of the *I.T.Q.* referred to, P. Martin differs from the author. "D'après M. Toner," he says, "la justice original n'était, dans le pensée d'Anselme, qu' un don naturel. Mais il faut répondre," he continues, "que S. Anselme entendait par cette justice, un don surnaturel, une grâce. Cela appert du chap. X. (*De Conceptu Virginali*), où il dit qu' Adam perdit la grâce qu' il aurait pu garantir à sa postérité. Quant à la nature, elle n' a pas été changée dans sa substance, elle est demeurée essentiellement la même"; and in proof of this statement he quotes the passage, "*ipsa natura propagandi, quamvis remaneret, non fuit subdita ejus voluntati, sicut esset, si non peccasset, et gratian, quam de se propagandis servare poterat, perdidit, etc.*"



Why emphasize *permaneret*, as does P. Martin, and not rather *natura propagandi*, i.e., propagation by union of the sexes ("per virum simul et mulierem," ch. xi., *init.*)? It is of this *natura propagandi* as carrying with it a law of heredity in respect to justice in the original state and to sin in the fallen state, that St. Anselm speaks throughout his chapter, thus leading up to assertion in the following chapter of the main point of the treatise, viz., that a *virginal* conception, not being according to the *natura propagandi*, but rather resembling a new creation, secures exemption from the *haereditas peccati*. And only a virginal conception secures this in any child of Adam. A restoration of the gift of integrity to parents would not suffice. St. Anselm is not speaking of *human nature as such with an endowment of natural justice remaining* after the fall, but only of propagation by sexual union, in the *nature or essential character* of which no change took place: there was a *nature or essential character* of which no change, he maintains, took place; there was a change only in the circumstance that sexual concupiscence is no longer subject to the rational will. It is hard, then, to see what support for his contention P. Martin finds in *quamdis permaneret*.

As to the other italicised clause, it is to be observed that the word *gratia* is not of itself conclusive unless it is clearly used in contrast to the full comprehension of *natura* in the philosophical sense of that term. The fact that it is, however, sometimes used loosely by St. Augustine and others to describe gifts of the Creator that are *natural* in the technical theological sense ought to prepare us to expect that it *may be* so used by St. Anselm in this passage. And that it is loosely used seems to follow clearly from the words used a few sentences earlier: *Dedit etiam illi Deus hanc gratiam, ut, sicut quando illum condidit nulla propagandi operante natura aut voluntate creaturae simul fecit eum et rationalem et justum, ita simul cum rationalem haberent animam justissent quos generaret operante natura et voluntate, si non peccaret . . . qui ex humana natura propagarentur non praecedente peccato ex necessitate justitiam pariter haberent cum rationalitate.*" Here the reference in *hanc gratiam* is extended to creation itself and to the gift of *rationality* as well as *justice*; both would have been transmitted *ex necessitate*, a necessity founded on the divine attributes, and, but for the sin, the same in both cases. There is implied in all this at least an *exigitive* naturalness in original justice.



The Rector and Purgatory: a Study on the Eschatology of a Trinity B.D., by Rev. John Nolan, P.P. (Belfast: The Catholic Book Co.; Dublin: M. H. Gill and Son, 1911, price 6d.), is a pamphlet worth getting. It is a triumphant vindication of the Catholic doctrine of Purgatory and Prayers for the Dead written in reply to a sermon on "The Profits of Purgatory" preached by the Rev. W. S. Kerr, B.D., Rector of St. Paul's Church, Belfast, and published in the papers. Not only is it shown beyond shadow of doubt that Purgatory and Prayers for the Dead were believed in the early Church, but, what is more disconcerting for Mr. Kerr and old-fashioned Protestants of his type, a vast array of the very best and most enlightened teachers of the Anglican Church, with which Mr. Kerr is supposed to be in communion, are brought forward not only as witnesses to this fact of history (which no scholar any longer denies), but as advocates of Catholic teaching and practice. Also some Irish Protestant authorities are produced. Against this mass of Protestant testimony Mr. Kerr's bigoted abuse of Rome is made to look petty and contemptible and his "drum-beating" singularly ineffective. He cannot feel comfortable after the severe castigation he has received at Father Nolan's hands, nor are his own people's respect for and confidence in him as a teacher likely to be increased by their reading this pamphlet. Father Nolan has done his work thoroughly, and that it was work which involved a great deal of labour and a vast amount of reading will be seen at a glance.



A few topics which bear only indirectly on the main issue had perhaps better been omitted; but as they possess a near interest, locally and historically, for Father Nolan's immediate neighbours, the general reader will pardon their introduction. In two earlier pamphlets, *The Rector and the Fathers* and (sequel) *The Rector and his Critics*

(6d. each: same publishers), Father Nolan has successfully handled some other points in Mr. Kerr's sermons against Catholicism.

◆ ◆ ◆
The Beauty and Truth of the Catholic Church, Sermons from the German, adapted and edited by Rev. Edward Jones, with an Introduction by Most Rev. John Ireland, D.D., Vol. I., pp. vi. + 326 (price 5s. net), has been sent us by B. Herder (St. Louis and London, 1911). We can recommend the volume highly both in point of matter and of literary form. It contains twenty-eight sermons, and covers practically the whole ground of the treatise, *De Ecclesia*, with introductory sermons on "the necessity of a revealed religion," "the preparation for a universal expectation of a Redeemer," and "the Apostles' Creed and its significance." It is an adaptation and no mere translation from the German of Heinrich Von Hurter.

◆ ◆ ◆
 We have received from Messrs. Longmans, Green and Co., "*Motive-Force and Motivation-Tracks*," by the Rev. Boyd Barrett, S.J. This volume contains a description of experiments carried out during two years in the psychophysical laboratory of Louvain University: experiments that aimed at determining as accurately as possible the influence of motives on the will. These researches are not of any direct value to the student of the metaphysical problems of free-will. But both as regards the methods employed and the results reached, they are of interest to the student of Character-Formation and of Will-Education. And the author's plan of exposition is as valuable as his diligent investigation. He begins with a survey of modern views bearing on the purpose of his experiments. Then follows an exhaustive description of these experiments. And in all the later chapters, the data gained by these researches are employed in the analysis of the whole process of motivation.

◆ ◆ ◆
Roman Documents and Decrees, edited by Rev. David Dunford, and published by Messrs. Washbourne, has now entered on a new series. Formerly it was published quarterly, and only in the original language of the decrees, but in future it will be published monthly, and will give an English translation in addition to the original decrees. We strongly recommend this very useful publication to the clergy, whose duty it is to keep in touch with the new laws and regulations which concern them. The price is 7s. per annum.

◆ ◆ ◆
The Illustrated Bible History of the Old and New Testaments, for the use of Catholic Schools, by I. Schuster, D.D., revised by Mrs. J. Sadlier, is so well known, and has been so highly commended by more than a hundred bishops, and even by His Holiness, that words of praise would be akin to painting the lily. It has by this time been fairly established as a classic in its own order in Catholic schools. With its illustrations (110 in number), its clearness and simplicity, it is calculated to make a deep impression on the minds of the young. It is merely necessary to welcome the eleventh edition. B. Herder. Bound, 1s. 3d.

In Chapters in Christian Doctrine, Reason the Witness of Faith, the author says in the preface:—"The following treatise of Catholic Belief has a higher aim than a Catechism. Although retaining the usual form of questions and answers for good reasons, the author aims at bringing out the absolute harmony of Religion with Reason for the especial instruction of the American and English Catholics who are constantly confronted by both press and pulpit, and by daily intercourse, with the ever-ready ridicule of apparent discrepancies between their distinctive views of life and the current views of the world." This is a big undertaking, and promises much. We cannot say, however, that the work satisfied our expectations. It is in the main the catechism in other, and we can scarcely say more telling, words, than those with which we have been made familiar. Sometimes, indeed, the author touches on deep philosophical and theological problems. We wish it the success that he anticipates for it, but we can scarcely share in his sanguineness. B. Herder. 75 cents.



The Holy Viaticum of Life as of Death, by Rev. Daniel A. Dever, Ph.D., D.D., is a beautiful and consoling little volume of some 180 pages, in which the author, as the title indicates, tries to scatter the shadows that naturally cluster around the thought of life's close. It is throughout in optimistic vein; Fra Angelican in thought. It is likewise poetic; and most refreshing it is to find sound theology clothed in such beautiful garb. Would we had more such. The sweet strains of the *O Salutaris Hostia* linger when dry theological formulæ are forgotten; and the more theology is wedded to poetry the more popular, and we venture to say effective, it will become. Many who might shrink from reading a cold treatise on a subject so intimately connected with death, would read this little volume with consolation and spiritual advantage. Benziger Bros. 3s.



The following circular has been issued by the *Catholic Record Society of Ireland*, established at the meeting of the Maynooth Union in June, 1911:—"Until the mass of unpublished documents which serve to throw light upon the religious development of the country has been made accessible to students, no satisfactory ecclesiastical or general history of Ireland can be written. Nor can the publication of these records be left entirely to individual enterprise on account of the serious financial responsibilities which such an undertaking must necessarily entail. It is only by the establishment of a Record or Historical Society, on the model of those that have been founded in other countries, that this work can be begun with any hope of success. For this reason the Maynooth Union, at its annual meeting in June, 1910, passed a resolution in favour of the establishment of an Irish Catholic

Record Society, and at the same time appointed a few of its members to arrange the necessary preliminaries. The report of this body was presented at the annual meeting in June, 1911, and a committee was formed to draft the rules and constitution of the body. The following have consented to serve on the committee:—Patron, Cardinal Logue; President, Most Rev. Dr. Healy; Vice-Presidents, Most Rev. Dr. Donnelly and Most Rev. Dr. O'Doherty; Committee, Canon O'Mahony, President of the Maynooth Union; Canon Murphy, ex-President, Maynooth Union; the Rectors of the Irish Colleges in Rome, Paris, and Salamanca; Dr. Windle, Dr. Cox, Rev. John Begley, Dr. Joyce, Rev. Dr. Carrigan, Professor MacNeill, Rev. A. Coleman, O.P.; Dr. Sigerson, Rev. Dr. D'Alton, Barry O'Brien, Esq.; Rev. Dr. Henebry, Professor Stockley, Rev. E. B. Fitzmaurice, O.F.M.; Professor O'Maille, Rev. Thomas Gogarty, Professor O'Sullivan, Rev. A. Kelleher, Professor Merriman, Rev. John MacErlean, S.J.; Dr. Grattan Flood, Rev. Patrick Power, M. J. McEnery, Esq.; Rev. R. Walsh, O.P.; M. J. Kenny, Esq.; Rev. Paul Walsh."



The Society is in no sense controversial and will confine itself entirely to the publication of documents in Irish, Latin, English, etc., that may help to illustrate the early, medieval, or modern history of Ireland. These documents will be published in the Journal of the Society. This Journal will appear at irregular intervals, but at least once a year, and will be sent to members free of cost. Dr. McCaffrey, Maynooth, has been appointed editor. The annual membership subscription has been fixed at 10/-. Donations to cover the initial expenses will be gratefully accepted. Replies to be addressed, The Secretary, Catholic Record Society of Ireland, St. Patrick's College, Maynooth.

Theological Articles in the Reviews.

THE IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD. October, 1911.—**Gerald O'Nolan, M.A.**, 'Gadelica Minora—III.' **Reginald Walsh, O.P.**, 'Glimpses of the Penal Times—XIII.' **James P. Rushe, O.D.C.**, 'The Scapular Promise—a Defence of Fr. Chéron.' **The Editor**, 'Obituary Note: Cardinal Moran.' November.—**James MacCaffrey, D.Ph.**, 'The Catholic Record Society of Ireland.' **John Rickaby, S.J.**, 'Moral Conduct.' **J. B. Williams**, 'Concerning Hugh Peters in Ireland: Carlyle and Some Historians.' **Gerald O'Nolan, M.A.**, 'Gadelica Minora—IV.' **Reginald Walsh, O.P.**, 'Glimpses of the Penal Times—XIV.' December.—**P. J. Manly**, 'Spiritualism and the Spirit World.' **Reginald Walsh, O.P.**, 'Glimpses of the Penal Times—XIV.' **Thomas Gogarty**, 'The Suppression of the London News-Books.' **R. Fullerton**, 'Oblatum occasione Baptismi, etc.' **W. H. Kirwan**, 'Some Celtic Missionary Saints—St. Columba.' **Gerald O'Nolan, M.A.**, 'Gadelica Minora—V.' Notes and Queries in Theology, Canon Law and Liturgy. Correspondence. Documents. Notices of Books.

THE CATHOLIC WORLD. October, 1911.—**E. A. Pace, Ph.D.**, 'The Cardinal's Jubilee.' [Tribute to Cardinal Gibbons.] **Hilaire Belloc**, 'What was the Reformation?' **E. Curran**, 'Henrik Ibsen.' **A. S. Will**, 'Some Characteristics of Cardinal Gibbons.' **M. H. Lucy, Ph.D.**, 'Administration of the Parish Schools.' **L. Johnston**, 'His Eminence Cardinal Gibbons.' November.—**H. P. Russell**, 'Christendom and the Turk.' **C. O'Sullivan**, 'The Agreement Prior to Mixed Marriages.' **W. Turner, S.T.D.**, 'Pragmatism—What Does it Mean?' **Hon. Mrs. M. Scott**, 'A Sister-in-law of St. Francis de Sales.' **W. Elliott, C.S.P.**, 'Making a Virtue of Necessity.' **J. J. Walsh, M.D.**, 'Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist.' **F. W. Grafton, S.J.**, 'Belgian Catholics and their Schools.' December.—**H. P. Russell**, 'The Church and the Churches.' **Max Turmann, LL.D.**, 'The Social Apostolate in France.' **E. Hickey**, 'A Study of Browning's Saul.' **Hilaire Belloc**, 'What was the Reformation?' **Hon. Mrs. M. Scott**, 'A Sister-in-law of St. Francis de Sales.'

ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW. October, 1911.—**D. Barry, S.T.L.**, 'Possession in Moral Theology.' **C. Constantini**, 'Christian Symbolology.—III. Studies in Christian Art.' **J. B. Ceulemans**, 'American Materialism.—II. Studies in American Philosophy.' **H. Pope, O.P.**, 'The Origin of the Clementine Vulgate.' **B. Feeney**, 'The Seminary and Moral Training.' **G. Metlake**, 'Bishop Ketteler as a Defender of the Liberty and Authority of the Church.' November.—**B. Feeney**, 'Character Building in the Seminary. The Ideal Seminary.' **C. D. Maginnis**, 'Catholic Church Architecture in America. The Village, Town and City Churches.' **G. Metlake**, 'Bishop Ketteler and Labour.' **W. G. Flood**, 'St. Cecilia as Patroness of Music.' **A. B. O'Neill, C.S.C.**, 'Orthodoxy in the Pulpit.' **A. J. Maas, S.J.**, 'The English Protestant Version of the Bible After Three Hundred Years.'

LA CIENCIA TOMISTA. Nov.-Dic, 1911.—**G. A. Getino, O.P.**, 'El Maestro Francisco de Vitoria.' **Marín-Sóla, O.P.**, 'La homogeneidad de la doctrina católica.' **Gómez-Izquierdo**, 'Andrés Piquer y Arrufat.' **Mestre, O.P.**, 'El budismo y el basilidismo.' Boletines: —De Teología Moral; De Filosofía; De Derecho Eclesiástico.

THE MONTH. October, 1911.—**Rev. Herbert Thurston**, 'The Laity and the Unconsecrated Chalice.' [Shows that Holy Communion under one kind was introduced not through parsimony but through motives of reverence.] **Rev. A. Keogh**, 'The Encyclopedia Britannica and the History of the Church.' [Finds very serious fault with much of the treatment of Catholic subjects.] **Rev. Joseph Keating**, 'Monsignor Benson De Civitate Dei.' [A review of the Monsignor's two works: *The Dawn of All* (1911) and *The Lord of the World* (1907).] **W. M. Letts**, 'The Sin of Witchcraft.' Flotsam and Jetsam. Reviews. November.—**Rev. Sydney T. Smith**, 'The Ideas of a Chief Inspector of Schools.' **The Editor**, 'Science Maligned.' 'Anglicanism and the Supernatural.' [Belief in the supernatural is rapidly disappearing.] **Rev. Chas. Plater**, 'Popular Retreats in the Past.' [Shows that the idea of spiritual Retreats for the laity is not a new one.] Flotsam and Jetsam. Reviews. December.—**The Editor**, 'Cardinal Bourne.' **Rev. Sydney Smith**, 'The *Ne Temere* Decree.' **Virginia M. Crawford**, 'The Ethics of Shopping.' **Rev. Herbert Thurston**, 'The Sign of the Cross.' [A contribution towards the history of the use of the sacred sign.] **Rev. C. C. Martindale**, 'The "Word" of God: Pagan and Jewish Background.' **Rev. J. Keating**, 'Some Problems of Temperance Reform.' Flotsam and Jetsam. Reviews.

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY BULLETIN. October, 1911.—**Thos. J. Shahan**, 'Cardinal Gibbons and the University.' **William Turner**, 'Aristotle's Influence in Modern Times.' **Patrick J. Healy**, 'The Materialistic Interpretation of Early Christian History.' Book Reviews. University Chronicle.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL. Decennial Number. October, 1911.—**Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.P.**, 'Creative Evolution and Philosophic Doubt.' **Henri Bergson**, 'Life and Consciousness.' **Alfred Loisy**, 'The Christian Mystery.' **Adolf Harnack**, 'Greek and Christian Piety at the End of the Third Century.' **Rev. W. Sanday, D.D.**, 'The Apocalyptic Element in the Gospels.' **Prof. Henry Jones**, 'The Corruption of the Citizenship of the Working Man.' **Rev. J. E. Carpenter, D.D.**, 'The Sikh Religion.' **James Bissett Pratt**, 'The Religious Philosophy of William James.' **Rev. P. T. Forsyth, D.D.**, 'Revelation and Bible.' **Prof. Frank Thilly**, 'The Characteristics of the Present Age.'

PALESTINE EXPLORATION FUND. QUARTERLY STATEMENT. October, 1911.—'Notes and News.' **Dr. Duncan Mackenzie**, 'The Fund's Excavations at 'Ain Shems.' **Archdeacon Dowling**, 'The Georgian Church in Jerusalem.' **Rev. W. F. Birch, M.A.**, 'The City and

Tomb of David on Ophel (so-called).’ **J. M. Tenz**, ‘Calvary—Place of a Skull.’ **Adolph Datz**, ‘Meteorological Observations taken in Jerusalem, 1910.’ **Joseph Offord**, ‘Recent Literature.’

THE EXPOSITORY TIMES. October, 1911.—‘Notes of Recent Exposition.’ **Rev. J. M. Shaw**, ‘The Present Theological Situation.’ ‘Literature.’ **Rev. W. F. Corr, D.D.**, ‘The Gift of Healing in the Church.’ ‘Contributions and Comments.’ **Rev. W. Marwick**, ‘Religion at the Universal Races’ Congress.’ November.—**Rev. George Jackson, B.A.**, ‘The Missionary Idea in the Gospels.’ **Rev. James Strahan, M.A.**, ‘The Perfect Friendship.’ [Some considerations on John xv. 14-15.] **Rev. Robert Law, D.D.**, ‘Christ’s Teaching regarding Divorce.’ **Rev. Arthur Dakin, D.Th.**, ‘The Idea underlying the Eschatological Discourses of Our Lord.’ **Rev. A. H. Sayce, D.D.**, ‘The Jewish Papyri of Elephantine.’ ‘Contributions and Comments.’ December.—**Rev. F. W. Worsley, D.D.**, ‘The Sealed Book of the Apocalypse.’ **Rev. G. A. Frank Knight**, ‘Illustrations of Spiritual Truths from Gibbon’s “Decline and Fall”.’ Contributions and Comments.

THE JOURNAL OF THEOLOGICAL STUDIES. October, 1911.—**Sir Henry H. Howorth**, ‘The Influence of St. Jerome on the Canon of the Western Church.—III.’ Documents:—‘An Arian Sermon from a MS. in the Chapter Library of Verona,’ transcription by **Don Antonio Spagnolo**: introduction and notes by **C. H. Turner**. Notes and Studies: **W. H. Worrell**, ‘The Odes of Solomon and the Pistis Sophia.’ **H. St. J. Thackeray**, ‘The Poetry of the Greek Book of Proverbs.’ **P. J. Heawood**, ‘אִרְמֵיָהוּ and אִרְמֵיָהוּ.’ **H. G. Evelyn-White**, ‘The Introduction to the Oxyrrynchus Sayings.’ **C. H. Turner**, ‘Latin Lists of the Canonical Books.—III.’ **Rev. C. F. Burney, D.Litt.**, ‘On Certain South Palestinian Place-Names.’ **S. A. Cook**, ‘The Study of Composite Writings in the Old Testament.’ **Rev. A. S. Duncan Jones**, ‘The Nature of the Church: an account of a recent controversy’ [on the primitive Church between Harnack and Sohm]. Reviews. Chronicle.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY. October, 1911.—**E. Von Dobschütz**, ‘The Most Important Motives for Behavior in the Life of the Early Christians.’ **Henry P. Smith**, ‘The Hebrew View of Sin.’ **Benjamin B. Warfield**, ‘The “Two Natures” and Recent Christological Speculation: II. The New Testament Jesus the Only Real Jesus.’ **John Edward Le Bosquet**, ‘The Classification and Evolution of Miracle.’ **George Galloway**, ‘Religious Experience and Theological Development.’ Critical Notes: **George H. Gilbert**, ‘A Critique of Prof. Warfield’s article in the July number of this journal.’ **Shailer Mathews**, ‘Is Belief in the Historicity of Jesus Indispensable to Christian Faith?’ [‘Christian faith (in its fullest sense) will lose something of its essential character in proportion as it replaces the experiences of a genuinely historical Jesus with social values.’] **J. De Zwaan**, ‘Ignatius and the Odists.’ Recent Theological Literature.

THE EAST AND THE WEST. October, 1911.—**K. T. Paul, B.A.**, 'Indian Methods of Evangelisation.' **R. G. Wilkinson**, 'The Wild Tribes of British Malaya.' **Bishop Montgomery**, 'Japan.' **G. S. Eddy**, 'The Situation in China.' **Rev. D. MacGillivray**, 'The Need of More and Better Christian Literature in China.' **Rev. R. Allen**, 'The Will to Convert in Mission Schools.' **Rev. J. O. F. Murray**, 'The Board of Study for the Preparation of Missionaries.' **K. A. Houghton**, 'The Proposed South African College.' **Rev. H. Mathews**, 'Christian and Heathen Marriage in China.' **Rev. W. A. Norton**, 'The Need of Philological and Ethnological Training for the Mission Field.' **Mark Levy**, 'A Parable and its Interpretation.' Editorial Notes. Reviews.

THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW. October, 1911.—**B. B. Warfield**, 'On Faith in its Psychological Aspects.' **J. Oscar Boyd**, 'The Character and Claims of the Roman Catholic English Bible.' **E. G. Sihler**, 'The Religion of the Emperor Julian.' List of the Writings of Samuel Miller. Reviews of Recent Literature.

REVUE DES SCIENCES PHILOSOPHIQUES ET THEOLOGIQUES. October, 1911.—**H.-H. Noble, O.P.**, 'Le Plaisir et la Joie.' **A. de Poulpiquet, O.P.**, 'Apologétique et Théologie.' **R.-M. Martin, O.P.**, 'La Question du Péché Originel dans Saint Anselme (1099-1100).' **A. Gardell, O.P.**, 'La Topicité.' Bulletins. Chronique. Recension des Revues.

ANNALES DE PHILOSOPHIE CHRETIENNE. October, 1911.—**L. Ollé-Laprune**, 'La Philosophie au Collège.' **L. Canet**, 'Pascal et la Théologie.' **A. Leger**, 'La Doctrine de Wesley' (*suite*). Bibliographie, etc. November.—**V. Delbos**, 'Le Problème religieux dans la Philosophie de l'Action.' **L. Canet**, 'Un Peintre: Eugène Carrière.' **A. Leger**, 'La Doctrine de Wesley' (*fin*). Bibliographie, etc.

REVUE THOMISTE. Novembre-Décembre, 1911.—**R. P. Hedde, O.P.**, 'Nécessité de la théologie spéculative ou scolastique.' **C. Huit**, 'Les éléments platoniciens de la doctrine de Saint Thomas.' **R. P. Cazes, O.P.**, 'La philosophie moderniste (2^e art.).' **R. P. Melizan, O.P.**, 'L'hypothèse de la génération spontanée (2^e art.).' **R. P. Martin, O.P.**, 'Tauleriana.' **R. P. Ferret, O.P.**, 'Chronique d'Écriture sainte.' **L. Crouzie**, 'Chronique de droit ecclésiastique.' Revue analytique des Revues.

REVUE D'HISTOIRE ECCLESIASTIQUE. Octobre, 1911.—**Callewaert**, 'La méthode dans la recherche de la base juridique des premières persécutions.' **Bril**, 'Les premiers temps du christianisme en Suède. Etude critique des sources littéraires hambourgeoises.' **Fournier**, 'Le décret de Burchard de Worms. Ses caractères, son influence.' **Van Isacker**, 'Notes sur l'intervention militaire de Clément VIII. en France à la fin du XVI^e siècle. Comptes Rendus. Chronique. Bibliographie.

REVUE BENEDICTINE. Juillet-Octobre, 1911.—**Quentin**, 'Manuscripts démembrés.' **Bihlmeyer**, 'Un texte interpolé de l'apocalypse de Thomas.' **Chapman**, 'Cassiodorus and the Echternach Gospels.' **Morin**, 'I. Liturgie et basiliques de Rome au milieu du vii^e siècle d'après les listes d'Evangiles de Würzburg. II. Le Pseudo-Bède sur les Psaumes et l'opus super Psalterium de maître Manegold de Lautenbach.' **Wilmart**, 'I. Le Psautier de la Reine N. 11. Sa provenance et sa date. II. L'âge et le bordre des messes de Mone.' **Denis**, 'D. Vincent Marsolle 4^e Supérieur général de la Congrégation de Saint Maur.' Notes et Documents. Comptes Rendus. Notes Bibliographiques.

ANALECTA BOLLANDIANA.—**Peeters**, 'S. Romain le néo-martyr d'après un document géorgien.' **Poncelet**, 'Les actes de S. Privat du Gévaudan.' **Serruys**, 'La patrie de S. Socrate.' **Zach**, 'S. I. Egeria ou Aetheria?' **Delahaye**, 'Les saints d'Aboukir.' Bulletin des publications hagiographiques.

BIBLISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT. Neunter Jahrgang, viertes Heft.—**Prof. Dr. Sebastian Euringer**, 'Die ägyptischen und keilinschriftlichen Analogien zum Funde des Codex Helciae (4 Kg 22 u. 2 Chr 34). II. Die ägyptischen Analogien im Vergleich mit den biblischen Berichten.' **Prof. Dr. Heinrich Donat**, 'Mich 2, 6—9.' **Fritz Zimmermann**, 'Religionsgeschichtliches zu Ex 8, 15 (19).' **P. Hubert, Klug O. M. Cap.**, 'Ist die Heilung des Beamtensohnes Jo 4, 46 ff das zweite Wunder Jesu in Galiläa?' **Prof. Dr. Max Meinertz**, 'Zur Frage nach der Anwesenheit des Verräters Judas bei der Einsetzung der Eucharistie.' **Joseph Sickenberger**, 'Das neue Dekret der Bibelkommission über das Mt-Evangelium und die sog. Zweiquellentheorie.' **Ch. Sigwalt**, 'Die Chronologie der syrischen Baruchapokalypse.' Eine andere Erläuterung von dem "Besitzer des Bluntakers" (Ch. Sigwalt). Besprechungen: Lagrange, Evangile selon Saint Marc (K. Kastner). Bibliographische Notizen (C. Das Neue Testament). Mitteilungen und Nachrichten. Verzeichnis der Autoren, deren Werke in den bibliographischen Notizen angezeigt wurden (P. Fellerer).

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
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The Supernatural.—I.

IN this and subsequent papers I purpose to explain the Catholic idea or theory of "the supernatural" as distinguished from "nature" or "the natural," to point out some important applications of the theory in the interpretation and defence of revealed truth, and to discuss certain aspects of opposing naturalistic theories.

I should begin by stating that my purpose is not directly controversial or apologetical, but simply explanatory. It is true, of course, that the mere explanation of an idea is often its best defence, and this, I believe, will be found to be the case in regard to the idea of the supernatural. At any rate it is necessary to explain the idea before putting it on trial, and this is what I aim at in this paper.

I should further state that on the readers' part the subject ought to be approached from the standpoint of the Catholic creed. It is not too much to ask unbelievers or non-Catholic believers to try to enter hypothetically into this standpoint, and it is only by doing so that they can realise the meaning and importance of the supernatural idea in Catholic teaching—where alone its full meaning is consistently maintained—or can test its ultimate value as a theory. They need not admit that the facts and doctrines contained in the creed, or the philosophic theism underlying them, are true; they need only try to understand these correctly, as Catholic theologians and philosophers explain them, and, looking at them *as if* they were true, try to see how the theory of the supernatural is involved in them, much as other scientific theories are involved in the data with which they deal; and how when it is evolved it serves to illuminate them and solve many of the difficulties usually urged against them. For Catholics also it is important to recall this standpoint. For the doctrines of faith come before the theory of the supernatural, by the aid of which they are interpreted; and perhaps the majority of Catholics believe them without any such explicit aid. For educated Catholics, however, the aid of a theory which enables them to meet many of the rational difficulties frequently urged

against doctrines of faith ought not to be neglected by those who have charge of instructing them.

I.

The word "supernatural" does not at first mention convey any very precise meaning to the average man. It is a word that is often vaguely and sometimes erroneously used. A lengthy list of such instances might be compiled, especially from non-Catholic writers, and a warning entered against them; but an easier and more effective way to ensure definiteness and accuracy of meaning is to follow the usage of the Catholic schools, only noticing incidentally, as the explanation proceeds, a few important divergent usages.

To say that supernatural means "above the natural," "above nature," does not lead us far in determining its technical scientific meaning. The questions at once arise: What is understood by "nature" or "the natural" in this connexion? How and in what sense is the supernatural *above* nature? How is it related to the nature which it transcends? What is it in itself? And these questions must be answered with some fulness before we can define the supernatural.

II.

We have first of all, then, to determine what is meant by "nature," which the supernatural is said to be above. Now nature may be taken either as a general name to denote the whole collection of created beings, the whole created universe, the cosmos as distinct from God; or it may be taken as a particular name to designate a particular class of created being. And taking it in this second sense we see at once that what is above the nature of one being or class of being may belong to the nature of another or be natural to that other. Thus a tree by nature possesses perfections and capacities which a stone does not possess; a horse in like manner is above a tree, and man above a horse. We might, therefore, conceivably speak of what is natural in a tree as supernatural in a stone, of what is natural in a horse as supernatural in a tree, of what is natural in man as supernatural in a horse; but, as a matter of fact, no particular nature lower than a man's has been taken as a term of comparison for the supernatural. In legitimate usage nothing

that is not at least superhuman may be described as supernatural. Ordinarily, however, it is not by reference to any particular nature that something is said to be supernatural, but by reference to nature as a general or universal term—not by reference to inanimate, or to animal, or to human nature separately, but in reference to them all collectively; and that alone is said to be supernatural which is above them all, and therefore above the highest in the collection.

Here it may be well in passing to enter a *caveat*. Nature as a general term is often used by scientists to designate the purely sensible or material world which it is the proper object of the physical sciences to investigate. Now there is no reason for objecting to this use of the term unless it is intended to be exclusive—intended to imply that the spiritual or supersensible is non-existent or unknowable. But this implication is sometimes intended by materialists, who for the purpose of discrediting the spiritual speak of it as supernatural. This is clearly an abuse of language which in the interest of true science must be reprobated. The world as we know it includes man himself, and all that belongs to his constitution must be included in the general concept of nature. But man is a spiritual being; he has in him a spiritual principle, the human soul, and spiritual powers, intellect and free will; and the spiritual or supersensible as exemplified in man has just the same right to be included in nature as anything that is purely material.

So far reason would lead us. But revelation introduces us to the angels, who, being purely spiritual creatures, are higher in the scale of being than man; and taking them into account we have in the whole created universe three great categories of being—the material which is the lowest in grade of perfection, the angelic or purely spiritual which is the highest, and man himself who is a composite of matter and spirit and holds an intermediate place. Here is an additional reason for refusing to identify the supernatural with the spiritual, and a reason also for enlarging the inclusiveness of nature as a universal term. For the angels have a nature of their own, higher than man's, as man's is higher than the brute's; and just as what is above the nature of a brute may be natural in man, so what is above the nature of man may be natural in an angel. If we wish then to be strictly universal in our reference to created nature we shall

no longer describe as supernatural what is superhuman unless it is also superangelic. Nature in comparison with which something is said to be supernatural will mean the entire created universe with all its perfections and powers. It is true, indeed, that even Catholic theologians sometimes use the word supernatural to describe what is merely superhuman without being superangelic; but this is not the usage of the best theologians, who for the sake of distinction prefer to describe such a thing as "preternatural." Thus if we assume for the sake of illustration that certain alleged phenomena of spiritism are true as objective facts, and that they cannot be explained without recurring to angelic (*i.e.*, diabolical) agency, their proper technical designation would be preternatural not supernatural.

III.

The next question is : In what sense is the supernatural above nature, taking nature in the comprehensive sense just explained? Nature in this sense includes the whole created universe, and what is above it must be divine, must refer in some way to God. Is it, then, to the divine activity involved in creation and conservation, or to the divine perfections imperfectly copied and reflected in creatures, or to the divine purpose to which creatures severally and collectively conform—is it to this that the supernatural refers? It might seem at first sight that nothing else is left to which the supernatural could possibly refer. But on a closer view it will be seen that, from the theistic standpoint, this reference, these relations to God, belong to the adequate concept of the created universe as a cosmos or ordered whole, are involved in the notion of nature as I have described it. All creatures have been brought into being by God; all are essentially dependent on Him not merely for their existence, but for their power to act; whatever perfections they possess are but finite participations of His infinite perfection; whatever laws they obey are of His ordering; whatever purposes they fulfil are of His designing; He is their first cause and their last end; and as no conception of the universe is adequate that does not include its essential relations to the first cause and last end, it follows that we cannot exclude God from the plan or order

of nature. It is true, of course, and must always be remembered, that God is above nature in the sense that He is distinct from and independent of it, and infinitely surpasses it in every kind of perfection. Pantheism, which would identify God with nature, is a contradiction and absurdity. But it is true, on the other hand, that God is immanent in nature, and that He is not above nature in any sense that would involve a denial of His immanence. Though we cannot conceive God as in any way necessitated to create, yet supposing the fact that He has freely chosen to call creatures into being for a purpose worthy of His infinite wisdom, it follows that He is bound by the terms of His own choice not merely to endow creatures in the beginning with the perfections proper to their several natures, but to sustain and support them and provide them with all that is necessary to enable them to work out their destiny. Hence whatever God gives to His creatures, whatever He does for them, whatever He owes to them, according to the terms of this relation, is a necessary part of the plan or order of the universe, and should therefore be described as natural rather than supernatural. The supernatural, therefore, as understood by Catholic theologians, does not refer to God considered precisely as creator, or to His relations towards creatures which necessarily follow from the fact of creation. It would be an abuse of language to speak of creation itself as supernatural, there being *ex hypothesi* no created nature in existence that could serve as a term of comparison. And, though God's continued contact with creatures after creation, His immanence and activity in the universe considered as the sequel of creation might be called supernatural in opposition to pantheistic theories, yet for the reasons given it is preferably described as natural. The assertion and defence of it is not peculiar to Christianity, but belongs to every system of theism; its recognition is the foundation of natural as distinguished from revealed religion.

It is in this connexion, perhaps, that the word supernatural is most frequently abused. Creation itself, divine concurrence with created causes, divine providence and other conclusions of theistic philosophy and natural religion are often referred to by Agnostics as if they necessarily involved supernaturalism, and the vagueness with which

non-Catholic theists sometimes speak of the supernatural encourages this confusion. But in Catholic theology the essential relations of creatures to God are considered to belong to the natural order, and it is only relations which transcend this order—which are not logically involved in creation—that are said to be supernatural. The order of nature, then, as Catholic theologians understand it, includes a number of things. It includes (1) the essences or substantial natures of all created beings, material, spiritual or composite; (2) those perfections and powers that belong to the integrity of the various classes of being, and may be found in varying degrees in different individuals of the class; (3) a certain latitude for development and progress on the lines of perfection proper to each class; (4) an end or destiny proportionate to the nature and capacity of each, and which, in the case of rational creatures, is to be worked out by free personal effort; and (5) whatever aid or support or protection from God—whatever divine providential activity—is needed to accomplish the general purpose of the universe and render the special destiny of rational creatures reasonably easy of attainment. All these things are necessary as the sequel of creation; all are due from God as the author of nature; all, in a word, are *natural*. Now the supernatural is that which transcends this order of nature, which does not belong or is not due to any creature by the title of creation, but which, if it is given by God, implies a new and gratuitous benefit, a free favour, to which no creature has an antecedent claim. The supernatural order presupposes the natural and adds to it a new series or class of relations between God and creatures. It implies exercises of divine power for the benefit of creatures in ways they could not expect. It implies the bestowal upon them of perfections by which their nature is raised above its own plane of development, endowed with a new capacity for leading a higher kind of life, and directed to a higher kind of destiny than mere creaturely aspirations could anticipate.

From all this it is clear that while putting the supernatural above nature or the natural order we do not imply that there is any opposition between them. One is *above* the other, not *contrary* to it. In the order of nature itself we distinguish the higher from the lower without making

them antagonistic or mutually exclusive. The spiritual, for example, and the material exist side by side in man. And similarly the relation between nature and the supernatural is one of mutual harmony. The supernatural does not take away or destroy the natural order or interfere with its essential laws. It exalts and sublimates nature, but leaves it intact in its naturalness. It adds a great deal but takes away nothing. It is important to emphasise this point, because a great deal of the prejudice against the supernatural in many minds is due to a misunderstanding. It is imagined that the supernatural is equivalent to the contranatural, and in many cases nothing more is required by way of proving the antecedent possibility of the supernatural than to correct this misapprehension. Those who recognise a personal God as the author of the existing universe must also recognise the order of nature as I have described it—as involving, that is, a multiplicity of relations between God and creatures. But they must also admit that, if God is really infinite—and a finite God is a contradiction—His power is not exhausted by the actual results of creation, nor His free dominion in bestowing His gifts limited to any particular measure or degree. Having created the actual universe He owes it indeed to His own wisdom to maintain it in orderly existence; but if out of special good-will towards rational creatures He chooses to add to the benefits of creation, it cannot be said that such condescension is unworthy of infinite wisdom.

IV.

I come now to the third question: What is the supernatural in itself? So far I have been describing it from the negative standpoint, telling what it is not rather than what it is. Turning now to the positive standpoint we need only recall some of the principal facts in the Catholic creed in order to see that the subject is full of mystery and that we cannot fully comprehend or explain what the supernatural is in itself. The Incarnation furnishes the highest instance of supernatural elevation of which we can conceive a creature to be capable, and until we comprehend this mystery we cannot comprehend what the supernatural in its fulness is. We can describe, indeed, and partially

realise its effects. A human nature, a body and soul like our own, is united to the divine nature in the person of the Son of God in so intimate and mysterious a way that, without ceasing to be truly human, it becomes as literally the property of the second divine person as my nature is the property of my person. God the Son is true man, and the man Jesus is true God. It is well for us to begin with this highest and most mysterious example of the supernatural, since all lesser realisations of it bear some analogy, or at least some external relation, to the Incarnation. Sanctifying grace makes men the adopted sons of God, after the analogy of Christ's natural sonship; it deifies them in a measure remotely resembling the literal deity of Christ; and the measure of this deification will be increased in the beatific vision—the vision of God face to face—which is promised to those who die in the state of grace. But, knowledge of these mysterious privileges, as of the mystery of the Incarnation, being beyond the reach of man's natural powers, it was necessary that God should make them known supernaturally, pledging His authority for their truth by such public signs of divine power as would rationally justify belief in them on the part of well-disposed men. Here we come down to the question of revelation and of miracles as proofs of revelation—to what are by comparison the lowest and least mysterious instances of the supernatural. They belong to the providential inauguration of the supernatural order and are, therefore, supernatural; but, that their *rationale* may be properly understood, they should be viewed in their connexion with those mysteries to which allusion has been made and which they serve to introduce to our knowledge. Having made this observation let me now try to illustrate the positive meaning and content of the supernatural idea by glancing briefly at the ascending series of supernatural facts.

Revelation, or the making known of some truth directly by God, is, as a means of knowledge, beyond what is due to rational creatures. Having given them by nature faculties by which they can acquire all needful knowledge, the Creator was not bound to speak directly to them and tell them what they could learn for themselves, much less add new information concerning the inner mysteries of His own life and being. Having put the book of nature into their

hands and given them power to read and interpret its pages and solve its important problems, God was not bound further to facilitate the study by giving them in advance the answers to the problems proposed. Men might perhaps hope that God's loving kindness would move Him to do something of this kind, but they would not venture to demand it as a right—at least not such a revelation as has actually been given in Christ. Even if revelation contained nothing more than what created intelligence could discover for itself, it would still in a sense be supernatural; as a process or method of instruction it would imply a gratuitous favour. But when revelation brings with it a great addition to the sum of natural knowledge—particularly when the mysterious secrets of divine being are made known—it is supernatural by a double title. Such in fact is the Christian revelation.

Miracles generally accompany revelation as an easy and obvious way of authenticating it. We can indeed conceive a revelation duly authenticated for the individual who receives it without miracles of the sensible order, but a public and historical revelation intended for all mankind should be guaranteed by fitting external manifestations of divine power—the bearer of the message from on high should prove his claim to speak in the name of God by evidence such as Christ has given. I am not here concerned with the validity of the claim of Christianity to be a true revelation guaranteed by undoubted miracles. I merely wish to point out how the general idea of the supernatural as something peculiarly divine—as involving some free or gratuitous exercise of divine bounty—is verified in revelation and in miracles; and I need hardly add that in these instances also the general principle holds good that the supernatural does not destroy nature or abrogate its essential laws. This is obvious in regard to revelation, while as regards miracles it is only necessary to set aside the false assumption that a miracle involves the suspension or abrogation of some law of nature, taking laws to mean the innate forces or tendencies at work in nature as distinct from the observed results they uniformly produce when no higher cause interferes to alter these results. Man himself is constantly interfering in this way to modify and control the workings of nature, and if it is not beyond his power nor

unworthy of his intelligence to do so for useful ends, surely it is within the power and worthy of the wisdom of God to do so still more effectively in order that man may recognise and confess Him. But as a man does not abolish the force of gravity when he throws up a stone in the air, so neither does God, when He works a miracle, abolish any of the forces of nature which He Himself created.

Did the supernatural, however, include nothing higher than revelation and miracles, it would still, indeed, deserve to be considered a striking proof of divine bounty, but it would fall very far short of the full sublimity of the Christian system. Revelation in itself is something objective and external, and faith, which is its subjective counterpart, would in any system imply a manner of knowledge not strictly due to the creature. But we might conceive a revelation that would be limited to objects of knowledge and love otherwise natural, and a corresponding faith that would not possess the dignity of Christian faith. *De facto*, however, revelation has been given for the purpose of bringing us into possession of objects of knowledge and love entirely beyond the natural range of human or angelic faculties, and the faith by which we accept that revelation has a specially transcendent character by reason of the hope and charity that are built upon it and the destiny to which it leads. The function and value of faith in the supernatural economy which God has revealed are set forth in the revelation itself. It is not a mere improved method or process for the training and development of our natural powers of intelligence; it is the beginning in us of a new life, moral as well as intellectual, on a plane above the natural—a life which in its fulness is divine rather than creaturely. This life begun by faith is further developed by hope and charity here on earth and its consummation is promised in the glory and happiness of heaven, where God Himself, infinite truth and goodness, will be the immediate object of contemplation and love for eternity. Here only do we reach the real inwardness of the supernatural idea, which we must try to realise a little more clearly, though from the very nature of the case we cannot at present comprehend it in all its mysterious grandeur. We can comprehend it only when the light of glory illumines our souls. That it is far above our highest anticipations and beyond

our present power to describe or conceive we know from the experience of saints like St. Paul, to whom glimpses of its splendour have been granted in ecstasy here below.

The supernatural destiny, from which the whole character of the supernatural life takes its colour, consists in seeing God face to face, and this vision of Him is called the beatific vision, because in it centres the happiness of eternal life. Hence what is true of the beatific vision is true also, in a less perfect degree, of the life of grace on earth—the life of faith, hope and charity by which men may merit that vision.

Now, the beatific vision is revealed to us as entirely different from our present manner of knowing God. We know Him now only mediately through creatures; we have no direct face to face perception of His infinite essence in itself—in its proper character as divine. Even faith, which enlarges the objects, does not change the manner of our knowledge in this respect. We still *reason* about God and *believe* in Him, but we do not *see* Him. He is not present to the mind as clearly and directly as are objects of vision to the eye. We do not realise His presence—even that supernatural presence which grace establishes in the soul—with the same vivid and compelling consciousness as we realise our personal existence. We do not apprehend His essence and attributes with the same ease or the same intuitive clearness as we apprehend the truth that two and two make four. Our knowledge of Him is indeed certain enough, but it is not immediate, direct, intuitive, simple and clear; it is remote, roundabout, complex and obscure. But in the beatific vision we shall see Him as He is in Himself, as we see the sun in the heavens. No veil will hide Him, no cloud obscure Him. We shall be as intimately and forcibly conscious of Him as of our own personalities. We shall gaze directly into the ocean of divine infinity and see therein distinctly the mysteries of His inner being. We shall not, indeed, penetrate with our finite vision the strictly infinite depths of His essence, but we shall see Him in a finite degree even as He sees Himself. He will admit us, as it were, to share in His own inner consciousness, in the intimate secrets of His mind and will. In a word, we shall be brought so near to Him and made so like to Him that we shall in a sense be deified, that our knowledge and love

of Him, and our life in friendly union with Him, will be no longer merely creaturely but divine. For that such a destiny is higher than any creature could claim as the necessary goal of its existence would seem to be as clear as that creaturely existence itself is contingent. God need not have created rational beings at all, but having created them He need not have so wonderfully exalted them. Some idea of the peculiarly divine and deifying character of the beatific vision may be formed by considering in ourselves the secretness and inviolability of our innermost consciousness. No other creature can look into our souls and see there those secrets which we wish to guard; knowledge of the secrets of the human heart is represented in revealed teaching as the proper prerogative of God. And if this is so in our case, what must be the inviolability of the secrets of God Himself? Yet these secrets are to be communicated in the beatific vision, and in order to render us capable of apprehending them our souls must be endowed with a new and mysterious power or perfection called the light of glory. This light will replace the gift of faith by which we cling to God as obscurely revealed to us in the present life and the gift of hope by which we strive after the secure possession of Him to which faith bids us look forward.

Faith and hope, then, as perfected by charity, are the principles or powers of the supernatural life here on earth. By them alone can we attain to the beatific vision. They are means to an end, and have the same supernatural character as the end to which they lead. As for pursuit of an end that would be natural, man is endowed with intellect and free will, powers which enable him to lead a *moral* life, so in view of his supernatural destiny he is given faith, hope and charity, new powers which enable him further to lead a *holy* life; and as in the natural order he would need the divine *concursus*, so in the supernatural order he needs *actual grace*. Of these gifts faith is the fundamental; and it is a grace or gratuitous gift which God is not bound to bestow except by the law of free bounty. It gives us, so to speak, the first turn towards God as He is to be seen in the beatific vision. It refers us directly to Him, and bids us rely on His authority for the truths He teaches rather than on the motives which the natural exercise of our reason would supply; and it presents Him to us in the mysteries

of revelation in a way that dimly and remotely suggests the intuition of the beatific vision. The Blessed Trinity, for instance, is one of those inner mysteries of God's being into which we shall be privileged to gaze; the mere knowledge of the existence of the mystery is a remote and partial communication of what will be more fully communicated hereafter. And in this we may see a reason why mysteries at present beyond our comprehension are included in revelation, with an obligation upon us to believe them. It is not to baffle and bewilder us they are revealed, but to lead us to await with docile hope the promise of a more perfect enlightenment.

But if faith is fundamental in the supernatural life of earth, by itself it is only the foundation. And hope is but a complement of faith, a ground course on this first foundation. The main edifice consists in charity or sanctifying grace, by which the soul, freed from sin and adorned with every beauty, is made a worthy temple for the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, and the deification of human nature is properly begun. It is only in rare and exceptional mystic states that the mysterious change brought about by the presence of sanctifying grace in the soul is clearly and vividly realised, but it is none the less true that such a change really takes place in the soul of every believer who is justified. An intimate union with God is established which confers a new dignity on man's person, a new value on his acts, a new inner character on his whole life. The just man is no longer a mere man, but the adopted son of God and the adopted brother of Christ. He lives, now not he, but Christ liveth in Him. The divine-human life which was Christ's by nature is communicated in a measure to every man on earth who has sanctifying grace in his soul, and will be communicated more fully in heaven.

And thus in trying to realise what the supernatural is in itself, in its external and internal exemplifications in human history and human life, we are led back in the end to the mystery with which we began—the mystery of the Incarnation, which is its highest conceivable exemplification and the type of all other exemplifications. It is true, of course—and this must always be borne in mind to guard against exaggerations of mysticism—that neither by grace in this life nor by the beatific vision in the next are men so

intimately united to God as to lose their own proper personalities, whereas in the Incarnation the human personality that ordinarily goes with a human nature is replaced by the divine personality of the Son God, so that the man Christ is true God, and God the Son is true man. But this difference, however vitally important for the proper understanding of revealed truth, does not forbid the analogy on which I am insisting and on which it is important to insist in presenting a general view of the supernatural for sympathetic consideration and acceptance. Those who believe in the Incarnation and look upon it in its true perspective as the great central fact in the whole economy of salvation, cannot consistently object to those lower and less mysterious instances of the supernatural of which I have spoken; nor, prejudices and misapprehensions apart, ought they to have any difficulty at the present day in accepting the Catholic theory of the supernatural and various applications of it to be noticed later on. In this connexion the fact is significant that decay of faith in the Incarnation among non-Catholic sectaries has followed the widespread perversion of the supernatural idea which came in with the Reformation. Of this there will be more to say in a subsequent paper.

V.

By way of conclusion to the present paper it may be well to recapitulate very briefly the principal points I have tried to explain. The natural as distinguished from the supernatural was given a comprehensive meaning. It was taken to include everything involved in the adequate concept of the universe in itself and in its necessary relations to God, its first cause and last end—to include, therefore, not merely the essences, properties, and active powers of created beings, but also their rights against God, or His obligations towards them, arising from the fact of creation; the right, for instance, to be conserved in existence, to be aided in action, to be guided to a destiny proportionate to the nature and perfection of each. And the supernatural was described as being whatever God does for His (rational) creatures, whatever He bestows upon them in addition to what is thus reasonably due. Gratuity, therefore, or non-indebtedness

on the part of God was laid down as the distinguishing characteristic of the supernatural. This, it was admitted, is a somewhat negative way of describing it, but it is the way best suited to our present powers of comprehension and to the use we shall have to make of the idea in the rational explanation and defence of certain doctrines of the creed. When we try to realise what the supernatural is in itself, in its positive character and content, we run directly into the region of the mysterious; and whatever length we may safely go in our effort to understand it, we shall be compelled in the end to return to the original point of view and announce as the clearest and most certain result of our study that, whatever they may be in themselves, some of God's gifts and promises to His creatures are without doubt gratuitous. We can see far enough into their mysterious sublimity to assure ourselves of this, and revealed teaching endorses our conclusion. From the Incarnation in which the gratuity of God's loving condescension most transcendently appears we descend to consider it as manifested, less transcendently indeed but quite convincingly, in the destiny actually allotted to mankind and the graces given to lead on to that destiny, be these the internal graces of faith, hope and charity or the external graces of revelation and miracles. We have thus a whole scheme or economy proposed for our acceptance, and we welcome it all the more thankfully because our reason recognises it as supernatural. We do not first think out a theory of the supernatural and then proceed to invent facts and doctrines to fit the theory. On the contrary, both logically and historically, the facts and doctrines of the Catholic creed are antecedent to the Catholic theory of the supernatural, which is based upon and deduced from them, and is formulated for the purpose of explaining their internal coherency and justifying their rational acceptance.

P. J. TONER.

The Economics of a Florentine Archbishop.¹

THE economics of St. Antonino (1389-1459) are a hidden wonder, for the separation of time and place has not robbed them of that splendour which makes him shine out from the gloom of the past as one of the greatest of all Archbishops.

Even when he was but Prior of the Dominican Convent of St. Marco, he had inaugurated one of Florence's most characteristic charities, one that is, that her restless character rendered necessary. After action and reactions, in 1436 the Medici had climbed up to the seat of power, and Cosimo was determined that this time he would establish a dynasty. Now, whereas other would-be tyrants sought to crush their foes by assassination and judicial murders, he, with crafty foresight, chose a weapon more deadly and efficient. The ruin would be greater, because the root and source of his rival's power would be destroyed. "He employed taxes," says a chronicler, "as other princes used daggers, to rid himself of his opponents." His aristocratic rivals had replaced the older system of arbitrary assessment by an arrangement called the *catasto* by which each citizen reported, under penalty of confiscation, his income and was taxed on it at the rate of seven *per cent.*, and this declaration of income was renewed every three years. But this equitable form of taxation was now done away with, and Cosimo went back to the more ancient and unjust assessment by the ruling body graduated, not according to income supposed or declared, but according to political opinions. The result was, inevitably, to bring ruin into the palaces of the anti-Mediceans. To St. Antonino this was a noticeable grievance, even though he was living in Cosimo's monastery of St. Marco and on Cosimo's bounty, for the distress of the

¹ From a Life of St. Antonino, to be published by Messrs. Longman, Green & Co. Reference should be made to *Die Volkswirtschaftlichen Anschauungen Antonins von Florenz* by Carl Ilgher. Paderborn, 1904.

poor, who were too proudly-born to beg and too ruinously taxed to do anything but starve in silence, was crying out in the streets.

He, therefore, appealed to twelve citizens and called them to a meeting at St. Marco. Their names are happily known to us and their trades no less, for they show the complete potency of the evil and the hold, too, that St. Antonino possessed on the entire city. Among them were the political enemies and friends of the Medici, the Strozzi and the Salviati; there were notaries, drapers, silk-mercers, a shearer, and a bootmaker. Before these he laid his scheme. This was to divide the city up into six districts, over each of which two of the twelve were to be appointed, whose duties would be to collect funds, to seek out the cases deserving of help, and to disburse the monies in their own divisions. Especially were they to direct their attentions to those most needy and least likely to complain, the *poveri vergognosi*, the shame-faced poor. Their headquarters were in the little Church of St. Martino, their directors the friars of St. Marco, their title the *Provveditori dei poveri vergognosi*; but the simple populace knew them only and call them even to-day the *Buonomini di St. Martino*, the good men of St. Martin.

Nothing was to lie outside the scope of their charity; doctor's bills, sick nurses, dowries for marriageable daughters, premiums for a lad's apprenticeship, the redemption of pawn-tickets, gifts of bed clothing, food and money were part of their material aids, while the visiting of the sick, the consoling of the faint-hearted, the staunching of sorrow's wide-gaping wounds, the spiritual comfort of prayers, masses, sacraments, completed the architectonic chivalry of this organisation. To show, moreover, his entire independence of all save charity, which is love, and God is love, St. Antonino added two further injunctions: (i.) that the monies received from benefactors were never to be funded, but simply taken and spent, for it showed want of delicacy to traffic with the alms of the faithful; (ii.) that no authority, civil or ecclesiastical, was ever to demand an account of the sums received or expended, nor to attempt to take upon itself the direction of the society. Both injunctions the Government of Florence has at times in its history endeavoured unsuccessfully to set aside, but the

continuance of this charity for five hundred years on the lines laid down by St. Antonino, and its failure whenever it has been at all amended, are pragmatic proofs of the wisdom of the sainted Prior.

As Archbishop, he had a more extended sphere of labour; and was not one to neglect the ever-widening field which grew before him as he toiled onwards to the sunset and the dawn. Hardly had a year passed in his episcopal office, when one of those recurring mediæval plagues attacked the city very fiercely. The Saint has told us of the horrors of the visitation. He has not told us of his heroic attempts to mitigate them. We are fortunate, however, in possessing accounts left by others who watched the gentle old man leading his mule round the city, up and down its twisting, scrambling streets, carrying in panniers to the poor and sick and dying what might be of most need. Wine and bread and vegetables, medicines and the incomparable Food of Angels were thus constantly at hand to be given out to the people. Is there wonder, then, that the simple folk recalled in his regard the perfect example of the Master, who did all things well, in miracle-working mercy walking the streets and lanes of Palestine, the cobbled rise and fall of Jerusalem's traffic-ways, and the ribbon-like glaring roads of white crushed stone which drove their paths over the hills and through the reaches of golden corn and scarlet poppy and dew-drenched lilies of the field?

It is by these and other astonishing acts of charity that the name of St. Antonino has become a household pride in Florence. The *Spedale de' Innocenti*, famous also for another reason, still cries out his name in the street. It was founded, it is true, years before by Leonardo Bruni of Arezzo, the great literary glory of early Florentine Renaissance. But it was not opened till 1444, and thenceforward St. Antonino took it under his protection. He was always very fond of children, delicate child as he had himself been, innocent he remained till he passed to where beyond these voices there is no more sin. And he saw here a useful institution at a time when public morality was already untying, with its worship of the human form divine, the bonds that held society together, for it was to house and tend the little ones born out of wedlock and left to the public charge for their existence. So Luca and Andrea

della Robbia made its walls alive with their exquisite little babies, whose fascinating beauty, made the more appealing by the winsome gesture of out-stretched hands, continuously calls upon the passer-by for alms.

To such an extent has the legend of the holy Archbishop coloured all the good-works of Florence, that by many he is acclaimed the founder of this Spedale. But of this, there is no historical justification at all.

A similar enterprise, but one which even more clearly shows his handiwork, is the Bigallo. Originally begun by another Dominican for another purpose, by St. Peter Martyr for a military order whose aim should be the forcible reduction of the anti-social Paterini, it was turned by him to a gentler use. The Paterini had all gone, perhaps because the knights had seen to that, or perhaps because the dependance on Rome which Florence from time to time found so necessary made heresy an unremunerative commercial speculation. In any case the Paterini had ceased to be of interest, and the knights had outlived their serviceableness. In fact the whole establishment had become somehow merged into the famous Burial Confraternity of the Brothers of Pity, whose high-raised hoods of black, with the gruesome-seeming eyeholes, at once revealing and concealing, may still be noted on their errands of mercy. However, St. Antonino wanted an orphanage for poor children. Here seemed a likely place, almost unoccupied. So he established an institution (though that hard-sounding phrase scarcely describes the smoothly moving home he set up) for the lost, vagabond and orphaned boys and girls of Florence.

His passion then was for the poor. All he had was to be at their disposal, for, Archbishop though he was, he still retained upon himself the vows of a Dominican friar, whereby he was wedded to Poverty. His time was put out for their employment, his eloquence pleaded for them in the councils of the citizens, his pen championed their cause amid the graver gatherings of moral theologians, his memory hunted through the long winding corridors of its astounding persistence for texts from Sacred Scripture, writings of the Fathers, decretals of Popes wherewith to assail the vulgar worship of wealth, his will broke through the crusted tradition of a hundred years and put on the

vesture of liberality. Perhaps to our modern ideas of things beautiful and becoming, and even it may well be to a generation which could be wooed and gladdened by the delicious fruits and flowers of the exquisite della Robbia, he went to excess, for he pulled up the garden which backed upon the Archiepiscopal Palace and scattered its lovely blossoms and drove a spade through the soft-grassed lawns of its Cathedral close and planted therein a host of vegetables, cabbages and turnips, for his fond loved poor. The words of some of the earliest writers even give one the idea that he parcelled it out into allotments for the most destitute.

But St. Antonino was no mere doer of good deeds without taking any further trouble as to their effect. He worked out a very detailed and practical scheme of social advancement, which is alive with problems which harass the minds of our generation, and he even spells it out in terminology which has about it all the air of modernity. It was evitable that he should have been enormously influenced by Aristotle, who in those ages was regarded in Dante's splendid phrase as "The Master of those that know." But his is no blind obedience, no dull following of another's ideas. To anyone who is familiar alike with the old classic writers and their more recent rivals in social and political economy, the works of our Saint have a startling value, for they stand mid-way between, and link together, new and old. Nor is it any objection to their worth to say that they are so very different from our modes of thought. Precisely there lies their stimulating effect, for each epoch as it passes is only too apt to keep within its own narrow groove and forget its early schooling in "dead languages." The fatal result is too apparent. Yet to eyes not blinded, "all the past read true, is prophecy."

At the beginning, says he, we must first define what we mean by a *good* thing, for herein lies the principal dividing line of all economic treatises. Scholastic as he is, he starts with a great broad truth: "a good thing is what all desire." But he makes haste at once to qualify this before it has had time to work out evil. "A good thing is what all desire," but God alone is Absolute Goodness, He alone is or can be desired for His own sake; all things else are desired inso-much as they lead on to Him. He can be sought for as an

end, directing and pointing on no further; but other things are only the objects of our desires because we conceive of them as taking us along the pathway of our pleasure, easing our steps in life's moving pursuit. He is the be-all and end-all, they are never to be the ultimate object of their own acquisition, so that "production is on account of man, not man of production." The rest can boast themselves in the highest meaning of the word "useful" to mankind; but He lifts Himself up amid the other tumultuous purposes of existence and proclaims His incommunicable attribute of Finality.

Riches then, and the full complement of economic instruments, are good things, for on all the Father looked from the beginning with expressed pleasure at their goodness. St. Antonino, therefore, will have none of that modern comfort which the millionaire preaches to the destitute, that poverty in itself is good. In itself, he says, it is an evil, though out of it good can be obtained (*Summa Moralis* iv. 12. 3, p. 622. Verona, 1740). Wealth of whatever kind is good if its usefulness be only properly apprehended. For all these things were ordained by God for the service of man (i. 13, 2, 9, p. 668; i. 7, 3, 1, p. 533). By his possessions, he is to ward off the anxiety of the morrow and rest in simple content. He is to find in them his sustenance and to employ them in the support of his family. But beyond their immediate serviceableness, instruments of wealth have a nobler use in leading men on to God. For, by their proper employment, he can the more easily approach to friendship with his Maker, realising his stewardship of the gifts committed to him and eventually achieving the full possession of their Master and his.

Moreover, because in man the soul is of greater importance than the body, and has always the prior claims to his allegiance, it follows that the whole science of economics (i.e., the science which seeks to regulate and adjust the relations between science and life) is ultimately a moral one, and must be dominated by principles of justice and must harmonise with the Ten Commandments. Sin accordingly becomes also an economic evil; and an economic evil in its complete sense becomes a sin.

It is possible, therefore, for these "goods" (wealth in its varied forms) to be turned to evil uses; and this is because

either they are evilly acquired or evilly distributed or evilly consumed (ii. 1, 12, 1, p. 192; iv. 14, 2, 4, p. 735). Here St. Antonino forestalls the great modern division of economics into Production, Distribution, Consumption. It will be convenient to work out his theories along these three highways. Production, says our Saint, is the law of life (iii. 8, 1, p. 291-293). Other animals achieve their end by the blind operation of instinct; but man is called to accomplish his under the guiding compass of his reason. He must see to do his work, for work he must. It is his duty, his perfection and his happiness. It should be noticed, too, that every work must be rightfully intentioned, be itself a lawful thing, and its achievement executed with perfect prudence.

Now this labour of man becomes partly complicated and partly simplified when the difference of the earth's productive force and the varied tastes and callings of individual men are taken into consideration, for it not unfrequently falls out that one has a superfluity of some article of necessity and a dearth of another, either because he finds the production of that one thing more congenial to his nature or because his locality supplies it and not that other thing (iv. 3, 2, etc.). Hence came into existence commerce in its primitive form of barter; and because barter itself was at times cumbersome and difficult of adjustment, money was invented as a medium of exchange. Then as forms of transit grew more rapid and inter-tribal and inter-national relations sped apace, the ever-widening communications of commerce knit together all the world. It hastened from shore to shore, bringing peace in its wake, and giving to the whole commonwealth of man the particular benefits of each group of peoples (i. 1, 3, 3, p. 34-35; ii. 1, 16, 3, p. 255). With commerce, too, truthfulness, justice and the other virtues assumed a new importance, for their necessity became social as well as moral. Morality and social life were at once fused beyond all disentanglement (iv. 5, 15, 3, p. 247). Along with all this, St. Antonino insists on the principle, rightly understood, which of late years Karl Marx has made so popular, that the value of things commercial (*i.e.*, exchangeable) depends upon labour, whether of mind or hand. Things in themselves are useless, until they have been completed by human industry or at any rate transferred to more favourable markets by human labour (ii. 1, 17, 6, p. 99).

Now the question which in the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries agitated the intelligences of good moralists was as to whether any gain was at all lawful in business, and if so up to what precise amount. This difficulty was part of a larger one, which dealt with the whole subject of usury.² Starting from the principle of Aristotle, that money cannot of itself beget money, which Shakespeare has admirably phrased in the paradox, "to breed from barren metal," the mediæval writers were evidently puzzled as to how to justify the taking of interest. Money can only be multiplied by the labour of him to whom it has been lent out; consequently for the lender to make capital out of the very industry and commercial skill of the borrower is, in their opinion, opposed to the law of nature, for no man has any right to sell his own native capacity (ii. 1, 6, 1, p. 70).

The result of their investigations can, I think, be briefly stated by saying that they agreed to deny the productivity of coin but to admit the productivity of capital. So long as commerce dealt with a question of mere gold or precious metal it was sheer usury to demand in return for its use an added sum called interest. But when funded accounts could be employed as capital and become distinct from passing currency, some form of interest was evidently lawful, for then came into consideration the loss sustained by the lender who might have put out his money into other commercial enterprises (ii. 1, 11, 2, p. 163). Moreover, there were the State-loans, which in Genoa, Venice, Florence and other places already paid to the citizens, from whom the money had been borrowed, an annual return which was regarded as a small percentage on the sums received. But these St. Antonino judges, on the authority of Master Nicholas, an English Dominican (perhaps the historian, Nicholas Trivet, O.P., 1258-1328, who wrote also on Canon Law), to be allowable, for they were forced-loans, which were exceedingly inconvenient and for which, therefore, the interest repaid might be looked upon as some sort of compensation (ii. 1-11, pp. 164-191).

For the principle he perpetually inculcates is that it is wrong to lend money directly for interest or to demand interest precisely as such. The intention may spoil the

² Cf. Weiss. O.P. Soziale Frage und soziale Ordnung II. 689. Fribourg 1892; Ashley, Economic History II. 377-488 London 1893.

moral worth of the action. So long, therefore, as the banker is prepared to demand a larger return for the monies he has advanced to the merchant, solely on the ground of his loss or of the danger of his not getting repayment (iii. 8, 3, 1, p. 303; ii. 1, 7, 21, p. 102) or other such reason, he may be allowed to continue. But if his motive is simply to exact interest on the score of a loan, then he is a usurer, and as such stands condemned. Hence he bitterly denounces "those of the nobility who are unwilling to work and yet who directly seek by lending their money to merchants to secure an annual interest besides the eventual return of an undiminished capital," for he notes that "though they call this a deposit, it is clear usury" (ii. 1, 6, 20, p. 80).

Having in this way settled that some gain is lawful in commerce, he endeavours to fix its amount and ventures out into the deep sea of maximum and minimum price. The value of an article, he here considers, not in itself (*valor naturalis*), but precisely in relation to society (*valor usualis*), for, though a mouse of itself as a living thing is of a higher value than dead wheat, yet to us men it is of much less value (ii. 1, 16, 3, pp. 255-257). In this latter sense, the value of an article depends chiefly upon (a) its usefulness, (b) its rarity or the difficulty of obtaining it, and (c) its pleasureableness. Thus wheat bread would be, in St. Antonino's idea, more valuable, because more efficient, than barley bread; platinum more valuable, because more rare, than gold; Raphael's masterpieces more valuable, because more productive of delight, than the works of Reubens. Of course this last division is one of varying and reversible judgments, for it rests on individual tastes and fancies.

It is possible then for a prudent man to apprise the value of anything, not indeed with absolute exactness but conjecturally, and allowing for divergences of time, place and people. Indeed St. Antonino, following what he tells us was the legal practise of his century, would allow half as much again as the maximum of selling-price and half as little as the minimum of buying-price (ii. 1, 16, 3, p. 236). An article, therefore, that has been conjecturally valued at one florin could be conscientiously sold at any price up to a florin and a half, or conscientiously bought at any price down to half a florin. These are the extreme limits. Naturally such a solution is open to many criticisms; but the fact of its being put forward at all makes it of present interest.

Finally, under the heading of production and the fixing of a just price, it is well to notice that St. Antonino fiercely forbids any formation of trusts or cartels or the authorising of monopolies for the purpose of securing dearer prices. Above all things no power, he holds, should be allowed individuals by the State of exploiting for their own ends the food and other necessities of the people (iii. 8, 3, 4, p. 306); ii. 1, 16, 2, p. 250 cf. Roscher, *System der Volkswirtschaft* i. 112, Stuttgart, 1894).

The Distribution of these "goods" in the community is no less a question of moral law, for it must be in strict accord with justice, else there will be continual turmoil in the State, restless constitution-making, unceasing discord between jarring factions, each in turn exiling the other (iv. 5, 3, 5, p. 183-184). The good Archbishop had not to go far afield in Florence to learn all this, for it was the uneven distribution of wealth and of political power which in 1396 roused the revolt of the Ciompi or disenfranchised populace and caused trouble after trouble, and faction and faction from the very earliest times till long after "the lily had been dyed vermillion." Not indeed that St. Antonino desired an equal division of all the property of the State, for it was the varied relationship of rich and poor, of ruler and ruled which to his mind made up the harmony of the Universe. From the analogy of nature, he argues against any dead level of exact humanity. For the intelligence of some is only fit to be under the direction of others; and the weakened wills of some need the supreme control of others; and the advancement of social well-being seems only to be possible when the few govern the many (iv. 2, 5, 6, p. 60). Not indeed as though servants and masters were of a different human species, as Aristotle would appear to have taught, for God did not create the poor from earth, and the nobles from precious metal, but all we are descended from our father Adam, of whom it is written that God made him from the dust (ii. 4, 4, 6, p. 581). So that our Saint steadfastly holds to it that the inequality of possessions and power in the world is due to the divine permission or even to a direct divine command (ii. 1, 12, 1, p. 192). It stands as an utterly unremediable law.

But it does not follow from this that the present state of society is such as God would have it to be. For first of all

the Archbishop lays it down as an indisputable principle that it is the duty of the State to provide for all its members (ii. 1, 11, 1, p. 161). Even when they have got past work, or for some other reason (such as ill-health, etc.) are unable to support themselves, then the society has the right and the duty to take from those who have more than they need and to hand it over to their less fortunate fellow-citizens: "for whose soever sustenance his own labour suffices not, the others of his own society who can work harder than they have need of, or who possess riches, are obliged to provide by the natural law of charity and friendship" (iv. 12, 3, 1, p. 623). Poverty, therefore, in the sense of destitution, must be ruled out of the State (ii. 1, 11, 1, p. 161). Every-one should have a sufficiency of food, clothing and accommodation, and unless such is guaranteed to the subjects, the rulers are at fault. From whatever cause the people are in distress, whether through their own fault or not (for St. Antonino makes no distinction at all), the State is bound to provide, though it may inflict punishment at the same time upon all who will not work according to their ability. Upon all lies what one may call the great law of content, *i.e.*, the duty of working for one's own support and of acquiring a sufficiency or rather real "decency" over and above the necessities of life; for, says the Archbishop, with something of that fire with which Rousseau set the Revolution ablaze, "the good of the State is something divine" (iv. 3, 6, 2, p. 86).

But the Saint looked much further ahead. He sketches out in terms curt and philosophic, without one trace of rhetoric or sonorous declamation, a city wherein the poor and sick shall be provided for in the hospitals (iv. 3, 6, 2, p. 86), and institutions (iv. 3, 6, 2, p. 196), where property shall be more fairly distributed, where the family life made up of complementary beings, the husband and wife, whose works and whose genius are the more peaceably united because they are so totally distinct, shall be the centre of the State's pre-occupation (iv. 2, 5, 2, pp. 55-60; i. 14, 5, 4, p. 735), where the children shall be properly educated in the knowledge of God, in letters, and in the arts and crafts useful to them in acquiring their livelihood (iv. 2, 6, 1, p. 64). Here masters and servants, with their mutual duties of forbearance, personal supervision and just remuneration on the

one hand, and of obedience and honest labour on the other (iv. 2, 5, 6, p. 60; iv. 2, 5, 7, pp. 61-62), shall unite in perfect peace. Here the individual right to acquire private property shall be absolutely recognised as of divine natural law; but the exercise of that right shall be restrained by the direction of the State, which may even, should need arise, insist on the common ownership by the State of all the forms of wealth. Still it is only fair to St. Antonino to note that he regards such a state of society as violent and impracticable, though evidently not contrary to justice (ii. 1, 14, 1, pp. 224-5; cf. Zighara *Philosophia* iii. Bk. i. cap. iii. art. 4, p. 710, Lyons, 1886, where he admits that the communistic state is not theoretically opposed to scholastic ethics).

Finally, his most trenchant sayings concern the just wage which every worker should receive. This should be paid promptly (iii. 8, 4, p. 308), and be according to the condition of the labourer, his skill, the danger of his occupation, the need and number of his family, the customs of the country, etc. (ii. 1, 17, 8, p. 268-269). And as a tender showing of the Saint's gentleness, a short sentence may be quoted wherein he lays it down that an employer of labour should "rather care for and tend his sick workmen than be in a hurry to send them away into a hospital" (iii. 3, 6, 7, p. 201).

The last great division of Political Economy concerns Consumption. Here also, as we have cited above from St. Antonino, evils may come in. For it is a sad thing to see side by side, extravagance and penury, to see horses and mules gaily caparisoned while the poor perish from hunger; or in a plague-stricken city where the sick lie naked, cold and foodless to find men and women dressed up with vain and gaudy ornaments (ii. 4, 4, 6, p. 581; ii. 4, 5, 2, p. 591). Extravagance is as much a social and moral evil as the unjust distribution of wealth. Each has a prime obligation to the support of himself and his family. When this has been discharged he has the further duty of paying to the society to which he belongs its lawful taxes, such as the rulers are obliged to impose for the proper administration of their dominions, for the security of the roads (ii. 1, 12, 6, pp. 195-196), for the safe-guarding against times of famine (iv. 2, 6, 1, p. 64), for the beautifying of the city (iv. 3, 6, 2, p. 86), etc. These taxes the citizen is for social reasons

morally obliged to pay; and by making a false declaration to the tax-officials (is St. Antonino thinking of the *catasto*?) a man commits theft against the State and is bound to restitution; unless, of course, it is a generally recognised custom for each to give in an incomplete or minimum balance sheet. On the other hand, taxation indulged in out of class-hatred or political spite is no less unjust. The citizens so acting commit mortal sin and are bound to restitution (ii. 1, 13, 3, p. 215). After his duties of justice to himself, his family, and the State (note this order on which the Saint much insists), the citizen is bound to almsgiving according to his means. From his superfluities, he must dispense to the needy and poor, and to the adornment of God's Temples. But this obligation is rather of charity than of justice; so that before he gives to beggars or to the Church, he must first pay his debts.

Last of all, over and beyond these obligations comes the virtue of magnificence or generosity. It is one which evidently appealed enormously to the Archbishop, for it is inculcated in almost every chapter of his stupendous work. To Florentines especially who loved their city with a passionate devotion, and whose eyes were endlessly gladdened by things of beauty reared by wealthy patriots to the honour of God or His mother, or to Messer San Giovanni Batista, or to one or other of the saints, and whose lives were lived amid all that was most noble in architecture, painting, sculpture and letters, magnanimity was no vulgar display of unjustly earned wealth, but an instinctive desire to leave their country the more splendid for their achievements.

These ideals which St. Antonino has set out in the four volumes of his *Summa Moralis* had to some extent been put into concrete activity in those marvellous institutions, the Greater and Lesser Guilds (cf. Edgcumbe Staley, the Guilds of Florence, London, 1908), and were already limned in stone along the graceful façade of Or San Michele. They are frankly commercial, it is true, but clean and religious and noble. They sum up a chivalrous and knightly aspect of mercantile adventure. They spell out the splendid chronicle of the Romance of Trade.

BEDE JARRETT, O.P.

Reflections on some Forms of Monism.

THEISM AND MONISM.—The philosopher who is without the true faith must be a lonely and restless individual. His intellectual gropings may lead him to a knowledge of God, a poor sort of knowledge at best, a knowledge that can never satisfy the moral needs and aspirations of his soul. But, perhaps oftener than not, the gropings of unaided reason fail altogether to find the path that leads to theism. In our days, at all events, the main trend of all such philosophical speculations as remain uninfluenced by the Christian faith is not towards theism, but towards one form or other of what is now commonly known as *Monism*. It is not an exaggeration to state that in the course of the last century monism gradually became the fashionable philosophy of erring human reason, and that for some considerable time it is likely to remain so. The object of the present article is to offer a few critical reflections on some of its deeper and more dangerous forms, and incidentally to call attention to a valuable work,¹ the perusal of which has occasioned these reflections. No apology need be offered for fixing the reader's attention on the widely prevalent tendency of actual speculations in science, in philosophy, and in religion, towards monism: the most serious modern assaults on Christian belief are all being delivered under its banner; while in many countries the influence of its speculations, in their crudest forms, is beginning to reach, and helping to demoralize, the masses. The wholesale corruption of public morals that issued from the preachings of mediæval pantheism will suggest what we may expect from the popularization of monism; for monism is a form of pantheism: and however pure and noble be the intentions of its academic exponents, the masses will never be induced to make the nice distinctions that would save it even from very degrading excesses in its practical consequences. It is not these, how-

¹ *Der Monismus und seine philosophische Grundlagen*: Beiträge zu einer Kritik moderner Geistesströmungen. Von Friedrich Klimke, S.J. (pp. xxiii., 620. Herder. Paper, 12s.; cloth, 13s. 6d.).

ever, but only some of its speculative aspects, we purpose to consider here.²

PANTHEISM AND MONISM.—There is no real, tangible difference between pantheism and monism. The difference is only in the antecedents—historical and doctrinal—out of which each system has developed, and in the points of view from which one and the same conception is regarded: that conception being the identity, or oneness, of God and the world. Pantheism originated in the study of God; monism starts in the study of the world. The former so misinterpreted the nature of the Deity as to eliminate the distinct reality of the world; the latter so misinterprets the nature of the world as to eliminate a distinct Deity and to substitute the world therefor. The former merged the world in God by misconstruing His indwelling and operation in the world as an identity of His very being with that of the world; the latter—more atheistically—merges God in the world by proclaiming the world-reality as the sole reality that exists—an absolutely self-subsisting and self-sufficing reality. Their relations are thus briefly outlined by the author of the work referred to above:—

“While, therefore, pantheism proceeds downwards from the concept of the Deity towards Nature, monism rises from the scientific study of Nature to the thought of its perfect and complete and self-sufficing unity. The former sees in God an eternal, infinite, absolutely perfect Essence, besides which, as being such, there can be no other reality; the latter finds in the world itself the sufficient ground of its being and existence, and so will either call the world God or recognize no God.

“While for theism God is above Nature, and Nature a creature dependent on God; and while for pantheism God is Nature, and Nature a portion or phase of the Divine Essence; for monism God is conceived after the likeness of Nature, and Nature itself conceived as the absolute, infinite, uncreated Being. Pantheism sprang from metaphysical enquiries into the Essence of the Absolute Being, and has its main sources in speculative lines of thought; monism, on the contrary, springs from the study of Nature, and is

² Father Klimke promises a separate volume on the ethical and religious aspects of Monism (*op. cit.* Vorwort, p. vii.).

accordingly a more accurate expression of the naturalistic tendencies of the present day. . . .

"But both agree with atheism in the denial of a personal Deity distinct from the world. In this Schopenhauer's judgment of pantheism applies equally to monism. Pantheism is but a polite atheism, he said. And, in truth, pantheism is the suppression of the dualist opposition between God and the world, it is the confession that the world exists of itself and by its own inner power. The formula of the pantheist, 'God and the world are one,' is but a delicate manner of dismissing the Almighty altogether.

"The word *Monism* seems, generally speaking, to suggest little in common with theological considerations. Wolff, who was the first to use the expression *Monists*, employed it to designate those philosophers who recognize in the whole sphere of existence only *one* (*μόνος*) kind of being—whether this be matter or spirit. . . . But there is an ever-growing effort to make monism meet and satisfy man's distinctively religious needs. These simply cannot be overlooked: they must always play a prominent part in shaping any world-view that claims to be adequate. And so it comes about that monism is driving out pantheism, inasmuch as the latter (*πᾶν-θεός*) is still too reminiscent of the concept of a supreme personal Being, which monists regard as absolutely inadmissible.³

Hence some monists would substitute for the term *pantheism* the term *panmonism*. How utterly inadequate such an impersonal concept of the supreme reality must be to satisfy man's religious cravings, the theist can have no difficulty in realizing.

PLEAS FOR MONISM.—Monists put forward many motives in support of their peculiar conception of the ultimate nature of all reality. Were we to believe them, it is favoured by such considerations as the following: the history of science and philosophy alike unmistakably point to it as the most reasonable conception of things; the undeniable craving of man's mind to unify the manifold imperatively demands it; the scientific laws of the conservation of matter and energy, and of the orderly evolution that obtains throughout all Nature, reveal the latter as a self-contained

³ *op. cit.*, pp. 14, 15.

and self-sufficing entity; monism is held to be the only conception that fully satisfies the more enlightened ideals and needs and cravings of which civilized man has become more clearly conscious in the domains of intellectual and artistic culture, as well as of ethics and religion.

No doubt these ambitious claims are gravely questioned by many serious thinkers of the front rank who do not themselves profess theism; but it is nevertheless true "that at the present day almost all the tendencies hostile to theism, whether in science or in philosophy, are moving towards a powerful coalition under the banner of monism. Just as humanism at the close of the Middle Ages, rationalism in the eighteenth century, and materialism early in the nineteenth, led the assault of the world on theism, so at the present day this assault is led by monism."⁴

Monism attempts, from various standpoints, to offer an answer to the question: In what form is a simple, self-consistent, satisfactory understanding of all reality, attainable by an inquiry into the data of human experience? Of this problem, theism, of course, offers us the only true and really satisfactory solution. But monists have reached their conception in various ways, of which we purpose to consider only a few of the most notable.

MONISM AS A METHOD.—And, first of all, we may premise this much: the manifest, palpable fact, that the human mind has an innate, natural, rational tendency to *unify* its manifold, fragmentary experiences, has never been seriously denied. We are ever reducing things to the class, referring facts to the law, subsuming narrower classes and laws under the wider class and the more general law; we are ever seeking to master and interpret our isolated experiences by groping among them for a unity of some sort, be this a unity of origin, of principle, of purpose, of cause, of process, of arrangement, of substance, or of being. That this is the natural trend of rational activity there can be no manner of doubt. Now, the descriptive title "*Monism as a method*" is sometimes used to designate this law of rational activity. Without quarrelling with such usage, we should prefer to restrict the word *monism* to the *doctrine* which this term is commonly understood to signify; and all the more so be-

⁴ *op. cit.*, p. 10.

cause monists claim that in this undoubted characteristic of rational thought—its unifying tendency—they have a significant and valuable indication of the truth of their *doctrine*. There is very little real propriety in describing this unifying form of mental activity as monism. But let us look at this claim of the monists, which is a more serious matter.

There is, no doubt, some superficial plausibility in conjecturing that because the process by which we know all reality (in so far, that is, as we do know it) tends to unify the latter, this must in ultimate analysis be really one. But, after all, how hazardous the conjecture is! There are so many sorts of unity, besides that which expresses all known and knowable things as one single, unitary Being! Then, when we come to examine the matter more clearly, we soon realize two things: first, that our reason has the power to examine, analyse and appraise this very unifying tendency with which it finds itself endowed; and, secondly, that it can and must judge how far, up to what point, or into what form of unity, it may safely, prudently, reasonably, follow this spontaneous, unifying tendency in its interpretation of experience. Whether it can interpret all experience as pointing to the reality of one single being, of which individual things are partial expressions (monism), or as revealing a system of distinct contingent realities existing dependently on one necessary reality (theism), is a question to the solution of which the mere fact of the unifying tendency of thought can afford no clue of any great importance.

Without, perhaps, committing the crude mistake of set-up the abstract, intellectual concept of "being in general" as an adequate ultimate interpretation of the nature of reality—the error of the Eleatics, who were the monists of ancient Greece—many of our modern monists are inclined to exaggerate the significance of the abstract thought-element in human experience. For, after all, there is revealed in experience another fact which is just as undeniable as the unifying tendency of thought: the fact, namely, that experience offers an emphatic resistance to complete unification, that there is in it an element of plurality which stubbornly refuses to be either overlooked or eliminated. If we are to attach any significance to such broad facts, would not

this latter point to some sort of dualism or pluralism as the ultimate form of reality, no less strongly than the former would point to monism?

SOURCES AND FORMS OF MONISM.—Everybody recognizes the existence of a great, broad distinction of some sort between mind or spirit, and matter or body. There are, roughly speaking, two realms in every man's experience. He is immediately conscious, in himself, of a form of being which he calls mind or spirit: a thinking, knowing, willing, moral-acting, self-conscious form of being; and he interprets experience as revealing to him the existence of other minds like his own. At the same time, experience also reveals to him another, a corporeal, form of being which he calls matter: a merely physically-active, non-moral form of being; in many ways remarkably different from the self-conscious, thinking, willing, spirit-form; though apparently allied in some strange way, not only with vegetative and sentient life-activity in the plant and animal kingdoms, but even with mind-activity itself in his own individual form of existence. Now, for the monist, the distinction between these two modes of being, revealed in human experience, is not ultimate and fundamental. For the theist it is: his philosophy is dualistic: even his own nature he regards as fundamentally composite: while he also recognizes an ultimate, irremovable, insurmountable distinction between all contingent, finite, dependent forms of being, whether spiritual or material, on the one hand, and the necessarily existent, self-sufficing and absolutely independent Being on the other; conceiving the latter after the analogy, not of matter, but of spirit. The monist seeks to suppress these distinctions in a variety of ways; his lines of thought often proceeding, nevertheless, in a curiously close parallelism, at some stages, with those of the theist. To some of those points of resemblance we shall direct attention as they occur. The main preoccupation of the monist, therefore, is to maintain that "whatever comes, or can come, directly or indirectly, into our experience is itself the single, absolute, self-grounded and self-sufficing Being; which Being, while in its own nature essentially one and the same throughout, reveals itself to us in the separateness of individual things and the dissimilarity of physical and mental processes."⁵

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 19, 20.

Now, man may either study the objects that fall or can fall within his experience, without devoting special attention to a study of the conditions imposed on him by the very nature and limitations of his powers and processes of cognition, the conditions under which alone as a knowing *subject* he can have experience of *objects*; or he may inquire mainly into the nature of these subjective conditions for experience, and concomitantly into the nature of the objects revealed in experience. Of course it has never been possible to separate completely these two departments of investigation; but in the eighteenth century, and mainly owing to the influence of Kant's philosophy, the attention of thinking men swung distinctly around from the former to the latter department, from the problem of *being* to the problem of *knowing*, from ontology to epistemology. We may, therefore, describe as ontological or metaphysical those forms of monism which have issued from a defective study of the problem of being, and as epistemological the more distinctively modern monism which has issued from a defective study of the problem of knowledge.

METAPHYSICAL MONISM.—According as metaphysical monism endeavours to see in mental phenomena mere manifestations of one fundamentally material reality; or in material phenomena mere manifestations of mind or spirit, likewise fundamentally one and self-subsisting; or in mind and matter alike, in all forms of what can be directly experienced, mere appearances of some one reality supposed to lie itself outside and beyond all possibility of reaching in any way into our experience: such monism may be classified as materialist, spiritualist, and transcendental or agnostic, respectively.

(a.) **MATERIALIST.**—With materialist monism no sincere thinker of any maturity can feel much sympathy. That mind and thought, will and purpose, and all the rich domains of intellectual, moral, religious, spiritual life and being, can be explained away as mere powers, energies, workings of the thing we call matter, or of anything even remotely analogous to it, is a contention that has been discredited and rejected in the history of human thought as repeatedly as it has been put forth. Materialists have had recourse to crude makeshifts—like that of endowing all matter with some sort of latent, potential, incipient life and

mind^a—in order to cloak somehow or other the all too obvious differences between matter and that which they would fain identify with matter. But such measures are distasteful to the sincere inquirer after truth: they lead only to confusion, for by doing such violence to language they perpetrate a crime against the requirements of rational thought itself.

Yet, despite its intellectual bankruptcy, materialism has always been easily accepted by half-educated and uneducated minds: from motives, indeed, which on analysis would hardly be set down as noble or creditable to the race. The progress of the physical and natural sciences, and the spread of the evolution theory, lent an apparent support to materialistic monism during the last century; its best-known protagonist in very recent times being Ernst Haeckel. But there are already many clear indications that the new German gospel of evolutionary monism will prove as short-lived as did Herbert Spencer's evolutionary philosophy in England. It is rapidly losing ground in the scientific world, and looking for support "mainly to the ranks of the half-educated."⁷ But, without doubt, its baneful influence will be felt for years after it has been abandoned by all thoughtful people.

(b.) SPIRITUALIST.—A far more plausible system is that of spiritualistic monism. Partly as a reaction against materialism, partly, too, as the outcome of a one-sided consideration of the problem of knowledge, spiritualistic monism proclaims that matter, so far from being the one only reality, is in truth only a phase or appearance of mind; that in itself, and as distinct from spirit, matter is not and cannot be real; that spirit is the only reality, and is all reality; that whatever is real can be conceived only as conscious spirit, and not otherwise; that all reality is *one* spirit or mind; and that the part of reality which we call matter can be only a state or stage in the continuous evolution or development-process of this one mind.

The conception of matter as something negative, as a limit or term of mind-activity, has been at all times familiar to philosophers: especially since the days of Berkeley men

^a Cf. Clifford's "Mind-stuff" in Father Maher's *Psychology*, c. xxiii. "Monistic Theories," p. 506.

⁷ *op. cit.*, p. 9; cf. pp. 123-130.

have learned to conceive of matter as an expression of spirit or mind; and however much the man in the street may feel inclined to pity those philosophers who seem to him to have "taken leave of their senses," it is undoubtedly less irrational to hold that the real is spiritual, and matter but one of its manifestations, than to hold that the real is material, and all spirit but a phase or phenomenon of matter. We cannot accept the greater as a part or product of the less; but we can at least conceive the less noble as a facet or aspect of the nobler. For matter Berkeley substituted a system of finite minds or spirits dependent on a Supreme Spirit; but monists of the spiritualist school have merged both matter and finite minds in the one sole, self-subsisting spirit: and, as we might expect, some of them conceive the nature of this sole reality rather after the analogy of *intelligence*, others rather after the analogy of *will*.

(a.) INTELLECTUALIST.—The contention that our directly-experienced universe of matter, life, and mind, is but the varied self-expression of one Intelligence, is really the exaggeration, or rather the perversion, of a great truth: the truth that this whole universe manifests the Thought of a Supreme Intelligence. The whole universe of direct experience displays a unity of order or design which pervades it through and through: it is a revelation of intelligent purpose. Now, a *Cosmos*, an orderly universe—which is intelligible only as the expression of intelligent purpose, and not otherwise—is a system of *interrelated* factors. But *relating* is unintelligible except as an expression of the activity of mind or spirit, that is, of something at least analogous to our mental activity of comparing and judging. Scholastic philosophers, as we know, discuss the question, whether or how far the exact object of our "relation"-concept is real; that is, whether this object is (in itself and apart from the terms related) a mere *ens rationis*, a product of our thought, or whether it is in itself something more than this; and some of them hold that there are relations which, in themselves and formally as relations, *are* something more than mere products of our thought. Now, if there be such relations, since they are not the product of *our* thought, we may fairly ask: Must they be the product of *some* thought? And from an analysis of our very notion of what a relation is, it would

seem that they must be in some sort or other a product or expression of some thought-activity : even relations between *material* things. It is in determining how precisely this is, or can be, that the theist and the monist differ. The latter regards not only experienced relations between material things, but even these things themselves, as ideas or thought-processes of the one single spirit which is the only reality : they have, according to him, no other reality than that of the spirit whose workings they are. The theist regards all material things, with their real relations—and all our finite human minds, which apprehend the material world and its relations and themselves and one another—as being, indeed, in a true sense, terms or objects of the Thought of God ; not, however, as therefore identical or consubstantial with the Divine Spirit, but as distinct from It though dependent on It : inasmuch as he holds the Divine Thought to be creative, and regards all these things as its *created* terms. The kinship he detects between matter and spirit lies precisely in this, that matter is for him a created term of the Divine Thought. For him, too, therefore, matter can have no existence except as a term of thought—the creative Thought of God. There have been theists—they are known in history as *Ontologists*—who have erroneously held that, not indeed material things themselves, but the intelligible relations apprehended by us in matter, are (in common, they would add, with all objects of abstract thought) identical in reality with the thought-activity of the Divine Mind. But, for the orthodox theist, matter is in its own proper nature not spiritual, mental, psychical ; not anything after the manner of a thought-process, or endowed with the spirit-mode of being.

We are not concerned here with the grounds of theism ; we wish merely to indicate possible points of comparison with spiritualist monism. Again, therefore, reverting to the conception of purpose or design as manifested in the *material* world, it is interesting to note how the theist makes this conception intelligible. Monists of the type we are considering claim that, since in their view matter is really spirit, and all human minds likewise identical with the one self-existing spirit, there can be no difficulty in understanding that material nature should manifest purpose in its processes : this, they say, is what we should expect, seeing that

design is a mark and manifestation of intelligence, and of intelligence alone. The existence of purpose in the material universe they even urge as an argument for their view; failing, apparently, to distinguish between the *conception* of purpose and its *execution*. Theists hold that the material world, in its processes, undoubtedly displays purpose; not, however, by the conscious conception of purpose, or anything analogous thereto, but only by executing the purpose of the Divine Mind which conserves it and operates in it. This operative immanence of the Divine Spirit in matter, as Intelligence, Will, and Power, is set forth with remarkable profundity of thought by St. Thomas, when, developing the Aristotelian conception of all Nature as teleological, he represents the material world, not as having activities in themselves indifferent and purposively directed by the Divine influence *from without*, as it were, but as acting purposively *from within*: matter acts *as if it were itself* intelligent; it acts "*executivè*" *propter finem*; it carries out or executes a purpose by its own inner *nature*; and this "nature" St. Thomas energetically describes as an "*ars quædam divina indita rebus, per quam ad fines proprios non solum ducuntur sed quodammodo radunt*"—"by which things are not merely led, but in a manner go, towards their ends."

Although, then, matter is, in its own proper reality, not identical with spirit, it is akin to spirit: not only because it is a term of the creative spirit-activity of the Divine Mind (and therefore intelligible to the human mind); but also because on account of its intimate union with spirit in the human person it will be *perennially* associated with spirit in the eternal domain of the realities that abide: "It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption. . . . For this corruptible must put on incorruption; and this mortal must put on immortality." The highest form of theism—that embodied in catholic philosophy as enlightened and perfected by Divine Revelation—offers us a conception of matter—the conception involved especially in the doctrines of the Eucharist and the Resurrection—a conception which links matter in an inseparable kinship with spirit, and

¹ Cf. Q. Q. DD. *De Veritate*, q. 22, a. 1.

² 1 Cor. xv. 42, 53.

which is certainly very far removed from the thought of all those philosophers who would set up, as Descartes did, an irreconcilable antithesis, an impassable chasm, between those two great forms of reality as revealed in human experience. Thus theism contains whatever is true in the spiritualist form of monism, while rejecting all that is erroneous and extravagant in its peculiar interpretation of reality.

(*β*) VOLUNTARIST.—Other propounders of spiritualist monism conceive the nature of the supposed single reality rather after the analogy of *will*. Reflecting that will is in us the mainstay of action, the leading formative principle of character, the channel of self-expression and self-realization, and the form under which we first reach a conscious conception of causality, power, efficiency: they have gone on to infer that the basic principle of all reality must be Will, and Will only. They see in all the data of direct experience, as the theist does, a systematic totality of dynamically interrelated factors, but this system they misinterpret as the self-working and self-expression of one only will. The inner world revealed in each one's self-consciousness they regard as a partial presentation of will-activity. All these 'inner worlds,' together with the whole external, material world, they hold to be one vast presentation, to the consciousness of the Absolute Will, of its own self-expressing will-substance, or will-activity. The fact of this Being becoming in any way self-conscious they regard as of secondary significance: the fundamental moment of all reality lies in Will.

In all this we may be permitted to recognize a two-fold perversion of a profound truth, namely, the all-sustaining operative influence and immanence of the Divine Will throughout the whole domain of intelligible reality. To the error of totally denying any kind or degree of real efficiency to the apparently active forms of being, whether mental or material, revealed directly in our experience—the error of the *Occasionalists*—these monists add the further error of confounding these forms of being, and their apparent activities, with the reality of the Supreme, Absolute Will Itself.

Now, if we assume that there is such a thing as really efficient causality revealed in our experience, it is an un-

doubted fact that the effort to understand such causality, to explain it, to render it intelligible to ourselves, must throw us back ultimately on the conception of an Absolute Will working with Absolute Power in and through and with the agencies revealed in our direct experiences.

"If we must admit a causal influence of these things [of direct experience] on one another, then"—writes Father Klimke¹⁰—"a closer consideration will convince us that a finite thing can never be the adequate cause of any effect, but is always, metaphysically regarded, only a part-cause, ever needing to be completed by another cause. Every effect is—at least under one aspect, at least as an effect—something new, something that was not there before. Even were the effect contained, whether formally or virtually, in the cause, it is certainly not identical with this latter, for if it were there would be no causality, nothing would 'happen.' In all causing and happening, something, which was heretofore only possible, becomes real and actual. But things cannot determine themselves to influence others, nor to receive the influence of others, since they are not dependent in their being on one another. Hence the necessary inference that all happening, all change, requires the concurrence of the Absolute Principle of being. When two things act on each other, the Absolute Being must work in and with them, the same Absolute Being in both—to relate them to each other, and supplement their native insufficiency."

"This is the profound teaching about the Divine Concursus with every creature. This, too, is the kernel of truth in the monistic conception of causality. . . . God works in all and with all. He permeates all reality, everywhere; there is no being beyond Him or independent of His conserving and concurring power. Just as creatures are brought into being only through God's omnipotence, and of themselves have no independent reality, so do they need the selfsame, ever-present, all-sustaining power to continue in this being and develop it by their activity. Every event in nature is a transitory, passing phenomenon, so bound up with conditions and circumstances that it must disappear to give place to some other. How could a mode of being so

¹⁰ *op. cit.*, p. 185.

incomplete discharge its function in existence without the concurrence of the First Cause?"

But while theism—in accordance not merely with the spontaneous dictates of good sense, but also, and no less certainly, with the reasoned dictates of the mind interpreting its experience—recognizes and proclaims the existence of real distinctions between those beings, whether spiritual or material, which furnish it with its immediate data, and between all of them alike and the Absolute Self-Existent Spirit, monism seeks to gratify its yearning for unity by suppressing all those distinctions and merging all the data of experience in identity with the one Absolute Spirit.

"In monism things have no activity of their own, all is the activity of the Absolute; in theism, on the contrary, things have a real and proper activity, though for this, too, they need the concurrence of God, the Absolute Being. In monism we have but a purely immanent operation of the Absolute; in theism a co-operation of the Absolute with creatures. In theism God is certainly in all things, in all space and in all time, but without thereby depriving things of their proper being and activity."¹¹

(c.) TRANSCENDENTAL.—Metaphysical monism of the transcendental type is another example of a great truth misinterpreted—or, perhaps, of a great mystery misconceived. For, as an inevitable result of the limitation of our minds, every human philosophy has its mysteries; but it may be a grievous error to misinterpret or misstate even these. And this is what transcendental monism does in regard to the incomprehensibility of the Absolute Being.

For the theist, each of the two great modes of being, the spiritual and the material, which come directly into human experience, has its own distinct reality; but a reality which is only contingent and dependent, not self-grounded or self-sufficing. The theist who realizes the full significance of the doctrine of creation and conservation must be deeply impressed by the weak and shadowy character of this reality as compared with that of the Ultimate, Absolute Being which is its ground. He recognizes and proclaims that the nature of the Absolute Being transcends direct human ex-

¹¹ *ibid.*, p. 186.

perience, and defies comprehension by the human mind. Yet this Absolute Being, though lying beyond the domain of direct human experience, he holds to be in some measure knowable, by means of the latter. That such Being exists he is certain; that he can know something, though very imperfectly, about Its nature he is equally certain. Whatever of pure or unmixed perfection—that is, perfection which does not essentially involve any imperfection—he finds in the world of experience, that he attributes to It: Spirit, Intelligence, Will, Power, Personality, Goodness, Holiness, etc. In doing so, however, he distinguishes between the finite, imperfect *mode* of his own concepts, and their positive *contents*: removing the former from the latter when he attributes these to the Absolute Being. And when he has done all this, he still recognizes that he has characterized the Absolute Being in an utterly inadequate manner: yet in the best and only manner attainable by a finite mind. So profoundly was St. Thomas impressed with this inadequacy of all human conceptions, as applied to the Deity, that he tells us more than once we can only know what God is not, rather than what He is.¹²

And this is the truth which agnostic monism—partly in fear of anthropomorphism, partly owing to its excessive demands in regard to the conditions which human “knowledge” should fulfil—has perverted into an error by proclaiming that the nature of the Absolute Reality lies wholly and entirely beyond the reach of any human attempt at characterization. This is a comfortless, paralysing gospel, in which the human mind has never found peace or satisfaction.

¹² “Manifestum est enim,” he says, “quod hoc nomen *bonum*, cum sit a nobis impositum, non signat nisi quod nos mente capimus. Unde, cum Deus sit supra mentem nostram, superexcedit hoc nomen. Et quia theologi consideraverunt quod omne nomen a nobis impositum deficit a Deo, ideo ipsi inter omnes modos quibus in Deum possumus ascendere per intellectum praeordinaverunt eum qui est per negationes. . . . Non enim conjungitur in praesenti intellectus noster Deo ut ejus essentiam videat, sed ut cognoscat de Deo quid non est. Unde haec conjunctio nostri ad Deum, quae nobis est in hac vita possibilis, perficitur quando devenimus ad hoc quod cognoscamus eum esse super excellentissimas creaturas.” *Comm. in Lib. de Divinis Nominibus*, c. xii., l. 3. Cf. Cardinal Mercier's *Conferences to his Seminarists*, p. 67, n. 1.

There are, of course, positive directions in transcendental monism—tendencies which may elicit our sympathy in so far as they are a witness to the unnaturalness of agnosticism. In common with theism, these all seek, in one way or another, what may be regarded as a somehow positive conception of the nature of that ultimate reality which does not come into our direct experience either of matter or of spirit; but all of them, unfortunately, misinterpret both matter and spirit as revelations of the existence and nature of the Absolute Being. For, abstracting from the various sources in which they have their origin, and the various methods by which they reach their ultimate conception of things,¹³ they all suppress distinctions that are undoubtedly real, and merge the material and the spiritual alike in the identity of one, sole, self-existing reality. The form of monism that is most distinctively characteristic of modern thought is that which has its origin in speculations regarding the nature of knowledge and the relation of the knowing subject to the known object. This is what has been called epistemological monism.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL MONISM.—Among the facts of our experience, that of which we are most intimately aware is the fact of thinking or knowing. We call it an activity of the mind. Now, whatever we think or know is somehow "in" the mind. How, then, can the mind know any reality other than itself? or, at all events, other than what is somehow or other a part, or phase, or state, or product, or modification of itself? This *Quomodo?* has ever been a puzzle to philosophers: apparently, indeed, an apt illustration of the saying of Ecclesiastes: "*Qui addit scientiam, addit et laborem*"¹⁴ though, in truth, when we come to reflect on the matter, the question: "How can the mind know *itself?*" seems to be not much less troublesome: since all thought, all knowledge, would appear to involve some sort of duality of a knowing subject set over against a known object.¹⁵ Anyhow, attempts at answering these questions,

¹³ Cf. Klimke, *op. cit.*, Book iii.

¹⁴ Eccles. i. 18.

¹⁵ Duality, unlike dualism, does not necessarily imply a *real* distinction between the terms distinguished; these may be really identical as in the case of self-knowledge. But, at least in our human conception of what knowledge is, we *must* always *think* of the knowing subject and the known

especially the first of them, have led to many sorts of more or less strange, we might even say amazing, conclusions as to the nature and mutual relations of thought and reality. We are concerned here only with the attempts that lead more or less directly to monism.

The known object must be somehow "in," or "one with" the knowing subject. Some philosophers have allowed themselves to be so influenced by this consideration as to believe that the mind, in knowing, must create or produce whatever it knows. Put in all its crudeness, the logical conclusion to which anyone taking up that attitude is forced, would be simply this: that the whole universe (including other men and their minds) is a product of his own thought! This is known as *Solipsism*—commonly admitted to be a *reductio ad absurdum* which the sane thinker is bound to avoid at any cost. Conceivably, one short way in which the thinker might avoid it would be by maintaining that his own thinking mind (or "self," as he would say) has no distinct, substantial being of its own, but is in some unknown, sub-conscious way connected with all other similar minds, all alike being merely transient phases or moments in the self-existing and self-operative being of One Mind or Spirit, of which the material world, too, is but an aspect or partial manifestation. And this, in bare outline, is the path along which many philosophers have passed to monism: or, rather, it is the main direction of many devious and bewildering pathways.

It is in the study of sense-perception and sense-consciousness that we are first brought face to face with the question of the possibility or impossibility of the mind's knowing any thing, object, or reality, really distinct from itself. And if we once allow ourselves to be persuaded that philosophers like Locke and Berkeley and Hume were right in assuming that the primary, direct, immediate object of the mind's knowledge is its own state, or process, or modification, or product, we are at once involved in serious trouble about the

object as distinct. That is, for us they are at least logically distinct. Many modern philosophers, Hegelians especially, confounding the logical order with the real, have sought to conceive a sort of knowledge which would be free not only from dualism but from duality; contending that this latter is a product of knowledge which has developed to the stage of consciousness. But is an activity that is not yet conscious properly described as "knowledge" at all?

distinct, substantive existence not merely of material things, but even of other minds. No doubt, philosophers are often, and perhaps fortunately, inconsistent in conveniently neglecting to follow out erroneous assumptions to their logical issues; and so some who deny that real *otherness* (as distinct from apparent, illusory otherness) is revealed in the immediate data of our cognitive experience, nevertheless hold that we can somehow or other come to know that at least really distinct minds do exist.¹⁶ However, the more usual result of identifying the direct and immediate object of knowledge with the knowing subject is some form or other of monism. The fact that the logical issue of such identification is solipsism should be a sufficient warning that such an initial step in solving the problem of knowledge is a false one.

But the study of this latter problem, from the days of Kant, has taken many divergent and misleading directions. Not that he was by any means the first to raise or discuss the problem as to the conditions and limitations under which the mind, as knowing subject, can understand

¹⁶ Of this Berkeley is a notable instance. But he appears never to have succeeded in totally eliminating that second great mode of being which he refused to describe as "material." He called material things mere "signs," "symbols," etc., and insisted on their absolute passivity and impotence, in contrast with active, percipient mind. But he seems nevertheless always to have retained in his system *two* modes of being, not one. "Existence is perceiving and willing, or *being perceived and willed*" (*Commonplace Book*, apud A. C. Fraser, *Berkeley*, in "Philosophies Ancient and Modern," p. 4; italics mine. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 37). While mind is the form of reality which perceives and wills, matter is that whose only reality consists in being perceived and willed. But even this is a form of reality, though dependent on mind and a product of mind. It is not human spirits that create these "symbols" or "appearances" in or for themselves or one another. For Berkeley, the Supreme Spirit has created human spirits, and these symbols for their use and benefit. The world of symbols, then, is not dependent on human spirits. It would exist without them, "in the mind of (the) Eternal Spirit" (*ibid.*, p. 19). But how? As identical with the latter, of which it would then be a mere process, after the manner of the Neoplatonic teaching? Or as a distinct, created form of reality? Berkeley was influenced in later life by Neoplatonism; but he can scarcely be accused of identifying what we call matter with the Divine Spirit. If, then, according to the second alternative, it is a created reality, and yet not active, percipient mind, it must be a second mode of created real being, distinct from the spirit-mode of reality. Hence Berkeley's world does not contain merely spirit, but also something other than spirit. Cf. *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, vol. xxiv., p. 280 (September, 1908).

reality as object. Mediæval philosophy is filled with discussions as to what relations and distinctions are real, and what merely logical. In other words, the philosophers of those days, recognizing in all cognition, as Kant did himself in his day, the product of a twofold factor, namely, the activity of the knowing *subject* or mind, and the *object* or datum or element given from without,—asked themselves what part of that product (which is the “reality as known”) is the contribution of the mental or subjective factor, and what the contribution of the extramental or objective factor. It is well known that the Kantian philosophy transferred to the subjective or mental factor, under the title of mental “forms” or “categories,” very many attributes (of spatial and temporal existence, quantity, quality, causality, substantiality, etc.) which had previously been regarded as characterizing and revealing the nature of the objective or extramental factor: thus transforming the latter into an unknowable something which must ever lie beyond the scope of human knowledge to attain or designate in any way whatsoever. Then followed Fichte with the further assertion that if all the *forms* ascribed by the mind to reality are in fact only forms or products of the mind itself, so, too, must the *matter* of reality be a product or creature of the mind: not, of course, of the individual minds which become self-conscious in actual human experience, but of the Absolute Mind which is ever partially expressing itself in and through those individual minds—the latter being not really distinct from, but mere manifestations of, the one Absolute Mind itself. A still more daring advance in this sort of *a priori* speculation was attempted by Hegel in his effort to transcend the duality of subject and object in thought by a complete identification of thought and thing, of ideal and real, of logical and ontological: in which he tried to show forth everything, conceivable and inconceivable alike, as but necessary phases in the rational evolution of the one Ideal-Real being.

Since Hegel's time, monistic philosophers have become less sanguine in their hopes of attaining to any definite characterization of the nature of the supposed “All-One” reality: and it is no wonder that they should, seeing that they are endeavouring to think out the nature of reality while dispensing (or pretending to dispense) with the supposed discredited concepts of substance, cause, spirit,

matter, etc. Whether they still start from the Hegelian standpoint of the "pure thought" of abstract being, divested of all determining categories; or whether, in reaction against this, they start from the opposite and equally indescribable standpoint of the "pure experience" of concrete being, similarly stripped of all the attributes by which alone the nature of being can be interpreted: they are all equally hampered in their speculations by the unjustifiable and paralysing sacrifices they have made in their very pre-suppositions. They refuse to think of a "substance" or "subject," and yet they talk about "phases" and "states" and "manifestations"; they refuse to think of an "agent" or "cause," and yet they talk of "processes" and "activities." Everyone, of course, will admit that investigation of ultimate problems must necessarily lead to modes of thought and expression which will be difficult and unfamiliar to the mind that is unaccustomed to such investigation. But when these modes begin to appear self-contradictory, or to be practically unintelligible because emptied of all meaning, or to violate those spontaneous dictates of our rational nature which are the outcome of what is known as "common sense," or "good sense," or "right reason": then, surely, something must be amiss with the lines of investigation which issue in such regrettable confusions.

REASON AND FAITH.—The universe directly revealed to us in our experience has an undeniable unity of some sort, both in so far as it is stable and in so far as it is subject to change. Does the ultimate ground of this unity lie, or can it lie, in this universe itself? Monists have sought to prove that it can and does. They have never succeeded, and they never can succeed. A thesis must be true before it can be demonstrated. The universe finds its ultimate ground and explanation only in its dependence on an Absolute Being who is its Creator, Conserver and Ruler; a Being who is distinct from it, not identical with it. This truth, the truth of theism, it certainly lies within the power of human reason to prove. And human reason has proved it abundantly. Yet we need not be surprised that so many who devote their lives to the study of those ultimate problems which lead up to it, have missed their way and failed to reach the truth—failed to find God. For we know that it is much easier for those whose minds have been illumina-

ted from their earliest years by the fulness of truth contained in the Christian revelation, to justify on grounds of right reason the truth of theism which they have always accepted, than it is for those who are groping in the darkness of doubt and unbelief to feel their way securely to the light of truth, and then rest assured that they have really found it.

In those circumstances the duty of the theist is plain. Sympathy for the erring is good; help is even better. Among monists there are very many sincere searchers after truth. These the educated theist can help in many ways and at many points, by expositions, explanations and discussions of the problems and doctrines and difficulties which theist and monist alike must consider in forming for themselves a consistent and satisfactory world-view. By such efforts in explanation and defence of theism he will be discharging not only the duty of Christian charity towards monists, but also the equally sacred duty of checking the further spread of a pernicious error and protecting those in possession of the truth from the danger of sacrificing this treasure to the insidious sophistries of monism.

A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF THEISM. —For these reasons we should welcome every honest effort to uphold theism against its latest intellectual rival. We should feel especially grateful for a really searching and masterly work which meets monists on their own ground, faces their contentions boldly, analyses their reasonings on grounds of pure reason, and—while gratefully recognizing and giving credit for the kernel of truth in the deep incrustation of monistic error—triumphantly vindicates the superiority of theism. Such a work is Fr. Klimke's *Monismus*. It goes to the roots of the problems; it is scholarly, sufficiently exhaustive, well-arranged and readable in spite of its voluminousness; and its publication is decidedly opportune. In the preceding pages we have merely touched in a most fugitive way a few phases of the problems and theories which the author subjects to a careful and detailed analysis. But even such remarks as the perusal of his work has suggested to us to set down in this article will, we hope, be sufficient to convince the reader of the deep religious importance, practical no less than speculative, of the tendency of thought towards monism, which is everywhere so prevalent at the present day.

P. COFFEY.

Faith and Probability.

THE twenty-fifth proposition of the Modernists, condemned in the Decree "Lamentabili," is as follows :—

"Assensus Fidei ultimo innititur in congerie probabilitatum."

Now, in well-known passages of the *Apologia*, Newman says that before his conversion he held that He who made us has so willed that in Mathematics indeed we should arrive at certitude by rigid demonstration, but in religious inquiry we should arrive at certitude by accumulated probabilities. He is speaking historically, stating a mere matter of fact about his own state of mind in 1843-4, not defending it. "And if any Catholic says in consequence that I have been converted in a wrong way, I cannot help that now." Was Newman converted in a wrong way? When he speaks of *probability* instead of *moral certainty*, he does not follow the usage of our schools. But is there a sound Catholic meaning in his words? May they be explained in a Catholic sense?

In the year 1843-4, Newman had Divine Faith though he was not yet a Catholic. Now, the analysis of an act of Faith, even in the abstract, is not an easy problem; in concrete form it is more difficult and complicated still. All Newman's writing upon Faith had the nature of autobiography; he was trying to give an account of his own thoughts and feelings. Did he fail to see and to state exactly what his Faith was? Pope Innocent XI. condemned the following proposition :—

"Assensus Fidei supernaturalis et utilis ad salutem stat cum notitia solum probabili revelationis, immo cum formidine qua quis formidat ne non sit locutus Deus."

In this proposition the emphasis is laid upon the state of mind of him who tries to make an act of Faith; it asserts that he can make the act even when *he thinks* that the doctrine he contemplates is only probably, not certainly revealed. The Modernist proposition directly attacks the objective value of the evidences themselves. Now, Newman did not attack the evidences; nor did he deny that he him-

self was *certain* about the Præambula Fidei; nor would he admit that his certainty was *imprudent*. But it would be imprudent, and it could not lead to Divine Faith, if it had no better foundation than mere *probability*.

It lies on the surface of the matter to say that Newman called probability what we call moral certainty. Again, there is a true sense in which it could be said that the evidences may be broken up and reduced to a number of separate probabilities; at least this seems to be true of such questions as the authenticity of the New Testament writings, where a multitude of details have to be taken into account. Again, a man may have ample grounds for certainty and still be unable to bring them out with force and clearness so as to impress others in the same way as himself. This would be especially true of Faith, which is so hard to analyse and explain. So what gives certainty to one man gives only probability to another.

But our evidences are able to give certainty in the strict sense to all. What is the nature of this certainty? And how is it to be brought home to the average non-Catholic of to-day?

Moral certainty excludes all *prudent* doubt. But what is a prudent doubt? Is it the same thing here as it would be in other ethical questions? An example or two will bring out my meaning.

You are bound to receive Holy Communion at Easter. But you must be in the state of grace before you can receive. Can you be sure that you are in the state of grace? Plainly some sort of assurance in this matter must be attainable. Now the Council of Trent teaches that no man can know with the certainty of Faith that he has recovered the Grace of God. Lugo, Viva, Mazzella, etc., make use of this teaching to show that no grade of *mere probability*, however high, suffices for the assent of Faith. They point out that after careful preparation for Confession, after doing everything in one's power for receiving Absolution, say, from the Pope himself, one may feel fairly confident that he has recovered God's friendship. To be uneasy, for example, about one's contrition, or confession, or about the faculties, the knowledge, the intention of the confessor would be to yield to mere scruples; it would be sinfully *imprudent* to keep away from the Holy Table on account of such misgivings. But

it would be also *imprudent*, on the other hand, to believe with Divine Faith that one is in the state of grace. Bellarmine assigns as a reason for this the difficulty of knowing with such certainty as Faith demands the reality and the sufficiency of one's own disposition for absolution; a man's soul and conscience is always a mystery to himself in this world. This point is important and will turn up again.

Again, a priest who baptises an infant may be quite sure about his intention and the validity of matter and form. Suppose the infant died immediately. The priest could be certain that the child is in heaven, and could possess the certainty of Faith itself about it; I suppose, of course, that particular instances of this kind form *part* of the Divine Word originally revealed in the general doctrine about the effect of Baptism, Absolution, etc. Now, to console the mother, the priest might say: Your child is in heaven. Could *she* believe it with Divine Faith? The only possible misgiving she could have would be about his intention. Yet Lugo says that this misgiving *ought* to restrain her from the assent of Faith; it is a *prudent misgiving* in this matter. Why? Because it is just possible that he had not the intention required. To re-assure her, he declares that he had; yet even then it is just possible that he is deluding her or himself. This seems to be a hard saying. For, is she not bound to accept his word from the pulpit? And is not his word sufficient to enable her to yield the assent of Faith to the doctrine he preaches? Viva says that simple folk may reason with themselves thus:—I may and ought to accept the teaching of wise and holy men about religion; but the priest is wise and holy. Now, if his word from the pulpit is reliable, why not also his assertion that he did the right thing at the font? Is it not just possible that he is going astray in the pulpit? In answer to this, it can be said that he is the public official witness of the public notorious fact of the teaching of the Catholic Church; that the folk do not depend upon him alone; that they are aware, in their own simple fashion, of the evidences of Christianity and of the Church. I need go no further into this, as it will also occur again.

Can you believe in the Real Presence of our Divine Lord in *this* Church? Can you make an act of Divine Faith? You may make an act of Faith in the *general* doctrine of

the Real Presence; but St. Thomas, Lugo, etc., deny that such an act is possible in regard to a particular consecrated Host. For it is just possible that the priest had not the right intention, was not validly baptised or ordained, and that the bishop who ordained him was not validly baptised, ordained, consecrated, and so on *ad infinitum*. All these bare possibilities, or any of them, suffice to constitute what Viva calls a *formido radicalis*, the root of a *misgiving* which in the matter of Divine Faith would be *prudent*. When that misgiving comes up to the surface of the mind, and is consciously before it, then it would be *rash* to attempt to make an act of Faith on account of it. But it would be *equally rash*, to say the least of it, to stay away from Mass on Sunday or to refuse to kneel at Mass because, forsooth, it is just possible that no valid consecration takes place.

Moral certainty, in the strict sense here contemplated, may be reduced to metaphysical certainty. For it is attained when there is no possibility of any sort remaining against the truth of the proposition to which assent is given, and in favour of its opposite. *The formido radicalis*, the root of misgiving, thin and metaphysical though it may be, must be utterly banished from the realm of Faith; but in other practical matters it often cannot be got rid of, and sensible men feel bound to pay no heed to it.

We now come to the practical question—How is a man of to-day to win this high, strict certainty? A man of to-day—that is, with the spirit, the outlook, the prejudices, the whole mental and moral make-up of this busy, sceptical twentieth century. He may retort upon us the argument of Viva, and say he is content to follow the many able and virtuous men who are not Catholics or Christians, or even Theists at all. Or he may be a more consistent modern, an Agnostic on principle, refusing to accept any statement on religious matters which is not fully proved. It will only irritate him to suggest in the blindest fashion that there is some moral fault at the bottom of his want of religion. His boast is that he is a lover of truth. Ask him what he means by this love of truth, whether it is a mere insatiable curiosity, a thirst for knowledge for its own sake, or for the sake of renown or influence, or something else. Or does it mean that he is anxious to know the Will of God and how to save his soul. Point out to him that he needs humility and a

pure nature, and must pray for Divine assistance. But he answers that he knows not whether there be a god or he has a soul; and, in any case, if he be true to the modern spirit, he scorns the notion of prayer in any sense. Come at him in another way, and tell him about the fall of man, about our manifold blindness and weakness and self-delusion. This will only draw from him a dozen or a score of smart things that have been said about Progress and Evolution. And he will assure you that it is all quite settled, that we can know nothing about these ultimate problems, that you are out of date, that the spirit of the age is against you. You admit that a day, or a week, or a year, will not suffice to bring home to him the truth of your views. The Catholic evidences require long, careful study and thought that their full force may be appreciated. They embrace details of all sorts which have little or no value in isolation, but when viewed in mutual connexion and support form an unbreakable chain of proof. Now, who has time to go through all this study and thought? Who has the critical faculty to see the full value of each link in the chain, and the power and grasp to hold all at once and see their united force at one straight glance?

He has not been reared in Catholic atmosphere, and it is useless to tell him to rely upon Catholic authorities. Every apologist to-day has to fight against the mighty force of the spirit of the age as well as against the apostles of that spirit. These latter have the advantage in that they appeal to instincts, axioms, maxims, prejudices that are in the air all round, and in the very essence and texture of the modern mind. One such instinct is that of independence, the obstinate refusal to bow either intellect or will before any authority whatsoever. This instinct is not merely infidel, it is also atheistic. And its subtle influence is intensified by the loud chorus that ever rises up in its praise, as well as by the calm assurance with which everybody takes it for granted. The Catholic Church is its sworn foe; and so hatred of her, scorn, contempt, ridicule, are further instincts of the modern mind. The last thing in the world that moderns would dream of doing is to investigate the claims of the Church. They may read our apologists, and they say they read with open minds and a conscientious desire to find out the truth. But this dry, cold impartiality sup-

poses a heart untouched. To tell such folk that the subject is of pressing, urgent, personal import, the only subject worth all their best efforts of study and attention, is simply to provoke and outrage their self-complacency, or else to give them reason for uproarious laughter.

Suppose this hard, cold spirit to be broken or bruised and troubled with anxious misgivings. It is then only that the real trouble begins. Every sentence of our apologists has called forth volumes of hostile argument, fiction, poetry, sneers, cavils; and all these hostile forces have a home and kindred in each modern mind, and allies all round. They fight against banishment, and rend their victim like the demons in the Gospel. You must buy three volumes octavo to get a decent refutation of one beggarly little sixpenny pamphlet. The friends of truth are few, weak, scattered, while the enemies are many and mighty. The internecine warfare of the religions, and especially of the Christian denominations, is a tremendous obstacle to the inquirer. He has to fight his way, step by step, up out of the thickets and the dark night of unbelief amid discordant cries of battle, against foes who attack him on all sides. Many are his wounds, long and toilsome and weary his journey, slow his progress. The bitter painfulness of modern conversion has been avowed by all converts; and the greatest of them gave the philosophy of it in his doctrine of probability.

We are not startled when Newman avows his conviction that between Atheism and Catholicity there is no logical medium; nor do we demur at his further avowal that utter scepticism is the only logical alternative to Catholicity. Nor does there seem to be anything objectionable in these words of his: "What must be the face-to-face antagonist by which to withstand and baffle the fierce energy of passion, and the all-corroding, all-dissolving scepticism of the intellect in religious inquiries? I have no intention at all of denying that truth is the real object of our reason, and that, if it does not attain to truth, either the premises or the process is in fault; but I am not speaking here of right reason, but of reason *as it acts in fact and concretely in fallen man*. I know that *even the unaided* reason, when correctly exercised, leads to a belief in God, in the immortality of the soul, and of a future retribution; but I am considering the faculty of reason actually and historically; and in this

point of view I do not think I am wrong in saying that its tendency is towards a simple unbelief in matters of religion. No truth, however sacred, can stand against it in the long run; and hence it is that in the pagan world, when our Lord came, the last traces of the religious knowledge of former times were all but disappearing from those portions of the world in which the intellect had been active and had had a career."

Every genuine argument directed straight against the Church is an argument on behalf of Agnosticism and Scepticism. But, then, man is not merely a logical machine, He has senses, imagination, emotion, will, passion. He is the victim of countless prejudices, some personal and peculiar, some the inheritance of national, religious, political tradition, some the impress of the spirit of the age. The average man has no time, no ability, no faculty of any sort for religious inquiry. Hence we say with St. Thomas that it was morally impossible for unaided reason to gain and to hold even a decent natural religion. Is it morally *possible* in this sense for the average man of to-day to fight his way by mere unaided reason up from the depths of unbelief to the threshold of the Church? For, mark: he is, in a sense, worse off than the old pagans. With all his soul he believes that Rome is Antichrist—or, at all events, the infidel equivalent thereof. He loathes as immoral and degrading the very notion of considering the claims of the Church for a moment. This is the first lesson of his home and his school; and it is the first principle assumed in the fierce warring proclaimed in all modern literature, philosophy, and politics. And with Rome and her claims he identifies the supernatural in every shape and form—revelation, mysteries, miracles, eternity, God. John Stuart Mill is a type. His father realised the meaning of Calvinism and became an Atheist, and educated his son from that standpoint. Neither got free from the inveterate hate and prejudice against the Catholic Church. And so in all moderns, the very discovery that Catholicity and Christianity are one and the same only deepens and strengthens the old anti-Catholic prejudice. And here is a new obstacle, characteristically modern, in the way of him who tries to return to Holy Church. Now, is this *prejudice* ALWAYS wilful? Has it not some of the greatest names on its side?

Has it not a philosophy and a literature to enforce and recommend it? *Can unaided reason* resist and overcome it—tear out by the roots and trample down what is part of itself? Is unaided reason to-day able to see probability, not to speak of certainty, in our evidences? The psychology of modern unbelief is a big subject; but Newman and his confrère, W. G. Ward, understood it fairly well.

Suppose, however, our inquirer has overcome this tremendous difficulty, which is at once subjective and objective. He reads our apologists attentively and prayerfully; their reasoning appeals to him; their answers to difficulties seem to be satisfactory. He sees at last the full cogency of the evidences. But stay; this appearance of cogency may be due to mere delusion of reason or imagination. Once before he was equally convinced and satisfied; but he found himself fatally astray. He found the earth trembling beneath his feet, he saw the stars of this lower world go out one by one. Can he ever rely upon himself and his convictions again? Then look at all the able and virtuous men who are against his present position. Look at all the able men who have abandoned the Church of Rome. How is he to be sure that he will not follow their example? Then, again, certain moral dispositions are required for Faith; and these dispositions are very hard to acquire at the present day. Even in the Catholic Church, the best and holiest know not whether they are worthy of love or of hatred. The more humble and sincere is the soul of the inquirer, the greater will be his dread of delusion on this point. And a more wily deceiver still may be at work. His conviction in favour of the Church of Rome may be a suggestion from below. This thought will derive force from the intense and bitter prejudice against the Church, in which he was reared, which is in the air all round him, which is an instinct and an axiom of the modern mind.

The obstacles in the way of the modern inquirer are (1) Prejudice, (2) Scepticism and Agnosticism and all the difficulties they raise against the evidences, (3) genuine conscientious misgivings and scruples, (4) want of leisure, ability, facilities for inquiry. Is *unaided reason* able to overcome these obstacles and to gain *strict moral certainty* in spite of them? I suppose in very rare cases the thing is possible. But is moral certainty gained by *unaided reason* of any use as a step to *Faith*?

Suarez says : " We may regard the decision in favour of the evidences as a judgment of mere reason ; and from that point of view grace is not needed. But if we regard it as positively disposing the mind and will for Faith and leading up to it, then it is not possible without the help of Divine Grace." This is the teaching of the Church against the semi-Pelagians. It may not be easy to set out in detail the series of actions in which the *Initium Fidei* consists. But it is true, at all events, that our inquirer must at every stage of his investigation join in the prayer of "Lead, Kindly Light." This prayer does not ask merely that his moral dispositions of heart and will be made right. Nor does it ask merely that the actions in which his actions consist be *supernaturalized*. Our inquirer would not be capable of such a prayer in the formal and explicit sense. He asks God to give him light in his darkness, "for a darkness," says Newman of his own case, "it emphatically was." He asks for light against delusions of reason, feeling, imagination, whatever their origin may be ; he asks that the eye of his mind be opened and made strong, and the glance of it true and straight and clear to see the rays that stream down from the City of God, to see and to appreciate the Christian evidences. This prayer is necessary, and its necessity seems to prove that the *certainly* which Divine Faith requires as a preceding condition is unattainable by unaided reason. In other words, unaided reason cannot attain to more than probability in the things of Faith. It is unable to see the real objective certainty of the evidences. Take the case of a man of exceptional abilities and opportunities ; it is true that if he gives himself up to a purely intellectual study of the evidences, difficulties will multiply and intensify and run together and coalesce as well as proofs of Catholicism ; but he may see and appreciate the full value of these proofs and get rid of all the difficulties. Yet he may not at once become a Catholic. Why ? He may wish to do so, but cannot ; at least he says so. And it may be that as yet he has not received the call of Grace. But if you analyse the process of assent in a purely natural, logical way, you have this problem to face.

Whatever God says is true. God says that the Church is Divine. Hence the Church is Divine. Now, a man who is quite certain about major and minor must assent to the con-

clusion. Would that assent be Divine Faith? Parallel with this case of a man going thus far by *unaided reason* are the cases of belief of demons and of formal heretics. Why are not their acts of belief acts of Faith also?

I think we can point to the cold irreverence and profanation implied in making Almighty God the major premiss of a syllogism. It may be allowable and useful to do so, with a view to render this difficult subject more comprehensible to the intellect. But in real concrete Faith it is God Himself we believe. And our theologians strive to exclude all syllogizing, all turning of the mind to creatures, all reliance upon them, when Divine Grace has brought the soul into the Presence of God Himself. It would be useful to compare the opinions of Suarez and Lugo here with some passages from Newman. So also St. Thomas's doctrine of the relation between Faith, Hope and Charity, and the doctrine of the Council of Trent upon Justification would enable us to find a sound Catholic sense in Newman's language. It must suffice to point out that Newman's teachings were largely autobiographical, confessions and soliloquies like those of his great prototype. Again, his was a living Faith, *Fides, charitate formata*; and this would help us to find Catholic doctrine in the very passages that are abused by the pseudo-Mystics.

The inquirer requires light; he also requires *moral dispositions*, self-sacrifice, purity of intention, conquest of strong prejudice, etc. These he cannot have without Grace, and for that, too, he prays. This is a final reason for doubting whether unaided reason to-day can acquire moral certainty.

P. FORD.

A New Science: Mission Science.

IN an age like ours so prolific in intellectual developments the birth of a new science is no striking occurrence. But the advent of one so intimately connected with the most vital functions of the Church must be hailed with particular satisfaction by Catholics.

The nineteenth century has rightly been called a century of Missions. It has witnessed a wonderful growth of evangelising work, paralleled only by that of the age of St. Francis Xavier and of St. Peter Claver. During its course, as during that of the seventeenth, the cause of the Gospel has been furthered by exploration, discovery and colonial expansion, whilst gaining considerably by facilities of travel and communication which three hundred years ago would have seemed to verge on the preternatural.

To gauge the results of this period we have but to turn to the well-informed pages of Father Krose's *Missions-statistik*,¹ or to Father Piolet's monumental work: *Les Missions Catholiques Françaises au dix-neuvième siècle*. These magnificent records, however belittled they may be by one or other discordant voice, explain the pressing want of a science to organise what otherwise threatens to become chaos.

German Catholics know from experience what wonders scientific organisation can do in the service of a good cause. And now that the Church has obtained a more secure footing in their own land, their thoughts have turned to Catholic Missions in heathen countries, and first of all to those of their own new colonies. Within the decade, 1892-1902, every year has witnessed the erection of a missionary house and centre in Germany, from which men and money flow unceasingly to distant fields. With characteristic thoroughness and whole-heartedness the Catholics of the German Empire have applied to these foundations and

¹ A short summary of Krose's book may be seen in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Art-Missions, and an English translation of the German original is, we understand, to appear shortly.

creations the scientific methods which give such irresistible efficiency to their undertakings.

They have been all the more spurred on to this course of action by the realisation of the advanced stage of organisation among their Protestant brethren on the Mission field. For many years already there has been a chair of Mission Science in the Berlin University (just as English Protestants have had theirs in Edinburgh since the sixties), while at the same time there is a large scientific Mission literature in keeping with the considerable development of Evangelical Missions in the nineteenth century. Mission Science has been so far a Protestant science.¹ And yet Catholic Missions have far more important issues at stake than those of all the other Christian denominations combined. Would it not be a positive benefit to them, if they were conducted on more strictly scientific lines? If they too had the advantage of the sure and methodical guidance of science?

Accordingly in 1909 the German Catholic Congress voted the erection of a Mission Science chair.² Nor was the practical working of the Missions to be limited to the clergy. Like every great Catholic cause, it claimed the sympathetic co-operation of the laity. And so, in the following year (1910) an *Academischer Missionsverein* was founded to interest the educated lay element and secure their influence and energetic assistance. It established its headquarters in Münster (600 students), and it already has branches in Breslau, Tübingen, Munich, and other Catholic intellectual centres.

Once started the idea was not allowed to sleep. A Mission Science *Seminar* or advanced class was attached to the theological faculty of Münster and equipped with a suitable library. More than this, in the Prussian Landtag a member of the Centre-Party got the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Public Instruction to sanction the erection of an appropriate building for this purpose. At the same time Catholic courses of lectures on Mission Science were being given at the Universities of Breslau, München, Strasburg, and at the Hamburg Colonial Institute.

¹ Germans have baptised it *Keruktik* and such like pedantic names.

² Its first occupant is Dr. Schmidlin, one of the prominent professors of the Catholic University of Münster in Westphalia.

In 1911 it was decided to start an International Institute for Mission Science Research, with its seat in Münster, and under the presidency of the Prince of Löwenstein. Finally at the beginning of the same year appeared the first number of the first Catholic Mission Science Review, the indispensable organ of the new science.⁴

From the first numbers of this interesting Quarterly we shall learn the aim and object of Catholic Mission Science and its proposed methods of procedure and plan of study.

The opening number, after a sympathetic introduction by Cardinal Fischer, of Cologne, naturally sets out to define Mission Science. What is to be understood by Mission? Is proselytizing work among the various Christian sects, among schismatics or heretics—to fall under the object of Mission Science? It has been thought better to restrict it to the evangelizing of non-Christians, a departure from the notions received at the Sacred Congregation of the Propaganda which puts missionary activities in the Near East, in Asia Minor and Egypt (and, until quite lately, in England and the United States) on the same level as those in purely non-Christian lands. At any rate, Mission Science, for the present, wants to occupy itself only with the evangelization of non-Christians. In its eyes Mission means *Christianisierungsarbeit*, Christianising work,⁵ as the chief Protestant exponent of Mission Science tersely puts it. It certainly answers the popular notion of Mission *par excellence*, viz., Missions to the heathens, including Moslems and even Jews!

In connection with the extension to be given to the word Mission, a further question arises which does not seem so far to have occupied the attention of either Catholic or Protestant writers. Under what category shall we classify the numerous class of those whom Devas (in his *Key to the World's Progress*) so aptly calls After-Christians—of the many hundred thousands of modern pagans that people the big cities of Europe and America? Is work among them to be included in the Mission work contemplated by the new Science? Apparently not. Apart from the consideration

⁴ *Zeitschrift für Missionwissenschaft*—Aschendorf—Münster i.W.—Editor, Prof. Dr. Schmidlin.

⁵ Warneck's *Evangelische Missionslehre*—1897. Perthes-Gotha p. 2.

of methods, it is not in their case a question of christianising, but if I may venture upon the word, re-christianising.*

Missions being thus clearly defined, it is proposed to study their past and present history, the principles and rules on which the Christian apostolate is based and constructed : facts and theories afford ample scope for scientific treatment and discussion as well as for methodical arrangement and classification. How extensive is the domain claimed by this Benjamin Science of Catholic Theology will appear in the course of these pages.

But it will be asked : why want to make a science of it ? Are there not too many sciences already ? How will theorising and dogmatising from the armchair improve matters ? What have lengthy reports and learned congresses to do with the progress and advance of a mission in the backwoods of America ? Have Missions not so far prospered without them ? So say the advocates of a happy-go-lucky system. Yet, Missions are too important a part of the life of the Church to allow them to drift about at haphazard. Like all modern political, social and commercial concerns, Missions have nothing to lose and everything to gain from being organised on a scientific and business-like footing. Of late there have been loud, though unjust, complaints that the results arrived at after three centuries of evangelisation do not correspond to the enormous output of Catholic energy, to the expenditure of so much money⁷ and to the sacrifice of so many valuable lives.⁸ It would have been much more to the mark to point out that a still greater measure of success would have attended the heroic efforts of the missionaries and of their benefactors, had there been proper organisation ; and that in several cases waste of time and of money might have been avoided, had the Missions

* On this subject of After-Christians, cf. Goyau's most interesting article in the *Oxford and Cambridge Review*, October, 1911.

⁷ Mgr. Baumgartner has calculated that in the nineteenth century alone the Catholic Church spent over £80,000,000 on her Missions, cf. Krose's *Missionsstatistik*, p. 36—Herder, 1908. This fact ought to dispose of the false notion commonly entertained about the greater generosity of Protestants to the Missions. Cf. *Missionsalmosen*, von A. Huonder, S.J., editor of the *Katholischen Missionen*.

⁸ Though no death statistics are at hand, the loss in life may be gauged from the number of those now at work in the Mission field : 12,000 priests and 24,000 lay brothers and nuns.

been conducted on a more systematic plan. In an age where trusts and combines, trade-unions and guilds rule the world, why should not Catholic Propaganda learn from them to aspire after greater results and a more decisive triumph?

Nor will Missions be the only gainers; Catholic Theology will see its own field greatly extended. Let us take, for instance, Apologetics. From a missionary point of view, the presentation of proofs on the usual themes will require variations in keeping with the totally altered circumstances of places and persons, of alien civilisation or barbarism, and of a mentality sometimes strange and puzzling to the average European. The arguments that convince us of the divinity of Christ and of the divine origin of His Church may not, and probably will not, appeal, say, to the Indian mind steeped as it is for the last twenty-five centuries in Idealism and Pantheism, and for which there is no line of demarcation between history and fiction, between reality and invention. Again, Hinduism is full of miracles and prodigies: bleeding statues of gods, heaven-sent idols, fire-walking, demoniacal possessions, and so forth. As in the days of Verpasian and of Apollonius of Tyana Christian apologists had to take pagan wonders into account, so too the modern missionary must be ready to discriminate between true and false thaumaturgism, if he wishes efficiently to establish the claims of Christianity. This process of adaptation will be of great use in making theologians view their demonstrations from every aspect, in making them state the case for our revealed religion in new ways and according to fresh methods: in a word, it will vivify and widen the study of Apologetics.

As to Moral Theology, the various customs and usages, the different laws and codes of Mission lands are continually raising interesting problems difficult of solution. The archives of the Congregation of Propaganda in Rome already contain a vast repertorium of them still awaiting their Ballerini or their Lehmkühl to be grouped and treated systematically. India alone with its infant-marriages, endogamy, methods of inheritance, and—at least in parts of the country—its strange institution of the matriarchate, etc., would provide a rich mine of "cases." So too would China with its many national traits and peculiarities of

custom, *v.g.*, its reverence for the dead (how far superstitions); its Confucius-worship (whether a purely civil or religious ceremony), etc. All this would make a "colonial edition" of the usual Moral Theology text-book a highly desirable and valuable addition to the Missionary's small library, confronted as he is from the outset with new situations and conditions not even hinted at in the ordinary books of casuistry. A work like this would have made impossible the occurrence of painful controversies such as those of the "Malabar Rites" and "Chinese Rites," so disastrous in their effects upon the most flourishing Missions of the Church.

Similarly with regard to Canon Law, mission work raises a number of questions, some of which already touched upon by the contemporaries of Xavier, have little application now,⁹ while others are full of actuality.

We may instance the vexed subject of Double Jurisdiction in India, *viz.*, that of Propaganda and that of Portuguese Padroado. Only those acquainted with the history of Eastern Missions during the last two centuries can realise

⁹ It may be worth noting some of these as a contrast to the stereotyped view of the land and age of the Inquisition. The Spanish Dominican Francis Victoria of Salamanca in his *Relectiones* 13 (Lyons 1557, Salamanca 1565, Ingolstadt 1580) holds that the Pope and the Kaiser have no right to transfer the dominion of heathen lands to other princes or to make war on them in order to impose Christianity. (In face of well-known contemporary events the question would not seem to be quite devoid of actuality, if instead of Pope and Kaiser we read Civilisation and Modern Powers.)

In the fifth of these *Relectiones* the learned friar treats other points akin to the above; he asks for instance! "*Indi barbari* (of course American Indians are meant) *utrum essent veri domini ante adventum Hispanorum privatim et publice*" and his answer is "*barbari nec propter peccatum infidelitatis nec propter peccata alia mortalia impediuntur quin sint veri domini tam publice quam privatim*" and further "*barbaris, etsi quantumcumque fides annuntiata probabiliter et sufficienter fuerit et noluerint eam recipere, tamen ob id non licet eos bello persequi et bonis suis spoliare*" and finally "*Principes Christiani non possunt etiam auctoritate papae coercere barbaros a peccatis contra legem naturae nec ratione illorum eos punire*" thus showing that liberty of conscience and religious tolerance were not unknown to the countrymen of the much-reviled Torquemada, and at the same time throwing a curious sidelight on the pious pretexts with which Christian princes sought to soothe their qualms of conscience after *le fait accompli*. Quotations from Prof. Schmidlin, in *Zeitschrift für Missionwissenschaft*—Heft 3.

the huge amount of strife and litigation, the loss of opportunities and of influence caused by this bitter contest of the effete rights of Portugal against the crying needs of the Christian apostolate in Asia.

Turning now to Pastoral Theology, it is clear that the handling of catechumens and neophytes requires something very different in the way of instructing, preaching and governing, from what we are accustomed to see in a community constituted as a regular parish for hundreds of years. Methods will have to be compared, experimented on, sanctioned, and not left any more to the arbitrary and sometimes hazardous choice of every private individual. Again, the very scarcity of missionaries (generally overworked) will have to be remedied all the sooner that the number of Christ's apostles tends rather to diminish than to increase, *v.g.*—these past years there has been an alarming decrease in vocations in the Paris *Séminaire des Missions Etrangères* with its hundred missions all over the globe. Pending the formation of a native clergy and of native churches, which Leo XIII. had so much at heart, a large extension will have to be given to the system of catechists and schoolmasters as mission auxiliaries. On this point modern missions might learn from the old, where with still fewer priests but more and better trained and better paid catechists the work of evangelisation was, to say the least, as successful as at the present day. Finally, corresponding to the decrease in the number of missionaries there is an ever-growing difficulty in finding the funds on which so far most of the Missions have subsisted. Europe and America think it high time that Christian converts should learn to provide for their own spiritual needs, to support their own clergy, to build their own schools and churches. Who can deny the justice of this claim?

Dogma in its turn will have the task of establishing the duties of the Church and of Catholics at large towards the heathen world: how far these duties are imperative on the successors of those to whom Christ said: "Go ye and preach to all nations," as well as on the lay element; what sacrifices in men and money they may imply on the part of both. This subject, if we are to believe Mgr. Le Roy, would appear to have been so far neglected: "*Chose étonnante dans tout le corps des Evangiles aucun commandement n'est plus*

solennel et plus clairement formulé que celui qui nous prescrit d'enseigner tous les peuples, et nous n'avons que je sache aucun manuel de théologie, aucun catéchisme, aucun livre qui relève cet ordre comme un devoir (on n'en parle généralement que comme d'un droit), qui nous informe de son caractère obligatoire et qui en tire à l'usage de chacun les conclusions nécessaires."¹⁰ Of course, it may be said that this duty of evangelising needs no more proof or comment than the obvious duty of teaching catechism: what does the Church exist for, if not precisely to spread the Faith? But we may certainly wonder that Catholic pulpits should sometimes be so silent as reported by competent persons. Prince Löwenstein, in the Breslau German Catholic Congress, was obliged to confess that when he asked himself how often he had heard this important duty impressed on the audience, a duty, in fulfilment of which, he said, every man, every child, could and should take part, he was obliged to answer: Never! And Countess Ledochowska speaks of her own experience in the same strain: "I have been piously brought up," she says, "I have received instruction in a convent, I have faithfully attended sermons, and yet I had reached the age of twenty-two before hearing a sermon on the Missions and on the duty of supporting them."¹¹ To avoid exaggeration and misapprehension on this point, it may be well to add that when speaking of the duty of *laymen* to support Catholic Missions, there can only be question of a duty of charity. Its binding force must, therefore, be gauged by the ordinary rules laid down by Moralists for the exercise of works of spiritual mercy. But it would no doubt be desirable that Catholics should hear oftener inculcated from the pulpit this particular form of spiritual mercy; and that the very laudable Charity sermon might sometimes give place to the Mission sermon.

Sixteenth and seventeenth century writers have made good attempts at impressing this duty on the proper persons. For instance, the Irish Franciscan Caron (born 1612, died in Dublin, 1666), devotes a chapter of his *Apostolatus evangelicus Missionariorum Regularium per univcrsum orbem expositus* (Antverpiæ, 1653) to the matter in

¹⁰ Quoted in *Etudes Religieuses*—1910, v. 125, p. 551.

¹¹ Quoted in *Etudes* l.c.

hand and sets out to show: What claims Missions and Missionaries have on the support of popes, bishops, priests, and Catholic princes.¹²

Modern Lutheran writers, not admitting the division of the Church into priests and laymen, logically insist on the duties of *all* Christians towards the heathen lands, and have exhaustively dealt with the subject. Let it suffice to quote Professor Warneck's *Evangelische Missionslehre*, mentioned above. The headings of some chapters are as follows: *Dogmatische Grundlegung der Sendung*; *Ethische Grundlegung* (basis); *Mission in Reden Jesu* (in the speeches of Jesus); *Missiontheologie des Paulus*, etc. Similarly Prof. Barnemann lays stress on the great influence Missions are bound to exercise over Protestant Theology: "Theology cannot afford to forget the great importance of Missions . . . henceforth the study of the relations between Theology and the Missions must be earnestly undertaken . . . Through the Missions we seek to quicken, extend and make fruitful the study of Theology."¹³ These are not mere barren words. Not to speak of a host of publications (no less than thirty-seven reviews), it has been calculated that in 1910 twenty public courses of lectures were being delivered at the various German Protestant Universities (*cf. Etudes*, l.c.) It is, of course, true to remark with Prof. Schmidlin that Protestant faculties of Theology, not being burdened with an excess of dogma and having thus comparatively little work to do, can afford to devote more time and attention to the Missions than the Catholic Universities with their loaded programmes. Yet could we not do something towards the same object?

A few words now on the proposed classification of the various departments of Mission Science. Prof. Schmidlin divides it into two principal branches, the first of which he

¹² Among other points touched on in his book, the following are curious enough: 3 Whether Regular Superiors have the right to order their subjects to the Missions or may hinder them from going; 4 Who sends to the Missions? The Pope, the General or the Provincial? 6 Whether infidels have to be compelled or persuaded into Christianity; 10 Of martyrdom and intercourse with the infidels, etc., *cf. Zeitschrift für Missionwissenschaft*—2 Heft.

¹³ Quoted in *Etudes*—1910, v. 125, p. 554.

calls *Missionskunde* and the second *Missionslehre*. The former is concerned with getting together the facts, the material for specialists to work upon :

1°. All the information available on the work done for the Missions : at home, in connection with the supply of missionaries, of priests, brothers and nuns ; with the foundation of Apostolic Schools, Colonial Seminaries, Colleges and Training Schools, where an adequate preparation would be given to the candidates for the apostolic life ; physical culture hand in hand with intellectual and spiritual attainments, with initiative, resourcefulness, mechanical and artistic acquirements, in short, all the qualities needed in the ideal pioneer of Christianity.¹⁴ The supply of funds is for the present as imperative as that of men, and should be organised through a well-devised system of small, but universal, contributions. If out of the 250 millions of Catholics living in civilised lands, only 50 millions could be brought to contribute a half-penny monthly, the thorny question of Mission finance would be very nearly solved.¹⁵

¹⁴ Among the requisites of the future missionary much more stress ought to be laid on the knowledge of non-Christian religions, and, at any rate, of the religion of the people he is destined to evangelise. Protestants have realised this very strongly. The missionary "must be a scholar stored with the lore of the sacred literature of religions." And so he will be prepared to become later "a student of religion as it appears in the lives of the people, in their curious customs, in their acts of worship, their moods of mind, ways of thinking, and above all in their individual and social conduct. The interval between the religion of the book and the religion of the life is often ghastly."—*Students and the Missionary Problem*, p. 212 (London, E.C., Warwick Lane, 22.)

¹⁵ As an example worthy of imitation it may be allowed to propose the ingenious charity of Belgian, German and other continental Catholics who by collecting old stamps have realised considerable sums. Thus the *Grand Séminaire* of Liege has in a few years given more than £10,000 to the Missions out of the proceeds of old stamps. A German Priest alone has sent over £12,000 to the Missions from the same source. The stamps were collected mainly by children. Much also can be done in Catholic schools and colleges. In several Belgian and German colleges the boys are organised into associations for the help of the Missions. Thus in the Jesuit College of Alost the Lower Line Association subscribed more than £400 for the Missions in ten years. In the German College of Sittard the subscriptions of the Lower Line Association totalled £70 last year. It may be noted that the money thus got is nearly all pocket-money, which the boys generously sacrifice for the great cause of the "Divine Imperialism of Christianity."

Under this same heading of *Missionskunde*,

2°. Mission history will occupy a large space: the Missions in the primitive Church, in the Middle Ages and in modern times, with the important lessons they have in store for future evangelisation.

Missionslehre, or Mission Science proper, would in its turn be subdivided into:

1°. Fundamental (*grundlegende*) Mission theory, establishing Catholic duties towards the non-Christians from the dogmatic, biblical, traditional, and other points of view;

2°. Practical Mission theory concerning itself with

(a) *Missionsrecht*, or Mission Canon Law (see applications above).

(b) *Missionsmethodik*, i.e., the scientific methods of dealing with the conversion of heathens: how to approach the pagan mind on the subject of religion, how far to spare its prejudices; and many other delicate points of practical psychology. Then, how to organise the converts into local churches, etc., etc.

Before concluding we may be allowed to express a regret which does, of course, in no way detract from our admiration at the earnestness and thoroughness with which German Catholics have set themselves to the task of furthering the fulfilment of the duty so solemnly imposed by Christ on His Church, viz., that of preaching the Gospel to all the nations of the earth. What a pity that the new science should not have been made more international! So far its committee, its official organ, are all exclusively under German control. No successful effort seems to have been made to enlist on its behalf the advice and help, say, of the French-speaking missionary element. And yet France and Belgium are the two great missionary lands of the present day. The co-operation of the heads of their numerous missionary congregations and societies must be secured at all costs if they are to come at all into touch with the new movement. The difficulty of language may be obviated by making the *Zeitschrift für Missionwissenschaft* a polyglot journal—after the example of that magnificent review "*Anthropos*" (Mödling, Vienna). French and English, or at least one of the two, should be allowed, with German, as a medium of communication between the missionaries of various nationa-

lities.¹⁶ English is advocated as the language—the adopted language—of a vast number of missionaries, perhaps the majority, scattered throughout the greatest colonial empire of the world; and also as the language of England, America and Australia, yesterday Mission lands themselves, and already aspiring to the noble task of spreading the Faith in pagan countries. Witness the Mill Hill Congregation, Cardinal Moran's College for the Japanese Mission, America's Apostolate in the Philippines.¹⁷ Ireland, too, the fruitful parent of the two great Churches of the New World, now that these begin to suffice for themselves, will henceforth resume, let us hope, the generous traditions of the days of St. Columban and St. Gall, when it was said of her numerous missionary sons, the pious *peregrini Christi*, pilgrims for the love of Christ, as they loved to call themselves, that "*eis consuetudo peregrinandi jam pene in naturam conversa est.*"¹⁸ Now, as in the days of old, Irish cloisters and churches still teem with Erin's noblest sons and daughters, whose magnificent faith and courage, whose splendid physique and powers of endurance fit them above all others for the labours and sufferings inherent to the apostolic life. May they emulate the grand work done by their forefathers, and do for the East what these did for the

¹⁶ A step in this direction has been taken by Fr. W. Schmidt, the editor of *Anthropos*, and he has announced a *Ferienkursus*, or course of vacation lectures for missionaries in both French and German for next summer in Louvain.

¹⁷ The Catholics of the United States have just started a Seminary for Foreign Missions at Hawthorn, N.Y. This will include an apostolic school. The whole will be controlled by the Catholic Foreign Mission Society, which will be modelled after the best traditions of the Missions Etrangères of Paris and St. Joseph's Society of Mill Hill. It will keep up permanent relations with its missionaries wherever they may be. The seminary itself will be conducted along the lines followed successfully at Mill Hill, Paris, Milan, Steyl, and at several similar institutions, all of which were visited last summer by the organisers appointed by the Archbishops of the country, Revs. Thomas F. Price, of Raleigh, N.C., and James A. Walsh, of Boston. The field to which the students will be sent has not yet been fixed. It is known, however, that the organisers have expressed a preference for missions in Eastern Asia, where it is recognised by Rome that there is a strong and urgent need of English-speaking missionaries.—*The Catholic Herald of India*, Dec. 13, 1911.

¹⁸ Strabon's Vita S. Galli, quoted in *Chrétientés Celtiques*—Gougaud—Paris, 1911.

West, and win the vast empires of pagan Asia to the Gospel of Christ!

3rd Dec., 1911. Feast of St. Francis Xavier.

MISSION SCIENCE : SCHEME.

FACTS.	{	1°. Mission Work.	{ (a) At Home. (b) Abroad.
		2°. Mission History.	{ (a) In Early Church. (b) In Middle Ages. (c) In Modern Times.
THEORY.	{	1°. Fundamental.	{ (a) Dogmatic Aspects. (b) Ethical " (c) Biblical, etc. "
		2°. Practical.	{ (a) Mission Canon Law. (b) Mission Methods.

AUXILIARY SCIENCES. { (a) Mission Statistics.
(b) Mission Geography.

REV. P. DAHMEN, S.J.

The Sign in Isaias VII. 14.

THE Immanuel prophecies of Isaias are of great importance for the theologian. They hold a very prominent place in the apologetic argument from prophecy, and they supply data of a unique kind for the discussion of prophetic religion. These Immanuel prophecies are brought together in chapters vii.-xii. of Isaias, and they must be studied together to be properly appreciated. In this paper I propose to discuss the meaning of one of the Immanuel passages only—the one of which chapter vii. verse 14 forms a part. The discussion will be mainly concerned with the Hebrew text of Is. vii. St. Matthew makes use of Isaias vii. 14, as a prophecy of the Virgin Birth, and all Christian theologians have followed him in treating that verse as containing a genuine prophetic statement of Christ's birth from a Virgin. Yet Isaias vii., 14, in spite of St. Matthew's authoritative explanation, has given theologians at all times much trouble. A literature of very considerable bulk has grown up about it, and an adequate history of exegetical theories on the 7th. chapter of Isaias would fill a thick volume. This body of literature may possibly be due to a simple misunderstanding, and in this paper I wish to call attention to a very obvious explanation of the text which involves no fundamental difficulties about the nature of prophecy and accepts fully the exegesis of St. Matthew. The real problem of Isaias vii. 14 centres around the "Sign" which is promised by Isaias. St. Matthew does not refer to a sign, and we cannot, except by forcing the text of the Evangelist, regard the first Gospel as identifying the Virgin Birth with a "sign" promised by Isaias to Achaz King of Judah. It is, therefore, quite open to the exegete to determine the nature of the sign in Isaias vii. 14 without reference to St. Matthew's Gospel. If the sign promised by the prophet is the Virgin Birth to take place 700 years and more after the prophet's time, the first Gospel furnishes no compelling evidence for this explanation. If that explanation, which has been until recently current in Catholic theology, involves considerable difficulties and demands a certain amount of mental

gymnastic to grasp, we are free to search for a more intelligible explanation. Such an explanation has been already outlined by Catholic scholars.¹

The main problem of *Isaias vii.* is: What is the sign which *Isaias* promises to King *Achaz* in *vii. 14*? If this sign is not the Virgin Birth, and if the Virgin Birth is referred to, as *St. Matthew* authoritatively explains it to be, in the verse, the problem arises: What is the meaning of the reference to the Virgin Birth in the passage? Neither of these problems can be discussed without reference to the historical context of the prophet's words. Three points, therefore, have to be examined: (a) the historical situation in chapter *vii.*; (b) the nature of the Sign in verse 14; (c) the ground of the reference to the Virgin Birth.

(a) The words of *Isaias* in chapter *vii.* were most probably spoken in 735 B.C. In the year 738 B.C. the Assyrian monarch, *Tiglathpileser III.* (the Pul of 4 K. xv. 19, 29) annexed the districts north of the Lebanon and Antilibanus, and received the tribute of a number of Syrian princes. Among these was *Menahem*, King of Israel, who paid the enormous tribute of 1,000 talents of silver to secure the friendship of the Assyrian King (4 K. xv. 19, 20). This act of *Menahem* brought ruin on his house, for his son *Peqachyah* had not reigned much more than a year when he was dethroned and murdered by a certain *Peqach-ben-Remalyah*. The overthrow of *Peqachyah* was an act of the anti-Assyrian party in Samaria, for we find the usurper, *Peqach-ben-Remalyah*, presently in league with *Rezin*, King of the Aramaean kingdom, Damascus. The two Kings, *Peqach* of Samaria and *Rezin* of Damascus, now set about organising all Syria, including Palestine, into a coalition against *Tiglathpileser III.* This will have been in the early part of 735, when *Yotham* was on the throne of Judah. In that year *Tiglathpileser* was occupied with extensive campaigns against the land of *Urartu* (Armenia). The moment was, therefore, suitable for a general rising

¹ For views similar to that outlined in text Cf. *Steinmetzer*, *Die Geschichte der Geburt und Kindheit Christi*. Münster, 1910. p. 22 ff.; *Condamin*, *Le livre d'Isaie*, Paris, 1905; *van Hoonacker*, *La prophétie relative à la naissance d'Immanuel*. Rev. Biblique, 1904: Ch. Huyghe S.J., *La Vierge-Mère dans Isaie*, La Science Catholique 1895. p. 226-243. *Durand*, *La Vierge-Mère et l'Emmanuel*, L'Université Catholique, 1899.

against Assyria in the South. The Samaritans and Aramaeans were joined by the Philistines and Edomites, but Yotham of Judah refused absolutely to join in the hostilities against Assyria. Peqach and Rezin threatened to ravage his territory if Yotham refused to join them. But the Judaeen king remained firm. The two northern kings then marched into the territory of Judah and laid waste a large number of its towns. Apparently at this time Yotham died, leaving the throne in the hands of his son Achaz. The situation which the young king had to face was sufficiently alarming. Aram, Achaz heard, "had settled down like a swarm of bees in Ephraim" (Isaias vii. 2). The northern armies were advancing rapidly on Jerusalem, and it was no wonder that "the heart of Achaz and the hearts of his people trembled as forest-trees tremble in a storm" (Isaias vii. 2). The account of the Syro-Ephraimite campaign against Judah contained in II. Chron. 28 makes it appear that the danger to Jerusalem was very serious. Peqach inflicted a crippling defeat on the main army of Achaz. Rezin in the south-east captured the important trading station, Elath, on the Aelanitic Gulf and apparently handed it over to the Edomites. Chronicles records further a renewal of the old hostility of Philistia, as if the Philistines had taken advantage of the general weakness of Judah to recapture some of their former territory. Altogether it was a time of great peril for the house of David. But, in spite of the danger which threatened his capital, Achaz was not less firmly opposed than Yotham had been to the coalition against Assyria. He realised, however, the full gravity of the situation and proceeded to prepare Jerusalem against a siege. He made known, too, in his court that he had a mind to call in the help of Tiglathpileser against the two northern kings. At this point the prophecy of Isaias in the seventh chapter falls. The prophet has gone out to meet King Achaz, while the latter is anxiously inspecting the water-supply of Jerusalem in view of the possibility of a siege. The situation in the chapter is highly dramatic. The victorious enemies are not far from the Holy City. Heralds of increasing disasters are daily arriving in Jerusalem. A siege of the Holy City is not unlikely. The commerce of Judah on the Red Sea and eastwards is paralysed by the loss of Elath. The Philistines are waking up in the west. Achaz is making the most

strenuous efforts to save Jerusalem from the northern kings. At this moment, while Achaz is at the height of his feverish uneasiness, the prophet appears. He meets the king "at the end of the conduit of the upper pool, on the highway of the fuller's field." He brings with him his son with the prophetic name, Shear-yashub.¹ In majestic words Isaiah warns Achaz to have no fear—the two tails of smoking firebrands from the north will speedily be extinguished. Yahveh will save His City without foreign help. Apparently the prophet was aware that Achaz had begun, or was about to begin, negotiations for help with Tiglathpileser. Possibly the embassy described in 4 K. 16, 7 ff. had already been despatched to Assyria. In the prophet's mind, to seek help from Asshur would be a double crime—a crime against the Theocracy, and a crime against the people. It was a crime to think that Yahveh could not save His people. It was a crime to rob the people of Judah to pay a stranger power, and to entice a greedy foreigner into the heart of the land. Asshur would be a razor that would shave Judah of its wealth. It is hardly surprising that Achaz is unmoved by the prophet's enthusiasm. The vigour of Rezin and Peqach did not look to him like the smouldering of a dying firebrand. Humanly speaking, it would have been strange if Achaz had accepted the prophet's message, and the prophet's words that follow suggest that it was not easy for Achaz in the circumstances to believe. "If thou dost not believe, neither canst thou stand." But belief in Yahveh's power and readiness to help was necessary, even though it was not easy, and therefore the prophet speaks again: "Ask for a sign from Yahveh thy God [*i.e.*, that this shall come to pass]: make it as deep as Sheol, or as high as Heaven." It is not necessary to find hypocrisy in the answer of Achaz: "I will not ask; I will not put Yahveh to the test." But whether this answer with its trim orthodoxy was a mere hypocritical ruse of Achaz or not, it roused a deep anger in Isaiah. The prophet seems to have looked on the king at the moment as a hypocrite and a weakling, for the words of his passionate outburst which follows vibrate with contempt for Achaz and his policy. The sublime oracle which the deprecating orthodoxy of Achaz called forth brings us to the problem of the "Sign."

¹ "A Remnant will return."

- (b) 13. Listen then O House of David! Is it too little for you to weary men that you weary my God also?
14. Therefore the Lord Himself will give you a sign. Let³ the Virgin conceive and give birth to a son and call his name Immanuel.
15. Curd⁴ and honey he shall eat what time he knoweth⁵ to reject evil and choose good.
16. For before the boy shall know to reject evil and choose good, the land before whose two kings thou cowerest shall be laid waste.⁶
17. On thee and on thy people and on the house of thy father, Yahveh will bring days such as have not come since the day when Ephraim parted from Judah—the King of Asshur.
18. And it shall come to pass in that day that Yahveh will hiss to the flies that are at the end of the streams of Egypt, and to the bees that are in the land of Asshur.
19. And they shall all come and settle in the precipitous ravines and clefts of the rocks, and upon all the thorn-bushes and upon every pasture.
20. In that day the Lord will shave with a razor hired beyond the river—with the King of Asshur, the head and the hair of the feet; and even the beard shall it sweep away.

³ Or, Should the Virgin, &c. For this translation of the vivid prophetic perfect with *hinneh* Cf. Condamin *Le livre d'Isaïe* p. 71 f. Condamin quotes in favour of this translation Ex. 3,¹³; IK 9⁷; Hosea 9⁶.

⁴ Vulgate has, *butyrum et mel comedet*. The Hebrew *Hem'ah* means thick milk, curd, or butter.

⁵ *Ut sciat* of the Vulgate represents the Hebrew infinitive with *l* which often has a merely temporal force.

⁶ Van Hoonacker in an article on the 7th ch. of Isaiah in the *Revue Biblique*, 1904, p. 213ff.—*La prophétie relative à la naissance d'Immanuel*, translates v. 16 thus; "Before the boy shall know to reject evil and choose good, the land (*i.e.* the land of Judah) will be laid waste. But thou who art full of fear before the two Kings, on thee etc." He connects v. 16 immediately with v. 17. But his reasons are not convincing. For van Hoonacker the sign consists in the devastation of Judah by the very means which Achaz employed to save it. Since, however, Judah was not devastated for more than a hundred years after Achaz time, this theory labours under the same difficulties as the familiar theory which identifies the sign with the birth of Immanuel from a Virgin. *Vid. infra*.

21. And it shall come to pass on that day that a man will rear a young cow and two sheep.
22. And it shall come to pass from the abundance of the production of milk he shall eat curd.
For curd and honey all who are left in the land shall eat.
23. And it shall come to pass on that day, that every place where a thousand vines worth a thousand shekels stand, shall be given up to thorns and briers.
24. Only with arrows and bow shall one come thither, for thorns and briers shall fill all the land.
25. And, as for all the mountains which men were wont to hoe with the mattock, no one shall come thither for fear of thorns and briers. They shall be a cattle-run and sheep-walk.

What, then, is the unasked-for sign which the Lord is to give? We must take the whole context as a unity. A sign, as usually understood, is something by which or from which we come to knowledge of something else. It is known, if not existent, prior to that of which it is the sign. A sign may tell us that something has been or that something will be; but the knowledge of the sign in both cases precedes our knowledge of the thing signified.

The current exegesis of the passage is thus summarised by Knabenbauer.⁷ The thing signified is the coming rescue of the Holy City. The sign is the Virgin Birth of the Messiah. He will be of the House of David so that that House will stand. The Virginal conception promised is the pledge and symbol of God's mighty power to change the gloomy present. But the Messiah is to be born in a lowly condition, away from the royal residence,—which shows that the House of David will have fallen from its political greatness. The promise all through is at the same time a threat. The House of David will stand, for the Messiah will come of it; yet He will be born at a time when its fortunes have fallen low indeed. But the Virginal Birth shows the never-failing mercy of a loving God.

It is clear that the thing signified is the fulfilment of Isaias' prophecy of the rescue of Judah through the fall of

⁷ *Commentarius in Isaiam Prophetam* p. 166 ff.

Ephraim and Damascus. If the Virgin Birth of the Messiah is the sign of the fulfilment of that prophecy, it must have been—if we take sign in the ordinary sense—more evident and certain for Achaz than the coming rescue of Judah. Yet how can a belief that something will happen 735 years hence be a medium through which one can know with certainty the occurrence of another something within a few years? And what right have we to assume, as we must on Knabenbauer's theory, that Achaz lived in a world of faith like a prophet, and that an event foretold was not less real for him than a fact experienced? In the present context Isaias has prophesied definitely that Judah will be saved and that Ephraim and Damascus will be humbled. What Achaz needs is a sign, in the sense of demonstration or proof that this prophecy will be fulfilled. Isaias has declared himself ready to perform any wonder that Achaz shall demand to guarantee the truth of his prophecy. The prophets' words, "make it deep as Sheol or high as heaven," are an amazing document of confident faith. But when the precisely orthodox ruler, with a suspicion of censure for such exalted faith, refuses to tempt the Lord by demanding wonders, the angry prophet declares the sign himself. It is in the circumstances a wondrous thing. It will also be a proof that the prophet has spoken truly. Achaz has met the promise of the fall of Ephraim and Damascus with a polite incredulity. It was, therefore, for him a thing most unlikely, the occurrence of which he would regard as a genuine wonder. But this very wonder the prophet declares will take place. The Sign will be the actual realisation of the prophecy. The best sign or proof of the truth of a prophecy is its fulfilment, and the fulfilment of Isaias' prophecy—so unlikely for Achaz when the prophet spoke—is to be the sign that the prophet has spoken the truth. The Sign, it is true, is not better known than the thing prophesied, for it is identical with it; but when Achaz shall see the words of Isaias fulfilled he will know that the prophet has spoken the words of God at God's command. The event will become for him a proof of the prophet's truth.

Now, is it fair to take "Sign" in this sense of demonstration or proof? When God is sending Moses as His ambassador to the Hebrews in Goshen He says: "This shall

be a sign to thee that I have sent thee. When thou hast brought forth the people out of Egypt, ye shall serve God upon this mountain" (Ex. iii. 15). Here the sign was to be the simple accomplishment of the thing promised. Again in 4 K. xix. 29 we find that "Sign" means the actual occurrence of the thing promised. "This shall be a sign for thee; this year one shall eat what grows of itself, and in the second year that which groweth out of the roots; and in the third year sow ye and reap ye and plant vineyards and eat the fruit thereof."⁸ Most readers will be reminded here of St. Luke's narrative of the Nativity (ch. ii.). When the angels have announced to the shepherds the birth of the Saviour they add (2, 12): "And this shall be a sign to you; ye shall find the Babe wrapped in swaddling clothes and laid in a manger."⁹

These are but a few out of several Biblical passages which might be quoted to prove that the sign of a prophecy or of a statement is often equivalent to the verification of such prophecy or statement. In other words, a sign in Biblical usage need not be distinct from the whole complex of which it is a sign. It is perfectly intelligible to regard the fulfilment of a prophecy as a proof (= sign) of the prophet's mission and veracity. But did Achaz live to see the prophecy of Isaias fulfilled? That is quite certain. In 732 Damascus was taken by the Assyrians, and its inhabitants deported to Kir. Rezin, the king, was put to death (4 K. xvi. 9). Ephraim was heavily punished at the same period. Tiglathpileser annexed the territories of Zabulon, Asher and Naphtali, as well as the East-Jordan possessions of Israel. From these districts he deported the inhabitants to Assyria, and forced Samaria to accept an Assyrian puppet as its king (4 K. xv. 29, 30; xvii. 1 f.).

Thus, within three or four years the prophecy of the rescue of Judah, and of the extinguishing of the smouldering fire-brands was accomplished. Isaias could point to this accomplishment later as a proof of his genuine prophetic mission. The fall of Ephraim and Damascus was secured by the very means which Isaias warns against so vehemently—the help of Tiglathpileser. This help was

⁸ Same verse occurs in Isaias 37³⁰.

⁹ Cf. further Jer. 44²⁹⁻³⁰.

to be a scourge for Judah, and how this came to pass is vividly foretold in Isaias vii. 17 ff., and is graphically told in II. Chrons. 28. But the "Sign" in vii. 14, as I have explained it, does not include the punishment of Judah. The Sign is contained in v.v. 15, 16. Judah will be prosperous again in a few years, and the land (*i.e.*, the united lands) of Ephraim and Syria will be devastated and its kings dethroned. The verses which follow (v. 17 to the end of the chapter) are a distinct prophecy of the fall of Judah. That was not to come for more than a hundred years, and the prospect of it could not have deeply affected Achaz. Yet it was to be the natural issue of the means which Achaz used to save his capital. The Assyrian friend was sure to become the Assyrian robber, and the customs of Asshur could not be established without disaster among the people of the Lord. All this Isaias foresaw through his political instinct, as well as by prophetic enlightenment. But he did not include it in his sign. That sign is the fulfilment of his prophecy as contained in v.v. 15, 16. Verse 15 describes the effect of its fulfilment on Judah; v. 16 the effect of its fulfilment on the two hostile kingdoms of the north.

(c) From what has been said, it follows that v. 14 does not really contain the sign to which Isaias refers. Yet the 14th. verse is an integral part of the context and cannot be regarded as a gloss or a superfluity. St. Matthew, as we have seen, explains v. 14 in a Messianic sense, and finds it fully realised in the birth of the Redeemer. The verse must, therefore, be prophetic of Christ's birth, but it is not necessary to maintain that this prophecy of the Virgin Birth was now for the first time spoken in a moment of transcendent faith and inspiration. There is no other text in the Old Testament which directly refers to a Virgin Birth, but it is interesting to note that Isaias' contemporary, the prophet Micah, also refers to a mysterious mother and child (Mic. v. 1-5). We have many prophetic writings, but when all are put together they present merely a fragmentary view of the religious beliefs of Israel. There seems to be good reason for holding that Isaias in vii. 14, when he speaks of *the* Virgin and her Child, calls up figures which were already familiar to the faith of

Judah.¹⁰ The history of the Messianic idea has not yet been studied satisfactorily. The pedantry of a destructive criticism whose chief aim seems to be to reject as many Biblical passages as possible, and the want of a sympathetic understanding of Oriental thought under which most European scholars have suffered, have so far stood in the way of a scientific history of the Messianic idea. Prophetic literature is so fragmentary, and modern Biblical science is still so inadequate, that it is not surprising to find Isaias and Micah referring to prophetic figures as to things well known, though we know of no parallel to their references in the Old Testament. We may take it that the Virgin Mother and her Child, to whom Isaias so familiarly refers, were not announced to the world for the first time in 735 B.C. The Child was announced long before Isaias by Amos and Hosea, and if we do not find the Virgin Mother and her Child clearly referred to together in the same context outside the two passages, Isaias vii. 14 and Micah v. 1-5, the reason is not far to seek. The prophets of Israel were not dogmatic theologians with a scholastic training, setting out their theses in syllogisms. Neither were they evolutionist historians of religion, aiming at analysing and portraying the current religious consciousness.

St. Matthew sufficiently guarantees the Messianic character of v. 14. But, even if St. Matthew were not there to solve all doubts, every thoughtful and sympathetic student of Isaias must have reached the same view. It is impossible to read the Immanuel prophecies in chapters vii., viii., ix. and xi. of Isaias without feeling convinced that the mysterious Saviour whom the prophet there describes is, in reality, the Messiah and a divine Messiah. In chapter vii. the Mother of this Saviour must be more than an ordinary woman, and one expects that qualities higher than

¹⁰ This view is also held by some modern non-Catholic writers. It is maintained, for instance, by Gressmann in his work, *Der Ursprung der israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie*, p. 276. But for Gressmann the Child and Mother are mythical figures borrowed from non-Israelite sagas. The mythical Child and Mother must have been taken over into Israelite belief, he thinks, at a very early period since we can find in the prophets scarcely a trace of the ancient myths from which they are derived. This fact, if fully considered, might have led Gressmann perhaps to admit the antiquity of the Immanuel-belief while rejecting its mythical origin.

those of ordinary mothers will be predicated of her. We find it natural then to hear her called "the Virgin"—ha 'almah. The Septuagint translators reflect the tradition of their own time, and doubtless of a much earlier time, when they translate ha 'almah quite unambiguously by ἡ παρθένος. In itself 'almah probably means no more than a young woman who has not yet borne a child.¹¹ Yet though the Septuagint translators usually translate 'almah by the indefinite expression νεάνις they here use the perfectly definite word παρθένος.¹² In the Greek Bible, therefore—the Bible used so freely by Christ and His first preachers—the Virgin-Mother was a familiar figure, and it would be unscientific to assert that the Septuagint translators here created, rather than transmitted, a theory.

Granted, then, that Isaiah in vii. 14 refers to the Child, Immanuel, and to the Virgin-Mother as to figures familiar to the religious mind of his day, what is the reason of the reference? From the point of view of language merely, the reference serves to determine the time within which the sign is to be given. Were the Child of prophecy now conceived He would have just reached the years of discretion when the sign shall take place. But the prophet could have said simply: "Within five years all this will come to pass." Why use the birth and growth of Immanuel to limit the time? The reason must be sought in the psyche of the prophet. One might call the early period of Isaiah's preaching the Immanuel period—so often during that period is Immanuel the central figure of his discourses. It has been often said that the prophetic mind does not hold events apart like the mind of the philosophic historian. In the case of each prophet some scene or notion seems to dominate his entire thought and imagery for long periods. At one time the Day of Yahveh predominates; at another the picture of a faithless spouse, at another the dread thought of a famine, or the vivid memory of an earthquake. The prophet seems forced, as it were, to speak for whole periods within one "universe of discourse." In his meeting with Achaz, described in chapter vii., the essentially prophetic

¹¹ The word occurs in six other biblical passages. It seems to mean in all a young woman who is unmarried or reputed to be unmarried. In Gen.

24⁴³ it is translated designedly again in the Sept. by παρθένος.

¹² The other Greek versions, Aq. Sym. Theod., have here νεάνις.

psychology of Isaias asserts itself—with all the more majesty and mystery because the prophet is passionately moved by the would-be strictly correct orthodoxy of Achaz. Isaias speaks not like a logical orator, but as a man inspired and living in the world of Judah's most glorious religious ideas.¹³

It is not reasonable, I believe, to explain the reference to the Virgin and the Child as due to the prophet's wish to suggest a hope for a broken Judah of the future—for the breaking of Judah is not, in the above explanation, any part of the sign. Further, it does not seem possible to regard the Immanuel-passage as a reason alleged to win the confidence of Achaz:—if such great things will happen later, surely God will rescue Judah now. This view of the text would suppose in Achaz a depth of faith, an intensity of conviction as to prophetic beliefs, which we have no ground other than the difficulty of the text for postulating.

In the view of v.v. 14-16 which I have suggested, v. 15 is taken as describing the state of Judah after the expulsion of its invaders. But most commentators see in the reference to curd and honey a proof that the Child will begin His life in a land despoiled, where only such food as the children of the desert eat is to be had. Some commentators, indeed, get rid of the difficulty by regarding v. 15 as the marginal gloss of a reader with eschatological interests. But there is really no difficulty. The prosperous state of Judah after its rescue is here described. Curd and honey are the symbols of wealth and not of destitution. The land into which the Hebrews came was not thought of as a desert when it was said to be "flowing with milk and honey." There is no good reason for setting up an essen-

¹³ Prof. Steinmetzer of Prague in his valuable work *Die Geschichte der Geburt und Kindheit Christi*, Münster 1910, maintains (p. 36) that the reference to the Mother and Child is made to suggest a picture. The Mother and Child were familiar to the Judæans of Isaias' time, and because the prophet wishes to make plain to his hearers the fulness of rescue and resulting prosperity which is near at hand for Judah, he describes it in words which suggest the expected joys of the day when the Virgin and Immanuel will appear. The *tertium comparationis* is the abundance of peace and prosperity. In this respect the coming time of deliverance for Judah will be like the Day of the Virgin and her Child. This view does not differ widely from that explained in the text, since it also implies, in a sense, what I describe as the Immanuel-period of Isaias.

tial distinction between "curd and honey," and "milk and honey." Curd is used in precisely the same way as milk as a symbol of fruitfulness in 2 K. xvii. 29; Deut. xxxii. 13 f; Job xx. 17. There is not in the Old Testament a single passage outside the 7th chapter of Isaias where milk and honey do not symbolise fertility, and v. 22 of that chapter, though it fits badly into its context, seems also to use the combination of curd and honey to suggest fruitfulness and abundance.

It is, therefore, unfair to take v. 15 as a description of a wasted land. It is to be taken rather as a description of a land whose enemies have been overthrown, and in which Immanuel is to spend his childhood-years.¹⁴

There is no difficulty with v.v. 17-21, 23-25. As v. 16 describes the ruin that was to come within a few years on Ephraim and Syria, so the verses 17-21, 23-25 describe the ruin which will eventually come upon Judah also. That ruin was to be, in a sense, an outcome of the Sign, but it was no part of it.¹⁵ The writer of II. Chronicles 28 is fully conscious of the futility and peril of Achaz' policy, and his words in v. v. 20-21 show that he, like Isaias, was prepared to see a connection between the calling in of the Assyrians by Achaz and the ultimate fall of Jerusalem; "And Tiglath-pileser, King of Assyria, advanced against him [viz., Achaz] and oppressed him instead of supporting him, because Achaz had plundered the House of Yahveh and the royal palace and the princes, and had given it [the spoil] to the King of Asshur without profit to himself."

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¹⁴ Gressman in his work *Der Ursprung der israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie* pp. 215 f. 274, emphasises strongly this interpretation of curd and honey as indicative of fruitfulness. When he goes on, however, to explain the phrase as due to non-Israelite sagas about the food of the gods we cannot of course agree with him.

¹⁵ I do not pretend to understand v. 22. It combines pictures of destitution and abundance, and the whole verse looks as if it were out of its proper context.

Book Reviews.

The Motu Proprio "Quantavis Diligentia" and its Critics. By the Archbishop of Dublin. With the Article contributed by Mgr. Heiner, Auditor of the Roman Rota, to the "Kölnische Volkszeitung," and an Appendix. Dublin: Browne and Nolan; M. H. Gill and Son.

Once again His Grace the Archbishop of Dublin has rendered notable service to the Catholic Church in Ireland and in all English-speaking countries. His Grace can always be relied on to act with effect whenever the Catholic cause needs defence or explanation, and his treatment of the question of the *Privilegium Fori* has added fresh laurels of victory to the cause for which he speaks. His publication of the pamphlet, entitled "The Motu Proprio 'Quantavis Diligentia' and its Critics," is the outcome of the controversy in which he discomfited the legal luminaries whose knowledge of Canon Law was equalled only by their acquaintance with the simple Latinity of Papal laws. He explains the principles of Canon Law, known to every canonist, on which depends the solution of the question: How far does the decree "Quantavis Diligentia" apply to Ireland and similarly circumstanced countries? Are the laity in Ireland prevented by the decree from arraigning clerics in the civil courts in those affairs which of themselves fall under the jurisdiction of secular tribunals? That is the question which His Grace discusses from the various points of view, which were raised by the self-constituted canonists of the *Daily Express*.

In the Introduction His Grace explains the motive which urged him to take part in the controversy. He "had nothing whatever to do with satisfying the Protestants, either of England or of Ireland as to how the Motu Proprio or anything else will work out, whether under a Home Rule system of government, or under any other system of government." His purpose in writing was an altogether different one. Under sensational headlines, the *Daily Express* published the "Motu Proprio," and there was danger that the consciences of many Catholics might be troubled. To allay possible scruples amongst Catholics, His Grace wrote to the papers which were most likely to be read by them, and explained the well-known canonical principles in the light of which alone the erroneous view, circulated by the *Daily Express*, could be displaced. His Grace did not pretend to decide the question finally; he merely wished to give the view of one—and everybody who knows His Grace must recognise that his authority as a canonist is of the highest—whose judgment is subject to the authoritative decisions of the Holy See. We may add that His Grace's letters have completely satisfied those for whose benefit he wrote, and it would be vain to try to convince others who are unwilling to be convinced.

The first section of the pamphlet is entitled "A Scare and How it was Met." It narrates that on the 21st of last December the *Daily Express* published the *Motu Proprio* and used such headings as "ANOTHER PAPAL DECREE. THUNDERBOLT FROM ROME. CLERGY AND THE CIVIL LAW. IMMUNITY FROM PERSECUTION. EXCOMMUNICATION FOR LAY LITIGANTS. A DRASTIC ORDINANCE." These headings, together with the editorial comments and letters from correspondents, were calculated to create alarm in Catholic circles throughout Ireland. The Constitution *Apostolicae Sedis*, 1869, imposed an excommunication on those who, in violation of the *Privilegium Fori*, oblige lay judges to bring ecclesiastics before their secular tribunals. In 1886 the Holy Office declared that the excommunication is incurred only by persons in position of public authority, who, by legislation or otherwise, oblige the judges of secular courts to bring ecclesiastics before those tribunals. By the recent *Motu Proprio* it is ordained "that all private persons, whether of the laity or in sacred orders, male or female, who without any permission of ecclesiastical authority cite before lay tribunals any ecclesiastical persons whomsoever, either in criminal or civil cases, and publicly compel them to be present thereat, incur excommunication *latae sententiae* reserved in a special way to the Roman Pontiff." The scaremongers raised the cry that this *Motu Proprio* prevented Irish Catholics from bringing ecclesiastics into secular courts. No Catholic Judge, no Catholic Law Officer, no Catholic Police Magistrate, no Catholic member of the Police Force, could discharge his sworn duty without incurring excommunication if the discharge of the duty involved the bringing of a Catholic priest into court! And no member of the Catholic community could, without incurring excommunication, seek redress in the courts against a priest who was guilty of libel or refused to pay his just debts! Then it was stated that the publication caused "a most profound sensation throughout the whole country." There was talk of "high-class negotiations between the hierarchical authorities and the Irish Executive," with a view to the incorporation of the *Motu Proprio* in "the rules of civil administration." To counteract these rumours and others of an equally baseless character, the Archbishop of Dublin wrote, 29th December, to the papers pointing out that the representation of the decree so energetically displayed before the public was founded on a total misconception. In the pamphlet, in which His Grace gives the views urged in his letters, he deals with the matter from two points of view—from the standpoint of those, like Mgr. Heiner, who hold that the *Motu Proprio* is an interpretation of the Constitution *Apostolicae Sedis*, and from the standpoint of those who hold that it is a new enactment. It is shown that in both views the same conclusion is reached, viz., that the *Motu Proprio*, like the Constitution *Apostolicae Sedis*, in no way prevents Irish Catholics from bringing ecclesiastics into the civil courts in matters that come within their jurisdiction.

The second section of the pamphlet refers to "The *Motu Proprio* considered as interpreting the Constitution '*Apostolicae Sedis*' of 1869."

In dealing with this subject Dr. Walsh, first of all, gives his view of the binding force in this country of the *Privilegium Fori*, with the excommunication attached by the *Apostolicae Sedis* to its violation, and he backs up his opinion by the testimony of Cardinal Cullen given in 1873 in the famous action brought by Father O'Keeffe, of Callan, against His Eminence. His Eminence laid down in absolutely clear language that in Ireland, in virtue of a long-standing custom, the old *Privilegium Fori* was abrogated by custom, and that the excommunication of the *Apostolicae Sedis*, attached to the violation of the privilege, was not in force. In illustration of his view he was able to mention the case of the Synod of Baltimore, which was held in 1866. A decree of the Synod enacted that no person, lay or ecclesiastic, should bring an ecclesiastic before a lay tribunal, but the decree was revised in Rome and restricted to the case of an ecclesiastic bringing another ecclesiastic into the secular courts in reference to an ecclesiastical matter. Asked whether, notwithstanding all this, a breach of the old ecclesiastical immunity, or *Privilegium Fori*, is not a violation of the ecclesiastical law, His Eminence replied:—"It is a breach of the law as it was, not of the law as now brought down by custom." Then the difficulty was put that the whole trouble in the O'Keeffe case arose out of the disagreements between Father O'Keeffe and his Bishop, in the course of which Fr. O'Keeffe had taken an action against the Bishop, and was then suspended for this as a canonical offence, and finally was suspended for it by Cardinal Cullen, acting as a delegate of the Holy See. If the *Privilegium Fori* had been abrogated by custom, how could Fr. O'Keeffe have committed a canonical offence in bringing his Bishop into court? In reply, His Eminence was easily able to show that, quite independently of the old *Privilegium Fori* and the *Apostolicae Sedis*, ecclesiastics are forbidden to bring other ecclesiastics into the secular courts. In proof of this, the expert witnesses referred to a canon of the Fourth General Council of Chalcedon, held in 451, to several decrees of the Popes, and to the decrees of Councils held in various countries, and, amongst the rest, in Ireland. This was a very limited law, and it was under this law that His Eminence had dealt with Fr. O'Keeffe.

The third section of the pamphlet deals with the "Canon Law and Custom," and points out the general principles which all canonists maintain, and according to which a custom, having the requisite conditions, is able, by means of the express, tacit, or "legal" consent of the canonical legislator, to abrogate an ecclesiastical law. In this section His Grace deals most effectively with the "amateur canonists" who, notwithstanding the fact that the point was specially emphasised by Cardinal Cullen, took no account of custom in determining whether or not an ecclesiastical law binds in any particular place. Mr. J. H. Campbell assured his hearers, at Coleraine, that the *Motu Proprio* is in force in Ireland because this country was not "excluded, either by name, or otherwise by agreement." His Grace shows that Mr. Campbell's knowledge of Canon Law is so meagre that he is not aware of

the teaching of canonists about the effect of custom on a law. It seems that custom finds no recognition in English jurisprudence, so far as the setting aside of an enacted law goes, and in this differs from the Scotch law which, like the Canon Law, assumes the principles of the Roman Civil Law in this matter. Full of his knowledge of English law, Mr. Campbell fell into the not unnatural error of applying its principles to Canon Law. Very aptly His Grace gives two quotations from Newman's letter to the Duke of Norfolk, on Gladstone's Expostulation, to show how difficult it is for the mere laymen in theology and Canon Law "to put off the modes of speech and language, which are usual with them, and to enter into scientific distinctions and traditional rules of interpretation which, as being new to them, appear evasive and unnatural."

The fourth section of the pamphlet deals with "A Marvellous 'Discovery' and What has Come of It." The discovery was given in the statement of the *Daily Express*, that "not only does the *Motu Proprio*, *Quantavis Diligentia*, apply to Ireland, but Archbishop Walsh is perfectly aware of the fact." The proof given for this is that at the Synod of Maynooth, held in 1875, Dr. Walsh, at that time a Professor of Theology in Maynooth, was in attendance on the Bishop of Ossory, who was better known afterwards as Cardinal Moran. Now, at page 88 of the Maynooth Statutes, not only is the decree *Apostolicae Sedis* quoted, and its origin, object and contents briefly explained, but the entire text of the Constitution, with its numerous censures or excommunications, *latae sententiae*, is given at page 351, under Appendix II. The conclusion, of course, is that the Synod of Maynooth looked on the Constitution as binding in Ireland, and that Dr. Walsh was aware of this. His Grace points out that it was he who drafted the chapter referred to, and that he knew perfectly well that the Constitution was binding in Ireland. So did Cardinal Cullen, who presided at the Synod. He was no "minimiser" of the authority of Papal documents, yet he explicitly laid down that the Constitution did not in Ireland prohibit laymen from bringing ecclesiastics into court. In this connection Dr. Walsh shows how the *Daily Express* was led astray by a mistranslation of the Constitution, which imposes an excommunication on those who oblige lay judges to compel the attendance of ecclesiastics in their courts, "*praeter canonicas dispositiones*." The *Daily Express* translated this phrase, "without a canonical dispensation"; hence its plight. The phrase should have been translated, "contrary to canonical provisions," and Canon Law, as expert canonists know, allows that, by reason of concordats or custom, in some places the immunity of the clergy is not binding, so that in these places laymen who bring ecclesiastics into court are not acting contrary to the provisions of Canon Law. It is precisely in this connection, that Mgr. Heiner's articles, which Dr. Walsh gives in the pamphlet, are of use, for they prove that, wherever custom against the *Privilegium Fori* prevails, the recent *Motu Proprio* has no force. In this matter Ireland is in exactly the same position as Germany, of which Mgr. Heiner spoke.

The fifth section of the pamphlet treats of "*Cardinal Cullen, the Privilegium Fori and the Apostolicae Sedis.*" In this section His Grace gives in detail the evidence of Cardinal Cullen in the O'Keeffe case, so far as it bears on the subject matter of the pamphlet. In the *Daily Express* Mr. Meredith held (1) that the evidence of Cardinal Cullen proved that, up to the year 1869, the *Privilegium Fori* was not in force in countries in which it was abrogated by concordats or desuetude, (2) that the Constitution *Apostolicae Sedis* restored the privilege, (3) that Cardinal Cullen was of opinion that the Decree of 1869 was binding in this country, and (4) that all the quotations from Cardinal Cullen's evidence, given by Archbishop Walsh, except one which is immaterial, have reference to the Canon Law as it existed before the decree of 1869. The Archbishop has no difficulty in demolishing this grotesque theory. Having explained the offence committed by an ecclesiastic who brings another ecclesiastic into court, Mr. Purcell, Q.C., asked:—"Does that rule equally apply to lay members who sue ecclesiastics, as to clerics?" His Eminence: "At present it does not. . . . In the middle ages, it applied equally to laymen and clerics. . . ."
 . . . Mr. Purcell: "As a matter of fact, does a Roman Catholic layman incur any, and what, censure; is he guilty of any, and what, offence against the common law, or against the systematised law, of the Church, if he sues a cleric in a court of law?" His Eminence: "In nearly every country now there are concordats with the Holy See, which expressly declare that . . . rights of property and matters of that kind may be decided in a civil court. In these cases a layman has nothing at all to answer for. In countries where there is no concordat, such as this country, . . . the Holy See has declared that breaches of ecclesiastical immunity are to be overlooked. . . ." . . . Mr. Purcell: "But still breaches of the law?" His Eminence: "It is a breach of the law as it was; not a breach of the law as it is now brought down by custom." Mr. Purcell: "I find in the *Apostolicae Sedis* no limitation at all to the rule you have laid down?" His Eminence: "Well, that does not interfere with the concordats or with the practice prevailing in the Church." Mr. Purcell: "Is there not at this moment an actual universal law of the Church that no layman shall bring a cleric before a lay tribunal?" His Eminence: "No." Mr. Purcell: "Is not that laid down in the *Apostolicae Sedis*?" His Eminence: "Not universally, it is nearly abrogated." These replies of Cardinal Cullen make it abundantly clear that at the moment of the trial, 20th May, 1873, he held that the *Privilegium Fori* was in abeyance in most countries, including Ireland, by reason of concordats or custom. It is extraordinary how Mr. Meredith's statements could have been made in face of this clear evidence.

In this same fifth section His Grace explains the attitude of Cardinal Cullen towards the Constitution, *Apostolicae Sedis*, as known from his evidence in the O'Keeffe trial. First of all, His Eminence held that the Constitution was binding in Ireland: "The *Apostolicae Sedis* was handed to very bishop in the Vatican Council, and by that means it was

made known all over the world. The Pope himself, who is the law-giver, declares that when he publishes a Bull at Rome, it is to bind everywhere. It is binding over all the Church." Secondly, His Eminence explained that the *Apostolicae Sedis*, which was an authoritative catalogue of ecclesiastical censures, did not create any new canonical offence. Thirdly, His Eminence held that the *Apostolicae Sedis* did not prevent a layman from taking legal proceedings against an ecclesiastic, since the old *Privilegium Fori* was no longer in force in Ireland. Fourthly, he explained that ecclesiastics were prevented from arraigning other ecclesiastics in the secular courts, but that this prohibition was altogether independent of the old *Privilegium Fori*. He considered that ecclesiastics who oblige lay judges to bring ecclesiastics before their secular tribunals act "*praeter canonicas dispositiones*," and thus come within the terms of the clause *Cogentes* of the *Apostolicae Sedis*. Fifthly, the Cardinal pointed out that all this had nothing to do with the case before the court, because his sentence on Fr. O'Keeffe was not a sentence declaring that he had incurred the excommunication of the *Apostolicae Sedis*; it was a sentence, not of excommunication, but of suspension, a censure of a wholly different nature. Sixthly, the Cardinal believed that Fr. O'Keeffe had incurred the excommunication of the *Apostolicae Sedis*, but this was an affair for his own conscience. No sentence of excommunication was pronounced against him. Finally, though the Cardinal believed that Fr. O'Keeffe had incurred the excommunication, he was unwilling to have recourse to the severe measure of pronouncing a judicial sentence to that effect; he thought it sufficient to call Fr. O'Keeffe's attention to the matter. Though His Eminence believed that the Constitution *Apostolicae Sedis* was in force in this country, he did not act on it; he would not enforce it on those who thought that it was not sufficiently promulgated. All this goes to show how wrong Mr. Meredith was when he said:—"It is manifest . . . that the sole ground upon which the Cardinal decided that he would not act upon the decree was because it had not been sufficiently promulgated at the time.

The sixth section of the pamphlet deals with "The *Motu Proprio* considered as an Independent Enactment." His Grace proves briefly in this section that even if the *Motu Proprio* be considered not an interpretation of the Constitution *Apostolicae Sedis*, but a new enactment, it does not interfere with the long-standing custom of this country, according to which laymen can arraign ecclesiastics in the civil courts without committing any canonical offence. Custom can not only abrogate a law already in force, but it can also prevent a new law from coming into force in a particular region. A new general law does not override a particular custom, unless there is some clause in the law declaring that the legislator intends to do so. There is no clause in the *Motu Proprio* which is sufficient to override the particular custom of this country. Just as in Germany and in Belgium an existing custom has been declared to be sufficient to prevent the *Motu Proprio* from coming into force, so too in this country the existing

custom has the same effect. The canonical reason for this is simple. Such a phrase as "contrariis quibusvis non obstantibus," which is contained in the *Motu Proprio*, is not sufficient to overcome the barrier of custom. It would, as a rule, suffice to say, "quacunq[ue] consuetudine non obstante," but even this is not strong enough in case of immemorial custom, for the abrogation of which it is necessary to have some such phrase as: "contrariis quibusvis, etiam specialissima mentione dignis, non obstantibus." We may add also that the *Motu Proprio* said that "the situation absolutely demands of Us that by severe punishment We restrain within due limits those whom the seriousness of the offence does not deter from this sacrilegious crime"—a phrase which goes to show that the punishment is imposed by the *Motu Proprio* only in places where already it was a canonical offence for the laity to bring ecclesiastics into the secular courts.

In the seventh section, His Grace deals at length with "The *Motu Proprio* in Germany and in Belgium." He explains the circumstances in which the *Motu Proprio* was declared not to be binding in those countries. The official announcements of the *Osservatore Romano* give the facts of the case. In regard to Germany, the *Osservatore* said, in connexion with a misleading telegram on the subject:—"In reference to this telegram we are authorised to state that, after the publication of the *Motu Proprio*, *Quantavis Diligentia*, Herr von Mühlberg, the Minister accredited by Prussia to the Holy See, asked, as he was instructed to do by his Government, what view was taken by the Holy See of the article of Mgr. Heiner. The Cardinal Secretary of State declared that the principles of Canon Law developed in the well-known article of Mgr. Heiner, regarding the *Motu Proprio*, *Quantavis Diligentia*, and the abrogation of the *Privilegium Fori* by contrary custom, are in conformity with the canonical doctrines of the Church. Consequently the aforesaid *Motu Proprio* does not affect Germany." This official pronouncement about Germany is applicable to every country where similar circumstances prevail, and in Ireland there has been a long-standing custom against the *Privilegium Fori*, so that this country is as little affected by the *Motu Proprio* as Germany and Belgium.

His Grace completes his treatment of the *Motu Proprio* by inserting in his pamphlet the article which Mgr. Heiner published in the "Kölnische Volkszeitung," and the supplementary articles written in defence of his teaching which has been officially declared to be in conformity with the canonical doctrines of the Church. Mgr. Heiner is an Auditor of the Rota, a fact which of itself shows his high standing as an authoritative canonist. He has also published well-known books on various canonical subjects, such as his *Manual of Canon Law*, his work on Censures, his tract on Matrimony, and his treatise on the Syllabus. Though these articles add nothing of importance to what is contained in His Grace's work, they serve a useful purpose in clearly showing that custom, according to the recognised canonical teachers, has the effect of abrogating a law already in existence, and of preventing a new law from coming into force.

J. M. HARTY.

Mystica Theologia Divi Thomae. R. P. Thomas a Vallgornera, O.P.
Editio Tertia curante Fr. J. J. Berthier, O.P. Augustae Taurinorum: P. Marietti. Pp. Tom. I., xxxi. + 608; Tom. II., 557.
 Price 7.12. Lire.

The first edition of this fine work was published in 1662, and the second appeared three years later. The author, R. P. Thomas a Vallgornera, O.P., was noted for his learning and piety. When Catalonia, to which he belonged, passed in 1662 from the rule of Spain to that of France, Fr. Thomas was appointed Vicar General of the Convents of the Order in the French king's dominions, and held this position of dignity till his death, which occurred in 1665. Besides this work on mysticism, he also published a book entitled "De Rosario B. Mariae Virginis."

The mystical theology of these volumes is founded on the teaching of St. Thomas. Free from the defects which accompany mystical works not based on sound theology, these volumes present a solid body of doctrine which puts their readers on the right road to sanctification. Too often what passes under the title of mystical theology is nothing more than the vain dreams and pious stories of theologically untrained minds. This work, however, is remote from the style of literature which serves rather to stir the feelings than to teach the mind. Those in charge of the spiritual training of ecclesiastics and religious will find in these volumes copious sources for sermon and instruction; all who read them can profit from their wisdom.

It is a rare thing to find the third edition of a book published two centuries and a half after the publication of the second edition. A presumption arises that after so many years a new edition is not called for; in this case, however, the presumption must yield to the fact that time has not dimmed the merits of the work. Fr. Berthier has done well in publishing this new edition; his labour is not in vain, and we bespeak a wide circle of readers for his valuable volumes.

J. M. HARTY.

Primitive Catholicism. By Mgr. Pierre Batiffol, Litt.D. (Translation by Henri L. Briancean, of St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore, from the Fifth French Edition of "l'Eglise Naissante," revised by the Author). Longmans, Green and Co. 1911. Pp. xxiii. + 424. 12s. 6d. net.

The fact that a scholarly work like this, dealing with difficult and delicate questions of New Testament exegesis and early history, has run in a few years through five French editions, is ample proof at once of its popularity and of its genuine worth. Mgr. Batiffol here attempts to trace the origin of the Church, in so far as it is a visible, universal society, built upon the framework of a rule of faith and a hierarchy;

and he does so, keeping constantly in view certain modern German Protestant theories as to the Church's origin. Against Professor Sohm, for instance, he shows that the Church was from the very beginning a visible society that "bore in its womb" a living authority; a living authority, that is, in contrast with a written authority; an authority that was not merely the outcome of an evolution of charismata, but divinely established by Christ; while against Professor Harnack he proves that Church government and authority did not grow, as it were, automatically out of the experience and needs of the first Christian societies. He makes a patient and searching examination of the evidence of the first two centuries, Scriptural and otherwise, and establishes beyond reasonable question that from the first hour the Church was a visible society under a government. "It was not governed by any mere abstract authority; or by the impervious requirements of charismata which were variable, obscure, intermittent, always needing to be verified, quickly discredited; nor by any statute spontaneously elaborated and embodying the experience of all the churches, for such experience would have produced only a universal variation; but by a living authority emanating we know from what quarter, and alone able to explain the unity of the institutions founded and the credit they enjoyed. The "Prima Clementis" declares all this in plain terms, and what else is the "Decree of the Apostles" (Acts, xv.) save the most striking manifestation of the existence of this authority, and of the lawfulness of its claims?" (p. xxi.).

The work is one of great apologetic value. And not only does it justify the Catholic Church, by proving her to be one in essence with the Church of the very first years of Christianity, but moreover, without professing to be polemical, it carries the war into the Protestant camps by showing that only the Catholic Church realises the ideal set before us in the New Testament and in the writings of the Fathers of the first two centuries. At the end of the second chapter, there is a valuable discussion of the famous Petrine text, Matt. xvi. 18-19: "Thou art Peter," etc. Harnack has gone so far as to say that this text is condemned "by all the rules of historical criticism," but our author shows very forcibly that the objections urged against the genuineness of the text have no real weight. It used to be the fashion with Protestant writers to attempt to explain away the Petrine prerogatives which this text promises; now most of them have changed their tactics; they admit that the text as it stands is rightly interpreted more or less in the Catholic sense, but they deny that it is genuine, and maintain that it was interpolated into the first Gospel at the end of the first century or later. Mgr. Batiffol has some very solid and searching criticism of this new position. On the whole, the work is one of great erudition and ability, and we earnestly hope that this English edition may meet with the success it deserves. The translation is carefully done, and the book is well brought out by Longmans, Green and Co.

J. MACRORY.

La Loi et la Foi. Etude sur Saint Paul et les Judaïsants par A. de Boysson, Directeur au Séminaire de Saint-Sulpice. Paris: Bloud et Cie. Pp. viii. + 339. 3.50 fr.

The question of the relation of Christianity to Judaism was one of the most important questions in the early Church. In the Epistles of St. Paul we find it turning up time after time; it occupied the attention of the Council of Jerusalem; and from its nature it must have been for a period a matter of daily discussion. Were Christians still bound by the Mosaic Law not only in its moral but also in its ceremonial portions? Was circumcision still obligatory, were certain foods still to be regarded as unclean, or, on the other hand, had circumcision and the Jewish ceremonial law been swept away by the new law of liberty promulgated by Jesus Christ? These are the questions that arose almost daily for discussion or solution, and we can gather from some of the Epistles of St. Paul, particularly from the Epistle to the Galatians, the heat to which they gave rise and the tremendous importance that attached to them. The present work consists of two parts, the first devoted to a study of the Judaizing tenets and to an account of St. Paul's struggles against them; the second to an exposition of the Apostles' own doctrine.

There is a useful preliminary chapter on the date of those New Testament books that bear upon the controversy, especially the Epistle to the Galatians, the Pastoral Epistles, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Epistle of St. James. In regard to the date and destination of the Epistle to the Galatians, the author espouses the view of those who maintain that the Epistle was written before the Council of Jerusalem, and addressed, not to the Christians of the ancient Province of Galatia, but to those of the much larger Roman Province of that name. The arguments for this view are set forth briefly and clearly, but no attempt is made to represent the opposite view as improbable or certainly wrong. On the date of the Epistle of St. James our author agrees with those who place it after St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans. The work is written in that light, easy style, which we have learned to expect from French authors, even when they deal with questions the most abstruse.

J. MACRORY.

The Eve of Catholic Emancipation (1803-1829). By Mgr. Bernard Ward. Vol. I., II. (1803-1820). With Illustrations. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1911. Price 21s. net.

In his former work, *The Dawn of the Catholic Revival in England*, Mgr. Ward undertook to sketch the history of the Catholic Church in England during the period extending from 1781 till 1803. The present volumes form a continuation of this work, embodying as they do the history of the English Catholic body from 1803 till 1820. As in his former work, Mgr. Ward has taken care not to identify himself with

any of the factions into which English Catholics were then divided, nor to take sides definitely in the unfortunate misunderstandings between other Vicars-Apostolic and Dr. Milner supported by the Irish Bishops. In the course of his work he was obliged to deal at length with many very delicate questions on which the best-intentioned writer could easily give offence, such as the strained relations between Dr. Milner and Drs. Douglass and Poynter, The Veto Question, The Fifth Resolution, The Blanchardist Schism, The Quarantotti Rescript, The Genoese Letter, and The Orthodox Journal. Yet, though all his readers may not accept his conclusions no one could possibly feel anything but pleased with the author's treatment of these subjects. He has done his best to procure the documentary evidence necessary for a historian of the period, and has endeavoured to give his readers a connected and impartial account of the most noteworthy movements within the Catholic body. The work is by far the best that has yet been written on this particular epoch, and is destined to remain for a long time the standard authority on the history of Catholicity in England during the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

Many of the admirers of Dr. Milner, who had been satisfied hitherto with Milner's own explanations or with the works of Husenbeth and Amherst, will be surprised and disappointed by a perusal of Mgr. Ward's volumes. They throw an entirely new light upon the transactions in which he was engaged and upon the methods of controversy which he felt called upon to adopt, and they are calculated undoubtedly to diminish the esteem and veneration with which the Vicar Apostolic of the Midland District was regarded by the great majority of the Catholic body both in Ireland and England. But we think that Mgr. Ward would be the last person to contend that Milner should be judged merely by what appears of him in these volumes. From the very nature of the case he is shown mainly as a clever and dangerous controversialist, invariably either attacking or defending himself against attack. The great constructive work of his life and the many great services which he rendered to the Catholic body are not brought out prominently, and hence it is, we think, that people should hesitate before jumping to conclusions about Milner after having finished the reading of this work. Milner lived in very critical times. During the early portion of his public career at any rate he had to deal with men who were pursuing a very dangerous line of policy, and in later life he found it difficult to persuade himself that the opinions of these men had undergone any serious modification.

In regard to the Veto Question, it is only right to point out that the attempt of the Government to secure some control—whether we are to call it veto or nomination—began long before 1795 and before the question of Maynooth had been raised. In the very volume from which the author quotes (Cogan's Diocese of Meath), he might have read that in a letter written in the year 1789, Dr. Butler, of Cashel speaks of the narrow escape which they had from seeing the nomination of their bishops pass to the hands of the King, and of the difficulty which they had in warding off such a danger. (Vol. III., p. 131). From reading

the book, and from the express statements of Charles Butler and Dr. Poynter, one would be inclined to believe that the English Catholic vicars or laymen never heard of any Government control over the appointment of Catholic Bishops, and that the vicars at any rate objected to it. But, as a matter of fact, the pamphlet of Sir John Throckmorton, in which he stated that if the King only signified such a wish he might have the nomination of the bishops in his hands, was written before 1808; and furthermore, in the letters forwarded by Sir John C. Hippisley to Dr. Troy, before the meeting in 1799, urging the Irish Bishops to accept State payment of the clergy (and as a consequence State control), he expressly stated that he had conferences with the Vicar Apostolic of the London District, who was entirely in favour of such a step ("Castlereagh Correspondence," Vol. III., pp. 81, 87). Again, it is hardly correct to imply that the question of the control of episcopal appointments was left in abeyance between 1799 and 1808. We think that a more careful examination of the Propaganda archives would go to show that in the year 1805 the question was referred to the Propaganda, and that an Instruction was forwarded dealing with the whole question. According to that document royal nomination was absolutely rejected as was also a proposal that the King should be allowed to select the future bishops from amongst the Vicars General appointed by the bishops themselves. Furthermore, the royal *Exequatur* on documents from Rome and State payment of the clergy were also condemned. But with regard to a negative power on the appointment of bishops (Veto) it was declared that though this was not to be desired, and was in some measure dangerous, still its concession would be attended with less difficulties, provided, however, that its use were so restricted that it could never be converted into a positive power of nomination.

The interference of the Irish Bishops in regard to the Fifth Resolution and the Blanchardist Schism was not so unwarrantable as it might seem if all the circumstances be considered. The Irish Bishops had already condemned the Veto in 1808. Earl Grey and his friends undoubtedly wished to get the English Catholics to accept it, and though they refused to agree to any explicit mention of the Veto still if the whole origin of the Fifth Resolution be considered, the vague terms in which it was couched were naturally interpreted by Irish Catholics to refer to the Veto. For the Vicars Apostolic to affix their signatures to such a document, without any consultation with those who had condemned it, was to put themselves in direct opposition to the Irish Bishops, and was a tacit condemnation of the policy that had been sanctioned by the Bishops and Catholics of Ireland. In such circumstances it is not strange that they remonstrated.

In regard to the Blanchardist Schism and the threat of Dr. Troy to break off all communion with the Vicars Apostolic it should be remembered that it was only after Blanchard had referred to the Irish Bishops as approving of his action by their silence that they interfered by condemning his opinions. Having thus become involved in the affair, and

especially in view of the fact that the Pope was a prisoner, it is not so surprising that they should resent the restoration of faculties to Abbé Trevaux, without any public retraction having been demanded of him. Such a step seemed to be a recognition of the French opponents of Pius VII., and the very fact that Dr. Douglass and Poynter refused to give them any satisfaction tended to confirm the view that the authorities of the London District were playing fast and loose with schism. It was then a question for the Irish Bishops, not exactly of exercising any authority over the Vicars, for they claimed none, but rather for considering seriously whether they could hold communion with those who seemed to be approvers of schism.

Here and there sentences occur throughout the book which should have been attended to by the proof reader. Thus, for example, Vol. I., p. 46, we read: "In order to defend himself, Milner wrote to Dr. Douglass that he was duly authorised by the Irish Bishops to do what he had (?), saying that in the preceding January, etc."

These points are not, however, of any great importance and do not affect the general excellence of Mgr. Ward's volumes. We hope that they will have the circulation that they well merit, and that the author may soon complete the story of the progress of the Church of England till the year of Catholic Emancipation.

JAMES MACCAFFREY.

Luther. von Hartmann Grisar, S.J. II. Band. Auf der Höhe des Lebens. Freiburg and London: Herder. 1911. Price, cloth, 16s.

The first volume of Father Grisar's work on Luther has been brought under the notice of the readers of this Review. It dealt with the life and works of Luther till the year 1522. The present volume continues the story and deals with the most active and stirring period of Luther's career. The first section deals with the organisation of the Lutheran party as an ecclesiastical body, with Luther's contradictory views regarding the lawfulness of taking up arms against the Emperor on behalf of religion, with his attitude towards the war against the Turks, and with his use of the patriotism of the Germans as a means of strengthening his party. The second section is an interesting one, treating of the development in Luther's mind of the consciousness that he was a heaven-sent prophet, raised up by God for the reformation of religion and of the signs which he brought forward, when challenged, in proof of this mission. The next part is taken up with Luther's moral teaching and practice. The famous sermon in which Luther used the formula, "*Esto peccator et pecca fortiter sed fortius fide*," is given at length, together with the various attempts made by his biographers to explain away this weak point of his ethical system. The value of the work, known as the "*Tischreden*" or "Table-Talk" of Luther, is discussed at length, and it is shown that its authority as an authentic document cannot be called in question, as the statements in it attributed to Luther

were taken down by his own intimate friends, and with his knowledge and consent. Friendly biographers have no hesitation in using the portions of it which suit their own purpose, and hesitate only at those portions which are exceedingly damaging to the character of a heaven-sent reformer. Many of the stories circulated about the private life of Luther are, according to Father Grisar, unreliable, but even when due allowance has been made, sufficient remains to show that in his own life Luther had no hesitation about putting the *pecca fortiter* in practice. The account of the relations between Luther and the other reformers, notably Melancth Zwingli, Carlstadt, Bugenhagen, etc., are discussed in the following sections. His relations with Henry VIII. of England and with Philip of Hesse are not of a character likely to cover him with glory. When applied to by the friends of Henry VIII. he was opposed to the divorce of Catharine of Arragon but on the other hand, he advised the King to take a second wife, and in the case of Philip of Hesse, he adopted a similar cause. He gave his approval under promise of secrecy to the second marriage of this prince. His attempts to explain this advice when the marriage became public are amusing, and lead the author naturally to the discussion of Luther's attitude towards truth and to his use of falsehood whenever it suited his purpose. The concluding sections are given over to disputes between Luther and Erasmus, to the moral results of the new religious movement, and to Luther's work as a preacher and theologian.

This Life of Luther is undoubtedly the most critical and most reliable that has yet been published.

JAMES MACCAFFREY.

La Contribution du Clergé de France, à L'Impôt pendant La Seconde Moitié du Règne de Louis XIV. (1689-1715), par Albert Cans, Paris, Picard et Fils, 1910. Price 3f.

The period covered by this book was a stormy one for France. Louis XIV. was engaged in the war of the League of Augsburg and in that of the Spanish Succession. Vast sums of money were required to maintain the royal forces, and all classes of his subjects were called upon to contribute their share. From this general demand the clergy were not exempted. On the contrary, they were obliged to pay a greater proportion according to their revenue and property than any other body of the king's subjects.

The present essay is very interesting as affording a glimpse of the many heads under which the clergy were summoned to contribute and of the methods adopted to raise large sums of money upon the ecclesiastical property. At the general assembly of the clergy held in 1690, they voted an immense sum as a "don gratuit" to support the king in his wars. Besides this, the king claimed "amortissement," which was an indemnity levied upon property acquired by ecclesiastical bodies in compensation for certain rights lost to the Crown by the transfer

of property from secular to ecclesiastical owners. It was collected at irregular periods. Thus in 1641 the clergy were obliged to pay "amortissement" on all property acquired by them since 1620, and in 1690 they were called upon to pay upon the property received since 1641. Then, again, the "Wood Tax," which was a fine imposed on the clergy on account of the non-observance of royal edicts regarding the timber growing on lands held by ecclesiastics, brought in considerably over four million francs into the royal coffers. In addition various other sources of revenue were found according as the occasion demanded.

In an interesting Appendix (pp. 96 ff.) the author supplies tables setting forth a comparison between the sums paid by the clergy during the years between 1660 and 1690 and 1690 and 1715. For the thirty years between 1660 and 1690 the clergy paid altogether under various forms of taxation over 36 million francs, or a mean annual payment of about 1,230,000 francs; while, on the other hand, during the period between 1690 and 1715, they paid 160 millions or 6,400,000 francs per year. In other words, assuming that their entire annual revenue was 110 million francs, which the author considers as a fair estimate, the clergy paid between 1660 and 1690 about 11 per cent. of their income, and for the years 1690-1715 about 58 per cent. From these figures it is sufficiently clear that the clergy of France, though nominally free of taxation, were made to pay their quota into the national treasury.

JAMES MACCAFFREY.

Notes on Harmony and Harmony Analysis. By Rev. Jules Botrel, C.S.Sp. Crown 8vo. Pp. 49. Dublin: Cramer, Wood and Co. 1911. Price 3s. nett.

This unassuming book will do good service as a supplement to the ordinary text-books on Harmony. It will also prove useful to those who wish to acquire a general idea of the essence of harmony without getting hampered by the numberless technicalities of part-writing which occupy so large a space in these text-books. The author takes a comprehensive view of his subject and points out some of the fundamental ideas that govern harmonic music. He lays stress on the principle of Tonality, which implies that all the chords constituting one Tonality have each a certain "impression" or "function." The former term has, we believe, first been used by Mr. S. S. Myerscough in his "First Principles of Harmony"; the second is the one used by Riemann. There are, then, three principal chords in a Key, each with its own function—Tonic, Dominant, and Subdominant. To these Fr. Botrel joins three other chords that lie a third lower. Thus we get in *C* major:

$\begin{Bmatrix} g \\ c-e \\ c-c \\ a \end{Bmatrix}$; $\begin{Bmatrix} d \\ b-b \\ g-g \\ e \end{Bmatrix}$; $\begin{Bmatrix} c \\ a-a \\ f-f \\ d \end{Bmatrix}$. In *A* minor $\begin{Bmatrix} c \\ c-c \\ a-a \\ f \end{Bmatrix}$; $\begin{Bmatrix} b \\ g-g \\ e-c \\ e \end{Bmatrix}$; $\begin{Bmatrix} a \\ d-d \\ f-b \\ b \end{Bmatrix}$.
 similarly:

The last chord ought, in our opinion be *b^b d f*. It is one of the principal imperfections in the book that the diminished triad is placed as

an independent chord alongside with the consonant triads. The author gives, on p. 27, two reasons for his procedure, neither of which is convincing. The main fact is that this chord is a dissonance. It ought, therefore, be classed with the dissonances, not with the consonances. We may add that the chord need not necessarily be considered as representing a Dominant Seventh. No doubt the notes *b* and *d* may be considered as parts of a consonant chord, and the *f* as the added dissonance; and very often the chord must thus be understood. But it is possible also to understand *d* and *f* as parts of a consonant triad, and *b* as the added dissonance; and frequently, especially in minor, this explanation corresponds to the actual impression.

Again the author seems to us to have taken a one-sided view of the "relative" chords. There is another relation between the principal chords and chords lying a third higher, thus in major:

$$\left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} b \\ g-g \\ e-e \\ c \end{smallmatrix} \right\}, \left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} f \text{ sharp} \\ d-d \\ b-b \\ g \end{smallmatrix} \right\}, \left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} e \\ c-c \\ a-a \\ f \end{smallmatrix} \right\}; \text{ and in minor: } \left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} g \\ e-e \\ c-c \\ a \end{smallmatrix} \right\}, \left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} d \\ b-b \\ g-g \\ e \end{smallmatrix} \right\}, \left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} c \\ a-a \\ f-f \\ d \end{smallmatrix} \right\}.$$

It is difficult to understand, if, *e.g.*, a minor is related to *c* major, why *c* major should not be related to a minor. Moreover, to mention only one instance, the chord succession *a* minor—*g* major—*c* major in the Key of *C* Major gives decidedly the impression of the succession Subdominant—Dominant—Tonic. This observation has not escaped Mr. Myerscough (*l.c.* Part II., p. 102). A minor, in this case, must therefore be understood as "relative" of *f* major.

The best section of the book is, perhaps, that on the "leading power" of chords, consonant and dissonant, diatonic and chromatic. We should like to make one remark about the chromatic consonances that form cadences to chords other than the Tonic. The author insists rightly that such progressions are real cadences (authentic or plagal), and that, at the same time, they do not interfere with the prevailing tonality. But his figuring is awkward. Riemann's system of figuring proves superior also here, inasmuch as it brings out both ideas clearly—first, that the one chord is Dominant or Subdominant in relation to the other, and, secondly, that the other maintains its own function in the prevailing tonality.

There are a few other minor points in which we cannot agree with the author. But, on the whole, we can recommend the book sincerely. As compared with the ordinary text-books on harmony, it marks a decided step in advance.

H. BEWERUNGE.

Through Evolution to the Living God. By the Rev. J. R. Cohu, Rector of Aston Clinton, Bucks; sometime Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford. Oxford: James Parker and Co.; London: Simpkin, Marshall and Co. 1912. Pp. xvi. + 242. Price 3s. 6d. net.

The writer of this little book tells us that he was at one time "whole-hearted in his discipleship of Darwin, Huxley and Herbert Spencer"

(p. 223) that "it has been the work of years" for him "to recover a Faith which science had shattered," and that "science itself has helped not a little to lead him through Evolution to Evolution's God" (p. v.). He hopes that these pages will be helpful to those who are exposed or have succumbed to agnostic influences by showing that the scientific theory of evolution, which is not itself a philosophy of the universe at all, really needs an ultimate philosophy to complete it, and that, if in seeking this philosophy the true spirit and methods of scientific enquiry are maintained, the result will be theism—a living, personal God. At the same time he appeals to Christian believers frankly to accept the evolutionist description of the cosmic process from atom up to man, and to interpret religious truth accordingly.

On its negative side, as a criticism of agnosticism and pantheism, more especially of Haeckel's materialistic monism, this book has a considerable scientific value, which is enhanced by the style and temper in which it is written. The style is clear, elegant and forceful, with perhaps a slight tendency to "catchiness," and the temper, while earnest and sometimes enthusiastic, is generally calm and always courteous. On the positive side, as an exposition of the theistic argument, the book is not altogether satisfactory, though many points in the argument are developed in a telling way. If I might state my impression paradoxically, I would say that the writer, on the one hand minimises, and on the other hand maximises unduly. He minimises in the first place (though, perhaps, he himself would not call this minimising) by limiting the standpoint from which the argument should set out and the lines along which it should move so as to suggest that *unless* we adopt the evolutionist hypothesis in its fulness, as he himself adopts it, we cannot *by rational inference* satisfy ourselves that God exists (although we might instinctively believe it). If that suggestion is intended it would ultimately mean that Plato or Aristotle or St. Paul could not have believed in God as reasonably as a disciple of Darwin, or that Newman must have traced back his conscience to a jelly spot if he was justified in taking it to be the strongest argument for God's existence. I call it minimising thus to limit, even by suggestion, the field of theistic proof: it is a temporising, not an absolute philosophy, and is open to the same objection as a temporising religion. In the next place our author seems to minimise by leaving the description of God too indefinite. He is quite right in saying that God cannot be "defined" (p. 9), but we can by analogy conceive and describe Him somewhat better than is done in this book, and if we would guard against pantheism, we ought to do so. Though Mr. Cohu speaks of God's transcendence as well as of His immanence and formally rejects pantheism, statements and expressions occur in his book that have a distinctively pantheistic flavour, v.g., "man's Personality, or self-consciousness, is *one in essence* with God's Personality" (p. 205).

On the other hand, and to some extent as the result of this minimising, Mr. Cohu maximises in assuming that nature gives an adequate revelation of God, and that *supernatural* revelation is neither needful

nor possible. This is maximising in the sense that it flatters natural theism by calling it Christian faith, but from the opposite side, as dethroning faith and denying or explaining away the Christian dogmas, it were better called minimising. In this respect the book is thoroughly modernistic in the condemned sense, and altogether unacceptable to the Catholic. I may quote a few passages by way of illustration: "If nothing that is actively alive can stand still, then Revelation must be progressive and so must Theology. Inspiration, even as Creation, is also a never-ending progressive process going on at this very moment" (p. 39); "Revelation is as never-ending and progressive an evolutionary process as Creation. Starting simultaneously with the dawn of man's consciousness and from tiny beginnings, it has ever been growing like a rolling snowball, and is more actively going on now than in Bible-days" (p. 59). In a footnote there is this passage: "As factors in Revelation, we fully recognise: (1) the immense weight and influence of great personalities, *i.e.*, souls specially attuned and responsive to God's Spirit; (2) Christ's *unique* Personality and Revelation." In fact Evolution itself is a Revelation, a "Gospel" (p. 229), and it has thrown so much new light on the old Gospel as to abolish much of its teaching: "it corrects our narrow anthropomorphic views of God" (p. 227), "repudiates the artificial distinction between 'natural' and 'supernatural'" (p. 225), "never has had such a set back as the Fall implies" (p. 226), yet wants to keep Christ as "Our Great Pattern and Captain," our mere metaphorical Redeemer (p. 227). If, as seems to be the case, Mr. Cohu's mistake in falling into agnosticism was due to his failing to distinguish between science and philosophy, it yet remains for him as a philosopher to rise to a higher and profounder grasp of theism which will enable him, while still retaining everything that *science has really verified* in the evolutionary hypothesis, to appreciate the true meaning of "the supernatural" which he brushes aside so lightly and to enter into the evidence for its existence. The supernatural throws as much additional light on the conclusions of natural theism as does theism on the conclusions of mere physical science; and a true realisation of what divine transcendence means is all that is needed to prove its antecedent possibility.

P. J. TONER.

The Mustard Tree. An Argument on behalf of the Divinity of Christ.
By O. R. Vassall-Phillips, C.S.S.R. R. and T. Washbourne, Ltd.,
London. 1912. Pp. xxxii + 530. Price 5s. net.

This book is recommended to the public by a Preface from the pen of Mgr. Benson, and an Epilogue from that of Hilaire Belloc, both good judges of what is at once Catholic and literary. But it will be found to recommend itself sufficiently on its own merits as an excellent, opportune, and persuasive contribution to Catholic apologetics.

After an introductory chapter on "Faith and its Evidences," which, in the author's own words, "consists merely of a statement of the question at issue [*i.e.*, the divinity of the Christian religion, more especially the divinity of Christ], together with a short exposition of the kind of evidence which may fairly be looked for by an educated and reasonable man in support of the Christian Religion" (p. xvi.), the main argument of the book is taken up and developed in six successive chapters (II.-VII.); "difficulties" discussed and solved in Chapter VIII.; and "the key to the problem" suggested in the concluding Chapter IX. Some useful notes on critical questions are appended together with an index of Scriptural references and a full general index.

The book is an expansion of the argument familiar to some of the Fathers (especially SS. Chrysostom and Augustine), and invoked by the Vatican Council (Const. de Fide, c. iii.) that the Catholic Church herself "is a great and perpetual motive of credibility and an unimpeachable witness to her own divine commission," and, therefore, to the divinity of her Founder. It was thus, substantially, those Fathers of the fourth and fifth century were accustomed to answer those who were disposed to complain that the difficulty of faith was increased for them by the interval that separated them from the visible Christ and His miracles; and the fifteen centuries that have since been added to that interval have mightily strengthened the argument. The life of the Church has been a miracle of the moral order, and the longer the miracle goes on the more convincing its evidence becomes. And if it is found that those very things in the life of the Church, which impress the observer most strongly as being humanly or naturally inexplicable, owe their origin and development and their indestructibility to certain words of power and prescience spoken at the beginning by a Jewish carpenter to a number of ignorant Jewish fishermen, then surely the observer, who is not too much under the influence of "flesh and blood" to hearken with Peter to the voice of his "Father who is in heaven," will feel the impulse to answer Christ's question—for to him also is the question personally addressed—in the words of Peter's memorable confession: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God" (Matt. xvi., 16). The effectiveness of this argument will depend in part on the impressiveness of the phenomena in the Church's life one may choose particularly to deal with (they are too numerous to be treated in their entirety), in part on the clearness with which their *nexus* with Christ as their cause is exhibited, and in part on the personal gifts and qualifications on which successful advocacy always depends. On none of these heads do I find anything to blame in this book, but on all of them I find much to praise. Father Vassall-Phillips is a pleasing and effective writer. In developing his argument—which he does with due attention to exegetical and historical details—he maintains the necessary connexion of the Church with Christ her Founder, and clearly arranges the particulars he has chosen in their cumulative bearing on the conclusion to be enforced. Finally, he has made a judicious choice of particulars, selecting those that are distinctively Catholic, as opposed

to vaguely Christian, and as such are more likely to be also distinctively divine. Thus under the explicit argument for the divinity of Christ lies a strongly persuasive, implicit argument for the exclusive claim of the Catholic Church adequately to represent Christ and His divinity before the world, and to non-Catholics who still believe in His divinity, this implicit argument is recommended for serious consideration.

After linking up the enquiry with the general argument from miracles and prophecy, Fr. Vassall-Phillips begins with a general view of the Catholic Church as an historic institution—the mustard seed grown into the mustard tree—and, among other striking marks of it foretold by Christ and fully realised in history, he emphasises in particular its wonderful unity, to which no parallel is found among men. Who, then, was Christ that He could foresee and bring about this unity? Then he considers the Papacy, the most wonderful institution in history, yet the very institution Christ showed His intention to set up from the day He called Peter to the ministry. Again, who was Christ that He could plan and maintain such an institution? Next he considers in order the phenomena connected with the sacraments of baptism and penance—especially the phenomenon of confession; with the sacrament and sacrifice of the Eucharist; with devotion to the Blessed Virgin; with the sacraments of confirmation and extreme unction, of order and matrimony, together with the religious life; and in all of these which so wonderfully affect the lives of so many millions of men, over-riding every difference of time and place and character and condition, he finds the question persistently suggested: Who was that Christ who had the vision of all this before Him and Whose word has brought it all about? Verily He was the Son of God. In the chapter on "Difficulties" which follows, coherency of argument and of point of view is not quite so well maintained, but in itself this is a helpful and suggestive chapter. I am loath to find fault with anything in a book that pleases me so well and that will, I hope, please equally well the many readers to whom this notice introduces it. The publishers also deserve a word of praise for the taste with which the book is produced.

P. J. TONER.

St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury. (The "Notre Dame" Series of Lives of the Saints). Sands and Co., London and Edinburgh. 1911. Pp. ix. + 287. Price 3s. 6d. net.

This is a well-written, popular Life of a great Saint and Doctor of the Church, and deserves to be heartily welcomed. If the other Lives in this series, by the Sisters of Notre Dame, are equally good—I do not recollect having seen any others—hagiology in English will owe the good Sisters no small debt. The present Life, we are told, "is little more than an attempt to give, in English dress, Eadmer's story of the saintly and heroic life of his beloved Father and Archbishop," but obligations are acknowledged to the exhaustive and interesting "*Histoire de St.*

Anselme" of Père Ragey, as well as to the scholarly and sympathetic works of Mr. M. Rule ("Life and Times of St. Anselm"), and Mr. J. M. Rigg ("St. Anselm of Canterbury—a chapter in the History of Religion"). No adequate analysis or criticism of St. Anselm's contributions to philosophy and theology, no estimate of his place and influence as a thinker, is attempted; nor was this, indeed, necessary, or even desirable, in a brief popular sketch. What was expected, and is here given, was a good portrait of the man himself in actual life and a good account of his life's work in its various phases. Students of philosophy and theology and of general history will read him and read about him with greater interest and deeper understanding after knowing him as he is made to live for them in this sketch.

P. J. TONER.

Das Buch Kohelet kritisch und metrisch untersucht übersetzt und erklärt, von Vincenz Zapletal, O.Pr. 2te. verbesserte Aufl. M. 4.80. Herder, Freiburg, London.

This new edition of Professor Zapletal's well-known commentary on Qoheleth takes account of the most recent literature on the book, and, in view of the author's lately published work "*De Poesi Hebraeorum in Veteri Testamento conservata*" (2nd ed. Fribourg, 1911), omits some portions of the very full treatment of Hebrew poetry contained in the first edition. For those who do not know the first edition we give the following brief account of the new edition of this model exegetical work.

The commentary consists of an introduction, critical Hebrew text, translation and notes. The text is arranged according to Prof. Zapletal's metrical theories. The translation of this metrical text is admirable, and the notes, though mostly brief, are scholarly and to the point. The chief importance of the work for theologians lies in the Introduction. It may be said at once that the Introduction omits nothing, and puts nothing obscurely. Prof. Zapletal has read all the literature on his subject. He knows even such a recent English work as Barton's *Ecclesiastes*. The Introduction deals with the various problems connected with the title, contents, literary construction, metre, and authorship of the book. It discusses further the peculiar features of Qoheleth's philosophy, his theories of this life and of the world beyond the grave, and his alleged heterodoxy. It discusses also the problem of the Canonicity of *Ecclesiastes*. The Hebrew name of the author of *Ecclesiastes*—Qoheleth, Zapletal takes to be equivalent to *Maqheleth*—"the collector." The feminine form is used according to Hebrew idiom for a neuter, and means here (according to Arabic analogies) "the zealous gatherer" or possibly "the official gatherer" (p. 5). Proverbs, not men, are the objects of the gathering. The name is artificial, and is meant to be so understood. Professor Zapletal is convinced that Qoheleth, in spite of its puzzlingly various contents and seeming inconsistencies, can be regarded as a literary and philosophical

unity, the work of a single thinker. Even the Epilogue he will not ascribe to a second author; its metre and language connect it with the body of the book. It is clear, of course, that Ecclesiastes is not a treatise on philosophy in a European or modern sense. But it is a series of reflexions which have passed through one man's mind; and if there are apparent inconsistencies, it is because the reflexions have been put down in the order in which they arose, not in the sequence of logical development. Yet there is a certain logical unity in the book. It is concerned with three main problems—God, the life beyond the grave (Sheol), and retribution. Around these problems Qoheleth groups his thoughts. There is not one of those thoughts, Professor Zapletal thinks, which cannot be paralleled from other books of the Old Testament. Job, and many of the Psalms, and Proverbs deal with the same central problems of life as Ecclesiastes, and the various reflexions and points of view which these other books suggest Qoheleth brings together; but he fails to unite them in one synthesis. Qoheleth admits God's existence, knowledge, and power. He believes in a future life in Sheol, in which the wise and fools share. He thinks too that, while the wicked seem to prosper and the good to suffer, yet God will somehow interfere to set things right—not in Sheol, but here in this life. Man knows little of the universe in which he finds himself, and where things generally are uncertain, it is prudent for him to adapt himself to circumstances, and take all possible reasonable enjoyment out of daily life. This is the old-fashioned philosophy of Qoheleth. It is not set down without objections, and the objections sometimes look like contradictions. Prof. Zapletal thinks that Qoheleth has in view in 3^d new theories, which suggest a doctrine of retribution in Sheol: "Who knows whether the breath of man ascends on high"—but Qoheleth, he maintains, only mentions these views to set them aside, not as if he wished to reject them, but because the old-fashioned familiar views about Sheol were more suggestive to him.

Professor Zapletal assigns Ecclesiastes to the Greek period. It belongs to that period, he says, by its thought, its social setting and its language. Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom presuppose it, and we must, therefore, assign it to about 200 B.C. Though it belongs, in this theory, to a time when Hellenism was a strong force in Palestine, the book bears no genuine trace of Greek influence. Zapletal's reasons for this view as against Pfeleiderer, Tyler, and others, are well put. Neither will Zapletal admit with Grimme any trace of Babylonian influence in Ecclesiastes. Qoheleth is, therefore, a product of the Greek period, but altogether Semitic and Hebrew in its point of view. The attribution of the book to Solomon is merely a literary artifice, such as we find in many Psalms, the Book of Jubilees, the Book of Henoch, the title of the Book of Wisdom, etc. The attempt to find actual historical situations referred to in the book, as in 4th and 9th 16 has been unsuccessful.

Prof. Zapletal says he could, if he wished, find strong arguments for the presence of Egyptian features in our book, and he gives some speci-

mens of such arguments. He seems, however, to suggest that these specimens are not to be taken seriously (p. 68 ff.). Kleinert and others long ago pointed out Alexandrian features in Ecclesiastes, and possibly the question of Egyptian influences in Qoheleth is much more serious than the learned exegete from Fribourg imagines.

All apparent traces in Ecclesiastes of such heterodox systems as Pessimism, Determinism, Materialism, Scepticism, Epicureanism, are easily explained away by Prof. Zapletal.

The work is a valuable contribution to the study of the Old Testament. I do not believe that the author has solved all the difficulties of Ecclesiastes. But his brilliantly supported theory of single authorship is much more reasonable than Siegfried's analysis into five treatises. The author's standpoint, too, is quite independent, and his extraordinary knowledge of Hebrew poetry makes his treatment of disputed readings peculiarly valuable. His solution of the problem of Qoheleth's theory of immortality seems to me more subtle than well-founded; and only raises new difficulties as to Old Testament theology.

P. BOYLAN.

Moralphilosophie. By Victor Cathrein, S.J. In 2 vols. Vol. I., Allgemeine Moralphilosophie, pp. xvi. + 628; Vol. II., Besondere Moralphilosophie, pp. xii. + 770. Fifth edition, revised. (London: Herder, 68 Gt. Russell Street. Bound, 23s. sewed, 20s.)

That four editions of such a voluminous work should have been exhausted since 1890 may be taken as a fair proof of its excellence and popularity. Indeed, it has established its place as a standard work of reference for German readers. The ethnological sketch—"Uebersicht über die Sittenlehre der wichtigsten Kultur- und Naturvölker"—which appeared as an index in the previous editions, is omitted from the present one: for enlargement and publication as a separate volume. But many sections of the previous editions have been supplemented and otherwise improved: in Vol. I., notably those on free-will, responsibility, natural law, and autonomous morality. An historical sketch has also been added to this volume; and additional contemporary ethical theories are noted and examined. In Vol. II. the author has revised and improved his former treatment of the following important questions: nature and origin of religion, private ownership, usury, marriage, *Frauenemanzipation*, Church and State, and the relation of these to social and economic problems. Some 120 pages are devoted to the treatment of Socialism. Modern controversies, such as those regarding the school and the press, get their due share of notice. The scope of the whole work is very comprehensive, embracing the ethics of the Individual, of the Family, and of the State. Its appeal is primarily to the Christian reader; but, expounding and defending Christian Ethics from the standpoint of natural reason, as the only stable system amid the shifting quicksands of modern speculation, it may be consulted with profit by all unprejudiced seekers after ethical truth.

P. COFFEY.

Die Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode. Von Dr. Martin Grabmann, Professor der Dogmatik am Bischöflichen Lyzeum zur Eichstätt. Zweiter Band. Herder, London. Cloth, 10s. 6d. Pp. xiv. + 586.

The first volume of the present work was reviewed in these pages in July, 1910. It brought down the author's researches to the commencement of the twelfth century. The present volume deals with the twelfth and the early thirteenth. And a third volume, completing the work, is to follow.

The work is one of first class importance, both for the philosopher and for the theologian, inasmuch as it aims, by a careful and exhaustive study of the mediæval sources, especially the still unpublished sources, to trace the influences that culminated in the great scholastic thought-synthesis of the Middle Ages—the *Mittelalterliche Weltanschauung*. The "Scholastic Method" is understood by the author, not in the narrower sense of mere technique or doctrinal apparatus, but in the fuller sense, as embracing both exposition and research throughout the whole domain of mediæval interests, philosophical, theological, and religious. It thus embodies and expresses the distinctively scholastic procedure by which the light of human reason is applied to the whole range of human experience, natural and supernatural, for the purpose of interpreting all its data, of harmonizing science and faith, and thus yielding a unified and consistent philosophy of life. The gradual development of this procedure throughout the twelfth century, as it is copiously illustrated in the present volume, is a theme of exceptional interest and instructiveness. For this was *par excellence* the century of the formation of scholasticism; the indispensable preparation for that wonderful output of constructive effort which will shed a peculiar lustre on the genius of the thirteenth century for all time.

The present volume represents a vast amount of labour and research. Manuscript materials from many continental libraries have been analysed. Authors whose influence on the thought of their age can be no longer doubted, but whose works are still unpublished, are here for the first time introduced to the general reader by selected extracts from, and critical appreciations of, their writings—Robert of Melun, Peter of Poitiers, and the Paris *summits* of the early thirteenth century, to mention a few notable examples. The results will modify many current views in regard to theological thought in the Middle Ages. Questions of authorship, too, and they are numerous, are discussed in the light of the most recently forthcoming data. The influence of each and all of the greater and more familiar figures of the epoch—William of Champeaux, Anselm of Laon, Peter Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor, Peter the Lombard, Gilbert de la Porée, John of Salisbury, Alan of Lille, and the leaders of the great School of Chartres—is examined at great length and with great wealth of illustration: so that Dr. Grabmann's work is pretty sure to rank as a classic which cannot afford to be passed over by anyone interested in the development of intellectual and religious activity in the Middle Ages.

P. COFFEY.

The Ministry of the Word and Sacraments. By the Right Rev. J. W. Diggle, D.D., Lord Bishop of Carlisle. Robert Scott, London, 62 Paternoster Row, E.C. 1911. Pp. 177. Price 2s. 6d. net.

From the positive side there are many points in this little volume deserving of consideration. The chapters, for instance, on "The Present Position of the English Church" and "The Spiritual Reformation of the Clergy" contain valuable and interesting information on the present material and spiritual condition of the Anglican clergy, and an amount of practical wisdom that might be taken to heart by the laity and clergy of all Churches, our own included. To the Anglican clergy, especially, we are sure that the book will be very welcome, and will suggest many lines along which their energies may be exercised with great spiritual profit to themselves and to the lay members of their communion.

If, however, after the experience of three centuries, we still needed any proof that the Anglican Church is largely a mere negation, and that her strength consists in a policy of opposition to the Catholic Church, the volume before us would supply it. In a work on "the ministry of the Word and Sacraments"—which, we need hardly say, is very much concerned with "the word," and very little, except in an unfriendly way, with "the sacraments"—it might be expected that a Christian minister could give his followers something in the way of spiritual teaching without defiling his pages with scurrilous abuse of a Church that taught the nations for sixteen centuries before his own little sect was ever heard of. But that would hardly suit the Protestant palate. Abuse of Rome is what is wanted, and his Lordship of Carlisle knows it.

An essay on these lines is likely to develop more heat than light. We have an abundance of wild assertions, but no evidence worthy of the name. "The errors and heresies of the Roman Church" are "manifold and in some instances appalling" (p. 105); "the business of the Bible is to prove what the Church has decreed should be taught" (107); "this goodness (of the Roman Church) is so overloaded with evils, and this truth with errors, that the resultant effect has been to make the Roman Church one of the greatest impediments to human progress and one of the greatest foes of Christ's religion" (p. 111); "not a single dogma distinctive of the Roman faith . . . was taught either by Christ or His Apostles" (p. 112); "in so far as Romanists derive their unity from allegiance to the Pope, it is a merely outward ecclesiastical uniformity" (p. 125); "I sometimes think the Evil One invented Purgatory in order to place impediments in the way of man's realization of Christ's conquest of death" (p. 139). These, and others like them, are nice charitable statements coming from a Christian minister and unsupported by the slightest particle of scientific evidence. But Catholics need not be troubled. We have heard all this raving before and so has every generation of Catholics from the first. A Church that has met the countless heresies of centuries is not likely to quail before the onslaught of an Anglican bishop, who cannot even say whether his own Church supports him or not.

The hoary platitudes of Protestant polemics are, of course, repeated—again without a particle of evidence. The rock of which Christ spoke in His address to Peter is “the divinity of Jesus the Christ” (p. 33): so the author states, blissfully forgetful of the result of centuries of controversy and of the fact that Continental rationalists have given up the struggle in despair and changed their method of attack by denying the authenticity of the whole text. “A sin against God, God alone can forgive” (p. 10), he proclaims with the heretics of the second and third centuries, and conveniently forgets to interpret, and contradict, “Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them,” and similar texts. No priest “can know the mind and will of God in respect of forgiveness” (p. 15), but Dr. Diggle knows the mind of God when it suits his purpose: “We know for certain that God has not confirmed these anathemas in heaven”—Roman anathemas of course (p. 12). And then he tilts at a windmill: “Even rigorous sacerdotalists . . . make confessors only of men of mature age and ripe experience. But . . . why this precaution? A priest is as much a priest at twenty-four years of age as at forty-two, and if his authority to forgive and remit is an unconditioned attribute of his ordination, it is just as valid in the callow, fledgling priest as in the priest of full grown knowledge and discerning wisdom” (pp. 12-13). Where did he discover the astonishing “fact” that the Catholic Church ever thought otherwise, or that she refuses the office of confessor to the “callow, fledgling priest”? The sacraments, we are told, are of very secondary importance. The author gloats over the fact that St. Paul “baptized only Crispus and Gaius and the household of Stephanas” (p. 23), and that “outside the brief narratives of the three Synoptic Evangelists, there are not half-a-dozen references to the Holy Communion in all the New Testament Scriptures” (p. 29). One would have thought he could find little consolation in the comparative silence of Scripture regarding the only portions of Christ’s sacramental legacy that the Anglican Church has not wantonly renounced. He quotes the query of the scribes and Pharisees: “Will this man give us his flesh to eat?” and seems to find it a balm and a blessing. If he finds comfort in such company, he may have it; no Catholic wants it. All this special pleading for the overwhelming importance of the ministry of the “Word” is rather grotesque when offered in the name of a Church that does not know what “word” she is to preach, and tolerates in her fold practically all shades of opinion from Catholicity to downright infidelity. “This diversity is part of the glory of the English Church, one sign and seal of the dwelling within her of the Holy Ghost” (p. 53). If diversity be such a sign, the Anglican Church has certainly got it with a vengeance. We have travelled far from the days when Christians were taught to accept the Gospel of Paul, and to reject all others, though an angel from heaven taught them.

The chapter on “The Church of the Future” is a triumph of poetic fancy. The Catholic, Greek and Eastern Churches are, it appears, hopelessly unfitted for the leading part. “The first steps . . . will be

made, I believe, by the Church of England and the English Nonconformists. . . . By degrees I hope all other Churches will join this great Catholic Union: those whose errors are fewest, first: those that, like the Roman Church, are most in error, last" (p. 140). "In the van of the procession I see our own beloved Church of England. . . . Then I see the Nonconformist and other reformed Churches following close behind; then the Greek and other Eastern Churches . . . ; then the Roman Church purified as by fire" (p. 76). Most men have a sense of humour, and will feel obliged for this spectacle of the Catholic Church following in the wake of a petty English sect that came sixteen centuries too late to be the Church of Christ and does not know her own mind on even the fundamental doctrines of the Christian creed.

"In my young days," our author confides, "I often dreamed dreams, and now I am growing old I sometimes see visions" (p. 75). It is pleasant to find something to agree with. On this point his Lordship is quite safe from contradiction.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

Der gottliche Heiland. Ein Lebensbild der studiierenden Jugend gewidmet von Moritz Meschler, S.J. Dritte verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage. B. Herder, Freiburg and London. 1911. Pp. xxi + 684. Price 5s.; in cloth, 6s. 8d.

The work of Fr. Meschler needs no introduction to the public. For a very long period he has been known to the German world and to a wide circle of readers in other countries as one of the foremost spiritual writers in the Catholic Church. It will be sufficient to recall the very kind reception given by the public generally, and by the reviewers especially, to his works—"Die Andacht zum göttlichen Herzen Jesu," "Die Gabe des heiligen Pfingstfestes," "Kreuzwegbuchlein," "Leben des hl. Aloysius von Gonzaga," "Aus dem katholischen Kirchenjahr," "Das Leben unseres Herrn Jesu Christi," and a host of minor publications. Even in quarters where little enthusiasm might have been expected, they were declared to be among the very best of their kind, characterized by deep spirituality, and written with a classic purity and simplicity of style. The same welcome has been extended to the present work on "The Divine Saviour." One reviewer who may be taken as typical, describes it as "a classic masterpiece." "The whole life of Our Lord, in so far as it has a special interest for youth, is depicted from constantly-changing, original view-points, in an elegant style and a language full of poetry."

The book is now in its third edition, and the praise, we need hardly say, is more deserved than ever. Everywhere there are marks of the loving care with which the author revised and improved every line of a picture that made such a strong appeal to himself, and that he justly considered of so much importance to the young students to whom it is dedicated. Apart from these improvements, there are additions of a

more considerable kind. After the Preface, there are three introductory chapters that found no place in the two previous editions: one on "the scene of Christ's life," another on "the historical sources for the Life of Jesus," and a third on the "religious condition of mankind at the time of Christ's coming."

We wish the third edition all the success attained by the others. No better work could be recommended to young people, none more calculated to give them an idea of Christ and His work that will remain with them for all time, and be a comfort and consolation in all the trials, temporal and spiritual, of later life.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

Notes.

In the elections recently held in Germany the Socialists secured a great victory. They are now the strongest political party in the Reichstag. But this success has been obtained at the expense of the German Liberal Parties, rather than at that of the Centre or Conservatives. In spite of various difficulties under which the Centre Party laboured, it has lost comparatively few members and retains still the balance of power. No Chancellor can hope to hold office without its support, nor can he hope to carry any measure against the wishes of the Extreme Left unless he can secure the support of the Centre.



His Holiness Pius X. has recently written a letter to His Eminence Cardinal Gibbons, praising the work of the Catholic University of Washington, and expressing the hope that American Catholics, already so generous towards the University, will extend to it still further help, so that it may be thoroughly equipped for the vast and important work that lies before it. In this connection, we note with pleasure that the Catholic University Fund, which is being collected by the Knights of Columbus, is expected to reach within the next few months the splendid sum of \$400,000.



It is gratifying to know that the Biblical Institute, established by our Holy Father in May, 1909, to promote the study of Sacred Scripture, has been making excellent headway. A palace situated on a slope of the Quirinal Hill, in the centre of Rome, has been overhauled and fitted up for the Institute, which is now admirably located there. The average number of students for the three years has been about 120, a very fair number when it is remembered that only students who have completed their philosophical and theological course are admitted. Not only Scripture itself, but also all the subsidiary studies, especially Oriental languages, will receive special attention; an annual periodical under the title "Commentationes Pontificii Instituti Biblici" will be published, and a series of publications under the title "Scripta Pontificii Instituti Biblici" is promised. Placed at the centre of Christendom, in touch with all the languages of the civilized world, its library supplied with 350 reviews and periodicals, its students drawn from the picked men of every nation, the Institute has a glorious opportunity, and we earnestly pray that it may abundantly fulfil the hopes it has evoked.



We welcome most cordially the first volume of the *Catholic Bulletin*. It gives in collected form the twelve monthly parts that appeared in 1911, and is brought out in a very tasteful and artistic manner, with

numerous illustrations, by the original publishers and proprietors, Messrs. M. H. Gill and Son, of Dublin. In the whole range of recent publications there is no volume of the kind that we can recommend so unreservedly to our readers: from the literary, artistic, national and Catholic viewpoints its appeal is uniform and irresistible. The articles, written almost exclusively by men and women already famous in Irish literary work, or prominently associated with movements for faith and fatherland, cover practically the whole sphere of Catholic literature, dealing not merely with subjects professedly religious, but with the much wider range of subjects in which Catholics may take a legitimate interest. Repression of immoral literature, the brightening of rural life, the value of Irish history, temperance, our obligations to ourselves and society, the educational value of the Irish language, its claims and prospects, scientific, religious, and literary problems, Intermediate education, the teaching of philosophy, Irish music, the beauty spots of Ireland—these may be mentioned as typical examples of the subjects treated. Without drawing invidious comparisons, we may be allowed to devote a special word of appreciation to the seven articles by the Very Rev. Dr. Coghlan on "Modernism and the Old Faith," "The Church and Christian Marriage," "Francis Moylan, Bishop of Cork," and "The Spell of Rome." It is not too much to say that they contain in a small compass most instructive and interesting reading than can be found in the pages of any similar periodical, and would of themselves be sufficient to make the *Bulletin* an ornament to the most exclusive library. The volume, we need hardly remark, is published with the *Imprimatur* of His Grace the Archbishop of Dublin, and has won unstinted praise from Catholic laymen and priests all the world over and from several members of the Irish Hierarchy. At a time when the best intellect of the country is engaged on the serious problem of repressing immoral literature, the appearance of such a work is a special blessing and a happy omen of brighter things. We offer the publishers our sincerest congratulations on a success that even they can hardly have anticipated, and we wish the *Bulletin* many long years to carry out the splendid work its first volume has so well begun. It is a delight to look at, and very much more than a delight to read.



In connexion with the question of immoral literature referred to, it is encouraging to recall that, within the past three months, two deputations have waited on the Home Secretary with a view to having the existing regulations more stringently enforced and the law itself strengthened in accordance with the recommendations of the Select Committee of 1908. The first spoke for the London Council of the Association for the Promotion of Public Morality, and the second, introduced by Mr. J. St. Loe Strachey, editor of the *Spectator*, for a very considerable body of editors, publishers, newsmen and booksellers. The reply of the Home Secretary was favourable, and a promise was made that a bill, already drafted, would shortly be introduced on the

lines of the Committee report. The sacred claims of "art," of course, came in for honourable mention: to some minds they seem to cover every sin in the Decalogue. We are familiar enough with the cry in Ireland. In the name of an "art" which no one but the "artists" themselves can appreciate, a small section claim free licence, not only for immoral Sunday newspapers, but for a decadent dramatist who, in pursuit of his fetich, was prepared to libel a nation and paint the purest peasants in the world as slaves to an impulse that would disgrace a savage. But, as the Home Secretary pointed out, the man of common sense knows perfectly well when a production is artistic, and when it is merely offensive. And, while the promised bill is coming, Ireland, we are glad to note, has taken the matter into her own hands.



It speaks highly for the activity of the firm of Benziger Bros., that while they are providing so much edifying reading for young people, they have just brought out Vols. V. and VI. of the English translation by Rev. Thos. Sebastian Byrne, D.D., of Bishop Bonomelli's "New Series of Homilies for the Whole Year." In their native Italian these Homilies met with a most favourable reception, and we think we may confidently predict the same for them in their English dress. The Bishop (of Cremona) tells us in his Preface that one of the chief objects he had in view in writing was to bring back preaching to the ancient pattern, such as we find it in the Fathers. The Homilies of St. John Chrysostom, of St. Augustine and St. Bernard, not to mention others, are commentaries on portions of Scripture, in which dogma and moral are woven together with admirable art, and the errors of the age are touched upon and refuted as the occasion arose. Bishop Bonomelli has taken them as his model, and his Homilies in every case have for their groundwork the sacred text. The present volumes are made up of Homilies of the Common of Saints, giving us, for instance, Homilies for the Mass of one Martyr-Bishop, for the Mass of Doctors, of Confessors, of Virgins, etc. The price is 20s. net.



The firm of P. Marietti, Turin, have recently brought out a new and handy edition of Cornelius A. Lapide's "Commentary on all the Pauline Epistles." The work has been revised, corrected, and brought up to date by Canon Padovani, Professor of Sacred Scripture in the Seminary of Cremona. A. Lapide's work is so well and favourably known that it needs no commendation. It may be uncritical at times, but it contains such a wealth of learning, and is such a storehouse of happy illustrations drawn from every field of the knowledge of his time, that it is still without a rival for the purposes of the preacher. It is a pity that the print in the present edition is rather small, but it was difficult otherwise to bring so much matter within the compass of two volumes, which, when bound together, will make only a moderate-sized book. The price of each volume in paper is 6 fr.

We earnestly trust that "A Soggarth's Last Verses," from the untiring pen of Father Matthew Russell, S.J., recently published by Burns and Oates, may, after all, not be his last. The little book is linked by its title with two previous volumes of verse from the same saintly pen: "A Soggarth's Secular Verses" and "A Soggarth's Sacred Verses." It contains nearly fifty short pieces, most of them on sacred subjects, but not a few on a variety of secular subjects. The price is 2s. net.



We are very glad to see that Mgr. Batiffol's "Orpheus et l'Evangile," which was reviewed in our October issue of 1910, has been translated into English and published by Longmans, Green and Co., a firm, by the way, that has been doing a good deal of late for the spread of Catholic literature. A new title: "The Credibility of the Gospel," has been wisely substituted for the former enigmatic one. The price of the book is 4/6 net.



In these days of "*Motu Proprio*'s" and Orange attacks on Catholic discipline, it may be just as well to recall the fact—mentioned long ago in the famous O'Keeffe case and repeated often since—that various non-Catholic institutions have subjected themselves to self-denying ordinances in regard to the enforcement of claims in the civil courts. To come as near home as possible, we have the statute of Trinity College. By Letters Patent of 13 Charles I., "All domestic disputes are to be examined, and, if possible, decided within the College. Whoever brings another into court outside without the consent of the Provost and the majority of the Senior Fellows, shall be expelled from the College": or, as it runs in Latin: "Omnes lites domesticæ intra Collegium et cognoscantur et (si fieri potest) dijudicentur. Qui foras vero aliquem in jus vocaverit, sine Præpositi et majoris partis Sociorum Seniorum consensu Collegio amoveatur." A disgraceful thing, surely, that Trinity College should fly in the face of the well-known principles of its own Parliamentary representatives, Messrs. Campbell and Carson, and "by such an arrogant and insolent decree," "aim a deadly blow at the sanctity and security of property."



The point has been noted by foreign journals, especially by the brilliantly-written Catholic *America*, which goes on to develop the subject in a way that may hardly be palatable to those of our number who are prepared to make greater sacrifices for the sake of peace than sane principles can sanction. In an article in the Dublin *Leader*, of 27th January last, Dr. O'Riordan, Rector of the Irish College in Rome, had said that "Irish Protestants . . . have been so long accustomed so to think and speak that they are regardless or unconscious of their offensiveness. If the Catholics of Dublin held a meeting and resolved: 'Since the *Motu Proprio* (the *Quantavis Diligentia*) affects Catholics only, we request Mr. Campbell and his friends to mind

their own business,' he would probably be surprised at their developed audacity. Such has been the fruit of Protestant privilege in Ireland, they cannot reconcile themselves to the change which a century has made. Hence, what is of divine right in a Protestant, in the Pope or in a Papist is that sin which shall not be forgiven." On which *America* remarks: "Continued Protestant ascendancy in the British Isles, and in not a few places outside of them, has left an air of insolent dominance on the one hand and servile timidity on the other, long after the laws that enforced them have become obsolete. . . . Even yet there is too much talk of tolerance and intolerance. There are Catholics, not all of them in Ireland, who are eager to prove their tolerance by giving their enemies everything good that is going. Under free institutions there should be no question of 'tolerance,' but of justice and equality of opportunity. Catholics, as well as others, have a right to claim and exact what their merits as citizens entitle them to, not more and not less."



Meanwhile we find apologists for the general law in quite unexpected quarters. In the January number of the *Review of Reviews*, Mr. W. T. Stead says:—"The Papal Decree is in reality an attempt to use the ecclesiastical boycott of excommunication in order to compel all Catholics to arbitrate before they fight. It might be well if the State took a leaf from the book of the Vatican and enacted a similar law on modern lines for the avoidance of unnecessary litigation. The Pope excommunicates all who summon clerics before a lay tribunal without the permission of a Bishop; but by the circular of 1886 the Bishop is compelled to grant that permission provided that efforts have been made to arrive at an amicable settlement. The new Decree, therefore, only amounts to the excommunication of all laymen who take a priest into court without having first attempted to arrive at an amicable settlement. That law might well be extended to all Christian men, whether lay or clerical."



From the firm of Pustet we have received the *De Vita Regulari* of Father Bonaventure Rebstock, O.S.B. This little work consists of a series of meditations on the daily duties of a priest intended mainly for the guidance of regulars, but exceedingly useful for all classes of the clergy. These meditations deal with, amongst other matters, the divine office, Mass, communion, spiritual reading, internal recollection, devotion to the Blessed Virgin, silence, labour, study, recreation, examination of conscience, confession, and spiritual advice.



Die Gesellschaft Jesu, Ihre Satzungen und Ihre Gefolge, by Father Mritz Meschler, S.J., is published by Herder (Freiburg and London). The author has been a member of the Society of Jesus for sixty years. He began his life as a Jesuit novice in Switzerland, from which he was forced to go into Germany when the Society was suppressed in Switzer-

land, and he has occupied at one time or another nearly every office except that of General. If there were any secrets in the Order, as he remarks, he had a splendid opportunity of becoming acquainted with them. The object of his work is neither to defend the Society nor to praise it. The author merely wishes to set forth what the Society really is, what it purports to do, and what are the results of its work. The first section (1-136) deals with the organisation of the Society—its constitution, divisions, spiritual exercises, its tendencies and its spirit. The second portion (136-297) deals with the results which it can show, its saints, its priestly activities, education, influence on literature and art, its missions and its charities. We only wish that those who are constantly attacking the Society of Jesus would carefully study this little volume. The price is 2s., bound in cloth.



The little work just published by Benziger Bros., under the title of "The Queen's Promise," will make interesting and edifying reading for young people. The story tells of a French queen who, angry at her daughter's desire to enter the religious life in preference to a royal marriage, vowed that the girl should never cross the convent threshold till the thistles that grew beneath the convent walls should bear blooming roses. Hopeless at such a refusal, the pious princess spent the night in tear and prayers, when lo! in the morning the thistles were abloom with a lovely rose unseen before, and known ever afterwards as the Queen's Promise. Pp. 199. Price 2s.



To the same firm we owe a new story entitled "The Wargrave Trust," from the pen of the well-known authoress, Christian Read. The story is thoroughly Catholic in tone; the characters are boldly and clearly drawn, and on the whole the work is one that can be recommended. Pp. 384. Price 4s. A work of a somewhat similar class, but not nearly so ambitious, also published by Benziger Bros., bears the title of "Poverina." The author is Evelyn Mary Buckingham. This is a story for young children, the heroine, "Poverina," being only eight years of age when she enters on the scene. Pp. 228. Price 2/9.



Another work just published by the same firm, is "The Tempest of the Heart," by Mary Agatha Gray. The central figure of the story is a young monk who has just completed his novitiate and is on the eve of making his final vows. The possessor of fine musical gifts, he begins to doubt whether he should not be burying his talents in the cloister, and at length yields to the call of the outer world and possible fame, and at midnight steals away from the monastery that had been his happy home for many peaceful years. The young monk's sister, Dorothy, who had been long looking forward to the day when her brother should receive Holy Orders, is nearly broken-hearted when she learns what has occurred. In vain she tries to meet him, he shuns her, and the story of her noble perseverance is one of the best things

in the book. At length, after he had drunk copiously of the world's praise and applause, and found it but a poor, unsatisfying draught, the brother is won back to God and the cloister by the pure and sweet influence of a sister's love. Price 3/6.



"Stuore" is the quaint title of another work from the same firm. "Stuore" is an old Italian word meaning mats, and as the author explains in an extract drawn, by the way, with acknowledgments from an article published many years ago in *The Irish Monthly* by Dr. Russell of Maynooth, it was a rule of the early Basilian monks that no portion of time, however minute, must be passed in idleness; and accordingly they were required to employ some of the brief intervals between the hours of prayer and of stated labour in some lighter occupation such as the weaving of mats. The author of the present work, then, implies by the title that the stories it contains have been written in short intervals snatched from more serious pursuits. The author is the Rev. Michael Earls, S.J. The stories are well written, and have no need of the apology implied in the title. Pp. 251. Price 3/3 net.



It requires no very strong imagination to picture the logical consequences of the Reformation principles. Insistence on the right of private judgment and denial of authority in matters of religion is bound to lead to results which even the most extreme of the early reformers can hardly have contemplated—to a complete rejection, in fact, of Christianity as the Christians of sixteen centuries understood it. It takes some time, of course, to induce a nation to renounce completely its legacy of Christian thought and give the new prophets sufficient courage to proclaim boldly the conclusions to which their principles inevitably tend. Respect for the past will continue to influence men's convictions, or, at least, to suggest silence even when it is felt that a breach with the past is unavoidable. The healthy vigour of the Catholic Church will impart a semblance of independent vitality to heretical sects, as every healthy organism does to parasitic growths. But, in spite of all these influences, principles will work out somehow in the end. The Protestant churches of the twentieth century are proclaiming in detail what their predecessors of the sixteenth believed in principle. We have drawn attention to some of these developments already. We have another example in the Jatho case.



An article in the *Tablet*, of January 13th, gives an interesting resumé of the whole case. Herr Jatho was for forty years an Evangelical pastor in Cologne, and, towards the end of that period, developed his rationalistic views so far that even the easy-going Prussian Church authorities were shocked. As early as 1905 a formal complaint was lodged against him before the Evangelical Supreme Church Council,

and the charge was repeated in the following year before the Superintendent and Consistory of the Rhine Provinces at Coblenz. No serious action, however, was taken: Herr Jatho continued to propagate his views, and in an Easter sermon at Barmen, in 1910, appears to have broken all records, even those established by himself.



The Supreme Council had to take action at last. On January 7th of last year it sent him a long document putting certain enquiries and suggesting, not exactly that he should modify his views, but that "he should find it possible to conform his public teaching to that of the Church, or, at least, to make his teaching approach nearer to this." The Council represents the conservative element in the Prussian Church, but what its conservatism amounts to may be judged from the fact, that in the six questions put to Herr Jatho, "there is not a word about the Holy Trinity, the Divinity of Christ, the inspiration or truth of Scripture, any kind of sacramental teaching." He is asked whether he believes "(1) in God at all, (2) in Christianity as in any way a truer religion than any other, (3) in any idea of sin and guilt, (4) in any importance in the person and teaching of Jesus Christ, (5) in a future life, (6) even in the 'fundamental idea' of the Christian religion."



Not so very difficult, one would imagine, for any Christian minister to give an affirmative answer to all these questions. But it was too much for Herr Jatho. His explanations are profuse, but their meaning is a simple "No" to each of the six. He rejects the idea of a God outside the world and calls himself a "Panentheist." He refuses to admit "original sin, reconciliation with God, forgiveness of sin," and denies that "the Christian revelation is the perfect revelation of God in Christ." According to him, Christ died "despairing of his work": "His person to us moderns can have only an educational value." As to the future life, "he can never make certain." "The Bible gives no certainty to me, and so in sermons and at funerals I make a point of saying nothing at all about a future life." A funeral oration by Herr Jatho must be a comfort and consolation to all concerned. What he means by going through Christian ceremonies and proclaiming himself a Christian minister, or, indeed, troubling himself about the Christian religion at all is more than the ordinary man can ever be got to understand.



There being nothing in his statement to indicate any Christian conviction whatever, the authorities had to pension him off on June 24th. They will think twice before they do the like of it again. A howl of indignation arose from all Evangelical Germany, only a feeble remnant of the Conservative party having the courage to set up a defence. "He is a victim (his admirers shouted) of an intolerance worthy of Rome; his cause is that of Evangelical liberty: the Spruchkollegium is as bad as the Spanish Inquisition: like Luther, Jatho faces the cruel forces

of mediæval fanaticism." Eminent professors and the leading Protestant papers entered the arena and fought for "Jatho the Martyr." "Can an honest man (they asked) stay in a church that has no place for Jatho?" "No one can dispute that if Jesus (He, too, was persecuted by theologians) appeared among us, He would say simply and wonderingly: 'This man serves his parish according to my ideas as hardly anyone else does.'" All of which comes to this, that, according to the vast majority of the German Evangelicals themselves, a man may act as an Evangelical minister, though there is nothing in his teaching to show that he differs from Jew, Mohammedan, Moslem, or any fairly decent-living Pagan, much in fact to show that he would regard all of these as unduly orthodox on the fundamental dogmas of the Christian creed. And if that is not a rejection of Christianity, then Christ and the martyrs died in vain, for the world was always Christian.



Messrs. Washbourne have published *The Holy Mass Properly Explained*, by the Very Rev. Eugene Vandeur, D.D., O.S.B., translated from the French by Rev. Vincent Gilbertson, O.S.B. We can warmly recommend the little volume to our readers; it contains much information that is instructive, not only for the laity for whom the work is primarily intended, but also for the clergy whose faith will be quickened and whose knowledge of the great mystery of the Altar will be increased by the story unfolded in these pages. The book is a history of the ceremonies of the Mass as well as a commentary on its various liturgical actions. Pp. 155. Price: Paper, 1s. net; Cloth, 1s. 6d. net.



Spiritual Perfection Through Charity, by Fr. H. Reginald Buckler, O.P., has been published by Messrs. Burns and Oates. Fr. Buckler is the author of several books that are useful guides in the spiritual combat. This, his latest work, is, as it were, the crown of all. St. Augustine defines virtue as "the order of love," and St. Thomas places our perfection essentially in Charity. A work, then, which leads to spiritual perfection through charity, adopts the greatest principle of interior sanctification, and points out the surest way to salvation. Fr. Buckler deserves the thanks of the Catholic community for his untiring energy. Pp. 346. Price 5s.



P. Gabriel Maria Blanc, C.S.S.R., has just published, through the Vatican Press, a new edition of the *Praxis Confessarii* of St. Ligouri. This edition is taken from the critical edition of the Moral Theology of St. Alphonsus, which has been edited by P. Leonardo Gaudé. Undoubtedly this is the best edition which has so far appeared, and is worthy of wide clerical support.



To see ourselves as others see us is not always conducive to self-appreciation. But sometimes it is. And in view of the charges of intolerance openly made against Irish Catholics, and the scarcely veiled

suggestions that their religion is often vitiated by superstitious tendencies, it may be well to quote a sentence or two from an article which Signor Bonaiuti, a visitor to our shores, contributes to a leading Italian review.



"In order to get an insight," he says, "into the profoundly religious spirit of the Celts in Ireland, . . . it will suffice to set one's foot in the Green Isle, and to betake oneself in the morning to any of the Catholic churches of Dublin. At once you will feel that you are in the true land of Faith; whatever be the day of the week, the hour of the morning, the church . . . you will find that it is packed with people in the most fervent attitude of prayer, . . . on whom hovers, sensibly, the living and permanent experience of the divine. . . . And if you visit the western and southern counties, and scrutinize everywhere the manifestations of religious life, you will not be long in persuading yourself that you are in the midst of the most Catholic nation of the world. . . . We of the Latin race are perchance prone to believe that this profound veneration of the Gospel *must* be accompanied by the most fanatical bigotry. Nothing of the kind. The Irishman is not bigoted, except in very rare cases. He detests the studied ostentation of faith—he feels the most cordial antipathy for every practice that may savour of fetichism and superstition—he feels instinctively the superiority of the Divine over human laws, he displays the greatest tolerance."



In reference to the influence of the Irish race on the development of the Catholic religion, he says: "The importance of Celtic Christianity in the formation of the devotion of the Catholic rite has not been yet sufficiently valued. Only recently a very subtle French psychologist, in *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, 1911, p. 429, rightly declared that the studies of the future will show how the imagination of the Irish race, so intimately moulded by the Gospel, is one of the essential factors in the religious development of the West." A statement to which anyone who has studied the activities of the Irish monks, as set forth in such works as Löning's *Geschichte der deutschen Kirche*, or Malnory's *Quid Luxovienses*, will have very little difficulty in giving his assent.



Messrs. Longmans have just published a work on Logic, in two volumes, entitled *The Science of Logic, an Inquiry into the Principles of Accurate Thought and Scientific Method*, by the Rev. Dr. Coffey, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, Maynooth College. A comprehensive work of this kind on Logic from the scholastic standpoint, for English readers, was really needed. We note, with pleasure, that the whole doctrine of Induction, its foundations and presuppositions, are fully treated in the second volume. The work will be reviewed in a subsequent issue of the QUARTERLY.

The history of medieval philosophy continues to engage the attention of numerous Continental scholars; and their researches are being rewarded by valuable results. Some of the most important of these are embodied in the studies which form the *Beitraege zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, edited by Drs. Baeumker and Von Hertling, and in the Louvain series, *Les Philosophes Belges*, edited by Professor De Wulf. The latter's well-known text-book, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, has just reached a fourth edition. This does not differ notably from the English edition, translated by Dr. Coffey, Maynooth, and published a few years ago by Messrs. Longmans. But the biography in the new edition is, of course, brought carefully up-to-date.



Just as we go to press we are favoured, through the courtesy of M. H. Gill and Son, the publishers, with an advance copy of the first number of *Studies*, the new Quarterly Review undertaken by "some Professors and Graduates" of the National University of Ireland. It will be issued each year in the months of March, June, September, and December, and will be under the editorial direction of a committee whose chairman is the Rev. T. A. Finlay, S.J., M.A., Professor of Political Economy in University College, Dublin. Its object will be to "give publicity to work of a scholarly type, extending over many important branches of study, and appealing to a wider circle of cultured readers than strictly special journalists could be expected to reach." The excellence of the first number is our best guarantee that the promise made in the Foreword will be carried out to the letter. It extends to some 220 pages, and, among a number of extremely interesting articles, we notice especially "The Electrical Theory of Matter," by the Rev. H. V. Gill, S.J.; "The Gallican Church and the National Assembly," by J. M. O'Sullivan; "Newman's Ideals and Irish Realities," by Rev. T. Corcoran, S.J.; "The Development of Supreme Judicature in Ireland," by J. A. Murnaghan; and "The Future of Private Property," by T. M. Kettle. There are in addition Notes, a Bulletin on "Recent Literature on the Relations of Soul and Body," and numerous Reviews. We offer the editors our best wishes for success in their undertaking, and, in view of the high standard already reached, have no doubt that their work will be a credit to the new University and be worthy of the best traditions of Irish scholarship.

Theological Articles in the Reviews.

THE IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD. January, 1912.—**Rev. J. MacCaffrey, D.Ph.**, 'The Catholic Church in 1911.' **John Ayscough**, 'A Novelist's Sermon.' **The Editor**, 'State Socialism.' [Advocating a moderate amount of State intervention in the management of railways, etc.] **Rev. J. Rickaby, S.J.**, 'Utilitarianism.' **W. H. Grattan Flood**, 'The Episcopal Succession in Ardagh.' February.—**Rev. T. Dunne, C.O.**, 'Repetition of Extreme Unction and the Last Blessing.' **C. Harrison**, 'Mr. Wells' Scepticism.' [An examination of the author's philosophy as expounded in his recent work, *First and Last Things*.] **Rev. T. F. MacNamara**, 'Some Ceremonies of South Indian Hill Tribes.' **Rev. W. B. O'Dowd**, 'The "Catholicism" of St. Augustine.' [A severe criticism of the treatment of the subject in the new edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.] **Mac Eclaise**, 'A Litany of Our Lady from "Leabhar Breac."' March.—**Rev. L. Plunkett**, 'African Native Prayers.' **T. P. O'Nolan**, 'The Origin and Development of Guilds and Trades Unions.' **T. F. Willis, B.A.**, 'Faith and Reason in relation to Conversion to the Church.' **J. Ayscough**, 'A Novelist's Sermon, II.' Notes and Queries: Moral Theology (**Rev. J. M. Harty, D.D.**), Canon Law (**Rev. M. J. O'Donnell, D.D.**), Liturgy (**Rev. T. O'Doherty**). Correspondence. Documents. Notices of Books.

THE CATHOLIC WORLD. January, 1912.—**H. P. Russell**, 'The Unity of the Visible Church.' **L. March Phillips**, 'Shall the East be Re-born?' **T. J. Gerrard**, 'Marriage and George Bernard Shaw.' **W. Elliott, C.S.P.**, '"Till the Shadows Retire."' **J. A. Ryan, S.T.D.**, 'Private Ownership and Socialism.' **S. Meynell**, 'Lady Herbert of Lea.' **Hilaire Belloc**, 'The Results of the Reformation.' February.—**W. E. Campbell**, 'Sir Thomas More and his Time.' **W. P. H. Kitchin, Ph.D.**, 'A Scholar's Death.' [Dr. James O'Connell.] **H. P. Russell**, 'The Sanctity of the Church.' **A. B. Purdie**, 'Canterbury Pilgrims.' **J. Ayscough**, 'Sir Walter.' **A. J. Shipman**, 'The Trial and Death of Francisco Ferrer.' **Katherine Brégy**, 'Jeanne d'Arc.' March.—**Father Cuthbert, O.S.F.O.**, 'St. Clare of Assisi.' **W. E. Campbell**, 'Sir Thomas More and his Time.' **H. P. Russell**, 'The Catholicity of the Church.' **C. B. Walker**, 'The Revised Psalter of the Breviary.' **W. Elliott, C.S.P.**, '"Approving the Better Things."' **Hilaire Belloc**, 'The Results of the Reformation.' **Sir Bertram C. A. Windle, LL.D.**, 'Some Personal Recollections of Henry Ignatius Dudley Ryder.'

ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW. January, 1912.—**J. J. Murphy, J.C.D.**, 'The Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church.' **W. E. Anthony**, 'The Chancel and its Fittings.' **G. Metlake**, 'A Catholic Bishop's Chris-

tian Labor Catechism.' **Right Rev. A. MacDonald, D.D.**, 'Is Genesis Expurgated Myth or History?' **Dr. Celso Costantini**, 'The Liturgy in Early Christian Art. IV. Clerical Studies in Christian Art.' **A. J. Maas**, 'The Study of Religion.' February.—**Dr. Celso Costantini**, 'The Development of the Basilica Style in Church Building. Clerical Studies in Christian Art.' **J. J. Murphy, J.C.D.**, 'The Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church. II.' **W. H. Grattan Flood**, 'A Unique Swedish Hymn Book.' **G. Metlake**, 'Bishop Ketteler Inaugurating his Socio-Political Program.' **J. B. Ferreres, S.J.**, and **Austin O'Malley, M.D.**, 'De Vasectomia Duplici.' 'Clerics and Secular Tribunals.' **J. S. Gaukroger, F.G.S.E.**, 'Suggestions for Equipping and Maintaining a Company of the Catholic Boys' Brigade.' March.—**F. G. Reuss, C.S.S.R.**, 'Pio X. Pont. Max. in solemn Commemoratione Sancti Joseph. A. MDCCCXCII.' **G. Metlake**, 'The Final Appeal of Bishop Ketteler to His Flock on the Social Question.' **A. B. Meehan, D.D.**, 'Incardination and Excardination of Diocesan Clergy.' **L. J. Sehringer**, 'Stained-Glass Windows in Catholic Churches.' **F. P. Donnelly, S.J.**, 'The Tiresome Sermon.' **Dr. Celso Costantini**, 'Byzantine Art. Clerical Studies in Christian Art.' **P. J. Gannon, S.J.**, 'G. K. Chesterton as an Apologist.' **A. O'Malley, M.D.**, 'Inseminatio ad Validum Matrimonium requisita.'

LA CIENCIA TOMISTA. Marzo-Abril, 1912.—**Colunga, O.P.**, 'La concepción sobrenatural.' **Lamano y Beneite**, 'El ascetismo de D. Diego de Torres Villarroel.' **G. Menéndez-Reigada, O.P.**, 'La Alemania actual.' **D. Gato, O.P.**, 'Las Cortes y la Constitución de Cádiz.' Boletines: **J. M. G. Grain, O.P.**, 'De Apologética.' **P. Quirós, O.P.**, 'De Arqueología.' Crónicas Científico-Sociales. Revista de Revistas. Bibliografía.

THE MONTH. January, 1912.—**Rev. H. Thurston**, 'The Cardinal's Hat and its History.' **Lillian M. Leggatt**, 'The French Novel in a New Rôle.' [The return of the more recent French authors to a saner and more wholesome standard of morality.] **Rev. C. C. Martindale**, 'The "Word" of God: Pagan and Jewish Background,—II. Mythological Developments.' **The Editor**, 'Doctor Lingard.' [An appreciation of his historical method and of his growing popularity among historians.] **L. M. L.**, 'Those of his own Household; Chapter I. [A translation of René Bazin's work.] February.—**Rev. Sydney F. Smith**, 'The Life of Cardinal Newman.' **Rev. H. Thurston**, 'The Story of the "Miracle."' [Medieval versions of the story now staged at Olympia: some criticism, not all favourable, of the present version and its production.] **Rev. C. C. Martindale**, 'The "Word" of God: Pagan and Jewish Background,—III. (concluded.) March, 1912.—**Rev. H. Thurston**, 'Carnival.' [A criticism of Dr. Frazer's identification of the Carnival with the Saturnalia.] **Rev. S. F. Smith**, 'The Reviewers of Newman's "Life."' **L. M. Leggatt**, 'Those of his own Household,'—Chapters II.-IV. Miscellanea. Critical and Historical Notes. Topics of the Month. Reviews. Short Notices. Books Received.

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY BULLETIN. January, 1912.—'Letter of His Holiness Pope Pius X. to Cardinal Gibbons.' [Praising the Catholic University of Washington, and appealing for further support for it.] **Thos. J. Shahan**, 'The Divine Infant.' **George M. Sauvage**, 'Intellectualism and Pragmatism: The Problem of Knowledge.' **William Turner**, 'John the Scot.' Book Reviews. Miscellaneous. University Chronicle.

PALESTINE EXPLORATION FUND. QUARTERLY STATEMENT. January, 1912.—**Philip J. Baldensperger**, 'The Immovable East (continued).' **W. E. Jennings-Bramley**, 'The Bedouin of the Sinaitic Peninsula.' **A. W. Crawley-Boevey, M.A.**, 'The New Theory of Calvary.' [Disputes the traditional site, and holds that what is known as the Skull Hill was the real scene of the Crucifixion. The evidence adduced not of much weight nor likely to shake the traditional view.] **E. J. Pilcher**, 'The Assuan Papyri and the Grave-Goods of Gezer.' **Prof. Gustaf Dalman**, 'The Search for the Temple Treasure at Jerusalem.' **Rev. J. E. Hanauer, M.A.**, 'Damascus Notes.' Reviews.

THE EXPOSITORY TIMES. January, 1912.—'Notes of Recent Exposition.' **Rev. H. A. Watson, D.D.**, 'Spiritual Power.' **Rev. A. H. Sayce, D.D., etc.**, 'The Archaeology of the Book of Genesis.' Literature. Contributions and Comments. February.—**Dr. D. Plooij**, 'The Attitude of the Outspread Hands in Early Christian Literature and Art.' [It denotes unification with Christ, with whom the Christian shares the cross and death.] **Rev. W. Montgomery, B.D.**, 'Dr. Schweitzer on the Interpretation of St. Paul.' **Rev. J. M. F. Ross, M.A.**, 'The Ordering of the Spiritual Life.' Literature. Contributions and Comments. March.—**Rev. J. G. Tasker, D.D.**, 'Harnack on 1 Corinthians xiii.' **Dr. D. Plooij**, 'The Attitude of the Outspread Hands in Early Christian Literature and Art.' **Prof. A. H. Sayce, D.D., etc.**, 'The Archaeology of the Book of Genesis.' 'Recent Foreign Theology.' Contributions and Comments.

THE JOURNAL OF THEOLOGICAL STUDIES. January, 1912.—**Rev. O. C. Quick**, 'The Value of Mysticism.' **Rev. H. J. White**, 'John Wordsworth, Bp. of Salisbury, and his work on the Vulgate N.T.' Documents:—**Rev. A. Ramsbotham**, 'The Commentary of Origen on the Epistle to the Romans.' Notes and Studies:—**Rev. E. C. Selwin, D.D.**, 'The Feast of Tabernacles, Epiphany, and Baptism.' **Rev. W. C. Bishop**, 'The African Rite.' **Rt. Rev. F. H. Chase, D.D.**, 'On *πρηνὴς γένεσις* in Acts i. 18.' **Dr. G. Przychocki**, 'Richard Croke's Search for Patristic MSS. in connexion with the Divorce of Catherine.' [In Latin.] **V. Rev. J. A. Robinson, D.D.**, 'Origen's Comments on the Apocalypse.' **Rev. R. H. Connolly, O.S.B.**, 'The Odes of Solomon: Jewish or Christian?' [Holds, against Harnack, that the Odes are an entirely Christian work.] Reviews.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY. January, 1912.—**E. C. Moore**, 'Modern Liberalism and That of the 18th Century.' **S. W. Dike**, 'Shall Churches Increase their Efficiency by Scientific Methods?' **W. A. Brown**, 'The Place of Christ in Modern Theology.' **D. S. Schaff**, 'The Movement and Mission of American Christianity.' **Champlin Burrage**, 'The Restoration of Immersion by the English Anabaptists and Baptists (1640-1700).' Critical Notes:—**C. R. Bowen**, 'John the Baptist in the N. T.' **D. C. Macintosh**, 'Is Belief in the Historicity of Jesus Indispensable to Christian Faith?' Recent Theological Literature.

THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW. January, 1912.—**J. Gresham Mochen**, 'The Hymns of the First Chapter of Luke.' **Louis F. Benson**, 'The Development of the English Hymn.' **Henry E. Dosker**, 'The Dutch "Staten-Bybel" of 1637.' Reviews of Recent Literature.

REVUE DES SCIENCES PHILOSOPHIQUES ET THEOLOGIQUES. January, 1912.—**M. S. Gillet, O.P.**, 'Les Jugements de valeur et la Conception positive de la morale.' **A. Lemonuyser, O.P.**, 'La Culte des Dieux étrangers en Israel. Achéra.' **R. Coulon, O.P.**, 'Jacobin, Gallican et "Appelan," le P. Noël Alexandre. Contribution à l'histoire théologique et religieuse du XVIII^e siècle.' Note:—**Et. Hugueny, O.P.**, 'Gratien et la Confession.' Bulletins. Chronique. Recension des Revues.

ANNALES DE PHILOSOPHIE CHRETIENNE. December, 1911.—**Ch. Dunan**, 'La variabilité des essences.' **J. Pallard**, 'La connaissance, à la limite de sa perfection, abolit-elle la conscience?' **G. Vattier**, 'La doctrine cartésienne de l'eucharistie chez Pierre Cally.' Bibliographie, etc. Janvier, 1912.—**J. Pallard**, 'La connaissance, à la limite de sa perfection, abolit-elle la conscience?' (fin). **G. Vattier**, 'La doctrine cartésienne de l'eucharistie chez Pierre Cally.' Bibliographie, etc. Fév., 1912.—**J. Durantel**, 'La notion de la création dans S. Thomas.' **R. Macaigue**, 'L'Eglise et L'Etat.' **J. Gueville**, 'L'idéalisme cartésien.' Bibliographie, etc.

REVUE THOMISTE. Janv.-Février, 1912.—**R. P. Hugon, O.P.**, 'L'opération commune des personnes divines au dehors.' **R. P. Martin, O.P.**, 'L'objet intégral de la théologie d'après Saint Thomas d'Aquin.' **R. P. Renaudin, O.S.B.**, 'L'action de la vie religieuse dans l'Eglise.' **R. P. Cazes, O.P.**, 'La philosophie moderniste (3^e art.).' **R. P. Robert, O.P.**, 'La doctrine sociale de Saint Thomas et sa réalisation dans les faits.' Notes et Etudes Critiques. Chroniques. Revue Analytique des Revues.

REVUE D'HISTOIRE ECCLESIASTIQUE. Janvier, 1912.—**A. d'Alés**, 'Tertullien et Calliste. Le traité de Tertullien De Poenitentia.' **P. de Puniet**, 'Les paroles de la consécration et leur valeur traditionnelle.' **V. Brants**, 'L'économie politique et sociale dans les écrits de L. Lessius.' Comptes Rendus. Chronique. Bibliographie.

ARCHIVUM FRANCISCANUM HISTORICUM. Januarius, 1912.—**Venantius Maggiani**, 'De relatione scriptorum quorundam S. Bonaventurae ad Bullam "Exiit" Nicolai III. (1279).' **Ehrard Schlund**, 'Petrus Peregrinus von Maricourt. Sein Leben und seine Schriften.' Documenta. Codicographia. Bibliographia. Commentaria ex Periodicis. Miscellanea. Chronica.

REVUE BENEDICTINE. Janvier, 1912.—**D. G. Morin**, 'Un traité inédit du IV^e siècle, le De Similitudine carnis peccati de l'évêque S. Pacien de Barcelone.' **D. F. Puniet**, 'Formulaire grec de Epiphane dans une traduction latine ancienne.' **D. A. Wilmart**, 'Un manuscrit du Tractatus de faux Origène espagnol sur l'arche de Noé.' **D. W. Berlière**, 'Les évêques auxiliaires de Liège.' Notes et Documents. Comptes Rendus. Notes Bibliographiques.

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
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Who were they who "understood not"?

—Luke ii. 50.

"Did you not know that I must be about my Father's business? And they understood not the word that he spoke unto them."—Luke ii. 49, 50. Douay Version.

(For the Greek text see *infra*, p. 277).

It is the custom with commentators and homilists,¹ who are impressed by the spiritual isolation of Christ, to quote the above passage in which, according to the traditional interpretation, St. Luke declares, or is alleged to declare, that even chosen souls like Mary and Joseph failed to such an extent to enter into the mind of Christ that they did not understand the words addressed to them by the Child in the temple, the words being those quoted above, "Did you not know," etc.?

The question put by the Divine Child to His "parents" is a question in form only, and so simple, that it comes to us with something like a shock to be told that they understood it not.

It may be a damaging confession to make, that the present writer was first led to propose a different interpretation of Luke ii. 50 by another kind of shock, which was not in the least theological but only affected his partially Hellenised ears. Noting the two cases of *αὐτός* in one short sentence, he asked himself: Is there anything in the use of these pronouns by the third Synoptist to justify us in saying that the *αὐτοί* and the *αὐτοῖς* must be referred to the same persons? Later on, the question took a more aggressive form. Does not everything tend to show that the said Lukan pronouns must be referred to different persons?

¹ Cf. Peabody, *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1903.

² Lk. ii. 41, 43.

At this point arose a temptation, easily overcome, to harness the Vulgate and make it join in the running towards the exegesis advocated here. Possibly the Vulgate translator had some difficulties with the pronouns of Luke. Anyhow, he translates, using two distinct pronominal forms, "*Ipsi non intellexerunt verbum quod locutus est ad eos.*"³ It were too much to assert that the Latin forestalls the interpretation which is here suggested. It is enough to say that if the proposed reform is accepted by scholars the Latin Version may remain unchanged, the *ipsi*, strongly stressed, representing one set of persons, and the *eos*, unemphasised, another—unless indeed *illi* is substituted for *ipsi*—*illi non intellexerunt*.

THE THIRD PERSONAL PRONOUN IN LUKE.

Here it may be asked : Is there anything in the use of the third Personal Pronoun in the third Synoptist to justify the assumption that the *αὐτοί* and *αὐτοῖς* of Luke ii. 50 can be referred to the same persons? If it be so, it would be interesting to find any parallel in the LXX. or New Testament, or indeed in any Greek writer, sacred or profane.

All are agreed that the above dative of the pronoun designates the two persons directly addressed by Jesus. More. It must be confessed that so far there is almost as much unanimity about the reference to the same pair in the nominative case. But is it as well founded? It is confidently asserted by grammarians that the *αὐτοί* must refer to the persons "last mentioned," and they were the parents. Must this be? Some reasons for doubting it may now be submitted.

The study of Luke's third personal pronoun *in recto* will be best conducted with the help of Bruder's *Concordance*. The nominative singular, introduced by *καί*, will be found in Luke i. 17, 22; ii. 28; iv. 15; v. 1, 14, 17; vi. 20; viii. 1, 22, 44; ix. 51; x. 38; xvi. 24; xvii. 11, 16; xix. 2; xxii. 41; xxiii. 51; xxiv. 25, 28; and the nominative plural, also with *καί* in vi. 11; ix. 36; xviii. 34; xxii. 23.

Possibly we are now in a position, even without extending our survey to the Acts, to arrive at a fair induction regard-

³ There are no variants of the least importance in the Latin or Greek texts.

ing the force of this construction in the third Gospel. It appears then (1) that *καί* in the above connection has no illative meaning but is simply the conjunction *and*; (2) that while serving as a mere connective, its presence often conveys the idea of a transition so abrupt that the subject of the preceding sentence is left behind and a new one introduced without warning; (3) that the contention that Luke uses the pronoun in the nominative, only of persons just presented to view in his narrative, cannot be sustained, in the light of such texts as vi. 11; ix. 36; xxii. 23; (4) that his *αὐτός* and *αὐτοί* are invariably emphatic, sometimes very strongly so.

The last remark needs some expansion. The way in which Luke avoids all ambiguity in his pronouns is not by keeping the arbitrary rule invented by some grammarians, that *αὐτός* refers to the person "last mentioned," but by the much more natural and classical law of emphasis embodied in certain forms of speech. A good test that his pronouns do not hinder but help his lucidity of expression, is to read him aloud, with stress laid on what his pure Greek obliges us to stress.⁴ No obscurity will then attach to the persons he wishes to designate by his pronouns. On this principle, it is somewhat irrelevant to argue that the parents of Jesus being conspicuous in the pericope immediately preceding Luke ii. 50, the *αὐτοί* must be referred to them. Indeed, the argument may be made to cut the other way. If so conspicuous in the context, why should Mary and Joseph be still further particularised by the *αὐτοί*, especially when the classical reserve and reverent temperament of the Evangelist would prompt him to touch lightly on their ignorance of a saying which must have been absolutely clear to himself, as he wrote, and indeed to all his readers who were acquainted with the mystery of the Paternity of the Child? The parents, as all allow, are in evidence, but the habitual delicacy of the Synoptist might be expected to shrink from giving prominence to a lack of spiritual discernment, which

⁴ The same method of reading aloud may be tried with the perplexing pronouns in Jn. xix. 35, *αὐτοῦ . . . κάκεινος*. The latter probably refers to Christ Himself. So Zahn, Peake and Sanday. If so, this new exegesis may be called a great discovery of modern critics of the Fourth Gospel.

⁵ Cf. Lk. ii. 19, 51, and the beautiful homily of S. Bede, *Brev. Rom.*, Dominica I. post Epiphaniam. This point will be developed *infra*.

in the Mother who had been pondering these things for more than twelve years, in her heart,' would appear almost inconceivable. If the parents were in the foreground of the writer's mind, he would probably have gone on to say, without setting their ignorance in bold relief, ἀλλ' οὐ συνῆκαν τὸ ῥῆμα ὃ ἐλάλησεν αὐτοῖς. An αὐτοί thus emphatically introduced here would seem so pointed and harsh as to be almost an impertinence. Nowhere does Luke speak of the parents of the Child except in a reverent way as οἱ γονεῖς,⁴ and when their presence in the narrative is manifest, his verbs run on smoothly without any explicit pronoun at all, as ἐπορεύοντο, ii. 41; ἤλθον, ii. 44; ἀνεζήτουν (*ibid.*), ἐξεπλάγγρισαν, ii. 48. The soundness of the generalisation can hardly be questioned—Luke omits the pronoun whenever the noun calls for no special emphasis. On the supposition that the parents were ignorant of the meaning of the word of the Child Jesus, this condition is fulfilled in a marked way. The parents could hardly be more prominent. Why then the αὐτοί if it is to be equated with οἱ γονεῖς? It looks as if it was to be referred to others present who knew not what Mary and Joseph knew.

The need of referring the *oblique* cases of the pronoun to the parents is not denied here, but affirmed throughout. On this point the evidence of Luke in ii. 42, 49, 50, 51 is conclusive, but nowhere, when he is *ex professo* treating of the parents, does he use the *nominative*, αὐτοί, of them, except in this one verse, ii. 50, as interpreted on the old lines. But why here if nowhere else? Grammatically it is less needed here than anywhere else, and exegetically it can scarcely be divested of the *souçon* of a slur on the intelligence of the two addressed by the Child Jesus.

Again, if the unemphatic αὐτοῖς, following close on the emphatic αὐτοί, is unquestionably to be referred to Mary and Joseph, it is hard to see what purpose is served by the latter form, understood according to the traditional view. Without it, the phrase would run quite naturally οὐ συνῆκαν, "they [unemphatic] understood not." On the other hand, if αὐτοί represents the parents, it could surely carry on its representative force through a line without the aid of αὐτοῖς, the more so as Luke has made this latter form wholly unnecessary in ii. 50, because in ii. 49 he has used πρὸς αὐτούς of the

⁴ Lk. ii. 41, 43.

parents. If they did not understand the spoken word of Jesus, why add that it was spoken to them (αὐτοῖς)? Of course it was, and could not, of its nature, be spoken to the strangers present.

The argument comes to this. If the pronoun both *in recto* and *in obliquo* is meant to point out the parents, the nominative is not only disparaging to them in its emphasis and grammatically redundant, but the dative is a feeble and trailing appendage. On the assumption that it was the parents and not the bystanders who were ignorant, Luke might have written in one or other of these ways—

(1) οὐ συνῆκαν τὸ ῥῆμα ὃ ἐλάλησεν αὐτοῖς,—or

(2) αὐτοὶ οὐ συνῆκαν τὸ ῥῆμα ὃ ἐλάλησεν.

It may be left to the scholarly reader to decide whether the conflation of these two sentences by the dual pronoun, which the traditional interpretation insists on referring to the parents, is like the Greek of Luke or is sound Greek at all.

If Luke's use of the pronouns is classical—and it were rash to deny it⁷—his αὐτοὶ and αὐτοῖς are best referred to distinct persons.

In this connexion the authority of Thucydides may prove helpful to our hypothesis. According to this historian, the Platæans before the formal opening of the Peloponnesian war would seem to have entered into a solemn engagement with Thebes to spare the lives of the Theban prisoners shut up in Plataea. The pledge was broken, and the prisoners to the number of 180 were put to death. Fearing something of the sort, but not knowing that the deed was done, the Athenians sent a messenger with instructions to the Platæans not to take further action with regard to the prisoners until *they* (the Athenians) had taken counsel about *them* (the prisoners)—πρὶν ἂν τι καὶ αὐτοὶ βουλευσώσι περὶ αὐτῶν.⁸ The parallelism between the αὐτοὶ . . . αὐτῶν of Thucydides and the αὐτοὶ . . . αὐτοῖς of Luke is not only striking, but serves to bring out what is undoubtedly the ordinary classical construction with αὐτός *in recto* and *in obliquo*. That is to say, the different *cases* of this pronoun refer to different *persons* in the narrative.

⁷ See *infra*.

⁸ Thuc. ii. 6. Cf. *ibid.* v. 22; v. 54; vii. 44. For these references the writer has to thank Father Donovan, S.J., M.A., formerly Professor of Greek at Stonyhurst College.

It is a nice point in Greek composition, but it raises what looks at first sight like a serious objection to the hypothesis advocated here. The different persons required by the present argument are pronounced by the great body of Greek scholars to be the same and not different. It is difficult to confront such a vast array of scholarship without appearing presumptuous. Yet it must be remembered that even in the rare moments of unanimity, scholars may make a slip and fail to reach the heights of inerrancy. Very often the unanimous scholars are right, but sometimes they are wrong. Experts in textual criticism are now fairly agreed that the reading in John iv. 35 is τετράμηνος and not τετράμηνον. The conclusion can hardly be disputed.⁹ An equally compact body of exegetes now comes on the scene to declare that τετράμηνος = τετράμηνον = *four months*. Most probably, to judge from the immense number of instances of such compounds in Greek literature, ancient and modern, sacred and profane, this confident assertion is wrong, and the form with—ος means *four-monthed*, or *four months' old* and not *four months*.¹⁰ To turn to Luke. In his 13th chapter the Evangelist is relating what befell when Jesus was moving south to make His last effort to win the Jews of Jerusalem. He was about two days' journey from the capital, when He remarked that He was near His destination and on "the third day" would reach it—just in time for the feast of Dedication.¹¹ The Lukan Greek is simplicity itself—τελειοῦμαι (Luke xiii. 32), that is, "I stop" or "I halt" or "I end."¹² But the language was too transparent for the Greek scholars, known as the English Revisers and American Committee, so they proceeded to turn it into a sphinx-like utterance. They had before them the "consummor" of the Vulgate, but far from being warned off by this unhappy verb, they committed themselves finally to the grotesque and impossible rendering, "I am perfected!"¹³

⁹ Here, if anywhere, the Canon of Bengel holds—"Proclivi lectioni præstat ardua."

¹⁰ The subject cannot be pursued here. The author has treated it fully in *The Dublin Review*, April, 1890.

¹¹ Jn. x. 22.

¹² Cf. the writer's *Anglo-Jewish Calendar for Every Day in the Gospels*, p. 81.

¹³ With characteristic modesty the American Committee suggested that the translation, "I end my course," should appear in the margin of the R.V. The valuable suggestion was rejected. But what does ending His "course" mean? It certainly did not end at this point.

Thus we have the Authorised Version and the Revised Version and the Vulgate and the Douay and the immense force of erudition represented by these authorities, concurring in a "translation" which is no translation of one of the easiest of Greek verbs. It is just within the bounds of possibility that the critics have blundered, and unanimously blundered, over the more elusive *nuances* of the pronouns of Luke ii. 50. The eminent scholar, Scrivener, for a time stood almost alone in his declaration that the reading "Judea" in Luke iv. 44 was "an intrinsic impossibility," and this in the face of the overwhelming mass of MS. authority against him; yet he was most probably right in reading with the Vulgate, "the synagogues of *Galilee*," and the hosts of his opponents most probably wrong."

THE SO-CALLED REFLEXIVE PRONOUN IN LUKE II. 50.

The negative contention that αὐτοί . . . αὐτοῖς cannot refer to the same persons will be strengthened by a brief inquiry into the oft-repeated statement of the compilers of Greek grammars, that αὐτός is a kind of reflexive pronoun doing duty for the "missing" nominative of ἐαυτοῦ. Strictly speaking, there is no such form in language as a "reflexive nominative." If it is "missing" in Greek, it is only because it never had or could have a rational *locus standi*. It is the same in our own tongue. Through no defect in English, but through a logical and philological necessity, there is no nominative corresponding to the dative *himself*. When an Irish peasant-wife says, "*Himself* will be glad to see you," she pays a tribute to her husband, but she also takes a very

²⁴ On their critical principles Westcott and Hort had no choice but to strike "Galilee" out. The A.V. and R.V. wisely retain it though the latter gives a place to "Judæa" in the margin. It is quite possible that both "Judea" and "Galilee" are interpolations, though the first is historically false and the latter historically true. Perhaps the chapter in Luke should end thus—"And he was preaching in their (ταῖς) synagogues." There are so many elementary problems left unsolved, both in O.T. and N.T. science, that it is probably as true to say of the latter that it is only in its stumbling youth as to say of the former that it is in its tumbling infancy. Who has ever "reconciled" "a third hour," not "the third hour" (Mk. xv. 25), with the chronotaxis of the other accounts, and who has yet counted the instances of the *Tetragrammaton* in the Fourth Gospel? See especially Jn. xviii. 5, 6, 8.

pardonable liberty with language, like Tennyson when he writes—

Himself would tilt it out among the lads.¹⁵

The uneasy suspicion that something wrong is being done is evidenced by the almost universal practice of inserting "he" before "himself," as when we say, "He himself was to blame."

Introducing the particle "self" we fancy we are giving the nominative a reflexive turn of which it is incapable, whereas we are only engaged in imparting stress, as though we should say, "'Tis *he* that said it" (αὐτὸς ἔφη) or "It is *He* that hath made us" (Ipse fecit nos)¹⁶ or "Shout *you*"¹⁷ (αὐτὸς σὺ ἀναβόησον).

It is the same with the αὐτοί of Luke ii. 50. The pronoun is *per se* incapable of a reflexive connotation, but by slipping in "selves," the supporters of the traditional interpretation can turn on their adversary and say triumphantly, "The first word in the verse has a 'selves' in it, and 'selves' can only mean the parents of the Child." Thus it happens that the grammar-ridden conscience that translates "they *themselves* understood not," at once begs the question at issue and tries to introduce the reflexive element into the purely emphatic pronoun of the Greek text.

Perhaps the best way of estimating the real force of this pronoun in the nominative, will be to give a passage from the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, where αὐτός occurs thrice. The Disciple of Socrates, accompanied by a companion, spies the Master hanging in mid-air in a kind of basket-aeroplane.

ΣΤΡΕΨ. φέρε τίς γὰρ οὗτος ὀπί¹⁸ τῆς κρεμάθρας ἀνὴρ;

ΜΑΘ. αὐτός.

ΣΤΡΕΨ. τίς αὐτός;

ΜΑΘ. Σωκράτης.

ΣΤΡΕΨ. ὦ Σωκράτης.

Ἰθ' οὗτος ἀναβόησον αὐτόν μοι μέγα.

ΜΑΘ. αὐτὸς μὲν οὖν σὺ κάλεσον, οὐ γὰρ μοι σχολή.

ΣΤΡΕΨ. ὦ Σωκράτης, ὦ Σωκρατίδιον.¹⁹

¹⁵ *Princess*. The same construction appears in the A.V. and Douay.

¹⁶ Ps. xcix. 3 (Vulg.). Cf. A.V. and R.V.

¹⁷ i.e., "I won't."

¹⁸ i.e., ὀπί.

¹⁹ Aristoph. *Nub.* 218. Ed. Weise, Leipzig, 1873.

The rapturous cry of the Disciple at the sight of the Master, is αὐτός, which is best rendered by "*He! He!*"²⁰ "Who's *he?*" asks the cynical friend. The passage halts badly if, with Professor Sonnenschein, we translate the joyful ejaculation by "*he himself.*"²¹

The purport of this section of our inquiry is clear. Much depends on this masked word "*selves.*" In Luke ii. 50 "*they themselves*" would certainly refer to Mary and Joseph. "*They*" with strong emphasis need not refer to them at all, but to other listeners. Before taking leave of the emphatic pronoun in Luke ii. 50, we may recur for a moment to a grammatico-aural argument if it can be called so, and ask, if the αὐτοί be applied to the parents of Jesus, would not Luke have written αὐτοί δέ and not καὶ αὐτοί ?

THE WORD THAT WAS "NOT UNDERSTANDED."

The pronouns of Luke ii. 50 may now make their exit to give place to the predicate, οὐ συνήκαν. The attempt will now be made to show that the verb with the negative particle cannot be taken as descriptive of the non-understanding of the Blessed Virgin Mary and her husband. If this can be shown, the conclusion, of course, will follow that the subject of the sentence, αὐτοί, cannot be referred to the parents but to others who may be truly said not to have understood.

To the question, Who were they who understood not ? the answer has been returned with unfaltering voice by the vast majority of Christian and non-Christian commentators who have dealt with the text from the early ages to our own day—Mary and Joseph were the two of whom it is written, "*They understood not the saying.*"

What was it then that they are said to have failed to understand ? Nothing more enigmatic than that the Divine Boy of twelve had by an affirmation couched in an interrogative form, reminded them that they ought to have known He was engaged in His Father's business, or if we adopt the rendering of the Revised Version, that they ought to have known that the likeliest place to find Him in, was His Father's house. If Mary of the contemplative heart,

²⁰ Unhappily, the printers of Greek will not allow us to use the note of exclamation. It would make all the difference. See *infra*.

²¹ *Greek Grammar*, p. 44.

years after the Incarnation of the Son of God in her womb, failed to understand this allusion of her Son to His one Father in heaven, it is hard to see how she could have understood the meaning of the message of Gabriel, or could have questioned the angel about the preservation of her virginity, or could have given a supremely deliberate assent to his proposal, by the words, "Behold the handmaid of the Lord; be it done to me according to thy word."²² The word, spoken in the lowly room of Nazareth, was, to say the least, not less obscure than the word of the Child in the temple of Jerusalem, yet the Virgin, "above all virgins blest,"²³ was fully alive to the import of the speech of the angelic envoy when he assured her that not by the intervention of man, but by the overshadowing of the Power of the Most High, was she to become the true earthly Mother of the all-holy Son of God. As enlightened in the mental, as she was stainless in the moral order,²⁴ she grasped the situation, and yielded unquestioning obedience to the communicated will of the heavenly Father. If Mary, the Jewish maid, standing in the temple in presence of her new-found Child, knew what the Father's "business" or "the House of God"²⁵ meant, Mary, the Mother of God made Flesh, knew better than all men and women of all time, the significance of the phrase, "about my Father's business" or "at my Father's"²⁶ on the lips of Jesus Christ. If she knew anything of the secrets of God, she knew the difference between *ὁ πατήρ σου* (Luke ii. 48) and *τοῦ πατρὸς μου* (Luke ii. 49). It is well nigh impossible to show, considering Mary's antecedents, that the saying which may have been dark indeed to the bystanders was anything but lightsome to her. If it was, we are within measurable distance of the conclusion that the Mother of the Incarnate God had lapsed from the high degree of spiritual intelligence which had marked her every word in the interview with Gabriel; in other words, that the Mary of the second chapter of her best biographer, is not the Mary of

²² Douay. Here the Vulgate and Douay have the advantage over the A.V. and R.V., both of which miss the meaning of *γένοιτο*.

²³ Wordsworth.

²⁴ "Our tainted nature's solitary boast." Wordsworth.

²⁵ Lk. vi. 4. It was a very common appellation. Cf. Edersheim, *The Temple and Its Services*.

²⁶ i.e., "at my Father's house." See *infra*.

his first. To her, as to all created intelligences, the Paternity of her Child must ever have been a mystery, but as far as any advance to the Divine Inaccessible is permitted to man, the mind and heart of the most highly favoured of women might be expected to be foremost in the keen and devout apprehension of the tremendous fact that the Word of the Father was made Flesh in the tabernacle of her body. *Quoad Mariam* as well as *quoad nos*, the Incarnation must be in its fulness, impenetrable and unfathomable, yet even we, as believing Christians, would take it amiss, if it were said of us that we "understood not" a statement that made no greater demand on our faith-enlightened minds than is involved in the mention of the true Father of Jesus and His interests or the House where He dwelt in Zion.

Of those who heard, without hearing, the mysterious prophecies of the incredible Passion to come, Luke writes : "They understood none of these things."²⁷ Is Mary to be likened to such hearers of the word, when even we can justly claim to be above this plane of unfaith and unintelligence ?

In this connection there is so remarkable a phenomenon in the history of Catholic exegesis that it deserves more than a passing notice. From some of the earliest Fathers down to the newest text-books adopted in Catholic Seminaries, there is perceptible a strain of apprehension lest the text under consideration should be taken to imply a kind of menace to the Catholic belief in the spiritual insight of the Virgin-Mother. It is not difficult to put ourselves in the somewhat uneasy position of these commentators and to view the verse as a possible weapon in the hands of men unversed in the theological and devotional literature of the Catholic Church. A simple statement of the Child of Mary is recorded in the verse so often quoted. The Catholic writer refuses to admit that it is a particularly hard saying to him, but he reluctantly owns that the third Synoptist does imply that it proved such a difficulty to the Mother, that when, presumably on her authority, he set down the incident in writing (Luke 49, 50), he was justified in adding that *she* "understood not" the word. To the Catholic theologian the doctrinal fact is clear—Mary knew all that he knows

²⁷ Lk. xviii. 34. It is to be noted that in this verse, as in Lk. ii. 50, the verb is the same, *οὐκ ᾔδειν*. See *infra*.

and a great deal more. How then did her understanding fail to reach the not exalted height of the simple saying? There was nothing obscure in it, and there was nothing obtuse in her. It is possible, we may add parenthetically, that Luke has said no such thing, but for the sake of argument, we assume that he has. At this juncture the procedure of the Catholic interpreter seems more worthy of note than of commendation. He begins by laying down a major premiss which, in its multifarious forms, is reducible to the following—

It is nothing derogatory to the Blessed Virgin and St. Joseph to say that they did not *comprehend in all its fulness* the exact signification of the words of the Divine Child. A full grasp of all the content, the extension and the intension of the stupendous mystery of the Incarnation is not within the compass of any created spirit, angelic or human. Only the Divine Mind as exercised on the Blessed Trinity can adequately understand the relationship between Father, Son and Holy Ghost, and can return an all-embracing answer to the question touching the Word made Flesh—Whose Son is He?

The minor premiss runs thus—Now, this is all that St. Luke means when he writes, οὐ συνήκαν, *non intellexerunt*, that is, the Mother and the Foster-father of Jesus necessarily fell short of the full *comprehension* of the sublime truth involved in the saying of Jesus.

The conclusion follows easily—Therefore the words of the Evangelist imply nothing derogatory to the divinely illumined minds of the Blessed Virgin and St. Joseph.

In presence of this laboured and unconvincing syllogism, one is tempted to ask: How comes it that when the mystery revealed to Mary and Joseph was at its most towering altitude at or near the Conception of Jesus, it is not written of them, "they understood not"? When did it begin to crush their spiritual capacity and to justify an expression disparaging to all believers, but indefinitely more harsh and repugnant when applied to a couple beloved of God and assenting with all their hearts to His very first revelation of the Incarnation of His Son?

On subjecting the syllogism to closer analysis, it will be found necessary (1) to dismiss the major premiss as a harmless and high-sounding platitude, (2) to meet the minor with

a frank denial. It is not true to say that a Greek writer who pens the word, *συνίημι*, means that he has a full "comprehension" of the proposition assented to, or that the negative prefixed to the verb does nothing more than deny the possession of abounding and exhaustive knowledge.

This very ordinary verb has the very ordinary meaning of apprehending a truth *humano more*. According to the explanation, the validity of which we venture to dispute, no man could say of the proposition, "God is the Creator of all things," *συνίημι*, "I understand"; and no Greek of the Photian schism could say of the *Filioque* of the Nicene Creed, *οὐ συνίημι*, "I do not understand." They understood it quite well enough to reject it. There is no law of language, logic or ethic, to compel us to hold our peace, or to withhold our declaration that we do or do not understand, until the full intension both of subject and predicate is thoroughly grasped. To refuse assent to any high philosophical or religious formula, until such an impossible condition is realised, is to fall to the depths of scepticism or pedantry and to set about the destruction of language as the medium of human thought.

The above remarks may serve as an introduction to the examination of some instances of the use and signification of *συνίημι* in Greek authors, sacred and profane. More extended researches in the same field would only enforce the conclusion that the verb possesses no such recondite meaning as "full comprehension" of the terms of a proposition.

Homer applies the word to a simple statement just heard—*ὃ δὲ ξυνέηκε*.²⁸ Herodotus and Thucydides use it of understanding foreign speech,²⁹ Xenophon of understanding an interpreter and the science of navigation.³⁰ In Plato's Dialogues, Socrates, after discoursing in a highly metaphysical strain on *τὸ μὴ ὂν* asks his hearer, *συνίης τι*; and Theætetus answers "Yes" (*ναί*), yet far from pretending that he has mastered the abstruse teaching on non-being, he adds with charming modesty, *ξυνέπομαι πως*.³¹

Turning to the New Testament we find the verb used freely without any connotation of deep insight or "full comprehension." See for instance Mt. xiii. 13, 14, 15, 19, 23,

²⁸ Il. xv. 442.

²⁹ Hdt. iv. 114; Thuc. i. 3.

³⁰ Xen. Anab. vii. 6, 8; Cyr. i. 6, 2; Hell. i. 6, 4.

³¹ Plato, *Op. om.* vol. viii., p. 137. Ed. Stallbaum, 1839.

51. In Mt. xv. 10, Jesus, who makes no impossible demand on the intelligence of His hearers, says συνίετε. In Mt. xvi. 12, the disciples understood (συνήκαν) the metaphorical meaning of leaven, and in Mt. xvii. 13, they understood (συνήκαν) the reference of the Lord to the Baptist. In Mt. xiii. 51, the Master asks, συνήκατε ταῦτα πάντα; λέγουσιν αὐτῷ· ναι. Instead of "Yes," they should have answered "No, we understand none of these things," if the meaning of the simple question put to them was, "Do ye *comprehend* the full meaning of all these parables?" The commentators referred to would apparently have obliged them to say οὐ and not ναι. Had they taken this advice, they would either have answered falsely, or proclaimed themselves wanting in the elements of human intelligence.

On the hypothesis of the profundity of thought in συνίημι, the use of this verb in Luke is equally inexplicable. He uses it eight times, and always in the ordinary sense of "understand." Sometimes the disciples did not understand at all—again in the ordinary sense—and Luke writes οὐδὲν συνήκαν.³³ Special attention may be directed to the same author in Acts vii. 25—οἱ δὲ οὐ συνήκαν, where there is no question of stretching to a far-off truth nor of subtle interpretation of a symbol or an analogy, but only of understanding a few incidents that lay on the surface and that Moses thought intelligible to the plain man or average thinker. In a word, the Scriptural use of συνίημι is identical with the classical, and Luke is much simpler than the above interpreters are prepared to admit. The verb he uses in ii. 50 has no more to do with keenness of perception or "fulness of comprehension" than the word ῥήμα,³⁴ which he employs no fewer than thirty-three times, has to do with oracular utterance, or ἐλάλησεν³⁵ with rhetorical delivery.

The position of the countless number of Catholic commentators is as easy to define as it is deserving of sympathy. They are engaged in a sort of apologia for Mary, Mother of God. They have the right idea about her intelligence, but they have also a lurking fear that Luke may possibly be construed as in favour of her unintelligence. Hence they force him to say the right thing, when he has

³³ Lk. xviii. 34, quoted *supra*.

³⁴ Lk. *ibid*.

³⁵ Lk. *ibid*.

already said it in a way of which they are unaware. To clear Mary of an imaginary charge of ignorance, they do violence to the best interpreter of Mary's spirit. Longing to pay a tribute to Mary, and finding the οὐ συνῆκαν lying like a rock of offence on their road, they try to remove it, not by an *apparatus criticus* but by the *tormentum bellicum* of a long and fallacious syllogism. They neglect the warning of Aristotle³⁵ against violent action and incur the censure of the modern student of the sacred text. There is nothing wrong with Mary's penetration, yet they fancy that her non-understanding may prove a stone of stumbling to the unfriendly Protestant. So it has. But did *she* fail to understand? That is the question. Besides her there were others present at the scene, whose eyes were holden and hearts unenlightened, of whom it could be most truly written, "*They understood not*"—and it is just in this direction, whither the αὐτοί and οὐ συνῆκαν of Luke point, that the timid commentators we venture to criticise, refuse to look.³⁶ Perhaps it was Mary's own eyes that marked the bewildered look on the faces of the doctors who were not in her secret, and perhaps it was Mary's lips that reported the fact to the historian of the Infancy and Childhood of her Son.³⁷

At the present stage of New Testament criticism, there is happily no need to dwell on the Marian character of the third Gospel.³⁸ Her influence is diffused like a fragrance over every page of its early chapters, her hand is seen in every line of the story of the Incarnation and Birth of the Saviour.³⁹ The literary skill of "the great artist and con-

³⁵ ἡ βία παρὰ φύσιν. *Eth. Nic.*

³⁶ Toletus and a Lapide refer to the exegesis defended here. Both reject it summarily. Maldonatus and Jansenius are opposed to it, but Cajetan is friendly. The author is indebted to Dr. MacRory for several references.

³⁷ This thought will be developed *infra*.

³⁸ Almost at random we may take three Protestant scholars in England, Ireland and Scotland.—See the late Bishop Westcott (Durham), on γόνα in Jn. ii. 4; the late Bishop Alexander (Derry), *Leading Ideas in the Gospels*; Sir William Ramsay (Aberdeen), *Was Christ Born in Bethlehem?*

³⁹ Cf. Lk. ii. 7, 16, 19; iii. 48, 51. "The Word was made Flesh" is probably more feminine than Johannine. Mary's hand is distinctly visible in the motherly ἐψηλάφησαν of 1 Jn. i. 1.

summate historian "is enhanced by the womanly spirit" which breathes through his unrivalled record of the favour of God poured forth on a woman and flowing over all flesh. Like so many physicians of all times, Luke was a man of high culture, a hard worker and a rapid writer.³ Above all the authors of the New Testament writings, he is classical, refined and reserved, but more than his grace of style is the intensely feminine tone of his narrative. He does not know what it is to crush the bruised reed or quench the smoking flax. He shrinks as naturally from sensational scenes as from flamboyant descriptions or unmeasured denunciation. He can never play the Boanerges. Who would have imagined that the life of Paul, as recorded in the Acts, concealed under its even and stately flow the stormy incidents, the unexampled labours and the unendurable sufferings which come to light in the impassioned narrative of the Apostle himself,⁴ or that the frenzied mob described with dignified calm by the Synoptist is identical with the men hit off by the Pauline

³ Wright, *Some N.T. Problems*, p. 25. Similar praise is bestowed on Luke by Newman, Renan, Farrer, Snell, *Gain or Loss?* p. 74; Blass, *Philol. Gospels*, p. 7; Schaff, *Companion to Gr. Test.* p. 55; Estlin Carpenter, *First Three Gospels*, p. 335.

⁴ The very antithesis to the Lukan spirit is found in Alford on Lk. viii. 44, who is betrayed into some foolish and unfeeling remarks on the woman with the issue of blood. Perhaps the best antidote to this form of coarseness will be found in Lecky, *Hist. Europ. Morals*, II., pp. 300, 389, 392, and *Rationalism*, c. III., which contains the magnificent panegyric on the Ideal Woman, Mary. There is a disgusting reproduction of the anti-Marian Talmudic stories in the *Encyc. Biblica*. A good deodoriser will be found in Randolph, *The Virgin Birth of our Lord*; the late Bishop Ellicott in *The Expository Times*, 1903; and especially a writer in the *Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1904.

⁵ How he worked under Paul may be gathered from Acts xxviii. 30, sq.

⁶ The parenthesis and frequent repetitions in the Acts are indications of rapid and unrevised writing. Cf. Acts ii. 42, 44, 46; iv. 32; vii. 58 sq.; viii. 10 sq.; xii. 12, 25; xx. 9; and especially xviii. 2, 3. These references could be multiplied.

⁷ Jerome *De Vir. Illust.* gives miserably faint praise to Luke, whom he credits with being "Græci sermonis haud ignarus"! The ascetical Bede frowns on the Synoptist as a stylist. "Sermo ejus tam in Evangelio quam in Actibus comptior est et secularium redolet eloquentiam"; *Ad Accam*, Migne, P.L. vol. XCII., p. 938. Bruce, *Synopt. Gosp.*, p. 50, is still more incapable of appreciating his style.

⁸ 2 Cor. ii.

snap, referring to their howling, "Beasts at Ephesus"? "The mastery of Greek language and rhythm by the Hellenist Luke is not enough to account for the essential sweetness of his style. Some of his richest undertones are those of a woman's heart and a woman's speech. The Woman "of whom we know nothing except her gentleness and her sorrow" not only placed at his disposal much that she, and only she, knew of her Child, but infused into him her subdued pathos and touched his page with the tender glow of universal compassion.

Can this be the woman of whom Luke writes that she "understood not"? For, it must be repeated, the Lukan verb means simple understanding and not profound "comprehension." If on this occasion she failed to understand her Son, what, we may ask, did she know about Him? One thing at least she knew,—that others inside and outside His Father's House understood Him not.

Before proceeding to inquire into the words probably employed by Mary as narrator of the incident, in conversation with Luke as her scribe, it will be well to submit a proposed new translation embracing the three crucial verses bearing on the saying which some persons present in the temple failed to understand.

PROPOSED NEW TRANSLATION OF LUKE II. 48, 49, 50.

τέκνον, τί ἐποίησας ἡμῖν οὕτως; ἰδοῦ ὁ πατήρ σου καὶ γὰρ ὀδυνώμενοι ζητοῦμέν σε.	Son, why hast thou done to us so? Behold, thy father and I sorrowing have been seeking thee.
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καὶ εἶπε πρὸς αὐτοὺς, τί, ὅτι ζητεῖτέ με; οὐκ ᾔδειτε ὅτι ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς μου δεῖ εἶναί με;	And he said unto them: What! 'Seeking' me? Did ye not know that at my Father's must I be?
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καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ συνῆκαν τὸ ῥῆμα ὃ ἐλάλησεν αὐτοῖς.	And THEY understood not the word which he had spoken unto them.
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⁴⁶ With Acts xix. contrast 1 Cor., xv. 32.

⁴⁷ Lecky, *Hist. Rationalism*, I. 213; 4th ed. Of course, there is exaggeration in the phrase. More than this is known of her.

The typographical changes introduced here are not of a revolutionary kind. They are made up of inverted commas, a note of exclamation, and small capitals. The pity is, it seems to us, that the Greek text, by some unwritten law, has to go without these little devices, especially the inverted commas, which often tell the eye, as swiftly as the ventriloquist tells the ear, that a new speaker has made his entrance.

"Modern typographical devices might with advantage be employed largely in editing classical, especially Greek, books."⁴

We may now consider—

A. SOME PARTICLES IN THE NEW TRANSLATION.

B. "AT MY FATHER'S."

C. TENSE-TRANSLATION FROM THE GREEK—ζητοῦμεν, ἤδειτε, ἐλάλησεν, Luke ii. 48, 49, 50.

A. THE PARTICLES *τί* and *ὅτι*.

"Quid est *quod* me quærebatis?" Vulg. (Luke ii. 49).

"How is it *that* you sought me?" Douay. (*ibid.*).

"How is it *that* ye sought me?" A.V. and R.V. (*ibid.*).

All these three translators have adhered tenaciously to the *ὅτι* which disappears in the new translation. It is this *ὅτι* (which the Vulgate never loses sight of, rendering it sometimes by *quod* and sometimes by *quia*), which has determined for the above three renderings the meaning of *τί*. The translators naturally could not bring themselves to write "What, that?" so they are driven to the paraphrase "How is it that?"

To show how this *that* may weaken and even seriously impair a translation, it is enough to cite the following—
καὶ ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς ὅτι κύριός ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ σαββάτου.
Luke vi. 5.

"Et dicebat illis: *Quia* dominus est Filius hominis etiam Sabbati." Vulg. (*ibid.*).

"And he said unto them, *That* the Son of Man is Lord also of the Sabbath." A.V. (*ibid.*).

⁴ *The Academy*, 3 June, 1905, p. 586.

Omit the $\delta\tau$, and the improvement is palpable—

"And he said to them: The Son of Man is Lord also of the Sabbath." Douay (*ibid.*).

"And he said unto them, The Son of Man is Lord of the Sabbath." R.V. (*ibid.*).

The same experiment may be tried, with exactly the same results, with the speeches in Xenophon, *passim*, where the $\delta\tau$ must be dropped if the English idiom is to be consulted at all. It is the height of pedantry and a mournful example of sham admiration of the classics, to imagine that every Greek construction must leave all modern phraseology far behind. The marked superiority of both French and English in disjointed colloquialism, spirited repartee or dramatic exclamation is evidenced by the feeble alternative offered to the Greek writer who would fain depict a *tableau* or report an animated conversation, but is hampered by the sedate genius of his well-jointed and shapely speech. It is pretty clear that the Son of Mary rallies His Mother gently on her use of the word "seeking" by repeating it in His answer. The $\delta\tau$ here is a poor substitute for inverted commas, and is, in all cases where brisk interchange of words is wanted, no better than a linguistic deadweight. It took a long time for translators to see this; and one of the many advantages of the Revised over the Authorised Version is, that the Revisers have recognised the necessity of treating the clumsy $\delta\tau$ as it deserves in a good English version.

Taking the $\tau\acute{\iota}$, $\delta\tau$ ¹⁹ in combination, it is difficult to accept "How is it that?" as a correct rendering. The meaning of "What?" is much more radical to $\tau\acute{\iota}$ than "Why?"²⁰ It is unlikely that the Child would have remonstrated with the parents for instituting a search for Him, or would have rebuked them for the discharge of a plain duty. He had no quarrel with the action of His Mother in seeking Him. All He did was to take up her long-drawn word, "seeking," and show it was not entirely appropriate. For three weary days, the woful query, with the stifled sob of the Mother of Sorrows, had been, "Where is He?" "Who has taken Him in?" "Where is He now, and what doing?" With the

¹⁹ The comma is necessary.

²⁰ See Liddell and Scott. The $\tau\acute{\iota}$ is necessarily "Why?" in Lk. ii. 49.

keen vision of faith she knew that though lost to her, He was not lost to His Father. This source of comfort, such as it was, was ever deep in her heart, but it needed to be brought out into the full light of her consciousness. Not until they saw the Child, through their mist of tears, and heard the word that gently upbraided them for their dejection, did His parents derive all the consolation that was derivable from their latent knowledge that, while parted from them, He was safe somewhere near His Father,⁵¹ or "at His Father's," engaged on His Father's work. That consolation, hitherto obscured by the cloud of temporary bereavement, was now to be shown in all its lustre by the answer of their Child. He would remind them that the conviction that He was with His Father might have been used more effectively to soften the blow and lift the weight of their anguish. Bending on them, a look wherein all shadow of reproachfulness was chased by the beaming smile that accompanied it, the Child asked, with the cheery *τί*, "What was all this grief about? Did they not know the while, as of course they did,"⁵² that He was in safe keeping while they proceeded with their heart-breaking search? It was, indeed, a "seeking" in one sense, but it was not the "seeking" of tearful parents who had not a notion where their beloved was, or who had taken him in charge and given him a shelter in loving arms.

"You call this, 'seeking'!" said the Child, "but we only seek for that which is lost, and you knew I was not really lost." If such a word as "criticism" is to be allowed at all in this connection, surely the criticism of the Child bore not on the search, but on the language of the Mother.

B. "AT MY FATHERS."⁵³

It must be a satisfaction to the few survivors of the Revision of 1881 to know that their banishment of "my Father's business" from the text to the margin has been endorsed and justified by the late Dr. Frederick Field, with a phenomenal wealth of illustration.⁵⁴ Still it is regrettable that the marginal note, sanctioned by the American

⁵¹ Not necessarily in the *temple*.

⁵² The *οὐκ*, of course, requires the answer "Yes."

⁵³ The translation suggested here. See p. 277, *supra*.

⁵⁴ *Notes on Trans. N.T.*

Committee, should contain these words—"Gr. *in the things of my Father*." If the Greek really says this, by what law of translation is the original to be tampered with by the gratuitous introduction of "house?"⁵⁵ Field has made it clear that "business" and still more "things" must be deleted from an English version. Yet a difficulty remains about "house." Luke, as a classical author, wishing to write "in my Father's house," might have written, without any dative, ἐν πατρός μου. In fact the very words, ἐν πατρός are found in Homer, and undoubtedly mean "in his father's house."⁵⁶ The ellipsis is quite common.⁵⁷ More than this, Luke, had he adopted this form, might have had in his mind, ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ, or ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ, or ἐν τῷ μεγάρῳ or ἐν τῷ βασιλείῳ,⁵⁸ understood before πατρός. None of these substantives appear. The strange thing is, that he is partial both to οἶκος and οἰκία, employing the first about 32 times and the latter about 21 times. The author of the fourth Gospel writes, without the least attempt at ellipsis, both οἶκον and οἰκία when he speaks of "the house of my Father."⁵⁹ That Luke really intends to designate the "Father's house" may be taken for certain, thanks to the researches of Field, but why does not Luke put it in the ordinary way with the unmistakable οἶκος? The answer seems to be that the Child did not speak quite so definitely. "At my Father's" certainly means "in my Father's house," but the latter form is more specific, and the former more reserved. Jesus did not censure His parents for not having come straight to the temple, which was κατ' ἐξοχήν His Father's House. He only assured them that He was safe "at His Father's." Probably the best equivalent for the Greek would be the very expressive yet undefined French, "Chez mon Père." There He was, and Mary knew it all the time, but Mary did not know the exact *locus* until she met Him face to face.

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(*To be concluded in our next number.*)

⁵⁵ In the R.V. this liberty with the Greek is of constant occurrence.

⁵⁶ *Il.* 6, 47.

⁵⁷ See Liddell and Scott, *s.v.* ἐν.

⁵⁸ As in *Lk.* vii. 26.

⁵⁹ *Jn.* ii. 16; *xiv.* 2. Luke, too, uses "the house of God," in the same straightforward way in *vi.* 4.

The Genesis of Present Industrial Conditions.

THE Labour Question is undoubtedly the most pressing question of the day, and even from the purely spiritual point of view one of paramount practical importance. While it is true that spiritual interests transcend material, and that the Church's mission is spiritual, still her mission is to those who are to be saved through the free acceptance of her doctrine and ministry, and who for good or ill simply cannot ignore material considerations. Since men cannot fail to be attracted by schemes which promise to alleviate human misery and redress social injustice, there is manifest danger to spiritual interests when schemes of social regeneration are associated with religious errors. This danger is augmented when the impression, no matter how created, is widely received that the church is committed to the defence of economic conditions that are fast coming to be regarded as intolerable. Skilful compounders find economic Socialism a very enticing coating for the doses of irreligious and immoral doctrines which they are assiduously recommending to the workingmen of to-day. The Church's mission is wide as humanity itself, and the working man's claim on it is according to the proportion of men who have to redeem the primal curse of the race, "in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread." She cannot, therefore, afford to see her influence with workingmen weakened by any unfounded prejudices against herself or prepossessions in favour of her enemies. She may not descend to the tactics of her enemies, who do not hesitate to propose reckless or impossible theories, and thereby not unfrequently captivate the unwary, but her sons can do much to make smooth her way by showing how unreasonable are the charges levelled against her in this respect, and how vain are the glorious expectations aroused by the theories of her opponents. Catholics cannot be expected to propound or even to accept any common economic theory, but they can

show that it is only by adherence to the church's teaching of justice, charity, and human dignity, that any truly effective economic reformation can be established.

It is a matter of surprise that many prominent Catholics so ardently take to themselves the rôle of apologist for the existing economic conditions. I do not wish to exaggerate; they do not seek to justify pauperism or slumdom. On the contrary, it is altogether to their credit that they commonly denounce such evils. But it is amazing how generally they seem to defend, or what is practically the same, to repudiate attacks on, the social relations and economic conditions which are the fundamental evils, and of which the admitted abominations are to a great extent only the necessary manifestations. Catholic voices of the very highest authority have protested against the inhuman power of capital and the defenceless condition of labour. These, however, are the exceptions. Catholic writers on these questions more frequently attempt to defend the monstrous strength on the one side and the appalling weakness on the other, hoping to escape from the natural consequences of these conditions by the aid of palliatives and by appeals to the mercy and charity of capitalists. Such a position is quite intelligible. Catholics are naturally conservative, and in this instance their natural conservatism is intensified by the irrational and immoral theories propounded by those who attack the existing conditions. Shocked and somewhat alarmed by proposals of Anarchists and Socialists, and conceiving that the choice lies between some of these revolutionary systems and that which now prevails, they select the latter without being at sufficient pains to distinguish what is desirable and necessary in it from what is merely a vicious corruption. They assume too lightly that the church has sanctioned the present order so absolutely that any attempt to change it must necessarily argue a disregard for her teaching authority. Herein they inflict serious damage on the prestige of Catholicism. They cause it, to a great extent, to be associated with hateful social and economic conditions, for which it is not responsible, and with which it has no real affinity, and to incur the odium produced by such association.

Anyone who studies modern society will notice in it two striking outstanding features. First: practically all the

resources of the community are exploited specially in the interests of a small minority of the population; secondly, side by side with that small minority of proprietors there is a large proletariat class, utterly without property, but politically free and industrially indispensable. It is in these two features that we find the root cause of our present social troubles and industrial unrest. The significant point for us to seize upon is that they have developed altogether during the past few centuries when a non-Catholic or anti-Catholic spirit dominated public policies in these countries.

It is difficult to form an unbiassed estimate of the conditions of society in which we find ourselves. Born into these conditions, and from earliest childhood experiencing them as regular and unfailing as the phenomena of nature, they have become so familiar to us that we are scarcely conscious of their existence at all. We accept them as part of the order of nature somewhat as we do the consistency of land and the buoyancy of water. But if one succeeds in freeing one's mind from the effects of this long, intimate association, and views society, as it were, from outside, he will readily perceive that the existence of the two features of modern society to which I have called attention is by no means necessary. Not only that, but if he pursues the inquiry, he will easily learn that these features were unknown in Europe, so long as the Catholic spirit and Catholic ideals were unchallenged.

As a result of this obsession by existing conditions, we are always inclined to take the rights and privileges of property as we find them, and argue that they are precisely such as would arise from the natural title of occupation. We assume that the first occupiers of land would naturally acquire almost precisely the rights which we see modern landowners enjoying, subject to public authority in the same way as these rights are at present. We seem to conceive primitive man going out into the virgin prairie, staking out his claim, and thereby becoming an absolute landowner. Every limitation of ownership we are disposed to attribute partly to concessions and compacts on his own part, and partly to the exercise of the *dominium altum* of the State. As a matter of history, precisely the opposite is what has happened. The existing rights of proprietors have grown, even in historical times, under the sanction and through

the aid of public authority from originals much more circumscribed. Writing of the middle of the fourteenth century, Dom. Gasquet says: "Of course, again, such a phrase, viz., large landowners, must not be interpreted in the modern sense, whereby a landowner is an owner of land in a way which, in these days of custom and perpetuity of tenure, would not have been even understood."¹ Now, no one can contend that any important proprietary rights in land have been acquired merely by occupation since 1350, and it will be my purpose in the remainder of this article to show that the rights and privileges of proprietors have been increased enormously—out of all recognition, as Dom. Gasquet observes, and to indicate the outstanding causes of the transformation, which will be found to be of little credit to their authors.

A great deal of attention has been paid to the different forms of feudalism. In reality there was no substantial difference in mediæval Europe in respect to the division of property, neither was the clan system in Ireland substantially different. It is frequently asserted, too, that Communism prevailed in feudal times. Scarcely anything could be farther from the truth. A true system of private ownership prevailed under feudalism. But ownership was widely diffused. An insignificant fraction of the community had not appropriated all the rights of property, leaving the vast bulk of the people propertyless or proletariat. Therein mediæval feudalism differed so very notably from modern industrialism that it is not difficult to understand how the mistake of supposing that there was no real private ownership under feudalism arose amongst theorists who took their notions from modern conditions.

Mr. Thorold Rogers gives us an instance of a typical feudal estate: "No doubt closes and meadows, usually the private estate or demesne of the lord, were in existence in very early times. But the land of the parish or manor, these closes or meadows excepted, were generally distributed as follows—There were a large number of common fields, in which each owner or occupier had a certain number of furrows, more or less frequently repeated. Between each set of furrows ran an uncultivated balk, a foot or two in

¹ "The Great Pestilence," p. 200.

breadth, which formed a boundary or landmark, and for some time of the year a pasture. . . . You will notice that one of these fields is divided into very numerous strips, and that the divisions of each with the name of the occupier are duly given. You will see that there are some thousands of these strips. . . . The owners or occupiers of these common fields had other advantages in the common of pasture and the lord's wood. The commons of pasture seem to have been, in early times, almost universal. They were, it would appear, that part of the settlement which was least convenient for the plough, least accessible, and least defensible. . . . Now, in the common of pasture, there was generally no stint."¹

With such a system of definite, co-existing rights in land, rural life was organised around the manor in mediæval England. First there was the lord of the manor. To him belonged the manor, house and demesne as his exclusive property, in addition to which he enjoyed rights—fixed by custom or compact—over all the inhabitants of the manor.

Then came the free tenants who held for rent, payable in money or kind, a house and premises, together with a certain number of the balks or furrows described above.

Next in order of social importance came the serfs. Each serf possessed a house and a certain number of furrows in the common field. He paid rent to the lord of the manor, generally in corn and labour. Besides this he was subject to the authority of the lord in various ways, and liable to numerous vexatious fines and disabilities.

Finally came the cottagers, who paid for their houses and premises a small annual sum, together with a small amount of personal service. They worked for wages for the lord of the manor, or for any one of the free tenants or serfs who found it convenient to employ them, and who could afford to pay for their services. Sometimes they devoted themselves to one or other of the small handicrafts, for which a demand could always be reckoned on in a rural community. As the cottagers enjoyed many common rights on the manor, and as their number relatively to the other classes on the manor was always very small, there was no real danger that they, who were the only class whose subsistence could be at all

¹ "The Economic Interpretation of History," pp. 59, 60, 61.

deemed precarious, should find themselves in straits for the means of livelihood.³

From a very early age many of the towns had enjoyed municipal rights, and all of them aimed at the management of their own affairs. Their special feature was the universality and activity of the guilds. The guilds were associations for mutual succour and protection. In mediæval towns every department of trade and industry had its own guild. The members of every guild had a practical monopoly in the business which they represented. It was the duty of the guild to see that the interests of that business were not prejudiced, and it had influence and funds sufficient for that purpose. It looked after the rate of wages and hours of service. It regulated the number of its members in order to prevent undue competition and unemployment; and for this purpose it insisted on strict adherence to the rules of apprenticeship. It also served as a benefit society for its members. It is important to note that although the members of the guilds paid regular subscriptions, a great proportion of their common funds were derived from charitable donations and bequests, to which were attached the obligations of performing or getting performed certain religious services, Masses, votive lights, etc., for the spiritual welfare of the benefactors. It will be seen subsequently that this religious aspect of the guilds afforded Henry VIII. an opportunity for indulging his characteristic rapacity on their property on the usual hypocritical plea of zeal for the abolition of superstitious practices.⁴

There was no need of anything corresponding to our Poor Law system. The destitute, aged, and infirm were adequately catered for by the charity of the monasteries, and the generous trusts established by the pious faithful. It is quite possible, indeed, that abuses had grown up in this connection. Unless the administration of charity is carefully regulated it is apt to encourage improvidence and dependence. The widespread destitution consequent on the suppression of the monasteries and confiscation of charitable funds suggests an amount of dependence on

³ Cf. Rogers. "Six Centuries of Work and Wages." Chap. II.

⁴ Cf. Rogers. *Ibid.* Chap. IV.

charity which must be regarded as abnormal considering the social relations of the time.

I want to make clear what exactly I claim for the social condition of mediæval England which I have tried to picture. I do not mean to say that, absolutely speaking, the people were materially better circumstanced than they are at present. I do not think that the workingmen, with all their present grievances, would find their lot more tolerable, if they were placed in the position of their ancestors of four or five centuries ago. There was room for much improvement. The most elementary knowledge of hygiene was absent; the virtue of cleanliness was little practised. The arts and sciences that minister to creature comforts were in their infancy, if not actually unborn. In these respects progress has undoubtedly been made.

But the progress has been almost altogether in favour of a small section of the community. All the discoveries and practical applications of science have been pressed into the service of the wealthy, the poor have to be content with what they could glean after the rich had gathered their harvest. Never in Christian times was the contrast between wealth and poverty so pronounced as when the development of industrialism had been completed. What is even more pertinent to our present consideration, the masses have lost their true human position of holders of legal rights in property or of members of recognised corporations, which secured them the means of providing for themselves and all who were naturally dependent on them, and have sunk to the condition of adventurous dependents on the labour market without property or security.

A great deal has been said, and much more has been insinuated, about the abject condition of feudal serfs, so that serfdom is popularly accepted as synonymous with tyrannical subjection, and as equivalent to a particularly base form of slavery. In truth, the condition of serfs was much more compatible with human dignity than that of the proletariat workingmen of to-day. The irritating disabilities under which the serfs undoubtedly lay were fast giving way under the normal pressure of advancing civilisation. The feudal conditions were bound to go. They were not unsuitable to an undeveloped state of civilisation, and they contained the germs of a new and better social

organisation. A great change was taking place, new liberties were beginning to be enjoyed and new rights to be acquired, and institutions suitable to and capable of moving along with the changing conditions were being established. The serfs smarted under their grievances and were discovering certain means of redress. Their complete emancipation was assured, unless, as is always an appreciable danger, their selfish masters should find an opportunity of thwarting their progress.

In 1349 occurred one of those natural visitations which occasionally effect social revolutions. It is calculated that about half the population of England perished by the Black Death. A number of tenancies were left without holders or claimants, and in consequence reverted to the lords of the manors. In this way the lords' ownership over a considerable amount of their land became more absolute, although for reasons to be mentioned presently it is doubtful if the lords considered this an advantage. The plague had swept away at least half the free labourers of the time, thereby causing the demand and price for free labour to run up. The lords found it difficult, therefore, to procure, even at enhanced prices, the amount of free labour they had been accustomed to employ on their estates. In addition to this, they had to employ free labourers, whenever they could obtain them, to do the work formerly done by these serfs who had died and left no heirs to their holdings. Finally they lost the rents they had hitherto received for the tenancies now vacant. For all this the reversion of the tenants' rights could scarcely be regarded as an adequate compensation, especially seeing that without these reversions they had already more land than they could conveniently work.

The effect of the plague on wages is particularly noteworthy. So high did wages become that an Act of Parliament was passed as early as 1349, fixing wages at what they had been in the year 1346, and enacting penalties for workmen who demanded and employers who paid more. The circumstances of the time were certainly very exceptional, but even so, it is hard to believe that they could justify such an extraordinary act. It is hard to see how such legislation could be justified in any circumstances. Perhaps the most obvious argument against its adoption is

found in the fact that it can scarcely ever be successful. Certainly it was not successful in this case. It was found necessary to pass an amending Act in the very next year. Almost every new Parliament tried to solve this problem, but without success. In about 250 years 37 Labourers' Acts were passed.

In the reign of Richard II. an attempt was made to revoke the liberties and advantages which the serfs had gradually acquired. It was enacted that henceforward serfs should be restrained from leaving the manors to which they belonged, and compelled to pay the old labour rents which had long before been commuted into money payments. This was obviously an intolerable grievance, both because it prevented the serfs from availing of the competition for labour at a time when, owing to the scarcity of labour, it raised its price, and also because owing to the increase in wages that had been already made, a recurrence to the old labour payments would represent more than the money payments into which they had been commuted. The serfs resented the Act, and the result was the insurrection of 1381, in which they succeeded so far as to be able to insist on their manumission being made the price of their submission.

Combinations of workmen were formed to resist the operation of the labourers' statutes. Prosecutions and imprisonments only tended to accentuate the evils which the statutes were intended to remedy. Remonstrances were made by employers against the imprisonment of the labourers, on the ground that it reduced still further the amount of available labour. For the same reason the employers were prepared to pay the fines inflicted on themselves and the men for violation of the statutes.

So far the modifications of feudalism had been altogether favourable to the poorer classes; even the law was not strong enough to deprive them of the advantages which the social disturbance occasioned by the great Plague had conferred on them. But the development towards equality and freedom was violently arrested and set in the direction of pauperism and servility by the rapacity of despotic sovereigns, supported by avaricious nobles, who in turn were privileged to share in the spoliation of the people. It is lamentable that the natural development or break up of feudalism should have been thwarted by a regime of exceptional tyranny and selfishness.

What has often passed for public opinion on this stirring epoch of transition is in reality the opinion of the callous despots and their greedy abettors who succeeded in diverting the movement towards liberty to serve their own selfish objects. It has suited the manipulators of current conceptions of history to represent Henry VIII. as a herculean cleanser of religious abominations, and Elizabeth as a heroic defender of English liberties. The picture of a stern reformer boldly suppressing monastic strongholds of luxury and immorality was able to make a forcible appeal to Protestant prejudice. English patriotism was stirred by the remembrance of the valiant woman, who by indomitable courage and irresistible enthusiasm saved their country from the unspeakable effects of Spanish oppression. But it was found convenient to say as little as possible about the domestic legislation of these paragon sovereigns. A judicious silence was observed about the fact that the wealth and lands of the suppressed monasteries were appropriated by Henry himself and his mercenary ministers, while the only effect on the mass of the population of this much-lauded economic stroke was to deprive them of the many useful social functions which these lands and wealth had been performing, especially for the poorer and more helpless section of the community. Much less was it deemed advisable to dwell on the havoc which the cupidity of this popular idol wrought on the trade guilds of his time. The immense revenues which had been expected from the suppression of the monasteries had proved insufficient to maintain his reckless extravagance. His insatiable rapacity then turned to the guilds, whose lands and property he confiscated. Not merely that, he passed a Bill decreeing the dissolution of all colleges, chantries, hospitals, and free chapels, and nothing but death prevented him from confiscating the property of the universities. No institution, however useful or necessary for the public well-being, was safe from the greed of the selfish and dissolute despot.

Powerful lords followed the selfish example set them by their sovereign. They, too, tried to capture as much as possible of the resources of the country. The work of enclosing the common lands went on apace. The people resisted, naturally, but might prevailed; their rights counted for nothing. This particular form of public spoliation was

not completed until the end of the eighteenth or beginning of the nineteenth century, but even before the end of the sixteenth century it had far advanced on its course. Despoiled of their rights in land, deprived of the protection of their guilds, and robbed of the charity and assistance of the monasteries, the dispossessed masses were by that time reduced to an abject state of destitution and helplessness. The evolution of a proletariat had been completed; and the trouble which is inseparable from a large proletariat class became immediately pressing.

Great allowance must be made for the difficulty and delicacy of the task which confronted the ministers of Elizabeth. The peasantry had been pauperised; those who had succeeded in appropriating the lands and land values were not disposed to forego any fraction of their privileges. The pauperised labourers were left absolutely without any right to the means of subsistence. They had to depend altogether on wages, and wages in those days were extremely precarious. Agriculture had declined, and the demand for agricultural labour so acute two centuries earlier had not continued; industries, which might serve to give employment to the excess of agricultural labourers, had not yet been developed. There was always, therefore, genuine danger of unemployment, and unemployment meant loss of wages and exposure to starvation. But they could not be allowed to starve. That would be too openly inhuman, besides which it would be dangerous; a large class of people have an inconvenient habit of causing trouble before they consent to die of starvation. Moreover, and perhaps this was the most potent of the motives which induced Elizabeth's government to attempt to regulate the condition of the poor, their labour was necessary to enable proprietors to enjoy the advantages of the wealth they had acquired. There would be little enjoyment in the possession of great estates if labourers could not be had to work on them.

The method adopted for dealing with this pressing problem is noteworthy. The state of a strictly limited number of absolute owners with an indefinite margin of paupers was recognised, and, as it were, stereotyped by law. The hateful Poor Law system was begun, which has ever since been associated with misery and discontent. The *adscriptio glebae* from which the serfs had freed themselves

in 1381 was practically re-enacted for all labourers, with this important difference : that whereas according to the old feudal ties serfs enjoyed very definite rights, as we have seen already, in the manors in which they were obliged to abide, according to the Statute of Elizabeth labourers were liable to be sent back to the parishes in which they were born or enrolled with no rights but simply to look for employment and failing to obtain it to receive a miserably insufficient pauper provision. It soon became manifest that this restriction was useless for the purpose for which it was intended, viz., of compelling every parish to bear the burden of its own paupers. It gravely hampered the labourers in seeking employment, and led to systematic evasion, deceit and suspicion on the part of the labourers and parish authorities alike. In deference to the clearly-expressed wishes of employers the restriction ceased, and labour became completely casualised.

The desirability of casualised labour, from the point of view of employers, was intensified by the growth of centralised industries about the middle of the eighteenth century. For the success of these industries it was of the utmost importance that labour should be able to flow freely in response to demand. Favoured in this respect, centralised industries developed rapidly, and workmen congregated in the industrial centres attracted by the demand for their labour. A twofold change was thus effected in the condition of the labourers. They were fast becoming urban, while formerly they had been rural, and they had lost the strict proprietorial rights which they had enjoyed as residents on the old manors. It was in these new conditions that the modern industrial system was fashioned, and it is to the second that we are to attribute all the subsequent subjection of labour to capital.

It has been customary, in accordance with that utterly false and most misleading myth known as The Materialistic Conception of History, to attribute the relations between capital and labour to the growth of industries. It would be hard to conceive a more hopeless confusion of cause and effect. So far from industries being the cause of these relations, it was these relations that shaped the course of industries. They had been produced by human causes, oppression and injustice, and were fully established at the

inception of the industrial development, and industries naturally adapted themselves to their requirements. Centralised industries require a large amount of concentrated capital and labour. But they do not require that the capital and labour should be divorced from one another. Had the divorce not been completed, had the labourers not been pauperised when the industries began, their development would have proceeded on very different lines. Most of the capital would be supplied by the workers themselves. The interests of labour and capital would be really identical, and whatever advantages the establishment of industries brought with it would be generally diffused.

As it happened, however, the few had the capital, the many the labour. And the few were in the superior economic condition. They established and controlled the industries, and turned them altogether to their own advantage. The many gained nothing except occasionally a better opportunity of finding employment. Impelled by the alternative of starvation, absolute or mitigated by pauper doles, they were ready to work for as much as would be barely sufficient to maintain them. The few who controlled the industries being able to procure the necessary labour at this price were not disposed to pay more. However successful or however profitable, therefore, industries might become, all advantages from them were effectively withdrawn from the mere workers.

Of course, the Statute of Elizabeth had attempted to regulate the rate of wages, but without success. The provision, although not legally annulled until 1824, had fallen into disuse long before. In 1776 Adam Smith published "The Wealth of Nations," and the economic theory of freedom of contract was accepted as suitable to the industrial requirements of the time.

There is no doubt that the principle of *Laissez faire* would be admirable, if only the conditions were fair to begin with, and could be kept fair amid the unceasing changes of social and economic life. It sounds very well to say that the State should allow capitalists and labourers to carry on industries by free agreements between themselves, interfering merely to see that no injustice is committed on either side. That is very plausible as a moral principle. And it does not require a great amount of ingenuity to make it

appear that when everyone looks out for his own interests in a system of free bargaining, the public will be better served than it could be by interference, artificial and often arbitrary on the part of the State, so that economically the principle might be maintained to be equally sound. It is amazing that so many should be deceived by an obvious fallacy. It would be equitable, and might be politic in the end, to leave all free to aim at their own personal advantage, if the opportunities were equal for all. But when the opportunities are unequal, and when the inequality has been brought about under the sanction of the State, and is still maintained by the authority of the State, the principle can be neither equitable nor politic. And such was the case when the principle was applied. A certain number of the prospective contractors had appropriated all the resources of the country, and the remainder had nothing beyond their own personal energy. What likelihood was there of genuinely free bargaining in such circumstances? We might just as reasonably look for a fair contest between two men, one of whom was possessed of a sword and pistols while his opponent had nothing but his own bare arms.

The high sounding phrase of freedom of contract was a mere delusion as far as large sections of workers were concerned. How could a man be said to be making a free contract, when he was compelled to take what was offered him or starve himself and all that were dependent on him? The capitalist was not under an equally compelling necessity to close the contract, and so he was in a position to put on the screw; besides which there was always a surplus of labour, so that if one refused to accept what was offered him, another was glad to take his place in order to save himself from the more undesirable state of unemployment. While, therefore, workmen were nominally free, they were in reality in a state of helpless bondage by reason of the force of economic pressure. And as if to bind their chains more firmly, they were denied the right of combination. Instinctively and aided by outsiders who championed their cause, workmen looked to combination as a means of improving their miserable position. For a long time Trades' Unions were proscribed by law, and, as was natural, being denied legitimate scope for their energy, they engaged themselves in deeds of recklessness and violence.

Results soon proved how morally inequitable and socially disastrous was the practical working of the principle of *Laissez faire* in the actual circumstances in which it was adopted. The condition of workmen prior to 1824 is a well-known scandal. I shall content myself with one quotation from Mr. W. S. Lilly: "I know of no more shameful page in human history than that whereon is recorded the condition of the English working classes in coal mines, woollen factories, and cotton factories during the first three decades of the nineteenth century. The victims of overwork, of underpay, of frauds and extortions of all kinds, notably those practised through the truck system, their condition was worse than that of overdriven horses: because those human faculties, those human needs which marked them off from the brute beasts, were utterly ignored and unprovided for. Nay, this is not the worst of it. Not only grown men and women, but little children were offered in sacrifice to 'Gain, the master idol of this realm.' The story revealed in Parliamentary Reports of 1842 and 1843, of general, deliberate, and systematic cruelty practised on girls and boys of tender age—'cruelty, horrible, incredible, unparalleled even in the history of pagan slavery,' a high authority calls it—cannot be read without sickening horror."⁵ I may add that the scandals were by no means confined to mines or factories. They were no less glaring amongst agricultural workers, although for very significant reasons, which we need not here discuss, these latter did not figure prominently in Parliamentary Reports.

About 1824 the scandals of industrialism had reached their lowest depths. Then came a change in the direction of industrial development. In that year the Coalition Act was repealed and Trades' Unions became legal. Partly by their own organised efforts, partly by the zealous support of philanthropists, and partly again by the incidence of political expediency, the workingmen succeeded in winning many valuable charters. Between the years 1833 and 1871 the great and generally successful campaign was waged for factory legislation. But these things were but the beginning, and revealed only one side of the activity of the new labour organisation movement. The workingmen organised

⁵ "First Principles in Politics," p. 98.

for Parliamentary and economic influence. I have no disposition to make light of the importance of their Parliamentary influence, but up to the present, at any rate, labour organisation has been effective mainly through its economic influence.

As long as men were compelled to treat individually with capitalists, they were absolutely incapable of so much as making a pretence of aiming at what they might legitimately consider themselves entitled to. The surplus labour, the margin of unemployed that was to be found in connection with every branch of industry, acted as a sort of automatic check which prevented wages from rising above the mere minimum that would equip and maintain the workers. Acting individually the men were powerless to alter this condition as long as there was some unemployed man always ready to step in and take up work at the same low wages and on the same hard terms as drove his predecessor to lay it down. This the Trades Unions sought to change by getting their members to assist one another in every reasonable demand for better wages and more equitable treatment. The task was not an easy one. Workmen on the verge of destitution, with their spirit broken by long association with hardship, could only with difficulty be induced to forego present advantages in the interest of their class, and in the prospect that they would some day enjoy the advantages of the cause for which they were asked to fight. For a long time it was possible for employers to work on this weakness, and play workmen against one another. But the Trades Unions kept on, and ultimately a certain measure of success has crowned their energy and perseverance. They have now enrolled on their lists a sufficient number of the workmen in every branch of industry to be in a position to present a united demand to their employers; and have so far won the confidence, or otherwise gained influence over the non-union men as to be able to count on their co-operation when they decide on trying conclusions with the employers. The compelling pressure of poverty is relieved to some extent by the funds, small indeed but not negligible, with which the societies are able to help their members during the course of industrial conflicts. And the advantages, which the employers enjoyed from being always able to look to the margin of

unemployed to fill their vacant positions, is lost when the workmen have agreed that positions are not to be accepted except on definite conditions.

However unsatisfactory the old arrangement between labour and capital was from many points of view, at all events it had the advantage of simplicity. Whatever real competition there was, was between the workmen or the capitalists amongst themselves. There was nothing that could be called competition as between labourers and employers. A regular supply of labour could always be reckoned on at a pretty constant price. Already under the influence of Trades Unions and Labour Associations the remuneration and conditions of labour itself is a subject of an acute and growing contest. By the force of combination the workmen have begun to aim at securing what they regard as equitable returns for their labour. The mastery of employers, so long accepted as a matter of course, is definitely challenged by workmen through their associations.

The organisation of the workmen, acutely class-conscious and desperately determined, has brought out the instability that was inherent in the mere existence of a large, free proletariat. No more convincing evidence of this instability could be conceived than the frequent recurrence of strikes and lockouts, and the growing determination with which industrial conflicts are waged. The conditions which grew and matured under the sway of Protestantism are fated to pass away. The grave danger now is that the new conditions will come to us as the ally of infidelity. The forward labour movement is being dominated by anti-Christian Socialism. At the present period of transition it is of supreme importance to discover lines on which that movement can proceed consistently with Catholic principles, so that Catholics can take part in it without doing violence to their consciences, and without any lurking suspicion of disloyalty to their religion. The progress of the movement is inevitable. If Catholics cannot share in it they are debarred from doing anything to alter a system which many of them not unreasonably regard as vicious, and the movement itself will become altogether infidel or at least anti-Catholic, and there will be a powerful agency at work to draw the oppressed sons of toil away from the influence of the church.

It would be grim irony of fate if Catholicism now found itself—to its own grave detriment—committed to the maintenance of conditions, which sprang originally from the rejection of its influence and control. The Catholic Church is indeed conservative for the general reason that it is wisely suspicious of everything that savours of revolution; and it is conservative in the present instance, because it feels bound to protect existing rights in property. The general principle of conservatism does not apply in this case. The preservation of the existing social system in its present form does not make for peace and stability. On the contrary, there is no possibility of either until it is considerably modified. There is no more certain way of precipitating a revolution, than the attempt to maintain the existing system unchanged and get it to work, by placing the country under martial law or compelling nigh on a million men to go down into mines and work against their will, which was the prudent method of statesmanship recently suggested by an influential weekly. The question, therefore, is whether, while respecting the existing rights, we can aim at modifying the existing system according to Catholic ideals and principles, or be compelled to pin ourselves to the existing system which is not of our making, and abide the ignominy and disadvantages of such an association. We cannot go back, even if we would, to the Catholic ages when this system was unknown and begin from there. We cannot cut off three centuries from the nation's history. The work of these centuries is an accomplished fact and we must make the best of it. What is to be the attitude of Catholics at this crisis? Can they, consistently with the teaching of the church, aim at modifying the existing system? If they cannot, their course is clear regardless of consequences. But if they can, then truth and charity, as well as good policy, demand that this be made known to them.

J. KELLEHER.

The Validation of Marriage.

THAT non-Catholics should of late show a more than usual interest in the Catholic doctrine on marriage is not matter for surprise. Many happenings, such as criticisms from various quarters on the *Ne temere* decree, the Divorce Commission, the wanton attacks on the sacredness of marriage in Socialistic publications, have in one way or another directed serious people to the Catholic Church, as the one institution which remains unchanged and unchangeable on this fundamental contract. More than twenty years ago Mr. Gladstone wrote in this strain: "It is indeed a great subject. I have long thought that the battle of Christianity will have to be fought around the sacredness of marriage. Only Christianity can save Society." There is nothing very new in this. The battle was fought before. But yet, as far as modern times are concerned, Mr. Gladstone was filling the rôle of a prophet. And the Christianity which, as he rightly says, is to stem the coming tide of laxity, is becoming more and more synonymous with the Catholic Church. The Church laws of the Established Church lie lightly on the consciences of those of her communion. This indeed is the deliberate judgment of a Protestant writer in the *Quarterly Review*.¹ He writes of England as of a "country where theory (*i.e.*, Church law) counts comparatively for so little, and working expediency for so much." The Canon law of the Catholic Church compels attention and invites examination, if only by contrast with the looseness and consequent moral laxity experienced elsewhere. It is no obsolescent code one reads when one takes up the study of the Catholic marriage laws, but one the letter and spirit of which are preserved in all their vigour by a divinely guided administration.

Some months ago, in the course of a conversation with an Anglican clergyman, who had given some serious study to this branch of theology, and whose reading included a goodly number of the modern manuals of moral theology, a

¹ "Eng. Church and Divorce." *Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1911.

discussion arose as to the validation of marriage. To this subject he had been attracted by some commentary on the *Ne temere* decree, where he saw it stated that the present Pope had validated certain marriages in Germany, when by the constitution *Provida* he had promulgated a marriage legislation for that country. As he had all the evidences of sincerity in his attempt to secure an accurate statement of Catholic doctrine, I was persuaded to put together for him in writing, with as few technicalities as possible, the teachings of theologians and canonists on the points at issue.

A student of this kind whose researches, however commendable from the point of view of sincerity and industry, were necessarily limited by the absence of systematic training in Catholic theology, was destined inevitably to acquire false impressions; nor was it to be wondered at that much he had read was little less than unintelligible to him. The fact of his alleging that he found the treatise on matrimony easy reading was almost a proof that his reading had been superficial. He was of opinion that all invalid marriages could be validated; that the Roman Court granted a divorce, or validated the marriage at its good pleasure; that it was difficult to see how or when the sacrament was conferred in this process of validation; and most difficult of all to follow the Pope's action in validating marriages of Protestants in Germany. Such are samples of his impressions and perplexities.

This paper is merely a development of some points which were submitted to this searcher after truth. It may be incidentally remarked that the attitude of mind he displayed is interesting and instructive, as typical of the difficulties experienced by those outside the Church when they tackle single-handed a question of this kind. And if such shoals await a clergyman whose professional training is, it is to be supposed, in some measure, a mental equipment for such study, what abysses of error lie in wait for the mere casual explorer in these difficult waters, and how necessarily unsuited must such an one be to give authoritative decisions on, or statements of, the Catholic doctrine?

It is, of course, not merely a loose but a false statement of doctrine to say that the Supreme Pontiff can if he wills

validate all marriages. The root of the marriage contract, as of every contract, is the consent of the parties; where this is vitiated by fear or duress, or again, where there is a mistake as to the object of the contract, for instance, as to the person who gives and receives marital rights, or as to some quality or characteristic which serves to individualise the person and which therefore becomes the object of the consent, it is not in the power of the Supreme Pontiff to validate the marriage. The Church courts if appealed to in such cases may uphold the validity of the contract as no obstacle to its validity has been proved to exist; or they may declare the marriage void, when from examination of witnesses and facts they find the fear to have been grave, or the mistake substantial, one or other reason precluding the possibility of a valid consent. This, however, is a very different thing from granting a full divorce, which implies the breaking of the marriage bond already validly tied. Had our friend read any case given in the *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* he might have noticed that the question before the *Rota* in such processes is "*An constat de nullitate matrimonii?*"; and how the answer, "*Constat de nullitate matrimonii in casu,*" when the defender of the marriage bond fails to establish his case, indicates authoritatively not a divorce, but the fact that there never was any marriage between the parties.

Voiding laws which emanate not from the natural law as those affecting the consent, just alluded to, nor from the divine law, are of course capable of being abrogated at the will of the law-giver; hence a marriage that is null because of such law or impediment can be validated; the law being abrogated in this special case, the parties become capable of giving their consent validly, and on doing so are married. Thus in impediments of affinity, or quasi-affinity arising from certain relationships or proximity of people, as, for instance, adoption, or the office of sponsor in the sacraments of Baptism or Confirmation; or again, in impediments arising from the omission of certain solemnities with which for wise reasons the contract is surrounded, as the presence of certain witnesses, the Church dealing with her own laws may dispense and directly validate the marriage, or enjoin on the parties a renewal of consent. The legitimising of the marriage does not necessarily

include the legitimising of children of unlawful wedlock; but as a matter of fact powers extensive to this effect are usually petitioned for, and granted when the dispensation is obtained.

In ordinary dispensations a new consent of both parties is not always required. No doubt such a renewal of consent is generally demanded, and this for validity; but the marriage may be validated by the consent of one party only. And this is sometimes allowed. The consent of the party which is not conscious of the impediment having been given in good faith continues in its effect; moral union of wills, moral co-existence of consent is obtained, and this suffices for a contract. Nor need this consent include *explicitly* all that is contained in Christian marriage; provided the parties intend to marry as good people ordinarily do; provided neither of them by some positive act of the will excludes some essential quality of Christian marriage, the marriage is valid.

Now to my friend's difficulty about the *sacrament* of matrimony. Holding, as he did rightly, that the parties are the ministers to each other of the sacrament there is no difficulty in the matter; they confer the sacrament at the moment they conclude a valid contract. Amongst Christians the contract and the sacrament are inseparable; one cannot exist independently of the other. Moreover, the sacrament is conferred validly although at the time of concluding the contract one or both parties were in sin; if subsequently the grace of God is secured by repentance, the grace of the sacrament operates; sanctifying grace is infused, and graces and helps peculiar to the needs of married life are imparted.

When a marriage is void because clandestinely celebrated, it must as a rule be repeated with due observance of the Tridentine form; and this publicly when the clandestine alliance has become known; otherwise the ceremony can be performed privately. These solemnities prescribed by the Council of Trent can of course be dispensed with; but this is rarely done. They are dispensed with in the case of validation in the hour of death. Then, any priest, even without witnesses, can of himself sufficiently witness to a marriage. Nor again is it absolutely impossible under the

Ne temere to have a valid marriage without these solemnities; theoretically, if the parties wish to avoid them they may do so by going to a remote part of the world, where access to a suitable priest is impossible for a month, they can marry validly before two witnesses; and if it is impossible to get two witnesses, or even one, this requirement will be no obstacle to the validity of their union.³ But, ordinarily speaking, where Catholics (except those of the Oriental rite) are concerned, a valid marriage is impossible when the prescribed solemnities are not adhered to. Nor is there any region of the world exempt from the *Ne temere* decree; an error in this particular was manifested by this gentleman when he asserted that the Fatherland enjoyed exemption from the *Ne temere*; evidently confusing marriages of Protestants, which are everywhere exempt, and mixed marriages of those born in Germany and celebrated there, with marriages of Catholics. Catholics in Germany, or Catholics of the Western rite dwelling in the East, are just as much bound by the *Ne temere* as Catholics in Ireland.

Here it may be convenient to allude to the sorest point in the discussion; as to what precisely the Pope meant by validating the marriages of Protestants in Germany, as he did by the constitution *Provida* (April 15, 1906). My friend having admitted that the marriages of Catholics were subject to the Church, I had only to remind him that the Council of Trent legislated for Christian marriages and not specifically for Catholic marriages; that hence when Protestants were baptized they were, unless specially exempt, as they were in some countries, subject to the law prescribing under penalty of invalidity the Tridentine form.

³ This case is purposely construed in order to include persons deliberately evading the law, or as it is said by Canonists, going to such a place in *fraudem legis*. That this circumstance does not interfere with the validity of the marriage in this instance, is the opinion of Vermeersch and other learned commentators on the "*Ne Temere*" and this because the law is silent on the point. "Quid, qui in talem locum se conferat in fraudem legis? Quia lex tacet, ejus beneficio fraudator minime excidit. Atqui a prima die adventus *valide* (post vero 30 dies *licite*) ibi contrahet matrimonium, sicut a prima die, in alio loco sacerdotem parochum habuisset ministrum validi matrimonii."—Vermeersch in "*Ne Temere*," No. 77.

The Catholic Church could therefore include Protestants in these voiding laws. The question is whether she did or not. That she did, is clear from the explicit statements of several Popes to this effect. Thus clandestinity, in places where the decree *Tametsi* was promulgated, and where no exemption was made in favour of Protestants, could render their marriages invalid, and therefore capable of revalidation. And it is to be noted that where marriages of Protestants in Germany were invalid by any impediment of the divine or natural law they were left as they were: hence surely not *all* Protestant marriages were validated, but only such as were void by reason of an impediment removable by the Roman Pontiff.

And did Protestants whose marriages were validated receive the sacrament of matrimony? Certainly they did; and this for the reason already given that Protestants are Christians, and between Christians a valid marriage is, *eo ipso*, a sacrament. It is the contract instituted by God, not the marriage of Catholics, that Christ raised to the dignity of a sacrament. Nay more, Protestants confer this sacrament on each other, even though they know nothing of it, and profess disbelief in the Sacraments of the Catholic Church, provided they do not by a positive act of their will exclude the idea of Christian marriage, or anything essential to it.

It may be imagined that these statements did not remove the soreness of my Anglican friend, as in fact they did not; but then it was Catholic doctrine he bargained for; there was no more in the bond.

Let us suppose that a marriage is void through the fact that the partner to a former marriage is still living, that is, through the impediment *ligamen*, as it is called; or that impotency voids the contract; let us further grant that death in one case, and a surgical operation in the other, removes the impediment; the marriage is to be validated by a renewal of consent. Yet this renewal is a prescription of the Church, for the invalidity arises not from defective consent but from incapacity to contract; and the incapacity being removed there is no obstacle to a valid marriage. It follows that a renewal of consent at least on the part of the person not directly affected by the impediment is not absolutely necessary under such circumstances. Confirmation is given

to this teaching by an answer of the Sacred Penitentiary in a case where consent was invalid through the impediment of *ligamen*. This point is of immense importance, as cases arise where a renewal of consent is attended with extreme difficulty.

When purely ecclesiastical impediments void the marriage the usual procedure on the part of the dispensing power is to insist on a renewal of consent; and this is strictly adhered to when both parties are aware of the nullity of the marriage. Where, however, only one party was aware that the marriage was null, a clause was formerly added to this dispensation which affected its validity and which was attended in its execution with great difficulties. The clause was: "*Dicta muliere (vel viro) de nullitate prioris matrimonii certiorata.*" This *certioratio* being of ecclesiastical origin was dispensable. At the Vatican Council the German bishops petitioned for a change of this clause, and from the year 1885 the clause was added: "*et quatenus haec certioratio absque gravi periculo fieri nequeat, renovato consensu juxta probatos auctores.*" Various methods for complying with this clause are given in the ordinary authors.

We come now to the extraordinary method of validating marriage, such as was used by Pius X. in reference to certain marriages in Germany (April 15, 1906). The *sanatio in radice*, as it is called, differs chiefly from the ordinary mode of validating in that no new consent is required. Bearing in mind, as we always must in treating of this subject, that the consent is the root of the marriage contract, we can easily conceive this consent voided, or, so to speak, wounded by some ecclesiastical impediment: and it is not difficult to understand how, if the voiding law is abrogated, the consent is healed, and how the contract made sound in its root, stands good. This mode of revalidation was, according to our Anglican friend, "puzzling, unintelligible, mysterious"; epithets which, to my mind, might with more justice be applied to the explanation of the dispensation than to the *sanatio* itself. If by the *sanatio in radice* the Roman Pontiff validates an invalid marriage of some ten years' standing, this by no means implies that the marriage is made valid from the beginning; the validity of the contract starts from the date of granting

of the *sanatio in radice*, or as it is said technically, *ex nunc, et non ex tunc*. The Pope cannot do more than this; nor can he render *really* legitimate the offspring of unlawful wedlock. This is a metaphysical impossibility. As Gasparri says: "*ad praeterita non est potentia, et infectum factum fieri non potest.*" The effect of the *sanatio* is then that in virtue of the consent originally given and not withdrawn, the contract is made *now* when the impediment is removed; and at the same time the children hitherto illegitimate are *considered* as legitimate; all canonical disabilities are removed; so that whereas they were ineligible for the clerical state, and debarred from various privileges in the gift of the Church, they are now no longer so; and this legitimacy extends to the past as well as the future, they are held legitimate from the date of the so-called marriage. As to whether the effect of this dispensation extended to civil disabilities as well, was a moot point with the older theologians. The question may now be considered *tranchée*, as the modern theologians and canonists unanimously agree that it does not extend to civil disabilities. (Feije, Gasparri, Wernz). The Church by the *sanatio* does indeed what she can to restore to their full rights and privileges those born of unlawful wedlock. But the removal of civil disabilities lies outside her domain; *effectus civilis legitimitatis sunt in casu, materia pure civilis non ecclesiastica* (Gasparri II., 1152).

Seeing then that there was no marriage in the beginning, and that the date of the valid marriage synchronises with the date of granting the dispensation, is there a sacrament conferred, and when is it conferred? From the fact that the sacrament is inseparable from the contract, the moment of revalidation is also the time when the parties to the contract confer on each other the sacrament of matrimony. Oftentimes they do so without knowing it, as when the marriages of a whole country are validated. And if they know nothing of the sacrament, what is its use or meaning to the parties concerned? Simply this; that whereas hitherto they had been living in material sin, and were deprived of the graces which the sacrament imparts to the married couple, they now enjoy these graces, unless indeed they are debarred from them by not being in the state of grace when the dispensation was granted. In this

latter contingency they receive the sacrament validly, and if afterwards they acquire by penance the state of grace, it will be fruitful also in their regard.

However paradoxical it may seem, the mysterious part of this dispensation is the explanation it receives at the hands of some learned canonists. As defined by Gasparri; "the *sanatio in radice* is the dispensation of a voiding law, by which the marriage becomes valid, extended by a fiction of law to the beginning of the marriage." And what is this fiction of law? Wernz defines it thus: "*dispositio legis adversus veritatem in re possibili.*" Of this definition it may be said that with all its precision it supplies very little canonical comfort, so to speak, to the enquirer. Now in reality a fiction of law is like every other fiction; it is a creature of the imagination. The legislator imagines a dispensation to have been granted before the marriage, and so all canonical disabilities are *considered* to have been removed. Indeed, for all the light it throws on the subject, this *factio juris* might be left unhonoured and unsung, at least as far as ordinary manuals of theology are concerned. Other explanations of the *sanatio* are offered by some theologians, the most remarkable for its ingenuity being the one to the effect that in ecclesiastical voiding laws the lawgiver legislates conditionally and dependently on the prevision of God. The marriage then, these theologians contend, was valid from the beginning, because the lawgiver in framing the voiding law intended not to include those marriages which God foresaw that the Pope would at some future time validate by a *sanatio in radice*. The condition being fulfilled the marriage was valid *ab initio*, and the *sanatio* was no more than a mere declaration to that effect on the part of the Pope. A fine sample this of what theologians can excogitate, to get over a difficulty. This explanation, however, resting on a false basis, viz., that the marriage was valid from the start is useless. Benedict XIV. teaches distinctly that the marriage is null in the beginning: "*Sed (per sanationem in radice) effectus de medio tolluntur, qui ob hujusmodi matrimonii nullitatem.*" . . . Moreover, such an explanation runs counter to the practice of the Church; for a renewal of consent is often prescribed in this dispensation. If then the marriage was valid from the start, a new absolute consent would not only

be superfluous, but gravely irreverent to the sacrament. (Wernz Jus. Decret. iv., p. 539).

A partial *sanatio* is sometimes granted. If, for instance, the consent on one side only is sound, an absolutely new consent is demanded from the partner; or if the effects of a valid marriage, that is, legitimacy of the offspring, is granted when the marriage cannot be validated, owing to the death or insanity of one party. The celebrated canonist, D'Annibale, held that in the event of one party becoming insane, a *sanatio* could be granted, including in its effects the validity of the marriage. The view is challenged by Wernz, with a good show of reason; his contention is that though there is no question of a withdrawal of consent, there is of its extinction; that insanity is tantamount to death; and that the consent being extinguished a valid marriage is no longer possible. Be that as it may, it is not expedient that a marriage in which one party is a lunatic should be irrevocably fixed; and that this is the sense of the Church on the point is made evident by a decree of December 1889, which declares: "*non expedire ut hujusmodi sanatio in radice concedatur.*"

From the unusual nature of this dispensation it follows that it is not given without grave reasons; nor is the faculty of granting it, as a rule, delegated to Bishops. The first recorded instance of this dispensation is that whereby Boniface VIII. in 1301 validated the marriage of Queen Mary with Sanctius of Castile, who was already dead; and of Ildephonsus, King of Lusitania, with the Countess of Polonia, who were both living. Before Benedict XIV's time dispensations of this kind were granted by Gregory XIII., Clement XI., and Clement XII. Towards the end of the eighteenth century they became specially frequent. The most remarkable cases of general dispensations validating the marriages of a whole district or country, are those granted by Julius III. for England when there was question of reconciling that country to the Catholic faith; by Pius VII. in 1801, and again in 1809, for marriages which were for various causes invalid, notably for non-observance of the Tridentine form; the same Pope granted another general *sanatio* in 1809; Pius IX. validated in 1856 invalid marriages in Austria. Both Leo XIII. and Pius X. have given such dispensations. Pius X. validated the

mixed marriages and marriages of baptized non-Catholics in Germany which were invalid because clandestine, in those parts where the *Tametsi* was obligatory and where no exemption had been given to any class from its obligations. This general validation of the marriages of heretics is not a new departure; for Benedict XIV. had validated similarly the clandestine marriages of heretics in Holland.

The fact that the Roman Pontiff has granted this dispensation is a proof of his power to grant it; and for a Catholic this argument, based as it is on the practice of the Church, is the most commodious and satisfactory one. No good reason can be alleged against the Pope's possessing this power. The natural consent was originally given, but was inefficacious owing to a voiding law enacted by the Roman Pontiff. What then is the mystery about this same consent taking effect now when the voiding law is abrogated? The fact that a few theologians held a view opposed to that of the illustrious phalanx of canonists and theologians who defend the Pontiff's power to grant this dispensation, arose from a false notion of the dispensation; from confusion between a consent which never existed and one really given and habitually persevering. And the statement sometimes advanced that Gregory XIII. denied he had this power is, first, of doubtful authenticity, and secondly, amply refuted by the fact that Gregory granted these dispensations; to this latter there exists the irrefragable testimony of Benedict XIV. And moreover, as Wernz remarks, these adversaries of the *sanatio* do not deny the power of the Pope, save in respect to the civil effects of the dispensation; and modern canonists are equally far from claiming so ample a power as this would imply, for the Roman Pontiff.

Manifestly only in impediments of ecclesiastical origin is there room for a *sanatio*: nor is clandestinity excluded. Nowadays on the Continent, where civil marriages are so frequent, the *sanatio* for marriages voided by clandestinity is often granted. The Church dispenses in such impediments as she can and is accustomed to dispense in (*super quo Ecclesia potest et solet*). Thus this dispensation is not granted in affinity, *ex copula licita in linea recta*; nor in impediments arising from sacred orders, or solemn religious professions.

A *natural* matrimonial consent must have been given in the beginning. This does not mean that the parties must have been in good faith, and that the marriage must have had the outward form or figure of marriage. Some theologians—Giovine for one—demand this as essential. The fact, however, that civil marriages in places like France, where the *Tametsi* was well known to bind, were validated; the fact, moreover, that it is possible for people to know of an impediment, and yet not attend to it at the moment of consent, or not believe in its voiding efficacy, and therefore give full consent to the receiving and handing over of marriage rights, seems to put these theologians out of court. Though a civil marriage has not the canonical form required by the *Ne temere* it has yet the natural form of marriage. As Tanquerey says: "*Conjuges scilicet apparent sufficienter consortium matrimoniale inire velle.*" Of course, as Feije and Gasparri hold, a true consent is impossible where one or both believe that an impediment bars the way; and hence a civil marriage really recognised as merely giving them legal sanction to live together and rendering them and their offspring immune from civil disabilities is outside the domain of a *saxatio*. But to my mind this could rarely happen, as people do not bother thinking about such matters; they simply wish marriage, and choose a way of getting married conveniently and expeditiously, without care whether it is the right or the wrong way.

The condition appended by the Holy See—" *Quatenus utraque pars in consensu de praesenti perseveret* "—means nothing more nor less than that there has been no formal withdrawal of the consent. It is presumed that no such revocation has taken place unless one of the parties applies for a sentence of court declaring the marriage void. And the sentence of the court must have been pronounced before the consent can be said to have been withdrawn; for up to this point the withdrawal is conditional, the mind of the parties concerned being, that they will separate provided the court declares their union null and void. The sentence being pronounced their determination becomes absolute. If the marriage is evidently void, for instance, because it is clandestine, and one of the parties knowing this, formally declares the intention of breaking up the marriage, consent

is withdrawn and a *sanatio* is impossible. Where, moreover, there is an action pending in the civil courts, the Church, even though she might, does not grant a *sanatio*; because where divorce is reasonably feared, it would be unseemly that the parties should be joined with the blessing of the Church, who would soon be released from wedlock by the law of the land. Besides, where a lawsuit is pending, there is danger that the consent has been withdrawn; the Church, therefore, rather than risk the violation of the divine law, declines the dispensation.

A serious cause, such as the refusal of one party to renew the consent, or a difficulty in making the presence of the impediment known, or in a case of a mixed marriage where the non-Catholic party refuses to comply with the Tridentine form, is required for the lawfulness of the dispensation which the Pope grants, and even for its validity when it is imparted by a bishop through delegated faculties. But as the Pope does not wish to act illegally, if a false cause is alleged as ground of the dispensation, and the Pope thereby dispenses without a cause, the dispensation is invalid. (Wernz Jus. Decret. iv. p. 568).

As to the advisability of applying for this dispensation, Wernz writes: "Since in our day it is so easy to obtain a *sanatio in radice*, I cannot subscribe to the opinion of those learned men, who if the parties are in good faith are too ready to reply: 'Leave them in their good faith; say nothing of the impediment.' (Dissimulandum, silendum). In this way formal sin is avoided; but the married couple are deprived of the grace of the sacrament of matrimony and of sacramental graces. And these losses, and the privation of such benefits are not compensated for by dissembling them."

E. J. CULLEN, C.M.

Theological Literature during the Investiture Struggle.

PRODUCTIVE of good results for the Church from the point of view of her freedom of government, her internal peace and the moral progress of the faithful, the Investiture struggle had also a distinct though less evident influence on the development of her theology and dogma. Not merely did it provoke the clash of swords and spears in battle, but it set many pens going and called many ideas into circulation.¹ Coming at a time when the schools were passing out

¹ Polemical religious interests prompted the first publication of the writings of the Investiture quarrel. The list of editors opens with the name of Ulrich von Hutten in the 16th century, and continues in the 17th with those of Melchior Goldart (*Apologiae pro D. N. Henrico IV.*, Hanau, 1611), of the Jesuit Gretser and others. In the 19th century a precious section of the *Monumenta Historica Germaniae (Libelli de Lite Imperatorum et Pontificum)*, 3 vols. Hanover, 1890-97) is taken up with the careful re-editing or editing for the first time of the principal works which owed their production to the Investiture controversy. Ernest Dümmler, continuing up the work of Waitz, who had taken the initiative, published the 1st vol. in 1890, and expressed the hope that this collection of pieces, previously scattered through numerous works or altogether unedited, would not fail to be useful to theologians and canonists. We would not venture to say that the materials furnished by these three volumes have been immediately utilised, or even known as they deserve to be. In any case, the volumes containing them are recommended by most illustrious names in German historical science. George Waitz made a beginning, and on his death the direction of the collection passed to Ernest Dümmler, who signs the prefaces of 1890, 1892 and 1897. Canonists of the historical school like Thamer, historians like Bernheim, Wattenbach, Boehmer, Sackur, etc., took charge of the textual editing; philologists like Traube, historians like Holder Egger furnished contributions; the valuable tables of names of places, persons and things are due to Sackur, Boehmer, etc. The libraries of Germany, Austria, England, Italy, France, and other countries have been searched. If here and there deficiencies are to be noted, as in the identification of texts or quotations, the work as a whole exhibits all the philological and historical merits we are accustomed to associate with the *Monumenta*. Yet the collection is not

of their infancy and coinciding with the great Berengarian controversy, the Investiture struggle may be said to be, with these other two events, at the root of the whole theological development of the twelfth century.

A rapid glance will suffice to indicate the share this contest had in bringing about these results. As regards materials and sources of information, and the diffusion of ideas which gave birth to or were born of institutions, and the systematic exposition of the rights of the Holy See, and the codification of sacramental teaching, it is beyond question, we believe, that our theology owes a great deal to this century. In the doctrinal sphere these results are especially noteworthy in regard to these latter two points, the theology of the Pope and the Church and that of the Sacraments. We leave aside a number of canonico-moral or disciplinary questions—such as those relating to simony, clerical celibacy, ecclesiastical property, etc.—which are of interest rather for moral theology or canon law and have only a remote connexion with dogma. The great theoretical question—which at the same time is always

complete. If a place is found for French, English, and other writings, yet the very plan and purpose of the collection, indicated by the general title, centred the attention of the editors on the documents relating to the German side of the struggle. Even here extracts from important works have been omitted, like the *Liber de Misericordia et Justitia* of Alger of Liège, or portions of chronicles or of letters which give information about events in the struggle or about the arguments of adversaries who met. The canonical collections made in the imperial interest are not all included; while those directly inspired by Gregory VII., or composed in his favour, are too numerous and too disparate in scope to be admitted: several of these have already been edited separately by Wolff von Glanvell, Thaner, etc. We must take account also of the very numerous local Councils (Mansi, t. xix., xx., xxi.) which will doubtless find a place in the section *Leges*. Nor is unedited material yet exhausted; some pieces may yet be rescued from the dust of libraries, as happened in the interval between the 2nd (1892) and the 3rd (1897) vol. (see Supplement, p. 571-726, in which the chronological order hitherto followed is broken). Dümmler does not despair of seeing a 4th vol. made up of such additions and of works hitherto compulsorily omitted. A small and very useful academic collection, illustrating the progress of the struggle from its beginning to the Concordant of Worms, has been prepared by Bernheim (*Quellen zur Gesch. des Investiturstreites*, Leipzig, 1907), who has made a judicious choice and grouping of extracts from the principal polemical documents.

practical—is now openly discussed, and if not always in a profound way at least with such fullness and ardour as to make this period conspicuous in the historical development of the problem.

Besides the interest attaching to the dogmatic, moral, disciplinary or canonical questions involved, these controversies and their results deserve attention also by reason of the fact that all the countries of Latin Christendom took part in them, though not all to the same extent.

The great variety of questions that arose, the widely different circumstances of their occurrence, and the changes in concrete situations that supervened has had the effect of setting up a very variable standard for determining the historical position of the writers who discussed them; the names that appear in the front rank at critical moments in the dispute are not always those that survive most steadily in the literary history of the following centuries. A writer, like Sigebert of Gembloux—we do not speak here of his *Chronicle*, which had a successful run throughout the Middle Ages, as is proved by the numerous additions to and copies of it that were made—may have enjoyed for a time a wide popularity only to see in a short time almost the whole of his works buried in the dust of the monastic *librariae*. A letter of Gregory VII., like the famous one to Hermann of Metz, provoked a veritable storm for the moment in the literary world and was subsequently cited only by those few polemical writers who paid attention to history. Prolific controversialists, like Manegold of Lautenbach or Bernold of Constance, maintained a fame in the memory of posterity that had nothing, or hardly anything, to do with their literary activity as controversialists; the first was renowned especially as a dialectician, the second as a chronicler, and in certain circles (where his *Micrologus* was not attributed to Yves) as a liturgist.

But, whatever about the literary posterity of any one of these polemical writings—and it must be recognised that in the case of many it would be difficult to find traces of them in the literature produced half a century afterwards—we shall see, nevertheless, that in their totality they furnished a contribution of importance to theological development by reason of the ideas or of the method which they helped to advance.

An individual share in this work is to be assigned to some, whose influence was not limited to the period of the struggle; and these we must mention at once. The principal persons who rank foremost in this connexion are Hildebrand and the group of cardinals and bishops who were resolute champions of the Holy See.² Such was the ascetic Peter Damian (+1072), whose taste was for the solitude of the mystic but whose devotedness was as unlimited as his language was expressive: "Satanum meum obsecro," says he, addressing Gregory VII.³ Such was Cardinal Humbert (+1061) of Silva Candida, formerly a monk at Moyon-Moutier, one of the most prominent representatives of the Lorrain group of Gregorians. He had the courage to learn Greek from some Eastern refugees who had taken shelter at Toul, and he accompanied his former bishop, Bruno, into Italy when the latter became Leo IX. According to the saying of Peter Damian, he was one of the eyes of the papacy.⁴ By the side of Humbert and of Peter there were

² See in Jaffé (*Regesta Rom. Pontificum*, 2nd edit., 2 vols., Leipzig, 1885-89) the abstract in chronological order of the letters of Gregory VII. and other Popes. This dossier contains most of the four to five hundred letters. The *Regesta Pont. Romanorum* of Kehr, under the auspices of the Academy of Göttingen, has the same documents, with many additions and corrections, grouped geographically. This is a valuable collection, but still unfinished: vol. I. (*Italia Pontificia*) appeared in 1905. The letters of Gregory VII. have been published by Ph. Jaffé (*Biblioth. Rerum Germanarum*, t. ii. *Monumenta Gregoriana*, p. 576, Berlin, 1865); also in Migne (P.L. cxlviii. 5). A good statement of Hildebrand's views on the origin and nature of civil authority, and of the controversies to which they gave rise, has been given by Prof. Cauchie in the *Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique* (t. v., 1904, p. 588 sq.). See the letters of Urban II. in Migne (P.L. cli., 284 sq.), of Paschal II., Gelasius II., and Calixtus II. (*ibid.* cxliii. 32 sq.); see also Loewenfeld, *Epist. Pont. Rom. ineditæ* (Leipzig, 1889), and Pfluck-Hastung, *Acta Pont. Rom. inedita*, 3 vols. (Stuttgart, 1881-88).

³ See in Migne (P.L. cxliv. and cxlv.) the works of Peter Damian. His principal work on the much debated question of the Sacraments, the *Liber Gratissimus*, which earned for him from Bernold of Constance the title of "alter Hieronymus," and his *Disceptatio Synodalis*, have been newly edited by Heinemann in vol. i. of the *Lites* (pp. 15-94).

⁴ Works in Migne (P.L. cxliii., 931-1279). Thauer has given in the *Lites* (vol. i., 95-253) a new edition of his *Libri tres adversus Simoniacos*, which defend views totally different from those of Peter Damian on the Sacraments, and which exercised an enormous influence at the time.

also Anselm of Lucca, whom Gregory VII. on his deathbed mentioned as one of the best *papabili*;⁵ Deus-dedit (+1099),⁶ the presumed author of *Dictatus Papae*; Bonizo of Sutri (+1091),⁷ Bruno of Segin (+1123),⁸ canonists or liturgists who had personal dealings with Hildebrand and enjoyed his intimacy. For German-speaking countries we must mention Gebhard of Salzburg (+1088)⁹ and Bernold of Constance (+1100),¹⁰ the first of whom, as bishop of one of the principal sees in southern Germany and permanent papal legate was such a champion of the good cause that, as Bernold tells us, his death plunged the Gregorians in grief; the second of whom, although the son of a priest's concubine, ranks among the best writers of the Gregorian party.

France produced several writers, among whom the palm belongs to Yves of Chartres (+1117),¹¹ one of the best balanced canonists of the period, in Bossuet's phrase the most "canoni-cotatos" of all the bishops. Also worthy of

⁵ *Liber contra Wilbertum et Sequaces ejus* in *Lites* vol. i., 517-28. His canonical collection has been partially edited by Thaner (Innsbruck, 1904). Other works in *Biblioth. Patrum* (Lyons), t. xxvii. 436.

⁶ Some works in Migne (P.L. cl. 1566), and better in Sackur's edition, *Libellus contra Invasores et Simoniacos et reliquos Schismaticos* (*Lites*, vol. ii., 292-365). The *Collectio Canonum*, first edited by Martinucci (Venice, 1869) from a very defective MS., has been very carefully re-edited by Wolff von Glanvell (Paderborn, 1905). The *Dictatus Papae*, attributed to Deus-dedit rather than to Gregory VII., may be seen in Jaffé, *Biblioth. Rerum Germ.* (t. ii. 174), or in Bernheim's *Quellen* (i. 47).

⁷ Some works in Migne (P.L. cl. 782); and in the *Lites* (t. ii. 569-620, edition of *Liber ad Amicum* by Dümmler); some fragments of his *Decretum* and the titles of chapters in Mai (*Nova PP. Biblioth.*, t. vii., part 3, p. 1 sq., Rome, 1854).

⁸ Migne (P.L. clxiv. and clxv.), and *Lites* (t. ii. 543-65—edition of the letters and of the *Libellus de Simoniaco* by Sackur).

⁹ The letter to Hermann of Metz in Migne (P.L. cxlviii., 847-69) and in *Lites* (t. i., 261-79).

¹⁰ Works in Migne (P.L. cxlviii. 1057-1460), and in *Lites* (t. ii. 1-168, edition by Thaner). But we subscribe to the opinion of Usermann, who would change the order followed by Thaner and put the *Apologeticae Rationes* (p. 95) before the *De Sacramentis Excommunicatorum* (p. 89).

¹¹ Works in Migne (P.L. clxi. and clxii.) and in *Lites* (t. ii., 640-657—edition by Sackur). On the canonical work of Yves P. Fournier is to be consulted (*Biblioth. de l'Ecole des Chartes*, t. lvii. and lviii., 1896 and 1897).

mention are Geoffrey of Vendôme,¹² an extremist, who crossed the Alps a dozen times in thirty years, and Hildebert of le Mans (+ 1133),¹³ who was more moderate. A little later we meet with Alger of Liège¹⁴ in Lotharingia, the author of a canonical collection in which, for the first time, it can be said that commentary is blended with transcription, and with Honorius of Autun,¹⁵ formerly attached to the Church of Canterbury, who popularised, sometimes in a talented way, the ideas which he borrowed from others.

Several of these names, as those of Humbert, Bernold, Alger, Bruno of Segni and Honorius, figured honourably in the Berengarian controversy.¹⁶

Less numerous were the men of ability who wrote in favour of the emperor and against the papal projects. Yet some names call for mention, like those of Guy of Ferrara,¹⁷ Sigebert of Gembloux¹⁸ and Hugh of Fleury.¹⁹ The first is the author of a long writing in favour of Henry IV. and the anti-pope Clement III., which is full of accusations against Hildebrand. To the last is to be attributed the earliest systematic treatise on the relations between Church and State: a friend of the King of England, perhaps a relative of the royal family, he leans towards the regalist side, but the work itself is moderate in tone and conception. On the

¹² Works in Migne (P.L. clvii., 33-297) and in *Lites* (t. ii., 676-700—ed. Sackur).

¹³ Works in Migne (P.L. clxxi.) and in *Lites* (t. ii., 667-672). The greater part of the sermons are not by Hildebert. Cf. Barth, *Hildebert von Lavardin u. das Kirchliche Stellungsbetzungsrecht*, in *Kirchenrechtliche Abhandlungen* of Stutz t. xxxix.-xxxvi. (Stuttgart, 1906).

¹⁴ Works in Migne (P.L. clxxx., 727 sq.). See H. Hüffer (*Beiträge zur Gesch. des Quellen des Kirchenrechts*, Munster, 1862, p. 1-67) and the prolegomena of Friedberg's edition of *Corp. Juris Can.* (Leipzig, 1879, p. lxxii.) for traces of Alger's influence on Gratian.

¹⁵ Works in Migne (P.L. clxxii.) and in *Lites* (t. iii., 29-80—ed. Dieterich).

¹⁶ The writer takes the liberty of referring the reader to his article on "the Eucharist in the 12th century in the West" in the *Dict. de Théologie Cathol.* (Vacant-Mangenot), t. iv., col. 1239 sq.

¹⁷ The *De Scismate Hildebrandi* is edited by Wilmans and Dümmler in *Lites* (t. i., 529-587).

¹⁸ Works in Migne (P.L. clx., 9-832) and the *Apologia* or *Cujusdam Epistula* in *Lites* (t. ii., 436-49, ed. Sackur).

¹⁹ Works in Migne (P.L. clxiii.); *Tract. de Regia Potestate et Sacerdotali Dignitate* in *Lites* (t. ii., 465-94, ed. Sackur).

other side Honorius of Autun²⁰ is the first to give a systematic exposition of the Gregorian idea, and compared to the Consultation of Wazon of Liège or the short treatise *De Ordinando Pontifice*,²¹ his work marks a considerable advance in the matter of stating and synthesising formulas.

It is to be observed, indeed, that the dialectical capacity of the disputants developed considerably owing to the clash of ideas which the controversy provoked; and this is one result which made its influence felt in the development of theology. Confined to texts which were often transmitted in a mutilated form and slavishly submissive to profane or religious *auctoritates*, whose prestige the general ignorance of that age tended to exaggerate beyond measure, the intellect of the tenth and eleventh centuries was in danger for a time of losing all initiative and giving up all enquiry outside the beaten paths. Unless where the way was marked out by *auctores authenticici*²² many obstinately refused to go exploring even in the case of purely profane questions. We have evidence of this in the admissions and forms of apology employed by those who broached an idea of their own invention.²³

A corrective of this tendency was furnished, no doubt, by the dialectic of the schools; but this needed to be set going by some authoritative book of questions or by some enigma arising from texts officially current. Were it not for the pregnant question of Boëtius or the suggestive formula of Martianus Capella, the problem of universals would not have arisen so soon in the minds of our mediæval ancestors; but by offering to their curiosity an enigma, the existence of which their own sagacity would not have guessed and by covering the invitation to speculate with the patronage of a respected name, this problem did away at once with a two-fold obstacle to dialectical progress. The prevailing

²⁰ The treatise *Summa Gloria* is printed in *Lites* (t. ii., 63-80).

²¹ The opuscle *De Ordinando Pontifice* in *Lites* (t. ii., 9-14, ed. Dümmler). The consultation of Wazon of Liège is given by Anselm of Liège in *Gesta Episcoporum Leodiensium*, cc. 58 and 65 (M.G.H. 88, t. vii., 224, 228, etc.).

²² We refer the reader to articles that appeared recently in the *Etudes* (t. xxxix., 1911, p. 172 and 496) and which will soon appear in a volume.

²³ See v.g. Theodore of Paderborn in his interpretation of the *Pater* (P.L. cxlviii., 333 sq.) and the complaints of Rupert of Deutz a little later.

timidity, however, was far from disappearing at once before the speculations of the *dialectici*; it may even be said that a whole chapter in the history of theology for nearly a century is taken up with the introduction in this way of dialectic into the domain of the sacred sciences.

But, in spite of this often servile fidelity in following *catenae* of *auctoritates* or *authentici* (the canon of which is given us by John of Angoulême in the second half of the eleventh century),²⁴ the numerous discussions in various fields called forth by the Investiture struggle compelled combatants to enter the lists with arms suited to the altered conditions. Against adversaries who did not all show respect for antiquity, in a new concrete situation which no longer corresponded entirely to the letter of the *authentici*, it was necessary to employ means of discussion inspired by the actual circumstances and to meet attacks by inventing replies that had not been previously formulated. Even when antiquity was relied on, the work was one of adaptation, deduction or interpretation, not to speak of the search for and choice of available documents. Under both these aspects the theological literature of the eleventh century and of the beginning of the twelfth presents interesting peculiarities. They debated a good deal and did not reason badly; they dissected texts and tried to enter into the thought of the authors. An example is the consultation of the two Swabian scholars, Bernold and Bernard of Constance, who set themselves to recover the true teaching of St. Augustine regarding the validity of sacraments administered by unworthy ministers.²⁵ They reasoned about facts and established situations, such as the rights of the laity, the nature of investiture (often called a *sacrament*), or the ownership of ecclesiastical property, sometimes with a dialectic that is often rather far-fetched than solid, and again with a timidity that compels them to admit, as if to reassure themselves, that they have got out of touch with the usual authorities. A good example in this respect is furnished by Placidus of Nonantola, who

²⁴ See the text in Thuzot, *Comptes-rendus des Séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, nouvelle série, t. vi., 1870, p. 249-290.

²⁵ Treated in Saltet, *Les Réordinations*, p. 208 sq. We shall speak of it in detail below.

warns us in the margin of his work every time he gives anything of his own—a mere reflexion or remark or reasoning on a text he has cited, or a new consideration which he puts forth. The etiquette with which he indicates these passages does not correspond with what was later the argument *ex ratione*.²⁵ Others, like Honorius of Autun, were stronger and less timid: they even went so far as to sound a trumpet blast every time they indulged in a piece of reasoning, the titles of the chapters containing it being accompanied by the word “syllogismus.”²⁶ It is not to be denied, however, that the work of Honorius, good populariser that he was, shows already the advances due to scholastic activity. Yves of Chartres also, and before him Marbodius of Rennes (to cite two names from France which took the lead in the scholastic movement), distinctly employ the argument *ex ratione* as well as that *ex auctoritate*.

One of the most remarkable productions from this point of view is the *Liber de misericordia et justitia* of Alger of Liège, which broke definitely with the past and inaugurated a new kind of book for the future. Thenceforth canonical compilations were to be no longer mere collections of texts set down one after another in a more or less suitable order of precedence; authors were to take care to add a personal commentary adapting texts to the existing situation.²⁷ Even on theological questions, like those relating to the validity of the sacraments, writers adopted a freer attitude and ventured now and then to advance personal views. Judged from this point of view, the patristic studies of some German clerics, of whom we shall speak later on, is particularly interesting.

Needless to say, this freer method of discussion was applied chiefly in the new fields opened up for investigation by the circumstances of the struggle, and it is in these we find the most abundant results. The heat of the quarrel and polemical needs made the most timid minds brave and

²⁵ See in *Lites* the *Liber de Honore Ecclesiae* (t. ii., 566-639) and the marginal notes: *ex ratione*.

²⁶ *De Offendiculo* cc. 33, 36, etc. (*Lites* t. iii., 49, 50, etc.).

²⁷ This entitles him to the praise bestowed by Hauch (*Kirchengesch. Deutschlands* t. iii., p. 953, Leipzig, 1896). Before Alger, Abbon of Fleury (+1004) had opened the way, but very timidly (*Collectio Canonum*, P.L. cxxxix., 473).

resourceful, and it would be very interesting to study closely the progress of the ideas and the value of the arguments advanced in favour of the most widely different theses in their bearing on the very grave political, social and economic problems fundamentally involved in the practical difficulties of the moment. The constitution of states, the essence of sovereignty, the legitimacy of ecclesiastical property, the value of deeds of donation, the relations between the civil and ecclesiastical power, etc., are so many of the great questions which made matter for most of the polemical treatises of the time.²⁹ Not, of course, that all who wrote had discovered the principles that should regulate the solution of these problems, or that they clearly perceived the normal conclusion to which inevitably this or that statement of an opportunist solution was bound to lead: it would be too much to ask from the intellect of that age that it should have clearly comprehended the vast problems that confronted it. This became possible only when the time of strife was over and the principles at stake could be detached from the entanglement of passing conditions. Yet, even if the men of the eleventh century were unable to take a comprehensive view, or if some of them have shown by their attempted solution of the problem that they were blind to its true nature, it must be admitted that the discussions in which they engaged had a good effect in clearing and preparing the way for real progress in the domain of theology.

Side by side with this advantage in the field of dialectical discussion we should mention also the advance that was made in the selection and extension of the patristic *dossier*.

The instinct to search the Fathers was a natural outcome

²⁹ We can give here only a few bibliographical indications; the literature of the subject is immense. Let it suffice to mention, beside general works of history, the works of Mirbt (*Die Publizistik im Zeitalter Gregors*, VII., Leipzig, 1894); Impart de la Tour (*Les Elections épiscopales dans l'Eglise de France*, Paris, 1890); Scharnagl (*Der Begriff der Investitur in den Quellen u. der Literatur des Investiturstreites*, Stuttgart, 1908, in *Kirchenrechtliche Abhandlungen* fasc. lvi.); Schmiedlin (*Das Investitur problem in Archiv für Kathol. Kirchenrecht*, t. lxxxvii., 1907, p. 87); Prof. Cauchie in a very detailed review of Sohin's work (*Stato e Chiesa*, Modena, 1901) gives valuable bibliographical information and judicious criticisms (*Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique*, t. vii., 1906, p. 573-98).

of the previously prevailing attitude of mind, that of reliance entirely on the *auctoritates*; and when the strife arose the writings of the past were scrutinised with unexampled assiduity for the purpose of finding authoritative support for either side. Let it suffice to mention here the numerous extracts borrowed from the writings of St. Cyprian, as may be seen from a glance at the *Indices* of the three-volume collection of *Libelli de Lite*. The theology of the twelfth century indicates no progress but rather a retrogression in this respect, for while it is true that St. Cyprian figures in the principal writers as one of the best known ante-Nicene Fathers, the number of quotations given—only four—is insignificant in comparison with the many passages cited by the Investiture controversialists.³⁰ St. Gregory, on the other hand, is strongly represented; with Jerome and Augustine and Ambrose he comes into a grouping of doctors, the first traces of which are found in the Carolingian epoch and which is soon to become officially consecrated in the Western Church.³¹ But St. Augustine is admittedly the writer most frequently appealed to; there is not, it may be said, a treatise of the time which does not invoke his authority; both sides try to shelter behind his name. Careful investigation has established the fact that texts taken from St. Augustine form a preponderating part of the patristic dossier utilised.³² This is due to several causes, not the least of which is the immense superiority of the great doctor of

³⁰ See the *Index Auctoritatum* in the 3 vols. of the *Lites*. For Cyprian and Peter Lombard see Baltzer, *Die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus* in the *Studien zur Gesch. der Theologie u. der Kirche*, viii., 3, p. 3 sq. (Leipzig, 1902). In old lists of the principal Fathers and Doctors of the Church St. Cyprian occurs frequently. (See *Bulletin d'ancienne Litterature et d'Archéologie chrétienne*, t. ii., 1912).

³¹ See Bardenhewer, *Gesch. der altchrist. Literatur*, t. i., p. 43 sq. (Leiburg, 1901) and the present writer's note in the *Bulletin d'ancienne Lit. et d'Archéol. chrét.*, t. ii., 1912.

³² Gregory the Great, who was more concerned with political questions than St. Augustine, also holds a prominent place, at least in the ecclesiastico-political problems. On this whole matter Mirbt's study (*Die Stellung Augustinus in der Publizistik des Gregorianischen Kirchenstreit*, Leipzig, 1888) may be consulted with profit, but more than one of his interpretations need to be corrected. The list of citations he furnishes (p. 64 sq.) has been augmented by the *Lites*. (See *Index Auctoritatum*).

Hippo, who has impressed himself indelibly on posterity. The circulation of his writings, which were found in great numbers in all the libraries, also serves to explain the fact, thus confirming what Rémusat has said, that before attributing any idea to a middle age writer of this period it is necessary first of all to examine whether St. Augustine had not already expressed it.²³ Then, the great controverted questions, like the relations of the two powers and the validity of the sacraments, had received from St. Augustine abundant and luminous treatment admirably suited for application in the prevailing discussions. We shall speak of this presently. Here let it be said that in spite of the prestige of the great doctor many refused to accept the solutions to which his lengthy discussion with the Donatists had led—a very striking proof of the obscurity which at this moment had gathered around problems already solved. Eminent men, for example like Cardinal Humbert and Geoffrey of Vendôme, obstinately refused in the heat of the controversy to open their eyes to the true solution.²⁴

Besides the direct and detailed study of St. Augustine's works we should mention also, as witnessing his importance, collections of extracts issued to propagate his ideas; but this is scarcely a peculiarity of the controversy. It had already been the practice for some time to circulate the principal authors of the past in resumés, extracts, or "select pages" as we say to-day.²⁵

A more novel contribution is that furnished by certain canonical collections, which, to borrow the expression of Cardinal Pitra, bring with them the mustiness of the ancient archives of St. Peter. Deus-dedit, Anselm of Lucca, and others, who worked at the instigation of Gregory VII., drew largely on these treasures. Other collections, like that utilised by the *Britanica*, put in circulation also a number of extracts from decretals which otherwise would certainly have been lost; and this corrected, though unfortunately only to a slight extent, the large percentage of apocryphal documents in the Pseudo-Isidorian collection,

²³ Rémusat, *S. Anselme de Canterbéry*, Paris, 1868, p. 406.

²⁴ We shall return to the explanations which Mirbt gives of this fact (op. cit. p. 108).

²⁵ See Mirbt, op. cit. 70 sq.

which maintained for a long time still an undisputed supremacy."

This is not the place to examine the effect of these ancient sources in perpetuating certain ideas or certain theological terms. It is our purpose to examine this question thoroughly in a work we are preparing on the sacramental theology of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and in which it will be made clear once again what a great influence canonical collections had in the dogmatic systematisation of this period.

As leading results of the Investiture controversy in the field of dogmatic theology we must mention here especially two important points, the echo of which lingers in the whole subsequent course of theology. The first is that of the power of the Pope and the supremacy of the Holy See, which, to speak summarily, manifested itself for a long time much more in practical belief than in "theoretical" treatises of theology. The second is that of the validity of the Sacraments independently of the worthiness of the minister. This question was especially practical at a time when the repugnance of the people to have dealings *in sacris* with ministers excommunicated or guilty of concubinage led to the opening of all the great doors of the churches so that the wind might purify them from the taint of unworthy priests; but it was no less evidently a question that called for discussion in theoretical writings and supplied matter for lengthy dissertations, of which we shall give an example.

The Theology *de Romano Pontifice et de Ecclesia* is formulated chiefly in the canonical collections,³⁶ from which it passes by way of incidental statement into many occasional treatises. As we have hinted above, its

³⁶ See below for bibliography of these collections.

³⁷ Handy information on the chronological series of the ancient canonical collections will be found in the following articles: *Canons (collection of ancient)* in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. iii., p. 281-87, by J. Besson; *Canonensammlungen* in the *Kirchenlexicon* t. iii., p. 1845-68, by Von Schulte. The dissertation of Ballerini is still valuable (*De antiquis Collectionibus et Collectoribus Canonum*, Append. ad Leonis M. opp. in Migne, P.L. lvi., 315 sq.); some good extracts in Theiner, *Disquisitiones Criticae in praeceptis Canonum et Decretalium Collectiones*, Romae, 1836.

first systematic statement in the writings of the period occurs in the *Collection in 74 Titles*. The idea which inspires the reply of Wazon of Liège is there expressed and explained very clearly, but this fact does not deprive that illustrious representative of the Lotharingian episcopate of the credit of having anticipated Gregory VII. in laying down the principle.²⁸

The principal ecclesiological truths affirmed refer to the primacy of the Roman See and its supremacy in doctrinal matters, in other words, its infallibility. As we have already hinted more than once, it is in the canonical collection of the Italian group especially that we meet with these systematic statements, which usually occupy a whole book or more. The primacy is attached to the apostolic succession, according to which the powers assigned to the See of Rome are derived from St. Peter. Infallibility and the power to judge or decide without appeal are strongly emphasised. It would require a special monograph to give details of the proofs advanced and of the materials utilised. Needless to say, the credit then enjoyed by the False Decretals had an unhappy influence on the value of the patristic *dossier* employed: that was an unavoidable calamity and does not at all justify the reproaches levelled by Döllinger against the partisans of the Holy See in his famous chapter on the *Fälschungen*.²⁹ Besides, not all of the *dossier* comes from the Pseudo-Isidore. At any rate, the chapters in these collections which affirm papal supremacy and the infallibility of the Church of Rome witness to the belief of the time and constitute an important link in the chain of tradition. It is easy to understand the exaggerated praise with which the edition of the collection of Deus-dedit, one of the leading Gregorian cardinals, was received at the time of the Vatican Council. The contents were of a kind to please the Catholic advocates of infallibility, but it must be admitted that the work of Martinucci, the editor, left a great deal to be desired, as has been shown

²⁸ A collection still unedited. The title and content of each chapter has been indicated by Fournier (*Le premier Manuel canonique de la Réforme du xie Siècle*) in the *Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire publiés par l'Ecole Française de Rome*, t. xiv., 1894, p. 147-223. Thaner died before being able to carry out his intention of editing it at the same time as the collection of Anselm of Lucca.

²⁹ *Der Papst u. das Concil*, von Janus, Leipzig, 1869, p. 107 sq.

beyond question by the new edition of von Glanvell recently published but unfortunately unfinished."

But besides *Deus-dedit* we must here mention several others whose work had a still wider influence. Such especially are Anselm of Lucca⁴¹ and Cardinal Gregory. The collection made by the former in twelve or (if we add his Penitential) thirteen books, and the *Polycarpus*⁴² of the latter had a large circulation. To these are to be added the *Decretum* of Bonizo of Sutri, the collection of Saragossa, those of the Basilica of St. Peter, of Pistoia, etc., and many other anonymous collections derived chiefly from Anselm and from the *Collection in 74 Titles*. The French group of Yves of Chartres and Gratian were influenced by these chapters on the question of papal supremacy.

But it is not only among the canonists that we meet with these developments. The whole polemical literature of the Gregorians is full of them, for example, the treatises of Bernold of Constance, Manegold, Placidus of Nonantola, Geoffrey of Vendôme, Honorius of Autun, etc. We need not here enter into the details of their views, nor need we apologise for the exaggerated language which several of them employ, especially when there is question of supremacy in temporal matters.⁴³ We confine ourselves to the task of determining the place of this literature in the history of theology and dogma and appreciating its effects.⁴⁴ These ideas were henceforth consecrated by the

⁴¹ Cf. *supra*.

⁴² *Anselmi . . . Lucensis Collectio Canonum*, Innsbruck, 1906 (ed. Thaner). Only the first four books have appeared. Mai gives the list of chapters in the *Specilegium Romanum*, t. iv., p. 372 sq., but unfortunately after a late MS. inferior to the good MSS. of Rome and Paris (e.g., *Bibl. nat. lat.*, 12519).

⁴³ These collections being unedited we must content ourselves with referring to the above-mentioned works of Ballerini, Theiner and Mai, or to the Studies of P. Fournier and others which we mention elsewhere, in the work already cited: *Theol. et Droit Canonique au xii^e Siècle*.

⁴⁴ We may refer, but always with reservations, to the works already cited of Mirbt.

⁴⁵ We shall see elsewhere what effect the *Decree* of Gratian had in promoting the rights of the Holy See, as well as the doctrines already taken as established at the time of its composition (about 1139).

triumph of the papacy and the ever-increasing extension of canon law. They were lived rather than systematically co-ordinated and expounded.

For it should be noted here that the theology of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries hardly, if at all, faced the task of synthesising these doctrines. Instead of finding their way into speculative treatises they entered into and took hold of the daily life of the clergy and faithful. So true is this that we search in vain for a systematic exposition of ecclesiological ideas by writers of *Sentences* and *Summas*, who generally content themselves with mentioning, in connexion with Christology, the grace bestowed on the Head of the Church, Jesus Christ, the *gratia capitis*.⁴ The rights of the Church, its divinity, the prerogatives of the Holy See, its infallibility, etc., are only incidentally referred to or else not mentioned at all. It is to the liturgists and canonists that we must turn for formal instruction, that is to say, to the representatives of what is called practical theology, and it is perhaps one of the chief merits of the liturgy that it brought into the life of the people so many fruitful ecclesiological ideas.

A result of this want of a treatise *De Ecclesia et Romano Pontifice*, evidently unforeseen in the twelfth century, made itself felt in an acute form at the end of the fourteenth and in the fifteenth century. The misfortunes of the schism had obscured the supremacy of the Roman See, and the cruel irony of events seemed to give the lie to the ideas which had hitherto regulated the daily lives of the faithful. It was then that a remedy was sought in the idea that a council was superior to the pope; and even the most religiously minded persons, like Denis the Carthusian,⁴ did not hesitate to adopt this idea, just as in the eleventh century a remedy for a similarly deplorable situation had been sought in the idea that the sacraments of unworthy ministers were invalid. St. Thomas, indeed, had written some admirable pages on the church, but it must be admitted that these did not constitute a systematic exposi-

⁴ See Grabmann, *Die Lehre des Thomas von Aquin von der Kirche als Gotteswerk* (Ratisbon, 1903, p. 14-21).

⁴ *De Auctoritate Summi Pont. et Gen. Concilli libri tres*, in the *Opera omnia Doct. Ecstatici D. Dionysii Curtusiani*, t. xxxvi., p. 525 sq. (Tournai, 1908).

tion of a kind with the rest of his teaching. It was only in the sixteenth century that the treatise *De Ecclesia* took its regular place in the theological Summas—thanks especially to the labours of Bellarmine⁴⁷—and even still it maintains points of contact with canon law which are a reminder of its origin and former vicissitudes. Perhaps, indeed, both for the sake of clearness in doctrine and with a view to the judicious use of sources, materials and methods, it might be well to distinguish further in this connexion what belongs respectively to the historical, apologetical, dogmatic, and canonical parts of this treatise. A many-sided competence would be needed to carry out this work, but its execution would be highly beneficial to Catholic theology.

After the Church and the Holy See, the Sacraments occupied the principal place in the theological discussions provoked by the Investiture controversy. We shall speak here only of one leading question, reserving for another work some notes on other interesting points. The grave problem of the validity of sacraments administered by unworthy ministers (heretics, schismatics, those excommunicated or living in concubinage) was solved at this time by different people in directly opposite ways. The practical bearing of the problem on the daily lives of the people rendered it singularly acute, and public opinion, to which both sides appealed,⁴⁸ made its own of it. Strongly roused by the papal prohibitions of 1074, 1076, and other synods, the faithful refused to have any communication *in sacris* with unworthy ministers, preferring to do without their ministrations even on their deathbed. The extreme measures which are mentioned, among others, by Sigebert of Gembloux, and which shock us by their crudity, prove the intensity of this popular aversion, and the writings of Honorius of Autun half a century later are full of equally expressive epithets.⁴⁹ In the popular mind the transition was only too easy from the idea of illiccity to that of invalidity.

⁴⁷ See de la Servière, *La Théologie de Bellarmiu*.

⁴⁸ On this appeal to public opinion see Hauch (op. cit. iii., p. 951 sq.) and Mirbt (op. cit. p. 121 and sq.).

⁴⁹ *Apologia*, etc., c. 2, etc., (*Lites*, ii., 438) and *Chronica ad an.* 1074 (M.G.H., SS. vi., p. 363); *De offenculo*, i., 54; ii., 5, etc. (*Lites* iii., 56, 59, etc.).

But this transition was made not infrequently by polemical theologians on theoretical grounds, so that we meet with opinions which go so far as to admit that valid sacraments have ceased in the church: valid power to transmit the ministerial office had somehow got lost in the all-invading flood of simony. This opinion is mentioned, among others, by Peter Damian, who rejects it, and by Bruno of Segni a full quarter of a century later.¹⁰ And it must be admitted that in the heat of the quarrel such a view was very tempting. To deny any value to the sacraments of unworthy ministers seemed to be an effective controversial weapon at once for turning away the faithful from using their ministrations, more surely than a mere prohibition would have done, and in the case of the clergy for stopping the transmission of sacerdotal or episcopal powers. Nor was it difficult to find authorities. Besides some obscure texts of St. Augustine, Pope Pelagius, Pope Innocent, etc., which turn up frequently in the same order, the whole re-baptism movement represented by St. Cyprian furnished an opportune treasury of arguments. Thus we constantly find the two series of texts, those of Cyprian against Pope Stephen and those of Augustine against the Donatists, lined up for or against invalidity. But by a curious turn of logic the texts of Cyprian which refer to baptism are used against the validity of orders in particular and of the sacraments generally, with the single exception of baptism, the validity of which, independently of the worthiness of the minister, is universally recognised.¹¹

It may be remarked also that a certain connexion exists between the ideas applied to orders and those entertained on the Eucharist. A study of the documents relating to the Berengarian controversy is suggestive in this respect. An opinion was making headway at the time in different quarters that, in case of an unworthy communion or of any outrage to the sacrament, Christ withdrew from the consecrated species and the real presence ceased at once: so, among others, speaks Guimond of Aversa, who opposes this idea. Something similar took place in ordination

¹⁰ *Liber Gratissimus*, c. 38 (*Lites*, i. 59); *Libellus de Symoniacis*, 1 and 10 (*Lites* ii., 547, 554 sq.).

¹¹ See, on question of reordinations and on the validity of the sacraments in general, Saltet (*op. cit.* p. 173 sq.).

according to certain anonymous opponents of Peter Damian and others.⁵²

Let us add that if we in our day are so accustomed to the true Catholic view in this matter as to find it difficult to enter into the possibility of the opposite error, the situation was very different in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when as yet on more than one point rather vague conceptions prevailed. The preceding century, during which, as Bernold of Constance remarks, many things had been done *per fas et nefas* contrary to sound tradition, had left a legacy of confusion on these subjects; and if we pause to reflect and consider these disputes in their contemporary setting and in connexion with the deplorable ecclesiastical situation for which a remedy was sought, we shall see that specious analogies were not wanting which pointed to a negative solution of the sacramental difficulty with sufficient plausibility to mislead the most upright minds. If from the early ages the Church had instituted marriage impediments, which she had greatly increased during the twelfth century, if she had given minute prescriptions regarding the matter and form of the Sacraments for the purpose of determining more precisely those elements in their primitive institution, was it *in itself* so strange that she might surround the power of orders with like or lesser restrictions? This is what many believed themselves free to assert or assume, especially several legates and supporters of the Gregorian reform.⁵³

The series of contradictory opinions regarding the validity of the sacraments opens with the name of Guy of Arezzo, one of whose expressions, destined to wide publicity, was soon credited to Anastasius or Pascal and won many adherents.⁵⁴ Then come the legate, Amatus of Oleron, Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida, and Cardinal Deus-dedit, all among Hildebrand's personal following. This was the party of extreme rigorism in these matters,

⁵² *Liber Gratissimus*, c. 9 (*Lites* i., 28). For Guilmond we refer to our above-mentioned study on the Eucharist in the 12th century.

⁵³ On this question see solutions proposed by Morinus, *De Ordinatio-nibus Exercitatio* v., c. 9, n. 1 (pars. iii., p. 82), Anvers-Amsterdam, 1695, and by Pourrat, *La Théol. Sacramentaire*, Paris, 1910, p. 215 sq.

⁵⁴ *Widonis Monachi Epist. ad Heribertum Archiepiscp.* (*Lites* i., 6 and 7).

as is noted by Guy of Ferrara in his pamphlet.⁵⁵ The Cardinals on Henry's side paid back in the same coin: if the fact that they are excommunicated destroys the validity of the sacraments which they confer, the same argument is good against their opponents, who are likewise excommunicated.

Extreme rigorism had still other representatives, of whom the principals were Bernard of Constance, the anonymous writer of Hirschau, and, in the French group, Geoffrey of Vendôme.⁵⁶

Fortunately, however, there were some who remained faithful to the true Augustinian tradition, especially Peter Damian, who was opposed on this point by St. John Gualbert, the founder of Vallombrosa, as well as by Cardinal Humbert. Damian's *Liber Gratissimus* turned a fertile furrow whence a rich harvest was soon to spring. Cardinal Atto and Anselm of Lucca, then Ranger of Lucca, Yves of Chartres, Marbodius of Rennes, etc., echo his teaching in canonical works, in their correspondence, and even in pieces of verse. Again, while anti-Gregorians, like Guy of Ferrara and Sigebert of Gembloux⁵⁷ held firmly for the validity of the sacraments, we find Yves in France and Alger of Liège in Lotharingia fighting for the same doctrine. They retained, no doubt, certain compromising shades in their teaching, but on the whole they kept to the right road.

Controversialists, like Manegold of Lautenbach or Bruno of Segni, betray a greater hesitation, a fact which is not surprising, since the Curia itself in direct touch with the Pope was divided in opinion and the decisions of local councils were strangely confusing and contradictory.⁵⁸ Those

⁵⁵ *De Scismate Hildebrandi* I. ii. (*Lites* i. 558 sq.).

⁵⁶ Not to lengthen these pages too much, we must be content to refer to Saltet (p. 173-341) or to the article of Schmidlin, *Die Auffassung der simonistischen u. schismatischen Weihen im elften Jahrhundert* in the *Archiv für Kath. Kirchenrecht* t. lxxxvii. (1907), p. 27-70. We add some remarks, reserving others for a more extended work.

⁵⁷ *Apologia*, c. 6 (*Lites*, ii., p. 44 sq.).

⁵⁸ This situation was no better than that of the 9th century, of which Sigebert and Bernold, the one an imperialist, the other a Gregorian, speak in similar terms. (See *De Scriptoribus Eccles.*, n. 112 of Sigebert, P.L. clx., 571, and the *De Sacramentis Excommunicatorum* of Bernold, *Lites*, ii., 93 sq.).

who are even slightly acquainted with this period of Church History will be aware that historians have passed the most contradictory judgments on the ordinations performed by certain Popes, like Leo IX., and especially Urban II. The import of the words employed in the documents is wanting in precision; in several of them it is not easy to determine the exact meaning of the word "irritus,"⁵⁹ It is known, moreover, that twenty years and more after the Concordat of Worms neither theologians nor canonists, who had the field cleared for purely theoretical work, were able to get rid of the whole legacy of the preceding centuries. Peter Lombard and Gratian, the two classical names in these branches of science, still failed to present a completely satisfactory doctrine.⁶⁰ Nor were the commentators on the *Sentences* or on the *Decree* able to agree, and to this fact perhaps is to be attributed the unwillingness of the Cistercians to accept Gratian's work.⁶¹ The systems of Rufinus and of Gaudulph were to continue their rivalry for a long time, and it was only after the end of the twelfth century that the last traces of confusion disappeared.

These painful gropings which mark this long period of hesitation—there are sometimes disconcerting recoils from the general advance, as with Gerhoch of Reichersberg, whose ideas lead us back fifty years—make it all the more interesting to study the mental development of a conscientious theologian of this period, whose case is all the more deserving of attention as he was one of the most faithful and clear-sighted controversialists of the papal party, a man

⁵⁹ We content ourselves with citing here, besides Saltet, Gigalski, *Die Stellung des P. Urbans II. zu den Sakramentshandlung der Simonisten, Schismatici u. Häretiker* in the *Theol. Quartalschrift*, t. lxxix., 1897, p. 216-59, where other useful bibliographical information will be found; Michael, in the *Zeitschrift für Kath. Theologie*, t. xv., 1891, p. 92 sq.; t. xvii., 1893, p. 195, sq., etc.

⁶⁰ The very clear texts of St. Augustine in the anti-Donatist controversy did not hinder Gratian from saying: "Potestas dandi baptismum et jus consecrandi dominicum corpus et largiendi sacros ordines plurimum inter se differunt" (*Decretum*, c. 1., q. i., c. 97). The distinction so frequently made between the Sacraments of schismatics and those of heretics (simony was regarded as a heresy) was also based on St. Augustine (Cf. Saltet, op. cit. p. 67 sq.).

⁶¹ "Propter varios qui inde provenire possunt errores." See Denifle, *Die Universitäten des Mittelalters bis 1400*, Berlin, 1885, p. 700, n. 131.

with a talented mind, a sympathetic character and the heart of an apostle, at once zealous and condescending, a gifted writer, a historian, liturgist, theologian and polemicist. We refer to Bernold of Constance, round whose name we may group the principal opinions and arguments to be noticed. Not that his writings have had the fame they deserved, so much so that after centuries of mistaken attribution his authorship of the *Micrologus*, one of the most interesting works in the history of the liturgy, has only been recognised within the last twenty years.⁸ In his own day other names figured more prominently in the world than that of this humble cleric of Constance, later an obscure monk of St. Blasien or Schaffhausen; but history owes it to him to record the tardy verdict that he, by his own conscientious effort, re-discovered an important dogmatic truth which the most of his more famous contemporaries failed to recognise.

He begins his literary career in the rôle of a pupil writing to his former teacher, Bernard of Constance, then a monk at Hildesheim, and explaining the difficulties that trouble him immediately after the excommunication of Henry IV. (1076). The old man Adelbert, who had also been Bernold's teacher, associates himself with his pupil in this consultation. The letter is a short one⁹ and, as regards the sacraments, merely states the difficulty that arises if one relies on the texts of SS. Augustine, Gregory, Leo, etc., which were currently quoted in the controversy. These *auctoritates* are the same as those given by Cardinal Deusdedit in his *Libellus Contra Invasores*; earlier still, the text of the *Sententiae Prosperi*, attributed to St. Augustine, had been given a prominent place in the famous letter of Guy of Arezzo,¹⁰ which attracted extraordinary attention.

⁸ See the work of dom Morin, who denies to Yves of Chartres the authorship of the *Micrologus*, in opposition to the opinion of Baeumer, who has since accepted dom Morin's view. (*Que l'auteur der Micrologus est Bernold de Constance* in the *Revue Bénédictine*, t. viii., 1892, p. 38 sq.). In connexion with this consultation we have found Saltet's work (already cited) useful; the study of Jean Geyset (*Bernold de Constance*, S. Etienne, 1904) also contains some good remarks, p. 98-111.

⁹ *De Damnatione Schismaticorum*, Epist. i. (*Lites* ii., 27-29).

¹⁰ *Libellus*, etc. (*Lites*, ii., 323), and *Widonis* . . . Epist. (ibid. i., 6).

Bernard's reply,⁶⁵ which by its bombast and excessive courtesy contrasts unfavourably with the simple modesty of Bernold's question, is taken up in its second part with the sacramental problem—the first part being devoted to the Roman primacy as against the Emperor: *inquiris praeterea a me . . . quid ego sentiam de confectione sacramentorum a simoniaco seu a quibuslibet excommunicatis usurpata.*⁶⁶ The solution given by the old teacher is certainly original, but it is based on crazy theological principles. It is bound up with the opinion which was still prevalent among those who denied even the Real Presence in an unworthy communion? The mere fact that this analogy is appealed to is not sufficient to prove this point. But in any case the best solution Bernard has to offer is to distinguish between two classes of simoniacs and excommunicated. The first class comprises those whose guilt is known (*Simoniacos igitur et excommunicatos in duo dividimus; alii . . . quorum scelus innotuit*); the second, those whose guilt is not yet known or proved (*alii qui etsi accusati . . . nondum tamen manifestati*). Sacraments administered by the first are worthless, while those administered by the second are valid; but an exception is made for baptism, which is held to be always valid. This, of course, is illogical, but the case of baptism had been so clearly decided since the third century as to force Bernard to contradict his own principle. The other sacraments, he says, operate by virtue of the faith of the recipient.

Evidently such a reply could not satisfy an alert enquirer, and Bernold felt bound to insist.⁶⁷ He could not fail to be struck by the weakness of the answer given by Bernard in regard to the sacramental question, and he gives his reason for disagreeing with it in an admirably brief and lucid way: he cannot admit that the validity of a ministerial action depends on the psychological condition of the subject (*scienti quidem non esse sacramenta, sed nescienti*), for the obvious reason that variety of opinion does not alter the essence of things (*nam essentiam rerum non solet in contrarium ducere contrarietas opinantium*). It would be hard for any critic to improve on this.

⁶⁵ *De Damnat. Schismat.*, Epist. ii. (*Lites*, ii., 29-47).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 38.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* Epist. iii. (*Lites*, ii., 47-58), especially p. 55, 56, 58.

But if Bernold was quick to see the weak points in his old master's teaching, he was not at the same time quite successful in suggesting an alternative solution. He believes that he can discover a way of reconciling the texts appealed to by both sides by means of a more or less novel theory—that of the “*forma sacramenti*.” This “*forma*” is received by all, but its validity *post factum* depends on the *consensus ecclesiae*. This was something less than what we would call to-day a *sanatio in radice*, but it implied the necessity of a dispensation to validate the otherwise invalid acts of a minister. This theory, as a matter of fact, had been broached already by Cardinal Humbert, a strong partisan of invalidity, who could find no other logical explanation of the validity of baptism administered by heretics than *per consensum ecclesiae*.⁶⁸ This was an error, in opposition to which Peter Damian maintained that the same principle of validity should apply to orders as to baptism,⁶⁹ but, owing to the variety of forms which it assumed, it was able to maintain itself for a long time. The appeal to the “*dispensatio*,” which, as appears from Yves of Chartres, met with an increasingly favourable reception, gave a new lease of life to this explanation.

In this connexion it is interesting to notice the opinion which the theologians of the period entertained of the Church's power to determine the Sacramental rite. It is clear that the views mentioned insist primarily on the canonical and disciplinary side of the question, and even a superficial examination of the dogmatic ideas involved shows that there was attributed to the church at this time a much more preponderating rôle than was afterwards allowed in fixing conditions for the liceity and validity of our sacramental rites. This point of view is important in connexion with the history of sacramental theology. It is shared, moreover, by Bonizo of Sutri and others.⁷⁰

We do not know the immediate result of this exchange of views between Bernold and Bernard; but both presumably continued in a state of hesitation for the time being. But

⁶⁸ *Libellus adv. Symoniacos*, l. i. (*Lites*, i., 105).

⁶⁹ *Liber Gratissimus*, c. 3, 5, 20, etc. (*Lites*, i., 21, 22, 46, etc.).

⁷⁰ Extracts from the *Decretum Bonizonis Episcopi*, l. i. in *Mai Nova PP. Biblioth.*, Rome, 1854, t. vii., p. 3, p. 1-2. Cf. the reflexions we have made above.

after the lapse of a dozen years Bernold reappears in what may be described as the second phase of his literary activity. This time, in his *Apologeticae Rationes*, he writes in defence of the decisions of the Gregorian Synod of Quedlimburg (1085) against Adelbert, the imperialist bishop of Spiers. His attitude may be described as one of reserve, for while defending the decree of nullity which the council had passed, and which had scandalised his opponent, he contents himself with this reply: "Don't be surprised at this canon; it merely repeats what has been said by Augustine, Gregory, Pelagius, Innocent, and Leo."⁷¹ Does Bernold share the view of the Fathers of this Synod, or does this possibly evasive formula merely imply a disinclination to express an opinion of his own? We prefer this second interpretation, which would explain very well why Bernold mentions only those authorities that had been cited by the bishops assembled at Quedlimburg; and this view is confirmed by the fact that shortly afterwards he intervenes again with an accurately formulated statement of the true doctrine.

This third stage in the development of Bernold's thought is best illustrated in a further letter which he wrote to Bernard. The "*flosculus vernans*," as the old monk of Hildesheim had named his young pupil, had reached maturity, thus fulfilling hopes pompously expressed by his master in their first consultation. This time Bernold writes, in a modest tone, it is true, but with a measure of assurance and finality which only the consciousness of being right could inspire.

In the beginning of the letter he⁷² recalls his previous hesitation and announces that he has at last made a "discovery." "Regarding the question of the sacraments of the excommunicated, about which I wrote to you some years ago, without being able at the time to reach any certain conclusion, I am now in a position to tell you what, with God's help, my littleness has been able to discover; and I submit it for your examination." His

⁷¹ See in Mansi, t. xx., p. 607-610, the very brief texts of the Council. The *Apologeticae Rationes* in *Lites* ii., 95-101. Saltet has pointed out the relation of this work to the other writings of Bernold and to the authorities invoked by the Council (op. cit. p. 214).

⁷² *De Sacram. Excomm.* (*Lites* ii., 89-94).

exposition of the question is very clear: "there are two opposing opinions," he says, "on the subject of these sacraments; some seem to deny any value at all to these sacraments; others, while forbidding their reception, do not deny them some reality." Then he cites the different authorities for and against. The texts already mentioned in his first letter (the same used by the Synod of Quedlimburg, by Deus-dedit, etc.), are given, after which come the patristic arguments for validity: "*sunt autem aliae [auctoritates] quae et extra ecclesiam sacramento posse confici affirmant.*"⁷⁵ The first place is given to a sentence of St. Anastasius which had already perplexed him at the time he wrote his first letter: "we fear," he had written, "to go against the opinion of Anastasius by rejecting validity."⁷⁶ Later, in his *libellus xiv.*, he holds firmly to the teaching of this Pope: "*Anastasio . . . credere debemus.*"⁷⁷ The supremacy of this text is not surprising, Peter Damian had made much of it in his *Liber Gratissimus*,⁷⁸ nor had anti-Gregorians, like Guibert of Ravenna (the anti-pope Clement III.), failed to invoke it in support of the validity of their sacraments.⁷⁹

Bernold also appeals to the authority of St. Augustine. The *Epistola ad Vincentium* which he introduces here enjoyed credit also with the imperialists; Guibert of Ravenna and Guy of Ferrara had employed it.⁸⁰ All this shows the care Bernold took to examine the different positions and the authorities supporting them. Sometime afterwards, about 1095, before the Council of Piacenza, he returns once more to this text of St. Augustine.⁸¹ His writings enable us to trace the progress of his thought.

Given, then, the opposing opinions and the authorities for each, what solution is to be adopted? A reconciliation, Bernold tells us, can be effected by attending to the distinction between the *effectus sacramenti* and the *veritas sacramenti*: "*sed hae sententiae, etsi diversae, a veritate*

⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 90.

⁷⁶ *De Damnat. Schismat.*, Ep. ii. (*Lites* ii., 57).

⁷⁷ *De Reordinatione vitanda* (*Lites* ii., 152).

⁷⁸ Cap. 25 (*Lites* ii., 53-54).

⁷⁹ *Decretum Wiberti vel Clementis Papae* (*Lites* i., 625).

⁸⁰ *Opp. citt.* (*Lites* i., 624 and 558).

⁸¹ *De Reord. vitanda* (*Lites* ii., 153).

tamen nusquam deviare probantur si competenter intelligantur."⁸⁰ The first series of texts, seemingly opposed to the sacraments of the excommunicated, ought to be understood of the effect of the sacraments: "*superiores sententiae . . . ad effectum sacramenti referantur*"; the second series is concerned only with the reality of their existence: "*inferiores ad veritatem sacramentorum referantur, quae eadem integritate et bonis et malis adesse creduntur*"; the sacraments exist for the wicked as well as for the good. The whole teaching of the Fathers, however divergent it may appear at first sight, may be summed up, according to Bernold, in these words: "*ac si vero ore ipsi sancti patres nobis communiter dicerent: extra ecclesiam nec sunt nec fiunt sacramenta effective, i.e., cum salute animae, ubi tamen eadem inutiliter, immo perniciose, et esse et fieri non denegamus.*"⁸¹

Then comes a detailed explanation of the texts of St. Leo, St. Gregory, etc., enforced by many quotations from St. Augustine. He particularly extols the authority of the great Doctor of Hippo, which was recognised as decisive by the Holy See; and he does so with all the satisfaction of a mind conscious of having found the true doctrine and gained that intellectual peace vainly sought after by many amidst the agonising conditions of the period. A text often invoked at the time and much used by pre-Thomist scholastics—*nulli sacramento injuria facienda est*—is also employed by Bernold. If at the time this text served to condemn, or at least to soften, the excesses of some rigorists who spoke only of reordination, later on it obtained such prestige that it was used by many in opposition to perfectly legitimate repetitions, that of extreme unction, for example—so much so that non-reiterability became with many a characteristic note in the definition of a sacrament.⁸²

Finally Bernold had the good fortune to discover the fraud owing to which the letter of Guy of Arezzo had long passed for a decision of Pascal I. (or of Anastasius): *illud scriptum musici Widonis quod sub nomine Paschalis papae*

⁸⁰ Op. cit., p. 90.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 91.

⁸² We shall return to this question elsewhere.

honorastis;⁴³ and this discovery destroyed a strong support of the view of the extreme party.

Some of the explanations which our theologian records in his exegesis of patristic texts are open to discussion, but it must be recognised on the whole that his position is a sound one, and that in this respect he displays remarkable superiority as a theologian. To what cause is the credit of this fact to be ascribed? Partly, no doubt, to Bernold's own reflexions, for it is clear from the different elements of his work how much he had been troubled by the problem. But a large influence must also be attributed to the writings of two of his contemporaries, Peter Damian and Anselm of Lucca. Bernold frankly avows the high esteem in which he held the opinion of Peter; after giving his own solution to Bernard, he at once puts it under the patronage of the pious cardinal whom he opposes to Guy of Arezzo. In his eyes the "*musicus*" had written "*sat improvide*" about the sacraments of simoniacs which he wished to annul (*de annullandis sacramentis*), but Peter was a man of high reputation for piety, knowledge and clearheadedness in these matters ("*et in hujusmodi causis sagacissimus*"); and great authority is allowed to his *Liber Gratissimus*.⁴⁴

Nor was this all. If the *Liber Gratissimus* gave light and direction in a general way to Bernold, other sources furnished no less valuable aids. A great part of the texts of St. Augustine, which are not in Peter's book, and on which Bernold founds his view point, was supplied by a canonical collection for which a great success was in store—that of Anselm of Lucca, book ix. of which gives most of the Augustinian passages. A detailed study establishes the fact of dependence.⁴⁵

But we must not for this reason deprive Bernold of the credit due for personal investigation. If others helped him whether, like Peter Damian, by putting him on the right road, or by introducing him to *auctoritates* to support his view, still the merit is his of being almost the only one out

⁴³ Op cit., p. 92. See also the marginal note cited by Thaner (*Lites* ii., 41) and the addition to Guy's letter in some MSS. (*Lites* i., 5-6).

⁴⁴ Op. cit., 92-93.

⁴⁵ Saltet gives the results (op. cit., p. 217). We have used for collating texts the Latin MS. 12519 of the *Biblioth. Nat.*, ff. 168-173.

of so many with the same means of enquiry within their reach who was able to see his way clearly.

This is clearly shown by the fact that the controversy was by no means ended by Bernold's luminous contribution. The names of Bruno of Segni and Geoffrey of Vendôme, of Hugh of Reading and Gerhoch of Reichersberg—only to mention these few from different countries—remain connected with controversies and identified with opinions on these same points far inferior to Bernold's views. We cannot go into details here, but would refer the reader to the above-mentioned work of Saltet, who shows that no generally accepted solution of the difficulties raised by the teaching and action of Urban II. in the matter of reordinations had been reached. This is not the place or time to dwell further on this chapter in the history of theology.⁸ Even Peter Lombard and Gratian, the two Masters of the Middle Ages in theology and canon law, proposed views that were unsatisfactory on the reordination problem, and that had to be given up. But the mere fact of the prolongation of these disputes shows the importance which the question had assumed during the Investiture struggle, and this justifies our attempt to sketch some of its phases.

Interesting from many points of view, as will be clear from what precedes, the polemical literature of this period constitutes, in our opinion, an important chapter in the history of theology and of dogma, and one that deserves some attention. If those who came after gathered up the fruits of the controversy, formulated sounder and clearer conclusions, added to the patristic *dossier* (especially of Greek writers), and advanced considerably in metaphysical analysis, we must not forget that the writers of the eleventh century had to face questions and combinations of circumstances that were new and that their efforts of systematisation had to start from the level of scholarship attained by post-Carolingian barbarism. In reviewing or criticising their ideas we must pay a tribute of respect to their efforts and recognise in several of them a true sagacity that opened the way to new theological conquests. If the advance was laborious, this only adds to the glory of the pioneers.

J. GHELLINCK, S.J.

⁸ We hope soon to be able to publish a study on the sacraments in Geoffrey of Vendôme, Yves, Gerhoch, etc.

Book Reviews.

The Catholic Encyclopædia. Vol. XIII. Revelation—Simon Stock.
London: Caxton Publishing Company. New York: Robert Appleton Company. Price 27s. 6d. Pp. xv. + 800.

The new volume of *The Catholic Encyclopædia* is worthy of its predecessors, both in the learning which every page discloses and in the style in which the learning is clothed. We offer our congratulations to the editors of the *Encyclopædia*, who deserve the gratitude of Catholics for the excellent way in which they have placed reliable information in the hands of all who seek for truth. The exhibition of intolerance which the *Encyclopædia Britannica* displayed in its disgraceful treatment of Catholic questions of first importance makes the publication of the *Catholic Encyclopædia* all the more welcome. The feebleness of the defence of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, which some Catholics put forth on this side of the Atlantic, does not diminish the utility of the *Catholic Encyclopædia*; the information contained in it helps to show all the more clearly how partial were the articles of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* and how futile the defence of its supporters.

The present volume of the *Catholic Encyclopædia* contains many interesting articles on all branches of Catholic science. In dogmatic theology there are numerous articles of great merit, of which the following are the most noteworthy: "Revelation," by Fr. Joyce, S.J.; "Sacraments," by Fr. Kennedy, O.P.; "Semi-Arianism," by Dom Chapman; "Sacrifice" and "Semipelagianism," by Dr. Pohle; "Scepticism," by Fr. Walker, S.J.; and "Scotism," by Dr. Minges, O.F.M.. Canon Law and Moral Theology are represented by such articles as "Roman Congregations" and "Roman Curia," by Fr. Ojetti, S.J.; "Right," by Fr. Cathrein, S.J.; and "Seal of Confession," by R. Nolan, B.A., in which the legal aspect of the subject is comprehensively discussed.

In Sacred Scripture the principal article is "The Epistle to the Romans," by Fr. Merk, S.J. Other important articles are: "Saducees" and "Scribes," by Dr. Driscoll; "Book of Ruth," by Dr. Gigot; "Sanhedrim," by Dr. Souvay; "Septuagint Version," by Vander Heeren; and "Scripture," by Fr. Maas, S.J. Liturgical subjects are manifold. We may specially mention "Rubrics" and "Text," by Dom Cabrol; "Sarum Rite," by Dom Bergh; "Rites," "Ritual," "Roman Rite," and "Sanctus," by Dr. Adrian Fortescue; "Septuagesima" and "Sexagesima," by Dr. Mersman; "Rites in the United States," by A. Shipman, M.A.

Ecclesiastical History and Bibliography claims the lion's share of the volume. We call special attention to "School of Ross," by Archbishop

Healy; "Rinuuccini," "Roman Catholic Relief Bill," and "Sarsfield," by Dr. D'Alton; "Apostolic Schools," by Fr. Boyle, C.M.; "The Rosary," by Fr. Thurston, S.J.; "Sabbatine Privilege," "Scapular" and "Saint Simon Stock," by Fr. Hilgers, S.J.; "Roscommon," by Charles McNeill; "Diocese of Ross," "St. Ronan," and "St. Senan," by Grattan Flood; "Western Schism," by Dr. Salembier; "Russia," by Dr. Palmieri; "Rome" and "University of Rome," by Mgr. Benigni; "Shrines of Our Lady and the Saints in Great Britain and Ireland," by Fr. Chandlery, S.J.; "Rosmini and Rosminianism," by G. Cormack.

Other important articles are: "Schools in Ireland," by Fr. Andrew Murphy; "Schools in Australia," by Fr. W. Ryan, S.J.; "Scholasticism," by Dr. Turner; "The Rosminian System," by D. Hickey; "Science and the Church," by Fr. Hagen, S.J.; and "Sculpture," by Fr. Kleinschmidt, O.F.M.

Though we have called attention to the foregoing articles because of their special interest for our readers, there are a great many other articles which help to make the *Catholic Encyclopædia* the great source of Catholic information for English-speaking peoples. In the thirteen volumes already published there is an immense store of scientific learning which shows that Catholicism is no intellectually barren system or obscurantist religion. It has no reason to fear the truth

J. M. HARTY.

The Mass, A Study of the Roman Liturgy. Adrian Fortescue.
London: Longmans, Green and Co. Price 6s. net. Pp. xii. + 428.

Right Rev. Mgr. Ward and Fr. Thurston, S.J., are the editors of "The Westminster Library: A Series of Manuals for Catholic Priests and Students." The series is designed to meet a need which is "widely felt, and which results in great measure from the predominant importance attached to Dogmatic and Moral Theology in the studies preliminary to the Priesthood." The aim of the editors is to place in the hands of priests and students convenient manuals on the various subjects which belong to "the outlying field of professional knowledge which is always in danger of being crowded out in the years before ordination, and the practical utility of which is not fully realised until some experience of the ministry has been gained." Our readers will appreciate the value of these Manuals, and will welcome the liturgical work which has now been published by the editors under the title of *The Mass, A Study of the Roman Liturgy*, and which has been written by Dr. Adrian Fortescue, whose reputation as a Liturgist is sufficiently high to make his book a reliable authority on an intricate subject.

The volume is divided into two parts, of which the first deals with the History of the Mass, and the second discusses the Order of the Mass. In the first part there are chapters dealing with "The Eucharist

in the first three Centuries," "The Parent Rites and their Descendants," "The Origin of the Roman Rite," and "The Mass since the time of Gregory I." In the second part we find chapters on "The Mass of the Catechumens to the Lessons"; "To the end of the Catechumens' Mass"; "The Mass of the Faithful, to the Eucharistic Prayer"; "The Canon"; "The Communion"; "After the Communion." There are two Appendices dealing with "The Names of the Mass" and "The Epiklesis." A very ample Bibliography completes the volume.

By far the most interesting part of the volume is that which deals with the difficult subject of the origin of the Roman Rite. "The Roman Mass has (especially in the Canon) certain peculiarities that separate it from all Eastern liturgies, indeed we may say from the Gallican rite too, and so from every other use in Christendom. These peculiarities are chiefly the absence of all litanies of intercession said by the deacon and the comparative eclipse of his function in the liturgy (except for the Gospel); then the place of the kiss of peace just before the Communion, instead of at the beginning of the Mass of the Faithful as in all other rites. But the chief peculiarities and the greatest difficulties are the absence of any invocation of the Holy Ghost to consecrate the oblation and the order of the various elements of the Canon. This last is the great question of all" (p. 110). These peculiarities are found in the first complete text we have, that of the Gelasian Sacramentary, the date of which is doubtful, and is provisionally placed at about the seventh century. From Justin Martyr's account (p. 18-21) we know what the Roman rite was in the second century, but a thick veil hangs over the Roman rite between the second and the seventh centuries. The author passes in review the theories of Bunsen, Probst, and Bickell, Dom Cagin, W. C. Bishop, Dr. Baumstark, Dr. Buchwald, Dr. Drews, and Dom Cabrol. Though not definitely adhering to any theory, the author favours the view of Dr. Drews, that a basis for restoring the original Roman Canon may be found in the Greek liturgy of St. James. According to this opinion the Roman Mass belongs to the same family as the rite of Jerusalem—Antioch; so that the original order of its prayers may be found by arranging them as the corresponding ones are arranged in St. James. This order is: *Quam oblationem* (but not in a relative form); *Qui pridie*; *Unde et memores* (*Anamnesis*); *Supra quae* and *Supplices te rogamus*, originally arranged as in *de Sacramentis*, and once containing the *Epiklesis*; *Te igitur*, *Memento vivorum*, *Communicantes*, *Memento defunctorum*, *Nobis quoque peccatoribus* (all these belonging to the Intercession). Dr. Drews thinks that the changes were made in the Roman rite by Gelasius I. (492-496), but this is only an accidental part of his theory. It may be noted that at first Funk strongly opposed the theory of Dr. Drews, but subsequently, to some extent at least, he seems to have modified his opposition.

The author relegates to an Appendix the interesting question of the absence of the *Epiklesis* from the Roman rite. The *Epiklesis* is an

Invocation of the Holy Ghost that he may change the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. It exists in all rites of the East, and existed in the Gallican rite, but we have no plain invocation of this kind in the Roman rite. The Invocation of the Holy Ghost is not primitive; the first clear witnesses of it that we have are in the fourth century, and in the neighbourhood of Antioch. Soon after it occurs all over the East and in the West too. Its normal place is after the words of Institution, at the end of the Anamnesis. The Alexandrine family of liturgies has a double Invocation, one before and one after the words of Institution. It is, the author thinks, quite certain that at one time the Roman rite had an Epiklesis of the Holy Ghost. Pope Gelasius I. refers to it twice, so that we may conclude that in the fifth century Rome had an Invocation of the Holy Ghost. Nor is there any reason to doubt that it stood in the normal place, after the words of Institution. We do not know for certain when it was removed from the Roman rite; all we know is that this occurred between the times of Gelasius I. (fifth century) and of the Gelasian Sacramentary (sixth or seventh century). It has often been suggested that the change was made by St. Gregory I. (590-604). Our "Supplices te rogamus" prayer seems to represent a fragment of the old Epiklesis, with the essential clause left out.

J. M. HARTY.

Cases of Conscience. Rev. T. Slater, S.J. Vol. II. New York: Benziger Brothers. Price 7s. net. Pp. 375.

We offer our congratulations to Fr. Slater on the publication of the second volume of *Cases of Conscience*. "Duties of Laymen," "Duties of Clerics," "Duties of Religious," "The Sacraments," "Censures," "Irregularity," "Ecclesiastical Burial," and "Indulgences" are the subjects casuistically discussed in the present volume. The style is clear and simple; the cases are such as occur in everyday life, and the theological ability shown by the author is such as we should expect from his well-established reputation. We hope that he will have a wide circle of readers amongst the clergy, who are sure to find the volume useful in the performance of their arduous duties.

We notice a case in connection with public theatricals in which we think Fr. Slater somewhat severe, or at least too prone to condemn without a distinction. The case is one in which youngsters perform a celebrated opera in a Town Hall in England, in aid of the local Catholic Mission. The public, orthodox and heterodox, attend and contribute a considerable sum of money. To show his gratitude the Rector, accompanied by an Irish clerical friend, goes to a second performance. The question is raised whether both priests incur the suspension imposed by the Fourth Council of Westminster on those in Sacred Orders who are "present at stage representations in public theatres, or in places temporarily made use of as public theatres." Having stated that the English

Rector does, and that the Irish priest does not, incur the suspension, Fr. Slater adds in regard to the Irish priest: "he does wrong in being present at the opera and renders himself liable to punishment at the hands of the bishop." Why does he do wrong? He is not bound by the local law, nor does the general law of the Church prohibit him from going to the opera. The opera is not indecent in any way, nor is there anything said in the case about scandal. Of course, scandal might be given if the people were ignorant of the freedom of clerical strangers from the prohibiting law, but such ignorance does not always exist, nor must it be presumed to exist in any particular case without proof. We know very well that in Ireland people would at once conclude that such priests, who attended, let us say, races or theatres, were under no prohibition, and we are slow to believe that in England the people are not equally well informed. We may also add that, according to a probable interpretation of the Synod of Maynooth, a performance of the kind contemplated in the case does not come at all under our theatrical prohibition; but we do not presume to say that the same interpretation is tenable in reference to the statute of the fourth Provincial Council of Westminster.

We notice that Fr. Slater holds that a confessor who gives absolution by means of the telephone in a case of extreme necessity is not to be blamed. We thoroughly agree with this conclusion on the supposition that the confessor does not intend to confer the sacrament absolutely. We remember that another book of *Cases of Conscience*, published some time ago, came to the unnecessarily strict conclusion that conditional absolution could not lawfully be given in such a case.

Fr. Slater's treatment of the various questions arising in connection with the decree "Ne Temere" is very satisfactory. He holds that informal betrothals as such are invalid in conscience, though indirectly they might give rise to obligations of restitution on account of consequent injury through deception. We fail to see how any theologian can come to a different conclusion. In favour of this contention Fr. Slater quotes Gennari, Ojetti, Vermeersch, Ferreres, and Beson. He could also add the new edition of the famous "Jus Decretalium" of Fr. Wernz, S.J., in so far as an obligation of justice arising from informal betrothals is concerned.

We again offer our felicitations to Fr. Slater on the completion of his *Cases of Conscience*. Messrs. Benziger also deserve congratulations on the excellent way in which their part has been performed.

J. M. HARTY.

De Pastore Animarum, Enchiridion Asceticum, Canonicum, ac Regiminis juxta Recent. SS. Pontific. Encyclic. ac SS. RR. Congr. Novissimas leges digestum. Pr. A. M. Micheletti. Romæ: Apud F. Pustet. Price 10 fr. Pp. xxxii. + 708.

With confidence we recommend to our clerical readers this comprehensive work on the duties of pastors, by Professor Micheletti, whose

books on subjects connected with Pedagogy have already gained for him a solid reputation for learning and prudence. In the preface the author reminds the pastor of souls that his office is full of sublime dignity since it follows on the footsteps of the Prophets, the Apostles, the Saints, and Our Lord, the High Priest of the New Law. If the office is sublime in its dignity, it also is sublime in the means at its disposal and in the reward which is ordained for those who faithfully fulfil its duties: "*Demum, si præmium quaeres, qui ad justitiam erudiunt multos, fulgebunt quasi stellæ in perpetuas æternitates.*"

The object of Professor Micheletti, in publishing this volume, was to assist the pastor in all things relating to his high office, and in carrying out this admirable task he has appealed to the various branches of science which edify and instruct. Ascetics, Canon Law, Liturgy, Moral Theology, Pastoral Medicine and Physiology are brought to bear on the work of the priest to whom the care of souls is committed. The most recent decisions of the Roman Congregations are placed at the disposal of the pastor, and the latest conclusions of ecclesiastical science are noted in their proper place.

The work is divided into two sections, of which the first deals with the personal qualifications of the pastor, and the second with the performance of his sacred duties in regard to the spiritual and the temporal administration of his parochial charge. The Pastor's Sanctity (pp. 2-80), Prudence (pp. 81-163), Justice and Equity (pp. 164-200), and Knowledge (pp. 201-207) are discussed in the first part of the volume. The second part treats of the pastor's Relations towards Superiors, Equals, and Inferiors (pp. 208-257); of his Duties in regard to Divine Worship (pp. 258-300); of his Administration of the Sacraments (pp. 301-468); of the Precepts of the Decalogue and the Church (pp. 469-498); of the Pastor's Aids, both direct and indirect (pp. 499-590); and of the Temporal Administration of the Parish (pp. 591-624). There follows a collection of documents and paradigms which bear on the practical side of a priest's life (pp. 628-693).

We hope that this fine volume will have a wide circulation amongst the priests of the English-speaking world. Rarely have we met with a book which is at the same time so complete and so compendious. There is scarcely any phase of pastoral life which does not find a place in its pages, and there are few pastoral subjects which do not receive careful attention. The book is for sale at Messrs. Gill and Son, Dublin; Messrs. Pustet, New York; and Messrs. Herder, London.

J. M. HARTY.

The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman. Based on his Private Journals and Correspondence. By Wilfred Ward. 2 volumes. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1912. Price 36s.

To write the Life of Cardinal Newman was no easy task even for the most gifted biographer. Had the Cardinal been merely a great theologian or merely a man of action, or had the sphere of his influence

been confined to one country alone, the work of preparing a biography might have been comparatively light. But if we remember the many-sided character of Newman and the various grooves into which his exceptionally brilliant intellectual gifts were directed, if we bear in mind that his biographer was called upon to deal with a man who was at once a philosopher, a theologian, a historian, an educationalist and a master of English prose, whose writings and opinions exercised a wonderful influence on his contemporaries and on contemporary thought throughout the whole Catholic world, we can realize to some extent the gigantic task set before himself by Mr. Wilfred Ward when he undertook to prepare a biography of Cardinal Newman.

The selection of Mr. Ward for such a work was singularly appropriate. In his previous books, especially in his *Life of Cardinal Wiseman* and of William George Ward, he had been called upon already to deal with the period covered by the earlier portion of these volumes, while his well-known sympathy with the guiding principle of Cardinal Newman in his theological discussions marked him out as eminently suitable for the duties of a biographer. That the selection was a happy one and that the writer has achieved a large measure of success is clear from the kindly reception given to his work by reviewers of all shades of opinion.

These volumes cover the period of Newman's activity from his reception into the Catholic Church in 1845 till his death in 1890. His studies at Rome, the foundation of the English Oratory, the Achilli Trial, the connection of Newman with the Catholic University of Ireland, the question of establishing a Catholic Hall at Oxford, the relations between Newman and the editors of the *Rambler* and *The Home and Foreign Review*, his views on Papal Infallibility and his appointment as Cardinal of the Roman Church are dealt with at length, while on the literary, theological and apologetic side—*The Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, the Lectures on the Difficulties of Anglicans, on University education and on the position of the Catholic Church in England, the *Apologia*, his Sermons and the *Grammar of Assent* are put down in their proper setting and subjected to a careful and sympathetic analysis. In view of the controversies which have raged round Newman in recent years, some claiming him as the originator, others as the opponent of Modernism, it might have been better had Mr. Ward dealt explicitly with this question, not indeed that any such addition is required to defend Cardinal Newman from the charge of heresy, for if there is one thing that stands out more prominently than another in these volumes, it is his absolute loyalty to the teaching of the Church and his dutiful submission to ecclesiastical authority, even at times when his own judgment and policy were called in question.

Many critics during his life and since his death have, it is true, spoken of the "Liberalism" of Newman, and several expressions from his writings and conversations have been wrested from their context and cited in proof of this charge, but to any man who reads these volumes dispassionately it must be evident that the "Liberalism" of

Newman was the "Liberalism" of a loyal subject, not of a would-be rebel. Few men of his own time recognised more clearly the secularist tendencies of the age and the dangers that threatened revealed religion were Catholic theologians to take refuge behind the barriers of authority and refuse to discuss the new problems that had been raised by the advance of science. Fewer still recognised the possibilities that lay before the Church in England and elsewhere at a time when the sects were breaking up in hopeless confusion and when religious-minded men of all parties looked with sympathy towards Catholicism as the mainstay and exponent of divine revelation. In these circumstances frank recognition and full discussion of the difficulties raised were, in his opinion, the proper policy, and he longed for the freedom enjoyed by theologians in the palmiest days of the Middle Ages when the opinions of one great university professor were opposed by his colleague in the next hall, when pronouncements of one theological faculty or religious order were controverted possibly as heretical by other faculties or other orders, when controversies were carried from school to school and from country to country, and when, only as a last resource and after the views of all parties had been heard and the difficulties carefully weighed, the case was submitted to the authoritative decision of the Church. In this way, he believed, full scope might be allowed for the exercise of individual judgment and for the necessary guidance of the visible authority set up by God to preserve pure and entire the revelation given to men by Christ. Such an attitude is very different from that of those who would reject entirely authority, or refuse to recognise the binding force of its decisions, and who advocate theories of personal independence which must lead of necessity to dogmatic confusion.

In spite of their many admitted excellencies we are forced to confess that we found these volumes somewhat disappointing. They do not rise to the level which we were inclined to expect from the author of the *Life of Cardinal Wiseman*. Whether it was that the mass of material demanded condensation or whether it was from fear that the biography would degenerate into a bare collection of extracts from the books and letters and conversations of Newman, the fact at any rate is that in these volumes there is too much of the biographer at times and too little of Newman. Possibly, too, it is the constant contrast with Newman as exhibited in the extracts that leads one to imagine that Mr. Ward's style has deteriorated much since he wrote the *Life of Cardinal Wiseman*. Somehow or another he appears at times dull and commonplace without hardly a trace of that vigour and raciness which made some of his earlier books so captivating for the general reader.

We must admit, too, that our expectations regarding the contents of the book were doomed also to disappointment. We were led to believe from those who were favoured with a glimpse of some of the chapters as they passed through the press, that we might expect some extraordinary revelations, and that with the publication of the *Life of Newman* much of the difficulties which beset the historian in dealing with the leading events of Church History in England for the last half of the

nineteenth century would be laid to rest forever. The chapter on Newman and the Irish University was cited in particular as a chapter that would surprise the public and prove to demonstration that, had Newman had a free hand, the Catholic University might have been a great success. Now the truth is that there is hardly anything new in these two volumes. Letters have, indeed, been published which are not included in other collections, but there is nothing which throws any new light on Newman or on the part which he played in the burning controversies of his day. Possibly in one respect this statement should be slightly modified, and that is in regard to the character of Newman himself. From some of the private correspondence published here for the first time, a fact which was already certain from some recent books, is made more certain, namely, that in spite of the Cardinal's great intellectual powers, his undeniable sanctity, his amiability and devotion to his friends he was at times quite too sensitive and querulous, suspecting personal slights where none were intended, unwilling to admit the value of the reasons that may have guided his opponents and slow to respond to any overtures from those whom he regarded as his enemies. And his view of men and things was at times quite too subjective. If he happened to be in good humour, everything seemed rosy and all difficulties disappeared, but two days later, to judge by his letters, the whole situation has darkened, his path is strewn with innumerable obstacles and all the world seems to be leagued against him when, as a matter of fact, nothing had changed except himself.

This fact should be borne in mind when we come to read the chapters dealing with Newman's connexion with Ireland. Some of his sayings about Cardinal Cullen and the Irish Bishops have been fastened upon to support certain theories, but we think we could find parallels for them were we to quote Newman on Cardinal Wiseman or Cardinal Manning or Cardinal Barnabo, or Father Faber or W. G. Ward, or in fact on any of his leading contemporaries whom he suspected of crossing his path. We have no wish to lay the blame for the failure of the Irish Catholic University on Cardinal Newman, if for no other reason than the very obvious one that we do not admit for a moment that the University was a failure. Nor do we wish to maintain for a moment that Newman received the assistance that he might have reasonably expected in the very trying situation in which he was placed. But we do say that the initial blunder was made when Newman was invited to undertake a work for which he was little qualified, and when he accepted the invitation in a spirit quite different from that intended by those who had agreed to the invitation. For the rough work of organising a University in Ireland at the time there was wanted a man of action rather than a scholar, a man of great physical strength and unlimited endurance, endowed with initiative and tenacity of will, willing to take with equanimity rebuffs and refusals, but never willing to admit that he was beaten. That Newman was not such a man even his greatest admirers must freely admit, and even had he been, the very fact that fully half his time as Rector of the Catholic University, if

not much more, was taken up with the settlement of affairs in his own society in England, would have made it impossible for him to have made the institution a success. Besides, his aim in accepting the invitation was not so much to provide a University for Ireland as to secure a centre for the higher education of his co-religionists in England, and, as a consequence, he placed himself in a false position with the Irish Bishops. Thus he wished to have Cardinal Wiseman appointed Chancellor of the new University, and Dr. Manning Vice-Rector; he intended to assert for himself a predominant voice in the appointment of University professors and officers, many of whom, from the nature of the case, must necessarily have been and were his former Oxford colleagues; he intended to invite Cardinal Wiseman to preach the sermon at the solemn opening of the University Chapel, and to bring over a company of the English Oratorians to take charge of the religious service. In order to overawe the Irish Bishops his friends in England applied to the Pope to have him made a bishop without any consultation with the ecclesiastical authorities in Ireland—if we accept a casual conversation between Drs. Wiseman and Cullen at some railway station where they happened to meet. If we add to this the fact that even during the most critical times for the University, Newman was much more frequently in England, engaged in the affairs of the Oratorians, than in Ireland planning for the success of the Catholic University the rectorship of which he had accepted, we can see that at least there are two sides to the question, and that not all the fault is to be put upon Cardinal Cullen.

But we do not wish to lay too much stress on this question, for we know that in his heart of hearts Newman loved Ireland, and that to his dying day he retained the greatest admiration for Cardinal Cullen and the liveliest recollection of the kindness which he received from all classes during his term as Rector of the Catholic University. He understood too well the mistakes made by English rulers in Ireland, not to sympathise with much of the popular demand then so bitterly opposed by a large body of the English Catholics. "Were I an Irishman," he writes to one of his correspondents, "I should be in heart a rebel." Again, he writes: "I am no politician. I have long thought that the Irish would gain Home Rule in some shape, and that because of the issue of the series of past conflicts with Great Britain, which seem to portend it, and because of Greece, Belgium, Lombardy, Hungary and Bulgaria." From recent events it would seem that Newman was gifted with prophetic instincts on national as well as religious questions.

JAMES MACCAFFREY.

The Old Irish World. By Alice Stopford Green. Dublin: M. H. Gill and Son. 1912. Price 4s. 6d.

Mrs. Green is so well known to our readers, as the author of *The Making of Ireland and Its Undoing* and *Irish Nationality*, that she requires no introduction. In her works, not alone has she deserted the old lines along which Irish History has been written for the last three centuries, but she has made it impossible for any person who wishes to be recognised as an authority to return to the old groove.

The present volume consists of four essays: "The Way of History in Ireland," "The Trade Routes of Ireland," "A Great Irish Lady," "A Castle at Ardglass," and "Tradition in Irish History." In the first of these she emphasises the fact that, while in other countries the educational authorities insist upon the study of the national history as a most important factor for the welfare of the nation, in Ireland the study of Irish history has been completely discouraged. "Before the Norman Invasion Ireland was a land of savages" was regarded as an axiom requiring no demonstration, and anything that tended to disturb belief in this first principle was carefully excluded from official programmes. "Of one thing, however," she writes, "we may be sure. The reform of Irish history must begin in our own country, among our own people. Since it is public opinion that at last decides what our people shall learn of their fatherland, we ourselves must be the keepers of our fame and the makers of our history. Let us in Ireland, therefore, remember that we have an ancestry on which there is no need to cry shame."

The second essay, dealing with the Trade Routes of Ireland, will prove a mine of information to those who believe that in the old days Ireland's only path to the Continent lay through Britain. The "Great Irish Lady" referred to in the third essay is Margaret, daughter of O'Carroll, Lord of Ely, and wife of Calvagh O'Connor Faly, Lord of Offaly. Round this lady Mrs. Green manages to group a great deal of the history of the struggles carried on between the Irish and the foreigners during the 15th century, and from the story of Lady Margaret's life, to prove that the Irish of her day were neither ignorant nor savage nor unacquainted with any land save England. The Castle of Ardglass, which has been purchased by Mr. Francis Bigger, and restored as it was when held by an Irish chieftain, affords Mrs. Green an opportunity of dealing with the history of Lecale and Ardglass from the earliest times till the present day. The last chapter, "The Tradition of Irish History," is a reprint of her article in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, in reply to the criticism of her history published in the *Quarterly Review*, by Mr. Robert Dunlop. Few who have read both articles can have any difficulty in determining to which side the palm of victory should be awarded.

We hope that this latest book of Mrs. Green may have a large circulation, if for no other reason than that the new method of writing and studying Irish History may become more widely known and appreciated.

JAMES MACCAFFREY.

Concilium Tridentinum. Diariorum, Actorum, Epistularum, Tractatum. Nova Collectio. Edidit Societas Goerresiana. Tomus Secundus. Diariorum Pars Secunda. Tomus Quintus, Actorum Pars Altera. Herder, Freiburg, London, 1911. Price, in paper, £3 10s. each. Bound, £3 17s.

The Council of Trent assembled at a most critical period in the history of the Catholic Church. The religious revolt that had been begun in the year 1517 rapidly spread in Germany, Switzerland, France, Northern Europe and England. Faith and discipline were in turn assailed, and especially in view of the bewildering discussions that marked the decadent period of scholasticism, even many of the most learned and most loyal of the faithful were completely bewildered. The necessity of convoking a General Council to put an end to the doctrinal and disciplinary confusion and to undertake the work of reform that should have been undertaken at Constance, Basle or Florence, was universally recognised. The Fathers of the Council were confronted with many serious difficulties, but notwithstanding these, they succeeded in laying down concisely and clearly the doctrine of the Church as opposed to the teaching of the sects, and in formulating disciplinary canons directed against abuses which had helped the enemies of the Church in the earlier stages of their campaign.

The importance of the work done at the Council of Trent is recognised by both Catholics and Protestants, but in spite of this recognition it is still true that no complete and reliable History of the Council of Trent has yet been published. The works of Pallavicini and Sarpi are too controversial to be scientific, while even the volumes of Le Plat, Döllinger and Theiner do not pretend to cover the whole field.

In view of this want the Görresgesellschaft, which has done so much already to promote scholarly studies among German Catholics, determined to bring out a series of twelve or thirteen large volumes covering the whole ground of the Council of Trent. Three of these volumes were to be given up to the Diaries (*Diaria*) kept by certain Fathers who took part in the deliberations of the Council, some of whom were attached to the Roman Curia, others of them being Germans, Spaniards, Frenchmen, or Belgians. It is evident that such diaries are of the greatest importance for the future historian of the Council. Five of the volumes were to deal with the *Acta* of the Council, only excerpts of which have yet been published. One volume was assigned to Tracts (*Tractatus*) published before the convocation of the Council or during its sessions, and which had an important influence on the deliberations of the Fathers. The remaining volumes were to be given up entirely to Letters (*Epistulae*), dealing with the work done at Trent, more especially with the Letters that passed between the Legates and the Roman Court. Most of these letters have not been published in any of the other collections published on the Council. Vol. I. (*Diariorum Pars Prima*), edited by Sebastian Merkle, and Vol. IV. (*Actorum Pars Prima*), edited by Mgr. Ehses, have been issued already from the printing-press of Herder,

and have been reviewed very favourably by both Catholic and Protestant scholars.

Vol. II. (*Diariorum Pars Secunda*), by Merkle, and Vol. V. (*Actorum Pars Altera*), by Ehes, have just been published by the same firm. Vol. II. (177 + 964 pp.) contains the Diaries of Massarelli regarding the Conclave held after the death of Paul III., the pontificate of Julius III., Marcellus II., Pius IV., together with the Diaries of Laurentius Pratanus, Hieronymus Seripandus, Ludovicus Bondonus de Branchis Firmani, Onuphrius Panvinus, Antonius Guidus, and of P. Gonçalez de Mendoga. Vol. V. contains the complete *Acta* of the Council from the Third Session to the translation of the Council to Bonona. Both volumes are supplied with a very copious Index. Everything has been done by both editors and publishers to make the work a final court of appeal for historians on all questions that can possibly arise in connexion with the work of the Council of Trent. To ensure this result no expense has been spared, and the least that might be expected in return is that all libraries, whether Catholic or Protestant, should make it accessible to scholars by securing copies at once.

People in this country will be interested especially in the very prominent part played at the Council by the Archbishop of Armagh, Robert Wauchop. In the *Epilogus* of Pratani (II., p. 369), in dealing with the list of legates, archbishops, bishops and generals of religious orders present in December, 1545, the author says: "Armachanus vero, Scotus et caecus, paulo antea, dum Romam properaret extorsurus a pontifice praecedentiam, ut scilicet in concilio caecus anteiret omnibus oculatis, prope Florentiam equi calce ictus crus fregit. Re itaque infecta Tridentinum relatus velut Appius quidam alter in senatum, quoties habitus est, deferri voluit, ibique contentiose plerumque caecutiit." In nearly all the discussions, especially those regarding the Versions of the Scripture, Original Sin, Justification, Residence of Bishops, and the Eucharist, the Archbishop of Armagh took a leading part, and spared no pains to impress his view on the Council. During the years 1545, 1546 and 1547 he appears to have been the only prelate from Ireland present at the Council.

It is interesting, too, to note the reference made to another Archbishop of Armagh by the Bishop of Verdun during the discussion on the Sacrament of Orders (Vol. II., p. 764): "Quare qui negat Jurisdictionem episcopi in presbyteros, qui asserit presbyterum ex aequo cum episcopo excommunicare, absolvere aliaque munia episcoporum exercere, is ante mille annos Aerii impii, idiotarum Valdensium ante trecentos, Armacani Hibernici ante ducentos annos, Joannis item Wicliffe et Joannis Hus ita pridem damnatam heresim et sepultam revocat. Quorum quidem haereticorum maior pars in eam lapsa est heresim, ut episcopalem dignitatem, quam assequi non poterant, et contemptibilem redderent, et in hominum odium adducerent, ut de Aerio testatur divus Augustinus et de Joanne Wicliffe recentiores historiae." The reference in this speech is clearly to the well known work of Fitzralph *Summa in Quaestionibus Armenorum* (1511), which Bellarmine says

should be read with care. Such a guarded statement of a competent authority falls far short of the charge of heresy levelled against Fitzralph by the Bishop of Verdun.

It is to be hoped that a copy of this work will find its way into the library of all ecclesiastical colleges and universities.

JAMES MACCAFFREY.

Geschichte der Verehrung Marias im 16 und 17 Jahrhundert. Ein Betrag zur Religionswissenschaft und Kunstgeschichte. von Stephen Beissel, S.J. Mit 228 Abbildungen. Herder, Freiburg and London. 1910. Price 12s. paper; 14s. 6d. bound.

In a previous work, *Geschichte der Verehrung Marias in Deutschland während des Mittelalters*, Father Beissel traced the story of devotion to Mary in Germany from the beginning of the Middle Ages. The present volume is a continuation of this earlier book, except that in it he does not confine his attention to Germany, but deals with devotion to the Blessed Virgin throughout the whole world. Nor does he confine himself merely to the period indicated in the volume. In many portions of his treatment for the sake of clearness and completeness he was obliged to go back to a period much earlier than the 16th or 17th centuries.

Hardly a question that would interest a student of this subject has been omitted, though in many cases one would wish that the author could have allowed himself more space to deal with difficult questions. In such instances, however, the references appended in the footnotes will serve to indicate where a fuller discussion may be sought. Amongst some of the subjects dealt with in the volume are the history of the "Hail Mary," showing the period when the different portions of the "Hail Mary" and the "Holy Mary" became common in the different countries of Europe; the Angelus, the Rosary, the Feast of the Immaculate Conception, the Holy House of Loreto, and the various Litanies of the Blessed Virgin. In regard to the Feast of the Immaculate Conception the author notes and rightly that in one of the Irish Calendars of the 9th and 10th century the Feast of the Conception of the Blessed Virgin is put down for the 3rd of May, but he should have given a reference to the work on which he relied. In the chapter on Litanies of the Blessed Virgin the author calls attention to the important part played in such composition by the Irish Litany, or rather collection of titles given to the Blessed Virgin referred to by O'Curry in his *Manuscript Materials of Irish History*.

A chapter is devoted to the pictures of the Blessed Virgin painted by Italian and Dutch painters in the 16th century; another is given to pictures of the Blessed Virgin produced in the 17th century, and yet another is given to the remarkable statues of the Blessed Virgin during these centuries. The illustrations, reproducing as they do the masterpieces in this very rich department of art, are not the least interesting and valuable portion of a really valuable work.

JAMES MACCAFFREY.

The Divine Trinity. By Rev. Joseph Pohle, Ph.D., DD. Translated by Arthur Preuss. B. Herder, St. Louis, Freiburg, London. 1912. Pp. iv. + 297. Price 6s. net.

We have already welcomed the first volume of Preuss's translation of Dr. Pohle's *Lehrbuch der Dogmatik*, and taken occasion, in noticing it, to find fault with the plan of publication. If the work was to be translated at all—and it is worth translating—the publishers should have arranged for a translation in not more than three volumes (like the original) to be published at the same time. If the present rate of multiplication goes on it will take from eight to ten volumes to reproduce the original *Lehrbuch*, and for that very reason, and because of the additional cost, we are inclined to believe that the plan adopted is not likely to be as successful, even commercially, as its designers have imagined. It is not improbable that a Handbook of Dogma by an English-speaking theologian for English-speaking students may appear before this translation is completed, and in a much handier and cheaper form than is promised by this undertaking.

We need not add anything by way of commendation to what we have said in our notice of the first volume. Dr. Pohle's *Lehrbuch* is an excellent manual of Dogma, and Mr. Preuss's translation leaves little to be desired. Still, there is always something in a translation which makes it less satisfying than the original for those to whom the original is accessible. But for those who do not read German this translation will be very useful, the chief drawback being that they have not the whole original in handier form, and for students who are accustomed to use a Latin text-book it will also very useful.

P. J. TONER.

Evolution and the Fall. By the Rev. Francis J. Hall, D.D., Prof. of Dogmatic Theology in the Western Theological Seminary, Chicago, Ill. Longmans, Green and Co., New York and London. 1910. Pp. xviii. + 225. Price 5s. net.

This volume contains the "Bishop Paddock Lectures" for 1909-10 (six in number), and is devoted to the task of reconciling the doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin with a limited form of the Evolutionary Theory. Without entering into details I might describe Dr. Hall's general position as follows: provisionally, and without committing ourselves to any definite explanation of the evolutionary process, we ought, on the evidence available, to accept as a scientific commonplace not merely the general theory of the development of new species, but the special fact that man's physical organism has had, or may have had, a purely animal ancestry; but this admission does not contradict the Catholic doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin. I quite agree with Dr. Hall's general contention, and have little fault to find with his method of treatment except this: that, in the first place, the terminology he adopts ("physical" and "superphysical" in regard to man) does not seem

to express with sufficient clearness the distinction which in scholastic theology is usually described as the "material and spiritual"; and in the second place, that the idea of the supernatural—especially its gratuity—is somewhat obscured. It would take up too much space to elaborate these points, which are somewhat subtle and technical; but I am glad to be able to say of this book of Dr. Hall's what I have said of other works of his that our Catholic readers would be well advised to read it.

P. J. TONER.

The Beauty and Truth of the Catholic Church. Sermons from the German, adapted and edited by the Rev. Edward Jones, with an Introduction by the Most Rev. John Ireland, D.D. Vol. II. B. Herder, St. Louis, Freiburg, London. 1911. Pp. 391. Price 6s. net.

We need only say a word or two about this second volume of Sermons on the "beauty and truth of the Catholic Church," having already recommended the first volume. The sermons contained in this volume (35 in number) deal with the Sacraments in general (1-2), and with Baptism (3-4), Confirmation (5), and the Eucharist as a sacrament and sacrifice (6-35). They are excellent both in matter and style.

P. J. TONER.

Back to the World. Translated from the French of Champol's "*Les Revenantes*," by L. M. Leggatt. Benziger Bros., New York, Cincinnati, Chicago. 1912. Pp. 378. Price 5s. 6d. net.

The modern French novel has come to be regarded with a certain amount of suspicion and distrust by the ordinary Catholic. The phases of life it depicts and the code of morality it generally adopts are among the last things that could claim the approval of anyone anxious for the faith and purity of the reading public.

But things are not quite as they were. A new school has arisen, we are glad to say, that yields to none in literary excellence, and upholds, at the same time, a very high and wholesome standard in ethics and religion. No better example could be given of its work than *Les Revenantes* of M. Champol. It is inspired by the highest ideals of Catholic faith and morality. Aspects of French life, occasioned by the present anti-religious regime, are sketched with a power and sympathy and depth of literary beauty that we cannot praise or admire too much. And the name of the translator, already favourably known in connexion with other works of the school—"Those of His Own Household," in the current numbers of the *Month*, is the latest we remember—is the best guarantee that as little as possible of the grace and charm of the original has evaporated in the process of translation.

The story, in some respects a sequel to that of *Sœur Alexandrine* by the same author, is the story of Sisters of the Annunciation disbanded

by the decrees of the French Government and driven back to the secular life. The trials, temptations and sufferings through which they have to pass can easily be imagined, but we doubt whether they have ever been so vividly described as by M. Champol. Some undergo a fiery ordeal of physical suffering and are rewarded by as happy a death as they could have hoped for even in the convent. But others have to meet temptations of a more insidious kind, all the more dangerous because seemingly so innocent. It is on these that the author dwells especially, in his picture of the after life of Henriette, the Sister St. Gabriel of the convent. Surrounded by a life of luxury and brought into intimate contact with the thoughts and friends of a former time, she forgets little by little the lessons of the cloister, and is on the point of embracing a life of worldly happiness when a voice almost from the grave recalls her to a sense of higher things, and points out the way of sacrifice as the only one that will bring her peace.

As edifying reading for old and young the book cannot be too highly recommended.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

Christus. Manuel d'Histoire des Religions. Par Joseph Huby, Professeur au Scholasticat d'Ore Place, Hastings. 4e edition. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne et Cie., 117 Rue de Rennes. Pp. 1036. 1912.

The study of the comparative history of religions has within recent times evoked world-wide interest, and laid the basis of a new theological science, the importance of which it would be very unwise to under-rate. For many years, of course, researches had been made by Christian scholars in the wide field of non-Christian religions; but they were pursued in a more or less desultory fashion, and, from the point of view of scientific theology, led to few results of any consequence. A work by Dupuis, entitled *De l'Origine de tous les Cultes* and published in Paris in 1795, may be regarded as the first serious effort to combine the data of previous inquirers and to read a meaning, however mistaken, into the multitudinous facts that had been accumulated. The adoption of a more critical historical method was not without its effects on the new development, and numerous studies, both from the rationalistic and Catholic standpoints, appeared in the first three quarters of the nineteenth century. It was not, however, until the publication of Tiele's *Histoire des Religions jusqu'à l'Avènement des Religions Universalistes* in 1876 that we can be said to have had our first real manual on the subject. The work was continued, in England by Max Müller in his translations, with copious introductions, of the *Sacred Books of the East* (1878-1905), in France by Burnouf, Rémusat and Julien, and in Germany by a host of writers too numerous to mention. Chairs in the subject were founded in various Universities. Catholics looked askance at the new science for a time, for it was being treated in a frankly

rationalistic and anti-Catholic spirit, but they soon awoke to its importance, and the *C.T.S. Lectures on the History of Religions*, the *Science et Religion* series, the *Bibliothèque d'Histoire des Religions*, the *Etudes sur l'Histoire des Religions*, the *Biblische Zeitschrift*, and many other publications of a similar kind are witnesses to their activities in the countries with which we are most intimately connected. In the International Catholic Congress, held in Paris in 1891, one of the six sections was devoted to the history of religions. The idea was developed by Protestant workers in the same field, notably in the establishment of *The World's Parliament of Religions* which holds its meetings every four years in places so widely separated as Bâle and Chicago.

To say that even substantial agreement has been arrived at by the various sections of workers engaged on the subject would be going beyond anything the facts warrant. Nor should we be surprised. The data on which speculation is based are obscure and susceptible of various interpretations: the statements made by savage tribes of the present day are often unreliable and always easily misunderstood, and the documents of ancient civilizations—depending often for their interpretation on mental and social conditions which we can only imperfectly appreciate at this distance of time—can hardly be said to furnish better results. And, even were the data certain, the theories built upon them would depend very largely on the philosophic and religious outlook of the inquirer. The atheist sees in them merely the extenuation of an ignorant fear which education and civilization will in time remove: the evolutionist the gradual development of the religious instinct which every religion will express partially, but none fully: and so of the others.

And, if various readings of history are presented in this way, it is surely important that the Catholic should have one from his own standpoint. That has been the idea of M. Huby, to whose ability and energy we owe the present volume—the best of its kind by far that we have seen. The religions of the East and West, Christian and non-Christian, polytheistic and monotheistic, savage and civilized, primitive and modern, are all passed in review, and their essential characteristics selected and classified. Recognising that no one individual can be an expert in all branches of the subject, he has sought out Catholic writers in different countries who can speak with authority in their own departments, and allowed them to give in their own words the results of their specialized study. On this principle, the work may occasionally lose a little in unity and harmony of plan, but the gain in the way of reliable and authentic information is incomparably greater.

To gain an idea of the contents. In the opening chapter the "Study of Religions" is discussed by M. de Grandmaison (47 pp.); the religion of tribes in the lower ranks of civilization by Mgr. le Roy (44 pp.); that of the Chinese by Léon Wieger (25 pp.); that of Japan, by Joseph Dahlmann (38 pp.); of the Persians, by Albert Carnoy (55 pp.); of the Indians, by Louis de la Vallée Poussin (76 pp.); of the Greeks, by J.

Huby (50 pp.); of the Romans, by C. Martindale (55 pp.); of the ancient Germans, by Ernest Böminghaus (22 pp.); of the Egyptians, by Alexis Mallon (32 pp.); of the Babylonians and Assyrians, by Albert Condamin (37 pp.); of Islam, by E. Power (43 pp.); of Israel, by J. Nikel (87 pp.); and of the Celts—a very interesting section for Irish readers—by John MacNeill, Professor, University College, Dublin. The treatment of the Christian religion is divided into five sections: the first, second and third, dealing respectively with the New Testament, the earlier centuries of the Christian Era and Middle Ages, by J. Huby and P. Rousselot (104 pp.); the fourth, with Christianity from the Renaissance to the Revolution, by A. Brou and P. Rousselot (60 pp.); and the fifth, with the Catholic religion of the nineteenth century, by De Grandmaison and P. Rousselot (72 pp.). The whole work runs to 1036 pages.

The author modestly states that his purpose is to give an elementary presentation of the subject (*une toute première initiation*). He has done much more. The articles are thoroughly scholarly, supported by continued references and a complete bibliography and, at the same time, popular in the sense that they can be read with pleasure and profit, even by those who have had no previous acquaintance with the subject. The author deserves the thanks of the Catholic world for putting within its reach, in a work of moderate compass and high literary quality, the best results of historical research. And while the merits of the book as a purely scientific work are great, its value as a religious work is greater still. For no one can read it through without feeling how far the Catholic religion stands above and beyond all its rivals, the perfect embodiment of the grace and truth that others have sought from the beginning and only in part attained.

The book is beautifully bound and printed, and furnished with a complete index. We can find no indication of the price.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

The Price of Unity. By B. W. Maturin. Longmans, Green and Co. 1912. Pp. xxxi. + 283. 5s. net.

Father Maturin belonged to the High Church party in England, until fifteen years ago, when middle life was well past, he entered the Catholic Church. Of the church which he left, especially of that part of it which is High Church, he retains the kindest memories, and for the characters and motives of its members he has the highest respect. If, then, the work before us attempts to set forth the weaknesses and inconsistencies of the High Church position, the attempt is made, not in any unworthy spirit of mere barren criticism, but in the hope that he may help those whom he has left behind to reach the rest and peace of soul which he himself now enjoys. Speaking of the feelings of one who, after years of anxious doubts and difficulties, at last finds himself at rest in the bosom of the Catholic Church, he writes: "It is only as

the years go by that one realizes how far one has travelled from one's former standpoint, and how great the change is. I do not mean so much in the details of faith, as in the whole comprehensive idea of what the Church is, and what it is to be in a Church that is always conscious of its own Divine authority and commission, and makes it felt from the highest to the lowest. You feel that you are in an organization that has endured the test of time and the assaults of many antagonists, whose foundations are built into the solid Rock against which the Gates of Hell cannot prevail, that you breathe an atmosphere in which your own weak faith is braced and strengthened by the faith of a vast multitude, and is supported by an authority upon which you can rest. You feel, indeed, like an exile who has returned to his Fatherland. There is a strange sense of coming to a land, and amongst a people, to whom you always belonged, though you did not know it. The surprises that meet you are surprises that seem to awaken memories of some long-forgotten past. It takes but a short time for a newcomer to feel as if he had been always there. All that was true in his former beliefs find their home and their place in the atmosphere to which they belong and from which they had been taken. They are like strains from some great symphony, whose beauty is only recognized when the whole is heard. To one who, like myself, came into the Church when middle life was well past, there has not been much of the sense of exultation which some have spoken of, still less has there ever been any feeling of bitterness or contempt for what I have left. But there has been an ever-deepening sense of certainty and security and peace, with moments of intense realization of the glory and the strength of the City of God, whose Walls are salvation and whose Gates are peace." I have quoted this passage because, besides affording a fair sample of the author's style, it also illustrates his purpose, which is not only to point out the weaknesses and defects of the English Church, but to set forth in contrast with them the real beauty and glory of the true Bride of Christ, against which most outsiders are so terribly prejudiced.

The work is meant to appeal chiefly to members of the High Church party, to which the author himself belonged. He discusses the difficulties which then presented themselves to his mind, the various motives which induced him to remain so long where he was, and the reasons which finally constrained him to enter the Catholic Church. To us Catholics, brought up in the Faith, many of the difficulties of intending converts are almost unintelligible. The tender memories of early years, the associations of friendship, the conviction that better men, morally and intellectually, than yourself have been and are satisfied with the church which you are thinking of abandoning, the fear that your unrest and dissatisfaction may be due to intellectual pride, the apprehension that you may have failed to respond to the grace of God, and hence that your trouble may be due to your own defects and not to those of the church to which you belong—all this and a great deal besides, contributes to hold back the intending convert and keep

him where he is. For all such difficulties and obstacles Fr. Maturin makes full and sympathetic allowance, but he insists that they cannot justify High Churchmen in clinging to their inconsistent and illogical position. If Christ founded one and only one Kingdom, all Christians are bound to belong to it, and it is folly to pretend that the Church of England, which revolted from Rome in the sixteenth century, and which since then has gone her own way in government, in faith, in sacraments, constitutes with the Roman Church, or with her and the Eastern Church, the one Kingdom of Christ. Again, if the Church is Christ's body, if a living body requires close and sympathetic union of its members, and if, as High Churchmen all admit, the Roman Church is a portion of that body, how can the English Church or any party in it, in view of the wide vital differences that separate them from Rome, belong to that same body? Such are some of the thoughts which Father Maturin develops at considerable length, always in a charitable and conciliatory spirit. We hope the work will find its way into the hands of many Anglicans, to whom it can hardly fail to do good. Catholics, too, will find it useful, as helping them to a clear and inside view of the High Church position.

J. MACRORY.

Die Selbstoffenbarung Jesu bei Mat. 11, 27 (Luc 10, 22). Eine kritisch-exegetische Untersuchung von Dr theol. Heinrich Schumacher. (Freiburger theologische Studien, 6. Heft), gr. 8° (xviii. u. 226 S). B. Herder, 68 Great Russell Street, London. 1912. Price 5 sh.

The brief passages of the first and third Gospels, with which this work deals, have been compared to an aerolite fallen from the Johannine firmament. The phrase is not inapt, as emphasising the clear and cogent character of the evidence afforded by the passages for the Divinity of Christ. It is hardly too much to say that when Our Lord Himself declares that all things were delivered to Him by His Father, and that no one knoweth the Son but the Father; neither doth any one know the Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him, the words are almost as clear evidence for Christ's Divinity as is afforded by any part of the fourth Gospel. It was to be expected, then, that like the fourth Gospel they would be selected for attack by the enemies of Our Lord's Divinity. According to Harnack the words do not mean that Jesus claims to be equal to God or to have a share in the Divine nature, but only that He had a knowledge of God superior to that of other men, and that it was His mission to share that knowledge with others; the Sonship that He claimed was not eternal, but acquired on the earth by His knowledge of the Father. M. Loisy, while rejecting Harnack's silly attempt to explain away the meaning of the passages, sought in another way to destroy their force. According to him, the words were never spoken by Jesus, but were merely attributed to him by some early Christian who thought they represented the true relation of Christ to the Father.

In the present work both these views are keenly and ably criticised. On the one hand, Harnack's exegesis is proved to be absolutely without foundation or justification; on the other, the genuineness of the passages is shown to be as certain as that of any other text in the Gospels. "Wenn es irgend ein Wort im Evangelium gibt, das wir unzweifel als eines echtes, ungefälschtes Wort Jesu verehren dürfen, dann ist es der Jubelruf bei Mat, 11, 27" (Luc. 10, 22).

J. MACRORY.

ΕΑΧΤΡΑ ΑΝ ΑΜΑΘΙΑΝ ΜΟΡ. With Notes and Complete Vocabulary.
 Edited by ΣΕΑΝ ΥΑ CεΑΛΛΑΙΣ. M. H. Gill and Son, Dublin.
 1911. Price 1s. net.

Though the subject of this long poem of 632 verses is of the light and fantastic order, dealing as it does with the martial and romantic adventures of the so-called "Αμαθία Μορ," it is well worth the attention of the serious student of Irish. He will find in it neat and terse expression, and, though there is nothing highly poetic in the conception of the story, it is redeemed from dulness by the dramatic way in which the episodes succeed one another. One can read it with sustained interest throughout, and here and there one meets with a stanza which runs so smoothly that it lingers in the memory, and helps one to forget the harsh and ill-constructed lines which unfortunately are rather numerous in the poem. As a fairly elementary text-book for schools it will be found extremely useful, and the editor, Sean ua Ceallais, has catered for the student-reader by supplying a fairly exhaustive vocabulary of 26 pages, in which some of the more difficult constructions are noted and explained. A little more explanation of certain points of grammar, which require elucidation, would have made the book more valuable to the private student, but as Mr. O'Kelly had probably the needs of school-going students in view, we do not feel that, in leaving many points to be dealt with by the teacher, he has failed in his design. Further help is given in a couple of pages of "Notes," attention being specially called to the more remarkable features of the language of the poem. The book is well printed in clear type by Messrs. M. H. Gill and Son.

ΣΕΑΡΟΙΟ Ο ΝΥΑΛΛΑΙΝ.

ΘΥΑΝΑΙΡΕ ΘΑΙΒΡΩ ΥΙ ΘΥΡΑΘΑΙΡ.—The Poems of David ó Bruadair. Part I. Containing Poems down to the year 1666. Edited with Introduction, Translation and Notes, by Rev. John C. MacErlean, S.J. London: Published for the Irish Texts Society by David Nutt. 1910.

The real inner history of Ireland, especially during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is to be found in the prose and poetry stored away in our Irish manuscripts. These often throw light on social and political conditions which escape the notice of the ordinary historian,

and a thorough knowledge of them is, therefore, indispensable for the writing of a comprehensive history of those periods. The book before us is a valuable addition to our sources of information in regard to the second half of the seventeenth century. It is the first instalment of the Poems of David ó Bruadair (circ. 1625-1698), and comprises all his writings arranged, as far as possible, in chronological order down to the year 1666. The editor (Rev. John C. MacErlean, S.J.) has done a notable service to the student of history, as well as the student of modern Irish literature, in putting before him the poems of a man, who, "whatever his faults may be, was a learned and true-hearted Gael, who, in dark and evil days, did his part faithfully in keeping alive the spirit of Irish nationality, and whom nothing could cause to swerve for a moment from the loyalty and love due to mother Erin" (Intro. xlv.). David lived during a period of grave political unrest, and he was no uninterested spectator of the intrigues of the time. In his poems we find reflected his own feelings and those of his patriotic fellow-countrymen concerning the important events through which they moved—feelings of pride in the greatness of Sarsfield, for instance, or of disgust at the chicanery and cabals of others. This intimate connection with the history of the time makes David's work especially valuable. But it has intrinsic, linguistic and literary claims to the attention of all interested in the knowledge and spread of modern Irish. Irish prose writers have still a great deal to learn about the vast potentialities of the language. Familiarity with poetry, such as that of David ó Bruadair, will be of the greatest assistance in teaching them how to wield the extensive vocabulary of modern Irish to the best advantage. We may refrain here from any critical appreciation of the literary merit of David's poetry until we receive the full fruits of his powers in the succeeding volumes which are promised us. The foretaste which we get in the present volume certainly augurs well for the feast still in store for us. Father MacErlean, in an exhaustive introduction of 40 pages, gives us most interesting information about the Uí Bhruadair (ch. 1), about the place and date of our poet's birth (ch. 2), his youth and education (ch. 3), his life and writings, and his death (chaps. 4, 5, 6). Copious explanations of various references in the text are interspersed throughout the book as footnotes, and in the special introductions prefixed to the separate poems. When we add that a very tasteful translation accompanies the poems, which, while not aiming at reproducing the main characteristics of the Irish metres, preserves in some measure the tone and spirit of the original, our readers will understand the amount of time and loving labour that must have been expended by Father MacErlean in preparing his book for the Press. We heartily congratulate him on the success which has crowned his efforts, and trust that every lover of the Irish language, and especially of Irish poetry, will hasten to procure a copy of this invaluable book, and thus help to preserve from undeserved oblivion "one of the greatest masters of Irish style, one of the last of those Irish poets who had been trained in the yet unbroken traditions of the classical poetic schools" (Intro. xlvii.).

SEARÓID Ó NUALLÁIN.

Notes.

The result of the Belgian elections cannot fail to be a source of pleasure not alone to Catholics in Belgium but to Catholics throughout the world. The foundation of a distinctly Catholic Party in Belgium was determined upon only when it was seen that without such a defence the very existence of the Catholic religion was seriously endangered, and it owes its strength to the bitter campaign carried on by the Liberals when they were in power against religious teaching in the schools. Since 1884, when it was first returned to office, till the present time, the Catholic Party has maintained its power and Belgium has gone forward by leaps and bounds. But grave fears were expressed on all sides that at the recent elections it was likely to suffer defeat. The very fact that it has been in office for 28 years was against it. People like a change, and many are sure to have particular grievances against any government, however perfect. Besides, an alliance had been concluded between the Socialists and the Liberals for the purpose of driving out the Catholics. The conclusion of such a union, they believed, would be certain to result in the defeat of their opponents. Again, the number of constituencies has been increased considerably in order to keep pace with the increasing population of Belgium, and finally there were signs of a disagreement amongst the leaders of the Catholic Party. But in spite of all forecasts and obstacles, the Government has increased its position both in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate, and unless something unforeseen happens the Catholic Party are secure in power for the next three years.



Whether the inner history of the Commission appointed by Leo XIII. to inquire into the validity of Anglican Orders will ever become fully known to the public, is a matter about which we need not speculate. The members of the Commission have kept silent except in so far as they felt called upon occasionally to correct erroneous statements or ward off unjustifiable attacks. Outsiders, however, bound by no special canons of secrecy, have shown an anxiety to publish whatever information they could gather on the subject, and when the chief witnesses chose to be silent, the attempts of others to enlighten the world were not always likely to be successful; even the most friendly feelings and most perfect sincerity could hardly save them from errors of serious consequence.



The latest instance of the fact is found in Lord Halifax's work, "Leo XIII. and Anglican Orders." Outside the members of the Commission, we could hardly think of anyone better qualified by character and position than his Lordship to throw valuable light on a subject that even for Catholics is not without its difficulties. And to

a great extent the work fulfils our expectations. As a representative of those non-Catholics who are nearest to the Church, he speaks, of course, with a high degree of authority, and his revelations of the attitude of his friends and of his own views on the whole subject are, from the Catholic point of view, of the greatest importance: even when dealing with the details of the Commission, his account is generally sufficiently near the truth to furnish instructive reading. But he falls here and there into the mistakes and errors inevitable in the circumstances. His blunders are occasionally so serious that two members of the Commission, Canon Moyes in the *Tablet*, and Abbot Gasquet in *Rome*, have been obliged to take him to task.



Canon Moyes selects three misstatements as most likely to prejudice the reading public against the decision of the Commission and the qualifications of the men by whom it was given. They amount to this: 1° that a considerable part of the time of the Commission was taken up with the historical question regarding Barlow and Parker, 2° that the rite itself was never submitted to serious inquiry, 3° that the Commission was bound from the start by previous decisions on the subject. Canon Moyes is, of course, at a disadvantage, inasmuch as neither he nor his fellow-members can urge in their defence all the evidence that they know to exist; still he is able to appeal to documents already before the public, which, in the judgment of any impartial outsider, are completely decisive in favour of the Commission and against his Lordship. His side of the case is stated plainly and simply, and it fully justifies the three statements with which he concludes, viz., that:

"The Commission did not spend any very considerable time in the discussion of the Barlow question.

"The Commission fully discussed the question of rite both in general and in detail.

"The Commission was perfectly free from first to last to consider all fresh evidence that could be brought forward, and the Papal decision was quite on the merits of the whole evidence adduced, and not upon any supposed requirement to conform to previous decisions."



In the course of a review in *Rome* of Lord Halifax's book, Abbot Gasquet also takes his Lordship to task, especially for the statement that the decision was founded upon the *previous* decisions of the Holy Office and not upon any new examination and discussion. "This, the Abbot declares, is absolutely and utterly false, as any member of the Commission will tell him and as the archives of the Vatican could prove if necessary." The fundamental reason, according to the Abbot, for the rejection of the claims put forward for Anglican Orders by Lord Halifax and his friends, was that the ancient Catholic formularies had been so tampered with and corrupted by the English Reformers, that the idea of the Mass as a sacrifice was swept away, and with it the idea of a sacrificing priesthood; hence in transmitting Orders there was no

intention of transmitting true priesthood. "If one is to believe the Reformers who were responsible for the liturgical changes in the 16th century," he writes, "they had succeeded in sweeping away the Mass altogether. Their declarations on the subject leave no possible doubt as to what they at least endeavoured to do, whilst the long persecutions unto death of those 'Mass priests' and others who clung to the old rite is at least corroborative evidence that they carried their determination to stamp out the old form of religion to the bitter end."



Fr. Klarmann's little book, entitled "The Crux of Pastoral Medicine," which was reviewed in this magazine some years ago, has had a prosperous career, and is now, we are glad to see, in its second edition. Needless to say, its strength of diction and logical cogency have in no way deteriorated in the meantime; quite the reverse is the fact. If we had any fault to find with the work, it would be that, perhaps, the author is inclined to dwell too long on good points he has made against his opponents, and to repeat principles and arguments after they must have sunk deep into the minds of even the most careless readers. Repetition is an effective oratorical device, but it may be overdone. For the matter contained in the work and the ability with which it is discussed we have nothing but praise. The section on real and apparent death contains valuable information for missionary priests, and the chapter on Vasectomy, or Vasotomy, will throw light on a subject much discussed nowadays, and lead to good results, we are sure, in those localities where the civil authorities have been blind enough to sanction a practice that is in itself an incitement to a vicious life, and that is bound in the long run to have a disastrous effect on the moral and material well-being of the race. We congratulate the author, and I hope he may be induced to give us many similar works in the same department.



The debates on the Welsh Disestablishment Bill, apart from their more immediate political bearing, have led the man in the street to speculate a little in theological matters, and supplied him with abundant evidence that the Continuity Theory cannot be maintained with any show of reason. But indeed the Anglican bishops seem to feel tired of the struggle, and are giving up the position. One of them, Dr. Welldon, recently wrote a work on Disestablishment. He at any rate has no doubts whatever on the subject. "At the Reformation," he says, "the State, or the Crown, acting on behalf of the State, took away large sums from the Church of Rome and transferred them to the Church of England: or, to put the case more accurately, took them away from a Church in communion with the See of Rome and transferred them to a Church not in communion with the See of Rome." Which is of course what history proves, and what no one outside a section of the Anglican fold would ever think of denying on historical evidence alone.

The attitude taken up by the Prime Minister on the question does not afford much light. First he declared, during the Welsh Disestablishment debate, that the Reformation made no breach in the continuity. "I am not one of those who think that the legislation of Henry VIII. transferred the privileges and endowments of a national establishment from the Church of Rome to the Church of England. I admit there has been through all these changes and developments a substantial identity and continuity of existence in our National Church from earliest history down to the present time." Since then he has endeavoured to explain his meaning by drawing a distinction between the spiritual unity and continuity of the Anglican Church and the various modifications it underwent at the will of Parliament. But the explanation completely gives away the case for continuity. "In other words," he says, "I was drawing and pointing to the distinction between the spiritual unity and continuity of the Church and the shifting phases it assumed from time to time, as a State Establishment, owing to the legislation of Parliament." He then proceeds to admit that amid these shifting phases the Crown and Parliament had made good their claim, "first of all to establish and define the Royal supremacy over the Church, and next to confine the Church, even in purely ecclesiastical matters, as its final Court of Appeal, to a Court of secular judges appointed by the Crown to change the doctrine and modify the ceremonies taught and practised, one moment to prohibit and another to admit such an institution as the marriage of the clergy." Thus he admits that Parliament has made good its claim to "change the doctrine" of the Church of England. In the face of such an admission, what room is there for the theory of continuity?



As Mr. Lloyd George in his own straight, strong way puts it: "It is only continuity in a technical and legal sense. In all things that are to be regarded as essential by the Church itself and by Christendom itself, the Church cannot claim that it is anything but a complete change from the old system." And it is this view of the Chancellor, maintaining the absence of any real continuity, that has been enshrined in the Welsh Disestablishment Bill. For the Bill, while leaving to the English Church in Wales whatever she has received since 1662, proposes to strip her of all her older endowments. Why is this, except that the older endowments are recognised to have been given for the support of another religion and another Church? The Bill is in fact a practical repudiation by Parliament of the Continuity Theory.



It is a startling departure and a sign of the times that all the Divinity Professors, both at Oxford and Cambridge, have proposed that the degrees in Divinity be thrown open to all comers without any religious test. Hitherto these degrees have been confined to the clergy of the Anglican Church, but if the proposed change be effected, an avowed unbeliever or agnostic may pose as a Doctor of Divinity in these Universities; and it is not easy to see how he can be consistently

excluded from even occupying in them a Professorial Chair. The question came before the Lower House of Canterbury Convocation in the first week of May last, but the House by passing to the "previous question," decided, for the present at any rate, to express no opinion on the subject. As *The Guardian* naively remarks, "this was, perhaps, a discreet conclusion, since it is never wise to lay down the law to people who may very likely ignore you."



The Friendship of Christ, by Robert Hugh Benson, is a small work of 167 pages, containing, in an abbreviated form, sermons preached in Rome during the year 1911. The sermons treat of Christ in the interior soul, Christ in the exterior—in the Eucharist, in the Church, in the Priest, in the Saint, in the Sinner, in the Average Man, in the Sufferer, and Christ in His Historical Life. The work contains many beautiful and suggestive thoughts well expressed, and can be sincerely recommended as one that will help the reader to see our Divine Friend and Lord more frequently and more clearly in the ordinary affairs of everyday life. Longmans, Green and Co. are the publishers. The price, 3s. 6d. net, is perhaps a little smart.



Another work of a somewhat similar kind is *The Humanity of Jesus*, an authorised translation from the original German of Father Moritz Meschler, S.J. The work consists of four chapters, dealing respectively with Our Divine Saviour's asceticism, His art of education, His intercourse with mankind, and His wisdom in speaking and teaching. As far as it goes, it is an admirable little treatise on Our Lord, and even those who have read and thought much on the subjects discussed will find here many new thoughts, or old ones put in a new and fresh way. Sands and Co are the publishers, and the price is 2s. 6d. net. Pp. 133.



Burns and Oates have just published, at the price of 1s. 6d. net, a little book of 75 pages, entitled "Marriage, Divorce, and Morality." The little work consists of four sermons and one lecture, all delivered during the present year by the Rev. Henry C. Day, S.J. The first sermon deals with present-day moral laxity, its causes and remedies; the second with the current depreciation of marriage; the third with divorce; the fourth with race degeneration in Great Britain; and the lecture discusses the urgent need and possible means of race regeneration.

The subjects are treated at once frankly and delicately, and the little work is well calculated to do good. Some of the figures given by Father Day are not encouraging reading. The work of the Divorce Court Judges in England is still steadily increasing, the number of matrimonial suits before them in the Hilary sittings of the present year being nearly sixty in excess of that of the same term last year. And the last quarterly returns of the Registrar-General for 1911 show the birth-rate in England and Wales to have been only 24.4 annually per 1,000 of the population. This is 2.9 per 1,000 below the mean

birth-rate in the ten preceding quarters, and 11.9 per 1,000 below the rate in 1876. In fact, it is the lowest birth-rate that has been recorded in any corresponding period since the establishment of civil registration. This is certainly a very serious matter for England and Wales; guns are of little use if there are not men behind them.



The latest official report states that of the \$500,000 to be collected by the American Knights of Columbus for the Catholic University of Washington, \$400,000 has already been received. It is expected that the full amount will be collected by October of this year, when it will be invested for the benefit of the University. This is a noble and instructive example of the power of such a Society to provide the sinews of war for Catholic educational purposes.



A distinguished American ecclesiastic, who desires that for the present his name should not be made public, has written to the Bishops of Ireland generously making an offer of a prize of £200 for the best Life of St. Columbanus, to be ready for the centenary celebrations in the year 1915. Such an offer could not fail to be acceptable to the Bishops, and more especially to Cardinal Logue, who has taken such a practical interest in the restoration of the Shrine of St. Columbanus at Bobbio. At the last meeting of the Episcopal Committee, held in April, the subject was considered, and it was resolved to invite His Grace the Archbishop of Tuam, the Right Hon. M. F. Cox, M.D., Dr. Sigerson, and Dr. MacCaffrey, Maynooth, to act in conjunction with a similar body to be appointed in the United States, if the donor wished to appoint such a committee. Since then the donor has been communicated with, and has expressed his complete satisfaction with the committee appointed by the Bishops. He wishes that to it alone should be given full power to draw up the conditions of the competition and to award the prize if, in the opinion of the members, any of the works submitted reach the proper standard. He writes that the motive that influenced him in making such offer was the hope that it might be the means of presenting the Irish people and their descendants with a work that would be at once popular and scholarly, embodying the best results of all modern writers who deal with the sources of the Saint's life and the period it embraces, and yet at the same time couched in good literary form. He would like to see a good account of the literary and artistic culture of contemporary Ireland and a reliable presentation of the social, political and economic aspects of the period given as a background for the Life of St. Columbanus. It is earnestly to be hoped that such a generous offer will meet with a ready response, and that competitors will be found in Ireland to undertake what should be for them such a labour of love. A further announcement will be made when the conditions for awarding the prize are fully arranged, but in the meantime all communications on the matter should be addressed to Dr. MacCaffrey, St. Patrick's College, Maynooth.

The *Journal of the County Louth Archæological Society* for the year 1911, edited by the Rev. James Quinn, C.C., is one of the most interesting and most valuable of the journals published by similar bodies in Ireland. The controversy regarding the Burial Place of St. Fanchea is still continued by Father Lawless, Father Gogarty, and Father Murray, and so skilfully has the battle been conducted, that he would be a rash man indeed who would interfere between them. Amongst the papers that we read with great interest and profit were: "St. Columba in Louth," by Father Laurence Murray; "Henry Jones, Bricklayer and Poet" (a Louth man who in the 18th century was proposed by Colley Cibber and the Earl of Chesterfield for the position of Poet-Laureate of England), by Father Gogarty; "The Clinton Family in County Louth," by the Rev. J. B. Leslie; "Louthiana," by the Editor and Mr. H. G. Tempest; and "Eibhlín a Rúin," by Father Donnellan. The entire work, printing and illustrations, is turned out in excellent style by Mr. Tempest, at the Dundalgan Press.



Messrs. Herder, of St. Louis, have forwarded *The Life of the Venerable Francis Liebermann*, by the Rev. G. Lee, C.S.Sp. It is a work of 321 pages, well printed and well bound, and the price is 4s. 6d. A good account is given of the conversion of the Venerable Liebermann—his father was a Jewish Rabbi of Saverne in Alsace—of his studies in Paris and Rome, of the foundation of the Missionaries of the Immaculate Heart, of his success as an administrator and spiritual adviser, of his death and of the "Introduction of his Cause." The best sources of information on the life and work of the Saint have been consulted, and the author has spared no pains to make his book both reliable and interesting.



Luther et la Question Sociale, edited by A. Tralin, 12 Rue du Vieux-Colombier, Paris, is a volume of the series published under the general title: "La Pensée et l'œuvre Sociale du Christianisme." The author is Abbé Léon Cristiani, who has also written "Du Luthéranisme au Protestantisme" and "Luther et le Luthéranisme." His various studies of Luther and Lutheranism well equipped him for the task of discussing the social attitude of the arch-reformer. In this volume the author gives us in a succinct form the history of the Social Revolution of 1525, a crisis which history recognises as tragic in the extreme. He purposes above all to explain the social ideas of Luther and his attitude towards the Social Revolution. The three sections in which he deals with these points are: "The Social Revolution of 1525," "The Attitude of Luther during the Social Revolution," and "The Social Value of the Lutheran Evangel." The most interesting chapters in the volume are: "Freedom of Thought from the Social Standpoint," in which the author traces the curious development of the teaching of Luther from his doctrine of freedom from religious control to his system of a State Religion, and "Theories of Luther about the State," in

which he explains the pessimistic teaching of the reformer concerning the necessity of social authority. Price 2 fr. 50c. Pp. 215.



Lettres à un Etudiant sur la Sainte Eucharistie, by L. Labauche, Professor in the Seminary of Saint-Sulpice, is a very useful critical survey of the Catholic doctrine of the Blessed Eucharist. These letters first appeared in the "Revue pratique d'Apologétique" from December, 1910, to October, 1911. They were occasioned by a request of some students of the University of Paris, who wished to have an authentic explanation of Catholic doctrine. In them we find an able defence of the traditional teaching on the Eucharist against the theories of Modernism. Beginning with a critical exposition of the ideas of Loisy concerning the Eucharist, they proceed to examine the sixth chapter of St. John, the Eucharistic faith of the second century as displayed especially in the writings of Justin Martyr, the Real Presence, Transubstantiation, the dogma of Transubstantiation and Philosophy, the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, Holy Communion, the dogma which is the vivifying centre of Catholic life, and the priesthood. The volume is published by Messrs. Bloud et Cie. Price 3 fr. 50c. Pp. 308.



We have received *The Interior Castle*, by Saint Teresa of Jesus, translated from the autograph of Saint Teresa by the Benedictines of Stanbrook, and revised, with introduction and additional notes, by the Very Reverend Benedict Zimmerman, O.C.D., second edition. As we learn from the Introduction, Saint Teresa began to write *The Interior Castle* on June 2, 1577, and completed it on November 29 of the same year; but there was an interruption of five months, so that the actual time spent in the composition of the work was only four weeks. Saint Teresa possessed the power of concentration of thought in a marvellous manner. The early mornings and late evenings were devoted to the composition of the book, while the rest of the day was taken up by the affairs of her Order. The book was eagerly read by those who were able to obtain copies. At the Archiepiscopal Seminary at Salamanca it was read publicly; and the students, contrary to custom, sacrificed the recreation rather than miss so edifying an instruction, with the result that several entered the religious life, one becoming a Franciscan, two others, who had already taken their degrees, joining the Discalced Carmelites. *The Interior Castle* is not a complete treatise of mystical theology. Like Saint Teresa's other works, it is intensely personal; she describes the road by which she was led, being well aware that others may be led in a different way. The present translation, the third in English, has been made directly from the photo-lithographic edition of the original which, on the occasion of the tercentenary of the Saint, was published under the direction of Cardinal Lluçh, Archbishop of Seville. The publisher is Thomas Baker, London. Price 6s. net. Pp. xxxvi. + 802.

Messrs. Herder, London, have sent us *The Business of Salvation*, by Bernard J. Otten, S.J., Professor of Theology in St. Louis University. It contains a series of discourses which the author was called on to deliver in the St. Louis Cathedral, where the audience was, to a large extent, composed of business men. The circumstances of the occasion explain the novel form of the discourses which place the work of salvation on a strict business basis, taking due account of Capital and Interest, of Gain and Loss, and of all the various Risks involved in Business Enterprises. Hence we find discourses entitled: "Capital," "Rate of Profits," "Net Gain," "Trade Conditions," "Apprenticeship," "A Speciality," "Ready Cash," "Subsidies," "Speculations," "Damages," "Securities," "Life Partnership," "Communism," "Utopian Dreams," "Social Unrest," "Capitalism," and "Fair Wage." Under these headings the duties of various states and persons are explained with clearness and cogency. Price 5s. net. Pp. 377.



The Ways of Mental Prayer, by the Right Rev. Dom Vitalis Lehodey, translated by a Monk of Mount Melleray, has been published by Messrs. Gill and Son. The author hopes that he is rendering a helpful service to his brethren by offering them a clear, simple, and short explanation of the kinds of prayer which, without yet leaving the common ways, are suitable to souls more advanced, so that they will have always at hand, briefly stated, the information they should otherwise have to seek for in twenty different books. Pp. xxxii. + 408.



Vade-Mecum des Predicateurs, published by Pierre Téqui, 82 Rue Bonaparte, Paris, is one of the best works of its kind that we have ever seen. It contains plans of sermons for Sundays, Feast Days, and Special Occasions. In the eight hundred pages of this volume there are summaries of sermons on nearly every subject. The two missionaries, who are the authors, are not content with mere headings; they give appropriate quotations from the Fathers, the theologians, and the mystical writers; so that the preacher can never be in want of suitable matter for his sermons if he has this Vade-Mecum in his library.



Messrs. Washbourne have sent us *The Reign of Jesus*, an abridgment of the work of the Blessed Jean Eudes, by the Abbé Granger, translated from the second French edition by K. M. L. Harding. In 1909 Père Eudes was beatified, and Cardinal Satolli chose this work as the subject of his panegyric on the Blessed Jean Eudes. The Abbé Granger has abridged and simplified the original, with the result that we have an excellent volume of 370 pages, which deserves to be found on the bookshelf and in the hands of all who are desirous of advancing the Reign of Christ.

One of the volumes in Herder's "Theologische Bibliothek," which we can recommend to students of theology who read German is the *Lehrbuch der Dogmatik*, von Dr. Bernhard Bartmann, Prof. of Theology in Paderborn (2nd enlarged and improved edition, 1911; pp. xix. + 861 large 8vo; price 14s. paper; 15s. 6d. bd. 1st edition existed only in lithograph). It is a complete handbook of dogmatic theology (special) compressed into a single volume, and divided into seven books (God, one and triune—Creation—Redemption—Grace—the Church—the Sacraments—Eschatology), with appropriate sub-divisions. A good general introduction (pp. 1-88) explains the meaning, etc., of dogma, the objective (revelation) and subjective (faith) principles of dogmatic knowledge, and the method and function of dogmatic theology as a science. In the introduction and book v. (the Church) a good deal of the ground proper to Fundamental Dogmatic Theology (Christian and Catholic Apologetics) is touched upon, and with very little addition to the space so taken up it would have been possible, we think, to include a formal treatise of Apologetics in this volume. At any rate we do not approve of the arrangement which puts back the treatise on the Church so far, unless, indeed, the subject has already been treated apologetically; and even in that case is there not a needless repetition in this second treatment? For the rest this *Lehrbuch* is a very good elementary text-book.



We think we have mentioned before that the firm of Herder, already well known to English readers by their American branch in St. Louis, have now a London branch also at 68 Great Russell Street. Their output of Latin, German and English Catholic publications entitles them to a foremost place in the international publishing trade.



Certitude, a Study in Philosophy (B. Herder, St. Louis, Freiburg and London, 1911) is an essay of 94 pages, by Rev. Aloysius Rother, S.J., Professor of Philosophy in St. Louis University, written, as the preface tells us, "according to the teaching of the scholastics" in order "to secure a greater esteem and love for the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas." Chap. I. deals with "introductory notions" (definition of certitude, states of mind falling short of certitude, divisions of certitude); Chap. II. with the "requisites for certitude" (assent to truth, infallible motives, evidence of infallibility of motives); and Chap. III. with the "properties of certitude." The treatment throughout is clear and simple, and well suited to the capacity of any average intelligent reader. We are glad to see that the author insists, in Chap. III., on a point that is not always sufficiently emphasised, viz., that "the name certitude is applied to assent given on metaphysical, physical and moral grounds, not univocally but analogically, the analogy in this case being that known as analogy of 'intrinsic attribution' whence it follows that the three orders of certitude are not species [of a common genus] in

the technical sense." A good deal of the difficulty sometimes felt in analysing moral certitude is based on the implicit assumption that it ought to be reduced to metaphysical.

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Sands and Co. (Edinburgh and London) have sent us *Sacred Dramas*, by Augusta Theodosia Drane (Mother Francis Raphael, O.S.D.), a neat volume handsomely illustrated and containing three pieces: St. Catherine of Alexandria, "Flowers from Heaven" (scenes from the martyrdom of St. Dorothea), and A Christmas Mystery, in two parts (I. The Shepherd's Watch; II. The Journey of the Kings). These were written many years ago by the late authoress for pupils in the schools belonging to her congregation, but without any idea of publishing them. They are published now by her Dominican sisters in the hope that they will be found suitable for home and school performances. We can recommend them for that purpose. Price 2s. 6d. net.

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An excellent little volume of the series *Science et Religion (Questions théologiques)*, published by MM. Bloud et Cie., Paris, is *Le Dogme* (1911) by M. P. Charles. In Chap. I., "Les sens des Dogmes," the author refutes the modernist theory of the meaning and function of dogmas, especially the notions of M. Le Roy. In Chap. II., "Evolution des Dogmes," he explains and defends the Catholic theory of development principally in opposition to M. Loisy.

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Another volume of the same series (sub-series, *Etudes de Philosophie et de Critique Religieuse*) lately received is M. J. Burel's *Isis et les Isisques sous l'Empire Romain* (1911). We recommend it to our readers as a handy and critically reliable account of the character and fortunes of the Isis cult in the Roman empire.

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The seventh edition of the *Propaedeutica Philosophica-Theologica* of Dr. Francis Egger, Auxiliary Bishop of the Diocese of Brixen (Austrian Tyrol), has reached us (Typis Wegerianis, Brixinae, 1912; one vol.; price 8m.); also the seventh edition of the same author's *Enchiridion Theologiae Dogmaticae Specialis* (same publisher, 1911; one vol., 10m.). The first editions of these works were published as far back as 1878 and 1887 respectively, and the fact that so many subsequent editions have been called for is convincing proof that the works have been found useful. They are standard compendia clearly and judiciously compiled, but possessing the limitations of their kind. The *Propaedeutica* covers the whole field of Philosophy (Logic, Criteriology, Ontology, Natural Theology, Psychology and Cosmology), and gives a good digest on traditional lines of the approved tenets of scholasticism. Obviously there is little scope in a single volume, covering so wide a field for originality, either in matter or treatment. And the same remark applies to the *Enchiridion*, which, presupposing a course of Apologetics or Fundamental Dogma, epitomises the usual tracts belonging to Special

Dogma more or less in the usual way. But it is unusual to take up space in a dogmatic compendium with a treatise on the dignity and prerogatives of St. Joseph (Appendix II. to *De Christo Redemptore*, pp. 507-522): the author anticipates surprise on the reader's part ("mirabitur quispiam," etc.), and that surprise, we think, will remain even after his apology for this appendix is considered.



We have received the French translation of Miss B. A. Baker's *A Modern Pilgrim's Progress* (1906) executed by a Benedictine Father of Solesmes, and published, with a preface by Dom Cabrol, under the title *Vers la Maison de Lumière, Histoire d'une Conversion* (Libraire Lecoffre, J. Gabalda and Cie. Paris, 1912). Many of our readers are acquainted with the original, and do not need to be told of its value and charm as a piece of religious autobiography. To those who may not know the work no stronger recommendation of it can be given than the fact that it has been thought worthy of being translated. The translation has been admirably done.



A delightful little book is *mú na mBeac*—a collection of Irish Prose and Poetry, compiled and edited by half-a-dozen members of the Columban League. There are in all about 80 pages of Irish texts from various sources, including two Homilies from *Lebor na Huidre*. The remaining seventy pages of the book are taken up with Notes, Appendices, and Vocabularies—all of which reflect considerable credit on the Editors' industry. For those to whom the linguistic aspect of Irish is paramount, a perusal of all contained within the covers of *mú na mBeac* will be both interesting and beneficial, if not always convincing. The book is printed in clear type by Dollard, and published by Messrs. M. H. Gill and Son, Ltd.

Theological Articles in the Reviews.

THE IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD. April, 1912.—**Rev. J. F. Hogan, D.D.** (Editor), 'Socialism and Taxation.' **John Ayscough**, 'A Novelist's Sermons.—III.' **T. Frederick Willis, B.A.**, 'Faith and Reason in relation to Conversion to the Church.' **Rev. M. J. O'Donnell, D.D.**, 'His Grace the Archbishop of Dublin and the Recent "Motu Proprio."' May, 1912.—**His Grace the Archbishop of Dublin**, 'Two Famous Irish Marriage Cases.' **Rev. M. Russell, S.J.**, 'A Neglected Adverb: or, Prime as Morning Prayer.' **Very Rev. Canon McCarthy**, 'The Fight for the Faith in the Primary and Secondary Schools of France.' **Rev. P. J. Manly**, 'Spiritualism and the Spirit World.—II.' June, 1912.—**His Grace the Archbishop of Dublin**, 'Two Famous Irish Marriage Cases.—II.' **John Ayscough**, 'A Novelist's Sermons.—IV.' **Rev. J. Rickaby, S.J.**, 'Probabilism as a Subsidiary Guide to Conduct.' Notes and Queries: (Theology.—**Rev. J. M. Harty, D.D.**; Canon Law.—**Rev. M. J. O'Donnell, D.D.**; Liturgy.—**Rev. T. O'Doherty**). Correspondence. Documents. Notices of Books. Title and Contents—January to June.

THE JOURNAL OF THEOLOGICAL STUDIES. April, 1912.—**Rev. G. H. Box**, 'The Christian Messiah in the Light of Judaism, Ancient and Modern.' **Rev. F. A. Robinson, D.D.**, 'The Problem of the Didache.' [Shows how the author made a disguised use of the writings of St. Paul and St. Luke.] Documents:—**Rev. A. Ramsbottom**, 'The Commentary of Origen on the Epistle to the Romans.' **Rev. E. S. Buchanan**, 'A Sixth-Century Fragment of St. Mark.' Notes and Studies:—**F. C. Burkitt**, 'A New MS. on the Odes of Solomon.' **C. H. Turner**, 'The Text of the newly-discovered Scholia of Origen on the Apocalypse.' **Rev. J. Chapman, O.S.B.**, 'Zacharias slain between the Temple and the Altar.' **Rev. C. F. Rogers**, 'How did the Jews Baptize?' **Rev. F. H. Chase, D.D.**, 'Note on *πρηνὴς γενόμενος* in Acts i. 18.' **Rev. E. F. Brown**, 'Note on Philippians i. 21, 22.' **Rev. C. F. Burney, D.Litt.**, 'Old Testament Notes.' **E. Nestle, D.D.**, 'The Judge Shamgar.' **Rev. H. F. B. Compston**, 'The accentuation of *Wayyomar* in Job.' Reviews.

THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW. April, 1912.—**Louis F. Benson**, 'The Liturgical Use of English Hymns.' **John G. Macken**, 'The Origin of the First Two Chapters of Luke.' **C. R. Morey**, 'The Origin of the Fish Symbol.' Reviews of Recent Literature.

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Law and Its Workings.' **G. A. Coe**, 'The Distinguishing Mark of a Christian.' Critical Notes:—**E. A. Cook**, 'Is the "Two-Nature" Theory of the Incarnation a Mystery or a Contradiction?' **B. Scott Easton**, 'Luke 17: 20-21. An Exegetical Study.' Recent Theological Literature.

REVUE DES SCIENCES PHILOSOPHIQUES ET THEOLOGIQUES. Avril, 1912.—**A. D. Gertillanges**, 'La Sanction morale dans la Philosophie de S. Thomas.' **M. D. Roland-Gosselon, O.P.**, 'Les Methodes de la Définition d'après Aristote.' **M. Jacquin, O.P.**, 'Le Magistère Ecclesiastique Source et Règle de la Théologie.' **R. Coulon, O.P.**, 'Jacobin, Gallican et "Appelan," le P. Noël Alexandre (*suite*). Note:—**A. Dehil, S.J.**, 'L'Attestation du nombre septénaire des Sacraments chez Gregoire de Bergame.' Bulletins:—de Philosophie (**M. Barge** et **H.-D. Noble, O.P.**), d'Histoire et des Doctrines Chrétiennes (**M. Jacquin, O.P.**). Chronique.

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Studies in Christian Art for the Clergy.' 'The Psalm "Beatus Vir"' in the Breviary.' June.—**H. G. Hughes**, 'A Recent Work on the Sacred Heart.' **A. Kemper, S.J.**, 'On Teaching Catechism.' **J. R. Fryar**, 'The Religious Military Orders.' **Dr. C. Constantini**, 'Gothic Art. VIII. Studies in Christian Art for the Clergy.' **A. J. Maas, S.J.**, 'The History of Religion.'

THE CATHOLIC WORLD. April, 1912.—**Sir Bertram C. A. Windle, LL.D.**, 'Darwin, "Darwinism," and Other "Isms."' **Fr. Cuthbert, O.S.F.C.**, 'St. Clare of Assisi.' **F. P. Duffy, D.D.**, 'The Life of Cardinal Newman.' **W. E. Campbell**, 'Sir Thomas More and His Time.' **H. P. Russell**, 'The Note of Apostolicity.' May.—**E. Hickey**, 'Catholic Principles and English Literature.' **Sir Bertram C. A. Windle, LL.D.**, 'Darwin, "Darwinism," and Other "Isms."' **C. A. Aiken, S.T.D.**, 'The Church Fathers and Private Property.' **Fr. Cuthbert, O.S.F.C.**, 'St. Clare of Assisi.' **Max Turmann, LL.D.**, 'The Social Apostolate in France.' June.—**T. J. Gerrard**, 'Eugenics and Catholic Teaching.' **Sir Bertram C. A. Windle, LL.D.**, 'Darwin, "Darwinism," and Other "Isms."' **Fr. Cuthbert, O.S.F.C.**, 'St. Clare of Assisi.' **A. T. Sadlier**, 'The Poet of the Blessed Sacrament.' [Don Pedro Calderon de la Barca.] **P. Robinson, O.F.M.**, 'Jørgensen's St. Francis.'

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
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
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Prophecy and Prophets in New Testament Times.

Be zealous for spiritual gifts, but rather that ye may prophecy (1 Cor. xiv. 1).

WE have all marvelled at the extraordinary picture of the Corinthian Church as presented to us in chapters xii.-xiv. of St. Paul's First Epistle to that Church. Its members seem to have been guilty of a certain childishness, of a peculiar want of moderation and sobriety which are all the more striking by reason of the contrast they afford to the calm tranquillity of the Gospel story. Yet it may be that in these same extravagances we have proof of the truth of the Gospel message; for men were to be literally "intoxicated with new wine," with the wine of the Holy Spirit, and it was inevitable that it should at times shew that it was in "old bottles" which were hardly capable of containing it.

A study, then, of the Spirit of Prophecy as portrayed in the New Testament, and of the Prophets of that era, will perhaps furnish us with a background which will, in its turn, set in due perspective the early Corinthian Church with its seeming extravagances, puerilities, and excesses.

I.

We are perhaps accustomed to picture the Prophets, and indeed Prophecy itself, as a feature peculiar to the Old Testament dispensation; and we are probably wont to regard the Apostles as completely displacing the Prophets after the advent of the Messiah Whose heralds these latter had been. But a careful study of the New Testament will shew us that this view calls for considerable modification. For just as Moses, in view of the Prophets who were to come after him, found it necessary to give careful directions for distinguishing true from false Prophets (Deut. xiii.), so also did the Messiah find it necessary to say: *Beware of*

false Prophets . . . by their fruits ye shall know them (St. Matth. vii. 15-20, *cp.* x. 41; xiv. 11, 24, etc.). He thus shewed that the Prophetic age was not past merely because the chief goal of Old Testament Prophecy had been reached, and that just as under the Old Dispensation (see Jeremias xxiii. and xxviii.), there had been many false Prophets, so also would there be many in this the last age of the Church who would arrogate to themselves the title of "men of the Spirit." And the basis of this Spirit of Prophecy was explicitly laid down by Our Lord when He said to His disciples: *The Spirit of Truth . . . will teach you all Truth . . . and the things that are to come He will shew you* (St. John xvi. 13), so that the words of the Creed: *Qui locutus est per Prophetas*, are true of the Prophets of the Old and of the New Dispensation alike. Hence St. Peter's unhesitating application to New Testament times of the words of Joel who spoke of Prophecy as a feature of the New Dispensation and as due to the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. Hence, too, in Acts i. 5, 8; v. 32, this outpouring of the Holy Spirit is spoken of as a Baptism with the Holy Ghost: *cp.* Rom. xv. 19.

St. John expresses the primary function of this outpouring of the Holy Spirit when he says: *the testimony of Jesus is the Spirit of Prophecy* (Apoc. xix. 10). To "testify" to Jesus is laid down, however, as being the rôle of the Apostles (St. Luke xxiv. 48, etc.); yet it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that therefore New Testament Prophecy merely meant "testifying" that Jesus had come in the flesh, or that these Prophets looked backwards whereas the Old Testament Seers looked forwards. Neither can we conclude that because it was the office of the Apostles to "testify" to the Messias as already come therefore only Apostles were Prophets; nor, again, that all Apostles were, by the very fact of their Apostleship, also Prophets. A perusal of the *Acts of the Apostles* will shew us how far removed are such conclusions from the truth.

The *Acts* might well be described as the *Book of the Holy Spirit*, for His action is mentioned over fifty times in the course of the narrative. And this influence of the Holy Spirit is in no sense confined to the Apostles; for in the first place we find certain men who are acknowledged as Prophets and who yet do not belong to the Twelve, *e.g.*, in xi.

27, and xxi. 10, Agabus is mentioned as a well-known Prophet from Judaea; in xv. 32 Judas and Silas are mentioned as *being Prophets also themselves*, where the word *also* may seem to indicate that they—as well as Barnabas and Saul—were Prophets, and that consequently these two Apostles were, as a matter of course, Prophets as well as Apostles, a point to which we shall return later. Further, this gift was not confined to the male sex, for the four daughters of Philip the Evangelist are named as “prophesying” (xxi. 9; see also 1 Cor. xi. 5), *every woman praying or prophesying*.

As to the place occupied by these Prophets in the early Church, our earliest information is furnished by the Church at Antioch where, as we are told in Acts xiii. 1, *there were . . . Prophets and Doctors, among whom were Barnabas, Simon, Lucius, Manahen, and Saul*. Whether all were Prophets as well as Doctors is not clear; Eusebius, however, *H.E.* 11, 3, when referring to this passage and to xi. 28, speaks of Paul and Barnabas as Prophets. It seems clear, at any rate, that Saul, though already “called” to the Apostleship (ix. 15), was not yet formally constituted an Apostle; not, of course, that he received his Apostleship from the Church, but that his call to it was formally notified to the Church at this time. That Prophets and Apostles were in no sense identified is also evident from the fact that we are here introduced to a Church in which there were Prophets and Doctors but no Apostle. And it is especially noteworthy that these Prophets and Doctors apparently constituted the governing body in that Church, for neither Priests nor Bishops, not even Elders, are mentioned. And this is but natural, for the Church was yet in Her infancy. How speedily the change from informal to formal government was to come about we can gather from Phil. i. 1, and Acts xx. 17 and 28. We note, moreover, that while in this Antiochian Church the Prophets are depicted as forming part of the governing body, we nowhere find Apostles occupying any such position. They are essentially “sent out” to preach, and would appear to have no fixed abode. This “non-resident” character of the Apostleship comes out clearly in the respective parts played by St. Peter and St. James at the Council of Jerusalem (Acts xv. 7-11 and 13-21).

Our second source of information regarding the relative positions of the Apostles and the New Testament Prophets is to be found in St. Paul's catalogues of the various members of the Hierarchy with their respective powers. Thus in Ephes. iii. 5, he speaks of *the mystery revealed to His holy Apostles and Prophets in the Spirit*: similarly in ii. 20 the Church is said to be built upon the foundation of the *Apostles and Prophets*. The same order is observed in Apoc. xviii. 20, *Rejoice over her, ye holy Apostles and Prophets*, and in xxii. 9, the Angel speaks to John of his brethren the *Prophets*. And the relative order of these two grades, as also of a third, the Doctors or Teachers, is clearly set forth in 1 Cor. xii. 28, *first Apostles, secondly Prophets, thirdly Doctors . . .*, cp. ver. 29; it is remarkable that St. Jerome (*Contra Rufinum*, II. 25, Migne, 11, col. 470) understands *Prophets* in this passage as referring to those of the Old Testament.

II.

There were Prophets then in the New Testament era, and they occupied a definite place in the Hierarchy; more than that, they took a prominent part in the government of the Church. But at first sight it is not easy to see what was precisely the rôle played by these Prophets in the New Testament economy. For it would seem as though the advent of the Messias had deprived Prophecy of its specific object, the prediction, namely, of "One Who was to come." But in addition to other functions there was a secondary function fulfilled by the Prophets of old, that, namely, of *consoling* (Isaias xl. 1, Eccius. xlviii. 27), and we find Barnabas, "the son of consolation" (Acts iv. 36), prominent in exercising this work of mercy (xi. 23-24), and it is added, as though by way of explanation, *for he was full of the Holy Ghost*; the same, too, is narrated expressly of Silas and Jude (xv. 32).¹ But it is evident that the special title of "Prophet," as well as the high place accorded them throughout the New Testament, demands for these Prophets a wider scope than that afforded by the work of consoling and strengthening the weak and the afflicted. And an examination of Acts and of St. Paul's Epistles will reveal the

¹ Cp. 1 Cor. xiv. 3.

extraordinarily large share which Prophets and Prophecy played in the life of the Doctor of the Gentiles. We are all familiar with the remarkable passage (Acts xvi. 6), where Paul, Silas and Timothy were forbidden by the Holy Ghost to preach in Asia; but one of the most curious differences between the so-called "Western" text of Acts and that now current, lies in the repeated interventions of the Holy Spirit preserved for us in the former. By the "Western" text of Acts we understand that preserved for us mainly in *Codex Bezae*, *Cantabrigiensis* or D, and supported by the witness of the Philoxenian Syriac version, the *Codex Floriacensis* (Latin), and quotations occurring in the writings of St. Cyprian and of St. Augustine, especially in the latter's *Speculum* and in his *Acta contra Felicem Manichaeum*.² Thus in Acts xviii. 21, St. Paul says to the Ephesians at the close of his second missionary journey: *I will return to you again, God willing*; he then goes up to Jerusalem, and in xix. 1, we find him returning to Epheus. But in the Western text he says (xviii. 21): *I must absolutely keep the coming Feast at Jerusalem*, and this is his excuse for not staying longer with them. From xix. 1, in the same text, we gather that he never went to Jerusalem as he had proposed: *Paul, being desirous, according to his own counsel, to go to Jerusalem, the Spirit told him to return to Asia*. Similarly in both texts of xix. 21, we are told that *Paul purposed in the spirit . . . to go to Jerusalem, saying: after I have been there I must see Rome also*. Again, in xvii. 15, when Paul was compelled to leave Berea, *Silas and Timothy conducted him as far as Athens*; but here the Western text inserts: *But he passed by Thessalia, for he was forbidden to preach the word to them*. In xx. 3, again, we have an almost exact parallel to xvi. 6; the ordinary text says that after he had spent three months in Greece *the Jews laid wait for him as he was about to sail into Syria, so he took a resolution to return through Macedonia*; but *Codex Bezae* has: *When plots were laid for him by the Jews he was desirous to be led into Syria, but the Spirit told him to return through Macedonia*.³

² See Blass, *Acta Apostolorum*, Gottinger, 1895.

³ See also in the "Western" text such passages as xv. 29, 32; xxvi. 1; xxvii. 34.

And this dependence upon Prophecy is still more remarkably manifested in the course of St. Paul's last journey to Jerusalem (chs. xx.-xxi.). Thus he says to the Elders at Miletus : *And now behold, being bound in the Spirit, I go to Jerusalem, not knowing the things that shall befall me there; save that the Holy Ghost in every city witnesseth to me, saying: that bands and afflictions wait for me at Jerusalem* (xx. 22-23). The limitations of his knowledge are particularly noticeable. And it would seem, too, as though these limitations were not furnished to him personally by the Holy Spirit but through the medium of others, presumably official Prophets, else why should he say : *in every city?* It reads as though the Prophets living in the cities through which he passed testified to him "in the Spirit" that these bands awaited him. Indeed this is clearly stated in xxi. 4, where the disciples at Tyre *said to him through the Spirit that he should not go up to Jerusalem.* The same might also be gathered from the peculiar expression made use of by St. Luke in xxi. 9, when he speaks of the four daughters of Philip *prophesying.* This present participle may mean that it was an habitual gift with them, but if so we should rather have expected the word *Prophetissa*, which he uses of Anna in the Gospel (ii. 36). Is it not possible that he means that these four daughters prophesied *on that occasion* just as the disciples at Tyre had done and just as Mnason did immediately afterwards? That St. Paul himself did not, at least on this occasion, enjoy the Spirit of Prophecy seems probable from his prediction (xx. 25) that they should see his face no more, a prediction which was apparently not fulfilled. At the same time it is worthy of remark that the Apostle shews a holy independence of these Prophecies, however official they may have been, for he persists in his intention of going up to the Holy City. It would almost seem as though he had a Spirit of Prophecy which transcended theirs. On the other hand, again, we note that on all the occasions when the special guidance of the Holy Spirit is especially manifested to him he has an official Prophet, if we may be pardoned the term, in his company, namely, Silas. Again, in 1 Cor. xiv. 18, where he claims a supereminent gift of tongues, he does not make the same claim for that of "Prophecy," though it might be answered that this would not

have been to the point. And further, it is noticeable that he speaks in a peculiarly impersonal tone of the Prophecies which were current in the Church; thus in 1 Tim. iv. 1, he does not say: "Now the Holy Spirit hath manifested *to me*," but "Now the Spirit manifestly saith" as though he were referring to some well-known prophecies which were current and accepted in the Church (*cp.* 2 Tim. iii. 1). Positive proof, then, for the view that St. Paul personally possessed the gift of Prophecy seems to be wanting, and he certainly nowhere implies that, because an Apostle, he was therefore a prophet as well.

The fact remains, however, that the Apostle was in the habit of receiving direction, even for his plans and movements, from the direct intervention of the Holy Spirit, whether this intervention came personally or directly to himself or not. This, then, was one of the peculiar functions of the Prophets of the New Testament. For such intimations were given "in the Spirit" as is often stated; indeed, *Codex Bezae* in xv. 32 adds to the words: *Judas and Silas being Prophets themselves*, the explanatory clause: *Since they were full of the Holy Spirit*, thus implying that Prophecy demanded, and indeed flowed from, the Holy Spirit in a peculiar fashion.

III.

So far, then, we have seen that the gift of "Prophecy" in New Testament times implied the power of *consoling* and also the special *illumination of the Holy Spirit* in regard to definite courses of action. We have seen, also, that certain individuals were especially regarded as possessing this gift, and that they ranked high in the Church in consequence, next, indeed, to the Apostles. Yet it may be questioned whether the cases of the use of this gift so far instanced are sufficient to account for the extraordinarily high position occupied by the Prophets. Thus Silas and Jude, in spite of their co-operation with Saul and Barnabas (Acts xv. 32), can hardly be said to occupy an official position; the same must be said of Agabus who, while foretelling great things, does not appear to have held any known official position. At the same time the action of the Holy Spirit on the Church was so full, was so widely distributed, was so potent

a factor in deciding even such apparently mundane affairs as the planning of a journey, that it is impossible not to suppose that in all the graver issues of Church life and organisation the outpouring of the Spirit was not only asked for and obtained, but even shewn in a remarkable manner. And we have seen that Prophecy and the presence of the Holy Spirit were practically identified. It may well be, then, that the high position assigned to the Prophets was due to the fact that with them rested the decision of the gravest issues upon which the future well-being of the Church depended. We have one or two well attested instances of this. The three most important departures of the Church were the three great steps in the work of the world's evangelisation indicated in the inception of missionary work in Samaria and Philistia by Philip the deacon, the reception of the Gentile Cornelius into the Church by St. Peter, and St. Paul's mission to the heathen. Yet note how the Author of Acts insists on the part played by the Holy Spirit in all these departures. Thus for Philip's work see viii. 29 and 39; note, too, St. Peter's consciousness of the Spirit's direction (x. 19, xi. 12); St. Paul's case we have referred to above. It is possible, too, that in St. Paul's choice of Timothy we have an instance of very direct and positive guidance by the Holy Spirit. In Acts xiv. 22, we are told of the origin of the Galatian hierarchy in the simplest terms: *And when they had ordained to them priests in every church, and had prayed with fasting, they commended them to the Lord*—these last words refer, of course, to the new converts, not to the newly ordained. But very different is the case of Timothy when Paul revisits the district on his second journey: *To this man the brethren that were at Lystra and Iconium gave a good testimony* (xvi. 2); was this the testimony of Prophets? We have the same word used by St. Paul himself when he says: *Save that the Holy Ghost testifieth to me in every city that bands . . . await me in Jerusalem* (xx. 23), and this would seem to be implied by St. Paul when he says to Timothy himself: *I commend to thee . . . according to the prophecies going before on thee, that thou . . .* (1 Tim. i. 18).⁴ Similarly St. Clement (1 Cor. xlii. 4-5) says of the Apostles

⁴ Cp. 1 Tim. iv. 14; 2 Tim. i. 6.

that "preaching the word throughout the countries and cities, they appointed their first-fruits, when they had proved them *by the Spirit*, to the Bishops and Deacons . . ." These passages seem, then, to indicate that the testimony of the Holy Spirit was required before men were admitted to the priesthood, and we have seen that such testimony was given through the medium of the Prophets. If this inference is justified we have here official action on the part of these Prophets, and the high place assigned them in the hierarchy becomes intelligible.

It might be questioned, however, whether the above instances are sufficient to justify the application of the term "Prophet" to such men. For "to prophecy" seems intimately bound up with the idea of "foretelling." But it would probably be difficult to find a more perfect instance than this of the confusion of a man's office with certain acts appropriate to it; and the reason is not far to seek: the Prophets undoubtedly did foretell, and it is by this that they are best known to us; moreover, the apparent etymology of the word, by which it was derived from *pro*—meaning "beforehand," and *phemi* "to tell," tended to confirm the notion that a Prophet was essentially one who "foretold." But when we derive the word from *pro*—meaning *for*—or *in place of*—and *phemi* "to speak," we find that things fall into shape. The Prophet was God's spokesman, and consequently Divine knowledge was communicated to him; this is clearly shewn in the case of Aaron (Exod. iv. 10-16, 30; cp. 11 Paral. xix. 16). The real basal signification, then, of the word "Prophet" is one who stands in God's place and who consequently has Divine knowledge communicated to him, and since, as St. Thomas points out⁵ Divine or supernatural knowledge is that which is *procul* or "far removed" from men; and since, again, such knowledge may be thus "far removed" in three ways, we have three objects of prophecy. For a thing may be far beyond the knowledge of an individual man though known to others who happen to be present or on the spot when it takes place; a disaster at sea is a good instance. St. Thomas refers to the case of Giezi and Eliseus (iv. Kgs. v. 21-26). Secondly, things may be far removed from human knowledge in the sense

⁵ *Summa Theol.* 2da. 2dae. clxxi. 1.

that, though perfectly knowable in themselves, *e.g.*, the Mystery of the Holy Trinity, yet they are beyond the capacity of the human mind. Thirdly, things may be far removed from human knowledge in the sense that they are not in themselves knowable since they are non-existent, *e.g.*, things which will only happen contingently, to reveal such things is to reveal the very mind of God, and hence such knowledge is the most befitting object of prophecy.⁶ Yet a man might be a Prophet and have no such revelation made to him. We have an instance of the commonly accepted idea of Prophecy in New Testament times in the words of the soldiery who mocked Our Lord : *Prophecy unto us who it was that struck thee!* Prophecy, then, for them, meant simply mysterious knowledge of things not within human ken, but not necessarily knowledge of the future. To the Jew "to prophecy" meant to speak in God's Name, and this might be quite an unconscious act, as we see in the extraordinary case of Caiaphas, of whom St. John (xi. 51) says : *this he spoke not of himself; but being the High-Priest of that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation.*

At the same time the term was of very wide significance in the New Testament era, for while St. John's *Apocalypse* is repeatedly called a "prophecy," as indeed it was in the strictest sense of the term, being a revelation of the things to come in the remote future (i. 3, xxii. 7, 18, 19); even the actual preaching of the Two Witnesses at the end of the world (xi. 3, 6) is spoken of as "prophecy."

IV.

We are now in a position to understand the Gift of Prophecy of which St. Paul speaks so much to the Corinthians. In the first place it seems to have sometimes, if not always, accompanied the "speaking with tongues"; this latter was the outward manifestation of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on the newly baptised (see especially Acts viii. 17-18), where the external manifestation of the outpouring of the Spirit was so striking as to lead to Simon's sinful request, though it is not stated in what this outpouring precisely consisted. In the case of Cornelius and his

⁶ *Ibid.* art. 3.

household, however, it is expressly stated that the bystanders *heard them speaking with tongues and magnifying God* (x. 46); and more explicitly still at Ephesus (xix. 1-7), in the case of those baptised originally in John's baptism, on their being baptised in the Name of Jesus *the Holy Ghost came upon them, and they spoke with tongues and prophesied*, this "prophesying" being apparently synonymous with the "magnifying God" in the case of Cornelius. It is worth noting, however, that this manifest outpouring of the Holy Spirit is not always mentioned in the case of the newly baptised, *e.g.*, ii. 41; iv. 4; viii. 38; ix. 18. Further, in 1 Cor. xi. 4-5, St. Paul speaks of a man or a woman "praying or prophesying" as though these terms were almost synonymous, but we must remember that he is speaking of public prayer in the church, not of private prayer in the house, and he seems to associate prophecy with this kind of prayer as though it was precisely at times of prayer that these outpourings of the Holy Spirit took place, with the result that men prophesied (see especially Acts, iv. 31).⁷ And what this "prophecy" was we can gather from hints scattered up and down St. Paul's chapters to the Corinthians on this head. The fundamental distinction between the gift of tongues and that of prophecy is stated to be that by the former a man spoke not unto men but unto God (xiv. 2), and the whole subsequent argument is based on this (*cp.* ver. 28); hence such a man's "gift" was only "to the edification of the Church" when there were present, as at Pentecost, people who were acquainted with the tongues so used and who could in consequence derive some profit from what was said and could also interpret it to others (xiv. 5, 13, 27). Prophecy, on the contrary, was essentially for the edification of the Church, *he that prophesieth speaketh to men unto edification and exhortation and comfort* (xiv. 4); consequently (ver. 5) prophecy is greater than the gift of tongues; further, it always implied a Divine message *understood* by the hearers and recognised as Divine; hence, too, its power to convert (24-25); once more, it was synonymous with *revelation* (26), or rather revelation was its immediate cause: *if anything be revealed to another . . . let the first hold his peace* (30); lastly, it was no

⁷ See also the passage from the *Pastor, Mand.* xi. given below.

frenzied madness, no Dervish-like possession: for *the spirits of prophets are subject to prophets* (32), where the complete absence of the article in the Greek text, spoilt in our version, seems to indicate some proverbial statement. In xiv. 3, quoted above, St. Paul seems, it is true, to limit the scope of this gift of prophecy to edification, exhortation and comfort, he says no word about its predictive aspect, yet the case of Agabus (xi. 28; xxi. 10-11) shews that such prediction was far from being excluded, though it may have been a less general aspect of prophecy.

And it is especially noticeable that St. Paul nowhere blames the Corinthians for being desirous of such gifts; on the contrary, he urges them to seek them (xii. 31; xiv. 1, 5, 31, 39); only in ver. 12 does he even hint that such gifts are not necessary: *forasmuch as you are zealous of spiritual gifts*. Rather does he regard them as the natural, though not essential, appanage of the life according to the Spirit; he talks in perfectly natural fashion of speaking in tongues himself more than all of them (xiv. 18); and all he demands of the Corinthian Christians is that they should allow charity and the needs of the Church to govern their use of such gifts, and consequently he urges them to desire the gift of prophecy (39).

The data furnished, then, by the New Testament point to an extraordinary outflow of the Holy Spirit on the new Christians, and this was especially manifested in the gift of tongues and in prophecy. And while all did not share in all the gifts (xii. 29-30; xiv. 27), it is yet clear that these gifts were very widely diffused in the Church, and that, apparently, all could expect to have one if not more of them. But prophecy, as we have seen, was very highly considered, and those who possessed this gift were in a sense the official organs, at least at times, of the Holy Spirit; they ranked, too, immediately after the Apostles. It is easy to see, then, that the dangers attaching to it were very great. Both from its intrinsic nature, where self-deception was so easy, as well as from the circumstances attaching to it, this gift was one which called for the most careful supervision by the Church. Extravagances, not to say scandals, were inevitable. We have an instance of the latter in Simon Magus, of the former in the state of the Corinthian Church, though the members of that Church were apparently more

prone unduly to exalt the gift of tongues than that of prophecy. The former, however, was not half so dangerous as the gift of prophecy. For it gave no precise official position to its possessor, neither was it calculated to exercise an influence on the minds of men, since it was as a general rule unintelligible. But prophecy, as denoting revelation, and as giving a man an influence in the counsels of the Church, and as enabling him to influence the future of others, *e.g.*, in the case of Timothy above instanced, was peculiarly liable to abuse. The references to such abuses are remarkably numerous. Thus as early as the second missionary journey we find St. Paul saying to the Thessalonians (1 Thess. v. 19-21): *Extinguish not the Spirit; despise not prophecies; but prove all things*. This seems to imply the presence of an abuse such as we should hardly have expected at that early stage; for it looks as though men fought shy of these gifts because of the absurdities into which some who possessed them had been led. St. Paul, therefore, reminds them that these gifts come from the Spirit, that they are not to be despised, but that at the same time they are to be proved (*cp.* 1 John iv. 1); the same, too, had been foretold by Our Lord Himself (St. Matth. vii. 15-23). It was inevitable that false prophets should arise, indeed Christ made this one of the signs of the coming of the end of all things (St. Matth. xxiv. 24), and to this St. Paul apparently alludes (2 Tim. iii. 1-5). The Epistles of the Captivity, viz., Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, and Philemon, are remarkable for their silence on the subject of prophecy, as indeed regarding all the gifts or *charismata*; in the Pastoral Epistles, while we have references to the official aspect of prophecy, St. Paul foresees the dangers which are to arise, nay, have already arisen, from men who arrogated to themselves the title of "teachers" and who undoubtedly bolstered up their claim by the additional claim to the possession of the Spirit, *e.g.*, 1 Tim. i. 6-7; iv. 1-3; vi. 3-5; 2 Tim. ii. 16-18; iii. 1-19, 13. Hence his constant references to the "form of sound doctrine" (1 Tim. i. 10-11; iv. 13, 16; vi. 3, 20; 2 Tim. i. 13; ii. 2; iii. 10; iv. 3); and, by consequence, to the Church as the "pillar and ground of truth" (1 Tim. iii. 15; 2 Tim. ii. 19), and to Holy Scripture as the inspired source of instruction (2 Tim. iii. 16). St. James is silent on the subject of these gifts, as also

St. Peter in his First Epistle; in his Second Epistle he refers to the false teachers who, like the false prophets of old, shall bring in sects (ii. 1; *cp.* St. Jude 4, 10, 18-19).

V.

At the same time, Prophecy, however liable to abuse, was yet a Divine gift and its possessors had an official place in the Church. It has always seemed, then, inconceivable that it should have passed away suddenly and completely. But the comparative silence of the Apostolic Fathers on this point has always been a mystery; for in the writings of St. Ignatius, Bishops, Priests, and Deacons are the natural successors of the Apostles, the Prophets as a class are non-existent. But the discovery in 1873 by Bryennios, Metropolitan of Nicomedia, of the *Didache* or *Teaching of the Twelve*, in the library of the Jerusalem monastery of the Holy Sepulchre at Constantinople, enabled us to fill up the gap. This treatise, well known nowadays to all scholars, is really little more than an early Christian *Catechism* divided into doctrinal, catechetical, liturgical, and disciplinary sections. The date of its composition is generally referred to the period between A.D. 70 and 100. And it has peculiar interest for us in view of the picture of Apostolic government which it presents. St. Paul had said: *first Apostles, secondly Prophets* (1 Cor. xii. 28; *cp.* Ephes. iv. 11); and this is precisely the order of Church government which we find pictured in the *Didache*. Thus, taking the various statements in order: in ch. x. after the Communion service a prayer of Thanksgiving is set forth (1-6), yet it is especially noted: *But permit the Prophets to give thanks* (εὐχαριστεῖν) *as much as they wish* (*cp.* 1 Cor. xiv. 29-31).

There then follow certain regulations regarding Apostles and Prophets who may visit them: *Now with regard to the Apostles and Prophets, according to the doctrine of the Gospel so do ye* (xi. 3).

4. *Let every Apostle that cometh to you be received as the Lord* (*cp.* St. Matth. x. 40).

5. *But he shall not remain (more than) one day and, if need be, a second day; if he remain a third day then is he a false Prophet.* This shews us that the terms *Apostle* and

Prophet are here used synonymously, viz., as indicating the travelling missionary who went from place to place.

6. *And when an Apostle departs let him take nothing beyond sufficient bread to carry him to his night's quarters: if he ask for money then is he a false Prophet.* These two tests of his Apostolic character should be noted. They shew that "wolves in sheep's clothing" were frequent in those early days.

7. *And no Prophet that speaketh in the Spirit shall ye try nor examine; for every sin shall be forgiven, but this sin shall not be forgiven.* Here we have the same picture of Prophecy as in the New Testament literature, the Prophets spoke "in the Spirit," and, as such, could fall under no man's judgment; the gravity of the sin of so judging is especially noticeable. But it might well be asked: how do we know whether a man speaks "in the Spirit"?

8. *Not everyone that speaketh "in the Spirit" is a Prophet, but only if he have the ways of the Lord. By their ways, then, shall the (true) Prophet and the false Prophet be known.* Instances are then given of the "ways" that characterise the false Prophets.

9. *No Prophet that ordereth a table "in the Spirit" eateth of it; if he doth, he is a false Prophet (cp. 1 Cor. xi. 20-22, 33-34);* a reference apparently to the Agape.

10. *And any Prophet that teacheth the truth but practises not what he teaches, is a false Prophet.*

11. *And every approved and true Prophet who maketh assemblies for a worldly mystery, but does not teach men to do as he does, let him not be judged by you; for his judgment is with God. For so too did the ancient Prophets.* The meaning of this verse is a mystery, there are as many interpretations as there are words in it! (See Schaff's edition, pp. 201-3). The point to observe, however, is that the Prophets of the New dispensation rank on the same level as those of the Old.

12. *But whosoever says "in the Spirit": Give me money, ye shall not listen to him; but if he says: Give it for others who lack; let no man judge him.*

After a chapter on the admission of disciples who may wish to live in any community—where we note in passing that everyone was bound to have a handicraft (cp. Acts, xviii. 3; xx. 34; 2 Thess. iii. 10, etc.)—we find in ch. xiii.

rules for the treatment of Prophets *who wish to settle* in some community. This shews us the existence of two classes of Prophets, those namely who were what we should rather term missionaries, and who, like the Apostles, had no fixed abode, and those who settled down in some place, thus :

XIII. 1. *But every true Prophet who wishes to settle amongst you is worthy of his food.*

2. *Similarly a true Teacher is worthy, he too, like the workman, of his food (cp. St. Matth. x. 10).*

3. *Therefore the first fruits of the produce of the press and the threshing floor, of cattle and of sheep, thou shalt take and give to the Prophets, for they are your Chief Priests.*

4. *But if ye have not a Prophet, give to the poor.*

In verses 5, 6, and 7, they are commanded to give to the Prophets out of the first-fruits of their bread, wine, oil, silver, raiment and "every possession."

There are many points calling for notice here. In the first place we note the presence of a third grade in the Hierarchy, that namely of Teachers, these occupy the fifth place in the list furnished us in Ephes. iv. 11, the third in that given in 1 Cor. xii. 29. Secondly, we note the equivalence between the Prophets of the New and the Old Dispensations. Thirdly, that the Prophets are actually termed "your High-Priests." Later on, in Ch. xv. we read :

1. *Elect therefore for yourselves Bishops and Deacons worthy of the Lord . . . for they, too, minister to you the ministry of the Prophets and Teachers.*

2. *Do not therefore despise them for they are the honoured among you with the Prophets and Teachers.*

Thus xv. 1 shews us that we are in presence of much the same stage of development as in Phil. i. 1, where Bishops and Deacons are mentioned, but no Priests as distinct from Bishops. The peculiar feature is, however, that nowhere in the New Testament have we any hint of such developments of the Prophetic office as we find portrayed here, though we can see the roots from which such development sprang. A further anomaly is that all trace of such influential position on the part of the Prophets as that portrayed in the *Didache* has disappeared by the beginning of the second century when St. Ignatius and St. Clement wrote, whereas we find what may be a recrudescence of it in

the *Pastor* which dates from about the middle of the second century. For Hermas apparently found it necessary to warn men against false Prophets : " And another is a false Prophet, he who destroys the minds of the servants of God, of the waverers that is, not of those who put their trust in God fully. For these waverers come, as though to the Divine Spirit, and question him about their future. And that false Prophet, having in him no power of the Divine Spirit, answers them according to their questions, and fills their minds with promises according to their desires." *Mand.* x. 1. In *Mand.* xi. a test of the true Prophet is given : " First of all prove a man who has the Spirit of God ; for the Spirit that is from above is peaceful and humble and departeth from wickedness and the empty desires of this world ; and He maketh Himself less than all men, neither when questioned does He reply to any, nor doth He reply to each : for neither does the Spirit of God speak to a man when he wills, but he speaks when God wills. When, then, a man who has the Spirit of God comes into the assembly of the Just, of those, that is, who have the faith of God, and when prayer is made to the Lord, then the Holy Messenger of the Divinity fills that man with the Holy Spirit, and he speaks in the multitude as God wills. Thus, then, is known the Spirit of the Divinity in whomsoever the Spirit of the Divinity speaks."

We have here a perfect commentary on 1 Cor. xiv. 29-32. And we note that though the Prophets are known as men who possess the Holy Spirit, yet this is not as an habitual gift but rather, as in the case of the Prophets of the Old Testament, as something transiently communicated, it is not at their beck and call. It was probably through a mistaken notion that this gift was permanent that the Prophets of the New Testament era fell into abuses. It is noticeable, too, that in the *Pastor* these Prophets are not spoken of as possessing any official position in the Church, they thus differ radically from those of the times figured in the *Didache*. This is not the place in which to examine into the date of the composition of the *Didache*, but if we were to go solely by the position assigned in it to the Prophets we might refer it to an even earlier date than A.D. 70.

The Gift of Prophecy, then, meant the undoubted possession of the Holy Spirit. It meant that when

engaged in prayer this Spirit suddenly descended on a man and by It he spoke things profitable to the Church at large, whether by way of consolation, instruction, or warning. He might even in a peculiarly official way be the mouthpiece of the Holy Spirit for the guidance of the Church in times of need; for through him persons fit for the ministry were pointed out, and through him the plans even of Apostles were corrected. At the same time this Gift was not an habitual possession, it was not at a man's beck and call. Moreover, as in all similar supernatural gifts, it was not always easy to distinguish clearly between the action of the Spirit and the action of the human mind. It was always possible for men to fancy that they were being directed by the Spirit whereas they were the victims of their own imagination. The case of Nathan, 2 Sam. vii. 3, as also that of Isaias xxxviii. 1, illustrate this.

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The Supernatural.—II.

HAVING explained in a previous paper the general idea of the supernatural, I proceed to consider how its application to certain doctrines of the Catholic creed helps to explain their reasonableness. Reserving others for subsequent treatment, I shall deal in this paper with the doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin, and also to some extent with that of the necessity of grace, as integral parts of the general economy of salvation revealed to us in the Old and New Testaments. It is revealed that God originally bestowed on mankind certain endowments which were to have continued with the descendants of Adam and Eve, if they had been faithful to God; that they, however, disobeyed and lost those gifts for themselves and their posterity; that their posterity in consequence inherit their sin and their loss as they would have inherited their innocence and happiness; that on the other hand a Redeemer was promised in the beginning and came in the person of Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Son of God, to undo the work of sin and recover grace and salvation for the human race; that the grace which He merited is intended for all, since He died for all, and that it is absolutely necessary for all, even for children who have not come to the use of reason and can only obtain it through the ministry of others; that, though Christ did not come for thousands of years after the fall, and millions of men had meantime lived and died, yet to them also the graces of redemption were offered by anticipation, so that salvation was within their power. These are some of the main features in the actual scheme of Divine Providence which we are asked to believe, and human reason, in accepting the scheme, is naturally prompted to enquire how it accords with our highest ideals of justice, wisdom and goodness, and our notion of those attributes in God.

And at first sight serious difficulties suggest themselves. Why, for example, should the fate of the whole human race have been made dependent on the act of a single man, its first father? Why for his sin should not only he

himself but all his children to the end of time be punished grievously? Why should I be made a sinner by the act of another before I am capable of choosing good or evil, even before I am born? Why, if God has created me for a certain end and allows me to be born with responsibility for that end, does He condemn me to come into the world without power or capacity to attain that end unless He Himself comes to my aid gratuitously with grace to which I have no right? And even supposing this grace to be due to Christ on my behalf, why should there be attached to it a value so extraordinary, yet apparently so arbitrary, that of two men who do a good action, to all appearance the same in either case and deserving of the same reward, one, a Christian, should merit a recompense exceeding great, to which the other, an infidel, has no claim? These and other difficulties may arise in the minds of those who are enquiring into the credibility of the Christian revelation, and while it is not suggested that any man should set up his own limited ideas of the fitness of things as an absolute test of what Divine revelation should contain, one can readily understand how such difficulties may cause men who are not otherwise ill-disposed to hesitate about accepting a revelation that involves them until some reasonable explanation is forthcoming.

Now, it will be found that the Catholic interpretation of these doctrines in accordance with the theory of the supernatural meets these difficulties satisfactorily.

Historically as well as logically there is an intimate connexion between the doctrines of original sin and of grace, and the Catholic position is perhaps best presented by comparing it with the positions to which it is opposed and in opposition to which it has been developed. The first great controversy on this subject arose in the beginning of the fifth century and was occasioned by the teaching of Pelagius. The Pelagian, like most of the other great heresies, was inspired by a spirit of pure rationalism and got rid of the rational difficulties connected with grace and original sin by denying certain clearly revealed facts and principles. Our first parents, it was held, were originally no better off than we are; their sin affected themselves alone; neither it nor any of its consequences were transmitted to us. In free will itself, without any

gratuitous aid from God, we have, as they had, sufficient power to lead a Christian life and merit eternal salvation in the vision of God face to face. The Church condemned this teaching and asserted the existence of original sin and the necessity and gratuity of grace; and the controversy having run its course, there was no further serious division of opinion among Christians till the outbreak of the Reformation, when the subject was re-opened and made one of the leading issues in the doctrinal war that ensued.

The Reformers for the most part went to the opposite extreme from Pelagianism. They not only maintained the existence of original sin and the necessity of grace for salvation, but they represented original sin as a total corruption of human nature in its moral and religious powers, so that without grace fallen man could not only not obtain salvation but could do nothing but commit sin. Free will had perished in the fall; nor did grace really restore it or heal the inherited corruption. Justification itself brought about no intrinsic change in the soul; the man reputed just owing to the imputation of Christ's justice remained in reality a sinner, although no longer responsible for his sinfulness; faith, the sole-sufficing instrument of justification, secured for the just man exemption from the eternal punishment he deserved, but he himself could not, properly speaking, co-operate in his own justification, nor, after justification, do anything to merit salvation. The whole process from beginning to end was to be attributed exclusively to the free mercy of God. Nay, not only was fallen man a helpless mass of perdition, destined to eternal damnation, but, in the extreme form of Calvinistic teaching, God was represented as having created man for the express purpose of damning him, and that antecedently to the fall, which was permitted or arranged in fulfilment of that terrible purpose.

It is evident what a painful tax on human reason such teaching was bound to prove. Even apart from its extreme positions, its general tone and tendency seemed impossible to reconcile with the dictates of reason, with any worthy conception of God's justice, wisdom and goodness; and, as a matter of fact, Protestant theologians soon felt themselves obliged to soften down the teaching of their first

leaders and to interpret more benignly the declarations of their early confessions. The Catholic Church repudiated these extremes, several of which were condemned in the Council of Trent; and the subsequent condemnation of the Jansenist system made the Catholic position still clearer. Now, it is a fact which has probably come within the experience of most educated Catholics that a great deal of the prejudice entertained by rationalists against the doctrines of original sin and of grace is directed against Protestant and Jansenist interpretations of those doctrines which the Catholic Church has expressly reprobated. Hence the need for being all the more insistent in keeping the Catholic interpretation before the world.

While Pelagianism and Protestantism are at opposite extremes in their teaching on original sin and grace both agree in eliminating the true idea of the supernatural from the scheme, and this is the common principle of their opposition to the Catholic interpretation of those doctrines in which the supernatural idea is fundamental. The Pelagians, assuming that whatever our first parents originally possessed must have been natural, argued that God could not, consistently with His justice, deprive their descendants of what was naturally due to them for a sin they had no free share in; and so were led to deny the existence of original gifts by the loss of which we are punished. The Reformers and Jansenists, on the other hand, also assuming that whatever was original must have been natural; contended that God could and did justly punish Adam's posterity by the deprivation of natural perfection, so that the very nature as such of fallen man is morally diseased and corrupted. Now, the Catholic position denies the leading assumption of both extreme parties, that whatever was original was also necessarily natural to man. Thus it saves the plain facts of revelation which Pelagians denied, and at the same time rescues Divine justice and goodness from the terrible burden which Protestant and Jansenist teaching would make them bear. Catholic teaching maintains against the Pelagians that our first parents possessed certain gifts or prerogatives of which we are deprived in consequence of their sin, but it maintains at the same time against Protestants and Jansenists that these prerogatives were not natural but supernatural;

that they were free gifts of God which He was in no way bound to bestow, and the transmission of which He was free to condition as He pleased without any question of injustice arising; that the loss of them, therefore, involves no corruption of human nature as such, but simply leaves man in a state in which his nature and natural powers are the same as they would have been had God destined him in the beginning to a natural, instead of a supernatural, end.

Passing over the proofs of the Catholic view contained in Scripture and Tradition, I may say that its reasonableness will be apparent to anyone who reflects for a moment on the character of those original gifts. I have emphasised in my previous paper the mysterious sublimity of the actual destiny bestowed on mankind—the destiny of the beatific vision—and of the gifts of faith, hope and charity which are given to lead on to that destiny; and I need not repeat what I have said. Our first parents had this destiny assigned to them and were put in possession of those gifts. They, therefore, possessed habitual or sanctifying grace, which presupposes and includes the others, and by means of it they were deified in a way no creature could claim as a right. In other words, this greatest of the original gifts was supernatural or gratuitous, as were also the lesser gifts of exemption from death, and integrity or immunity from concupiscence. In themselves, it is true, these latter gifts were less exalted than grace; as perfections elsewhere realised in nature they did not formally deify man but merely raised him to resemble creatures higher in the scale of being than himself.¹ But in point of gratuity they are to be reckoned with grace itself, though by a title less transcendent.

This will be clear from a brief explanation of their character. The human body being material is subject to the general laws of things material, and therefore to change, dissolution and death. Nor does the exemption from death promised to our first parents mean that their bodies were different from ours, exempt from the physiological laws on which life at present depends. It means merely that

¹ Hence they are usually described as *preternatural* by theologians in accordance with the distinction already explained (I.T.Q., April, pp. 133-4).

de facto they would not have died, if they had not sinned, however this result would have been effected. It may be supposed that God would have supplied them with means of warding off decay and prolonging life indefinitely; or more simply, that though subject to decay as we are, and unable to prolong life indefinitely, they would, when their term of probation was over, have received without dying glorious bodies like what we are to receive at the resurrection—that the body would have received its supernatural reward without being separated from the soul or undergoing the corruption of the grave. Thus corporal immortality in the original plan was rather a prospective privilege than an actual possession, and its loss involved no change in human nature as such.

The gift of integrity means that by the infusion of suitable habits or dispositions man was equipped with full power to control the tendencies of his lower nature, so that these would not make themselves felt, as they do now, in opposition to the deliberate dictates of reason. At present by long practice in self-discipline we are able to obtain a considerable measure of control over the passions and emotions of our sensitive or animal nature; we are able to build up character and self-control, so that reason and free will, not passion and impulse, are our guides. Now, the gift of integrity means that God gave to our first parents, and would have given to us, a perfectly developed character, ready-made so to speak; that He would have given us habits of self-control like those we now acquire for ourselves, but more perfect and more highly developed than most men ever acquire in this life. In this way one great source of temptation within ourselves that tends to drag us down would have been removed; we would have been spared that struggle between the flesh and the spirit of which every man has experience who tries to lead a life worthy of his higher self.

Such a conflict, however, is but the natural result of the union of matter and spirit in man. It is the innate law of animal nature to follow blindly what attracts it in its own order, and reason permits and sanctions the working of this law within limits, so long, that is, as its own higher interests are not antagonised. When that happens reason recognises the obligation of resisting and controlling

the inordinate tendencies that are felt. It is this precisely that makes man a moral and responsible being even in matters that directly concern his animal life, and the extent of his moral responsibility is measured by the extent of his control. Whether I am six feet tall, or have red hair or a Roman nose, will not enter into the estimate of my moral worth; but whether I steal to satisfy my fondness for gambling, or commit murder to obtain revenge is a very different matter. Whatever dispositions, therefore, may be in us, whatever impulses may be felt even towards things that are recognised as unlawful, so long as they are beyond the control of the rational powers, are not in themselves morally evil or sinful and do not imply any strictly moral corruption in our nature. They are merely physical phenomena which become moral only in the same way that the physical effect of the blow which I strike with my hand becomes moral, that is to say, by the consent or direction of the free will.

Nor does the conflict which is felt necessarily imply a moral deordination. Conflict of forces produces the balance and harmony of the universe—such is the law of nature throughout. The only exceptional feature in the conflict which man experiences in himself is that a free or self-determining spiritual force meets a blindly acting material one, and that the subject is conscious of the struggle. I emphasise this point because it is here chiefly that Protestants and Jansenists claimed to discover that corruption of human nature which, according to them, resulted from Adam's sin and constitutes original sin in us. Apart from other reasons which exclude their view, it is sufficient to remember what I have just been maintaining, that this rebellious disposition of man's lower nature, whether in itself or in its involuntary manifestations, is no more a sin or a moral corruption than any other physical shortcoming arising from the contact of matter and spirit in man. The Creator, therefore, in giving existence to a composite being like man was not bound to bestow the gift of integrity. From a natural point of view, and in reference to a natural destiny, the existence of concupiscence ought rather to be regarded as a reasonable stimulus to moral effort and moral development—as it is at present in the restored supernatural order. "Virtue is perfected in infirmity."

Hence the state of original justice, including grace, immortality and integrity, differed from the state of fallen man in nothing that was strictly natural. Those gifts were gratuitous, and it was the transmission or loss of them alone, not of anything natural, that was made dependent on Adam's fidelity. If he obeyed his children would inherit those gifts, if he disobeyed he would lose them and his children be born without them. And who will say that this plan was unjust or unwise or unworthy of the goodness of God? Who will say that God was not free to condition the transmission of those gifts as He was free to withhold them altogether? Who even in dealing with a fellow man—and man's independence is as nothing compared to God's absolute sovereignty—would claim the right to dictate to the giver the terms or conditions of his free donation? There is clearly no question of God's justice or man's rights being compromised by the plan. Nor can God's wisdom be indicted, as if the condition actually imposed were arbitrary or even frivolous. There is nothing frivolous where grievous sin is concerned, and the malice of Adam's sin, freely committed with sufficient knowledge of the consequences involved, is something we cannot measure; and surely no exercise of divine omnipotence could be so arbitrary, in the invidious meaning of that word, as the presumption of many objectors who sit in judgment on the divine plan. For what is there needlessly arbitrary in the fact of mankind being submitted to probation in respect of its supernatural prerogatives? or in the fact that the probationary responsibility was committed to the head and father of the race? The law of heredity in nature itself, of which some scientists make so much, does not seem to suggest to the rationalist who believes in God any difficulty against the justice and wisdom of Providence in the natural order. Yet as the result of that law, how many evils that derogate from the perfection of nature are transmitted from father to son! Indeed, heredity in the natural order, working as it does perhaps more efficaciously for degeneracy than development in the type, seems to furnish a more serious problem for the theist than does the supernatural law of heredity for the defender of revealed religion. Yet it is from rationalists who believe in God that we commonly hear this objection. Again, the same objectors also recog-

nise and insist on a law of solidarity in nature, while they condemn the solidarity established by God between Adam and all his descendants. Positivism, or the religion of humanity, exaggerates this natural solidarity, but all men recognise it, and social institutions are partly based upon it. There is a bond of common sympathy and responsibility, apart from the consent of the individual, between members of the same family, city or state, and disadvantages as well as benefits result inevitably from their association. Sometimes the bonds of solidarity are artificial, or at least free, and may be easily severed, but one great bond which nature itself has established cannot be severed, and that is the bond that connects us all with our common ancestor. Hence in making Adam our representative for the purpose of supernatural probation God merely followed the analogy of nature, and it is hard to understand how believers in rational theism can find anything unworthy of His wisdom in the selection.

The reasonableness of the whole supernatural scheme is no less evident when viewed in connexion with God's goodness. It is probable that the Incarnation would have taken place even if man had not fallen. From a rational point of view we are strongly inclined to expect it as the crowning fact in the supernatural order, and one school of Catholic theologians has maintained that it would have taken place. But speaking as it does of the actual and historical, not of the hypothetical, fact and purpose of the Incarnation revelation does not definitely assure us on the point. At any rate, in consequence of the fall a new motive—that of Redemption—became connected with the Incarnation, and the actual mission of the Son of God made man took on a new character which otherwise it would not have had. But in either view the goodness of God appears even more conspicuously in the redemption than in the original elevation of mankind. If the original bestowal of the supernatural was a signal proof of gratuitous bounty, what a mystery of liberality and condescending mercy was its renewal through the Incarnation after man himself had tried to wreck the design of God! *O felix culpa*, exclaimed St. Augustine, of Adam's sin, and Catholic tradition reverently repeats his paradox.

Here also is a further justification of God's wisdom. He did not permit the final defeat of His supernatural design but drew from the fall an occasion for revealing the full grandeur and mysterious sublimity of His ways. For we are not to consider the fall and its consequences as if it were an isolated incident in the course of Divine Providence; we are to view it in connexion with the larger design which includes its undoing, and so viewed and interpreted in the light of the supernatural idea it is seen to involve no reflexion on God's justice, wisdom or goodness, and therefore no rational difficulty that ought to hinder its acceptance.

To return to the outline of Catholic teaching I have been giving, we are now born, it is taught, as the result of Adam's sin without sanctifying grace in our souls and subject to death and concupiscence. We are, therefore, much worse off than we should have been if Adam had not sinned. Speaking historically, and in comparison with the state of original justice, it is true that fallen man is changed for the worse both in body and soul, and this is the point of view from which the fall is usually spoken of in sermons, catechisms, and popular works of piety. But from a philosophical or speculative as distinguished from the historical viewpoint, in comparison, that is, with our condition as it *might* have been originally had God given us only a natural destiny and natural endowments, we are no worse off in our fallen state except in one respect to be presently explained. Our natural perfections and natural powers are the same. We differ from what the natural man would have been only as the *spoliatus* differs from the *nudus*, only as one who has been stripped of a beautiful garment differs from one who has never worn it. God took from us nothing that strictly was ours : He stripped us but did not wound or mutilate us.

There is, however, one difference between the condition in which we are born and the condition that would have been natural. We are born sinners, whereas in the hypothetical state of nature we should not be so described. How is this to be explained? What is this sin in us which we call original sin? Now, the only difficulty in connexion with it is the propriety of the name sin, and while we defend the propriety of the name we freely admit that original sin is very different from sin we ourselves commit. First of all,

the name sin in this connexion denotes a state not an act. We speak of a man being in a state of sin if he has committed a sinful act and has not repented of it; he is a sinner so long as he remains in that state whether or not he commits any further sinful acts. It is to this state of sin that original sin is compared. In the supernatural order a grave sin destroys grace in the soul and turns man away from God, and in ordinary Catholic usage where the supernatural is kept in view the state of mortal sin and the state of grace are formally opposed to each other. The state of mortal sin means the privation or voluntary absence of the state of grace, and *vice versa*; one is the death of the soul, the other its life. Now, this same notion is verified in the state in which we are born: the privation of sanctifying grace is the death of the soul in the supernatural order; so far it is a state of sin resembling the state of mortal sin induced by our own act. It puts us out of due relation to God as our supernatural end and deprives us of the right to the beatific vision: this it has in common with personal sin. But another element—that of voluntariety—is required to verify the notion of sin, and it is this element that makes the want of grace in us to be a sin, which it would not be in the natural order. This want or privation which constitutes original sin must be attributable to the free act of some responsible will—our own will or that of our representative; and original sin is voluntary in this wide sense, being attributable to Adam's will. As in personal sin our own free act is the cause why God withdraws and withholds grace from our souls, so the act of Adam, our head and representative, is the cause why He deprives our souls of grace in creating them. Thus the notion of sin in a wide sense is verified in the condition in which we are born; there is sufficient agreement with the state of personal sin to justify the analogical use of the name, but there is at the same time a difference that is not to be overlooked. If the word sin were used only in the narrow sense as necessarily implying a free personal act of our own wills, original sin would not be a sin at all.

It is clear from the explanation given that original sin is intelligible only in the hypothesis of the supernatural order, and does not necessarily involve any deordination towards God as the natural end. In this it differs from

personal sins which we ourselves commit, for we cannot freely turn away from God as our supernatural end without turning from Him also as our natural end. Hence in point of guilt and liability to punishment original sin is the least of all sins—less than the slightest venial sin one may commit. Its penalty is not, as the Reformers taught, condemnation to the torments of hell, but as the majority of our theologians maintain, mere exclusion from the beatific vision; and this, it is further maintained, is merely an objective penalty compatible with a subjective state of perfect natural happiness for those who die with only original sin on their souls.¹

Thus neither in itself nor in any of its consequences does the doctrine of original sin as interpreted in Catholic theology press hard on human reason. No doubt there is mystery in it, but no such mystery as need fear the scrutiny of sane rational criticism.

As regards the Catholic doctrine of grace, so intimately connected with that of original sin, I shall make only one or two observations in this paper. In the first place I would observe that the doctrine of the necessity of actual grace is not to be understood as implying that this necessity was created by the fall. The historical and controversial association of these two doctrines has given rise to a manner of viewing and treating the subject calculated to suggest this view. But it follows from the general idea of the supernatural, as I have explained it, that this necessity existed for Adam before the fall as it exists for the just man to-day, being merely an application in the supernatural sphere of the general doctrine of divine concursus. Also it is highly probable that even if Adam had not sinned some of his descendants would have done so—though their sin would have affected only themselves—and there would thus have arisen the problem of justification for such sinners. That actual grace would have been necessary for them as for sinners at present, and that it would have been gratuitous also, will not be denied, and in the hypothesis of the Incarnation taking place, it is further probable that the grace of justification would have been mediated to sinners through

¹ See art. *Lot of Those Dying in Original Sin* in I.T.Q., July, 1909, pp. 313-326.

the Incarnate One. Thus a whole hypothetical economy of grace, in many ways resembling the actual economy, might be conceived, and to this might be applied most of the fundamental principles of Catholic teaching.

In the second place I would observe, in reply to the difficulty suggested in the beginning, that the value attached to grace as elevating man's acts and rendering them meritorious is not an arbitrary thing but a necessary implicate of the supernatural idea. Only supernatural acts can lead to a supernatural destiny, and it is grace that supernaturalises man's faculties and enables him to perform such acts. Acts performed without elevating grace may be ethically good and worthy of a proportionate reward, but they are not holy and do not merit the vision of God. The difference between the good Christian and the good infidel is that their lives run on different planes leading to different goals, and that no degree of advance on the lower plane will ever lead to the higher goal. The ascent must be made by means of grace from the higher to the lower plane; to have the right of entry into the inner sanctuary of God's life one must become the adopted son of God; to be admitted to the marriage feast one must put on the wedding garment.

P. J. TONER.

Multiple Personality.

A Paper read before the Philosophical Society of Queen's University, Belfast.

THERE is nothing more intimate to one than oneself, and yet there is scarcely anything of which our knowledge is so limited and our experience so unsatisfactory. Poets, dramatists, novelists, as well as the metaphysicians of all the ages, have essayed to sound the depths of personality, but their efforts have only served to convince us of the evasiveness and ultimate intangibility of that elusive shadow of ourselves which flits hither and thither across the dark continent of our psychic existence. "Man, know thyself" is undoubtedly a very shrewd and sensible counsel, a maxim of the greatest importance in our every-day life; but when we attempt to reduce the principle to practice we feel that our most untiring investigations only wrap the mind in a more intensified mystification, and that, try as we will, our best efforts are doomed to final disappointment.

It is more true of ourselves, as the objective or quasi-objective of our study, than it is in regard to any other branch of knowledge, that the more we know the more we realise how much remains unknown. True psychology is essentially introspective. And turning our thought in, as it were, upon ourselves in an attempt to grasp or to analyse a mental act or a series of acts, to link up the past with the present or to account for the process, we feel like a vessel without compass or helm on the broad bosom of the rolling ocean with the vast expanse beyond limitless, fathomless, unknown. "I come," writes St. Augustine, "to the spacious fields and palaces of memory, wherein are treasured unnumbered images and things of sense, and all our thoughts about them. . . . There in that vast court of memory are present to me heaven, earth, sea, and all that I can think upon, all that I have forgotten therein. There too I meet myself, and whatever I have felt and done, my

experiences, my beliefs, my hopes and plans for the years to come. . . . Great is this power of memory, a wondrous thing, O my God, in all its depth and manifold immensity, and this thing is my mind, and this mind is myself. . . . Fear and amazement overcome me when I think of it. And yet men go abroad to gaze upon the mountains and the waves, the broad rivers, the wide ocean, the courses of the stars, and pass themselves the crowning wonder by."

It was, no doubt, the mysterious immensity of this strange world, so familiar and yet so little known, that gave rise to the many contradictory theories of personality that have figured in philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to Locke and Hume, to Decartes and Leibnitz, to Mill and Professor James. With the history of the origin and development of the notion of personality we are not here directly concerned; nor can we stop to discuss the merits of the various systems which down to our own time have sought to solve the problem.

It must be remarked, however, that any theory which ignores the existence of a substantial, rational, spiritual soul in man cannot well pretend to offer an explanation of any of the phenomena of human life. Yet it is with theories of this kind that the English psychologists of the Associationist School, from Hume to James, are enamoured. It is perfectly astounding how men, whose genius we would not care to call into question, could be satisfied with a system of philosophy which is prepared to admit the existence and reality of thought but will promptly deny that there is anything thinking. Whatever slightly different shape it may take, there can be no doubt that the theory of the whole school comes to this, that mind is a succession of conscious states. Philosophy of this kind is worse than puerile. To make our rational nature consist exclusively in a series of transient acts which arise no one knows where and are sustained by absolute vacuity is assuredly a postulate, or brace of postulates, which easily beats the theory of the elephant and the tortoise. It is hopelessly inconceivable that there could exist an activity, material or immaterial, without something acting. We could as easily conceive a twenty-mile-an-hour rate of motion without something moving. Mental acts are not

denied for an obvious reason; for it is indisputable that the mind can compare, judge, reason; nay, it can, as it were, turn back upon itself and contemplate itself and what it does. These acts cannot be material: they must be immaterial. And for a certainty they cannot be the acts of nothing. They must, therefore, be sustained by an immaterial substance, for *actio sequitur esse*—you know a thing by what it does—a principle accepted, not by a certain sect of psychologists merely, but all round in all the physical sciences, which, in Aristotelian philosophy, form the groundwork of metaphysical study.

Materialism was a reaction against this spiritualistic teaching, but materialism was too plainly opposed to ordinary common sense long to survive the attacks which it invited. Thinking men cannot well get on without a thinking principle of some kind, however they may name it. Psychology without a soul is infinitely worse than Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. This has been very keenly felt in recent years, so keenly, in fact, that if I might slightly vary one of Mr. Dooley's opinions, I would say: Materialism is dead, Hennessy, but the Materialists don't know it.

Admitting the existence of a rational soul, the great difficulty at the present time is to reconcile all the psychic phenomena which come under observation with the theory of a single unifying principle, in man, of life and reasoning. There are innumerable abnormal cases on record which seem to upset all our notions of a unitary individual personality; and the hypothesis is now advanced that personality, or individuality—that is, specific individuality—in each of us, is not single as we have been accustomed to regard it, but multiple. So varied, indeed, according to this doctrine, is each one's personality that none of the propounders of the theory attempt to place limits to the multiplicity. *The Proceedings of the Psychical Research Society* furnish a long catalogue of cases of alleged altered personality, which, whatever our preconceived notions or prejudices, must undoubtedly give us pause. One or two of the better known and frequently quoted cases will convey to the uninitiated a sufficient idea of the problem which is at present engaging the attention of so many eminent psychologists.

Dr. Azam's patient, known as Félicité X, is a famous instance. Félicité, born at Bordeaux in 1843, was naturally a melancholy, morose child, very industrious and indifferent to society. When she was about fourteen she began to show symptoms of hysteria. She fell suddenly asleep one day for about ten minutes, after which she awakened completely changed in manner and character. This lasted for an hour or two; then the sleep came on again and she awoke in her normal state. The change at first recurred every five or six days, but ultimately the secondary state became predominant. It is worthy of remark that in the primary or normal state she suffered very acute pains in various parts of the body, especially the head, but in the secondary state there was complete relief from these. The change of disposition in the secondary state is strongly marked; she becomes gay and vivacious—almost noisy; instead of being indifferent to everything, her sensibilities—both emotional and imaginative—become excessive. All her faculties appear more developed and more complete. In the secondary state she remembered all that happened when she was in the same state before and also all the events of her normal life; whereas in the normal state she forgot completely all the occurrences of the secondary state. From this Binet concludes: "Two fundamental elements constitute personality—memory and character," but in Félicité there is a change of character and memory, therefore "Félicité is really two moral persons; she has really two Egos." (Maher: *Psychology*, p. 488).

Mary Reynolds, a Pennsylvanian girl, of whom Professor James, in the *Principles of Psychology*, gives account, is another striking instance of similar so-called change of personality. She awoke one day out of a twenty hours' sleep in a state of unnatural consciousness. Her memory was gone. She had forgotten everything she had learned, and refused to recognise or acknowledge her parents, brothers or sisters. Formerly of a serious melancholy disposition, she was now cheerful to extremity, buoyant and social. These alterations continued at intervals of varying length for about sixteen years, but finally ceased when she reached the age of thirty-five or thirty-six years, leaving her permanently in the secondary state. The striking thing about this case is that when in the primary

state there was no trace in her memory of the secondary, and when in the secondary all recollection of the primary was blotted out. After lapsing from state II. to state I. she took up her ordinary life where she had left it off, and in the same way when state II. again supervened she continued her life precisely from the point where this state had ceased, as if nothing had occurred in the meantime.

A still more remarkable case is that of Dr. Norton Prince's patient, Miss Beauchamp, or, should we say, the Misses Beauchamp. Owing to a mental shock in 1893 her character changed, though memory remained continuous. This state was afterwards called B I. Under hypnotism two other states manifested themselves, B II. and B III. Of these B III. ("Sally") practically developed an independent existence, and continually manifested itself apart from hypnotic suggestion. B I. had no memory of B II. or B III. B II. knew B I., but not B III., while B III. knew both the others. Eventually in 1899 after another mental shock there appeared a fourth "personality," B IV., whose memory presented a complete blank from the "disappearance" of the original Miss Beauchamp after the first shock till the appearance of B IV. after the second, six years later. Her character was, however, very unlike that of the original personality. B III. had memory of all that happened to B IV., but did not know her thoughts. Furthermore, B III. was exceedingly jealous both of her and of B I., and played spiteful tricks on them. (*The Catholic Encyclopædia*, vol. xi., p. 728).

Another class of cases in which it is claimed that alterations of personality occur is furnished by the phenomena of hypnotism. We are all familiar, if not with the practice at least with some of the literature on this subject. I do not think that anyone would be so foolish as to deny the reality of hypnotic suggestion. We must, of course, always be prepared for fraudulent impositions in cases of this kind; but apart from that, there can be no doubt whatsoever that some at least of the feats performed through hypnotic suggestion are very real. I need not go into details here. It is enough to remark that "In deep hypnosis we constantly find that the subject refers to his waking self in the third person. He feels himself another man and naturally assumes another name." (Podmore: *Modern Spiritualism*,

vol. ii., p. 355). There is, however, one phase of the subject, and that the strangest, to which I wish to refer, viz., post-hypnotic suggestion. A person in the hypnotic state is told, for instance, that on a certain day, in the more or less distant future, he will perform a certain act, visit the house of someone or post a blank sheet of paper to a person whom perhaps he has never seen, or go through some other similar performance. Now, it is claimed that these orders are carried out though the person to whom they are given never consciously adverts to them till the time for their execution arrives. These and such like phenomena are appealed to by the upholders of the multiple personality hypothesis as confirming their theory.

Again, in cases of religious conversion, the subject seems to be completely changed, a fact sufficiently elaborated in that very popular but unsatisfactory work, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, by William James.

Even in our own cases we constantly make use of language suggestive of plurality or at least duality in our own individual selves. We speak of doing battle with ourselves, of overcoming ourselves, and even of being beside ourselves. St. Paul's reference to the law of his members warring against the law of his mind, and to doing that which he willed not and leaving undone that which he willed, is also a case in point. St. Augustine gives expression to the same thought at somewhat greater length : "The new will which I began to have was not yet strong enough to overcome that other will strengthened by long indulgence. So these two wills, one old, one new, one carnal, the other spiritual, contended with each other and disturbed my soul. I understood by my own experience what I had read, 'flesh lusteth against spirit and spirit against flesh.' It was myself, indeed, in both the wills, yet more myself in that which I approved in myself than in that which I disapproved in myself. Yet it was through myself that habit had attained so fierce a mastery over me, because I had willingly come whither I willed not. Still bound to earth, I refused, O God, to fight on Thy side, as much afraid to be freed from all bonds, as I ought to have feared being trammelled by them."

Language of this kind, even when it is not figurative, as it often is, presents no special difficulty, and is sufficiently

explained by the double aspect of human nature, the animal and the rational. But cases like those of Miss Beauchamp, Félicité X, and the rest, as well as the extraordinary phenomena of hypnotism, dreams, trance, epilepsy, and so on, present a problem which has given rise to many attempts at solution. Some of these, however great the names of those responsible for them, cannot really claim the serious attention of thinking men. To attempt an explanation of such phenomena by referring them to "split consciousness," "unconscious consciousness," "threads," or "streams" of consciousness, is merely to shift the question from the forefront to the background, and to introduce terms, which, when not wholly metaphorical, are certainly misleading if not altogether meaningless. You might split a helmet or a hair, but you could no more split a consciousness than you could paint a universal judgment red or tie knots on abstract ideas. Threads of consciousness are about as intelligible as lumps of syllogistic reasoning.

The late Frederic Myers suggested the theory of double distinct consciousness which he named the "supraliminal" and "subliminal" self. "It is important to note," says his fellow-worker, Podmore, "that the theory is not a mere philosophical speculation founded on assumptions which are incapable of verification, but a scientific hypothesis, based on the interpretation of certain alleged facts." (*Modern Spiritualism*, vol. ii., p. 359). The alleged facts are those of which I have given some examples above.

It is not by any means easy to grasp what exactly is intended to be conveyed by the distinction of consciousness into *subliminal* and *supraliminal*. The *limen*, or threshold, would appear to be that point at which our ordinary consciousness ceases; for instance, the point at which we go to sleep, or at which a person under the influence of chloroform "goes over." Above this threshold, that is, in our ordinary waking state, we have the supraliminal self; below it, the subliminal. As an illustration, Mr. Myers likens consciousness to the solar spectrum, our work-a-day consciousness being represented by the visible portion of the spectrum. Beyond the red band there are rays which the sense of sight cannot detect, and outside the violet there are rays, the existence of which was not even suspected up till comparatively recent

times. Consciousness, Mr. Myers thinks, is something like the spectrum, the visible portion representing our ordinary, waking, normal state which he calls the supraliminal self, the invisible rays forming a parallel with those phenomena which take place beneath or beyond our normal waking consciousness. Substantially the same theory is advocated by Professor James in the work already referred to, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*.

With Myers and his colleagues our ordinary every-day conscious life and activity are merely the manifestation of psychical energies which form but a part, and that the least, of our total spiritual existence. At no great depth below the level of consciousness, as outside the violet band of the solar spectrum, there is a great reservoir of untapped faculty to which when appeal is made it is not made in vain, as is abundantly manifest in hypnotism, trance, and such like states. We are living really in two worlds, the one this gross material world of sense perception, the other that incorporeal spiritual world described as *cosmic* through which the soul ranges free, untrammelled by the fetters of the flesh. "I feel forced," says Mr. Myers, "to fall back upon the old-world conception of a *soul* which exercises an imperfect and fluctuating control over the organism; and exercises that control, I would add, along two main channels, only partly coincident—that of ordinary consciousness, adapted to the maintenance and guidance of earth-life; and that of subliminal consciousness, adapted to the maintenance of our larger spiritual life during our confinement in the flesh." (*Human Personality*, vol. i., p. 74. Ed. 1903). It is this larger spiritual life, the subliminal consciousness which appeals so strongly to the advocates of the theory. "The range of our subliminal mentation," Myers again writes, "is more extended than the range of our supraliminal. At one end of the scale we find dreams—a normal subliminal product, but of less practical value than any form of sane supraliminal thought. At the other end of the scale we find that the rarest, most precious knowledge comes to us from outside the ordinary field—through the eminently subliminal processes of telepathy, telaesthesia, ecstasy." (*Ibid.* p. 72). It is this subliminal mentation that comes into play when, after trying in vain to recall a name, a date, or an event, we stop thinking of it and

suddenly it flashes into our mind: it is this subliminal activity of the soul that guides the pen when we allow our hand to write a word we have forgotten how to spell, and so on. Genius is a subliminal uprush of ideas not consciously originated but shaped beyond the power of the will in the profounder regions of our being. The thinking principle in man, whatever it is, is more active and, as it were, more at home in that psychical world which is hidden from our normal consciousness below the threshold of our waking experience. Nor is the subliminal field of psychic operation confined within the limits of the corporal organism, according to the theory we are considering. Rather, the spirit enjoys some kind of mysterious existence independent of the body; so that it is able, in certain circumstances, to make excursions through what is called the metetherial world—beyond the ether, the spiritual, transcendental world which is the natural home of the soul—where it occasionally meets and communes with kindred spirits in their native environment. This is the explanation of the phenomena which we experience in dream-states—the soul wandering abroad and acquiring information from sources not accessible to waking consciousness. A mass of evidence, if it can be called evidence, has been put together by the members of the *Psychical Research Society* for the purpose of proving the reality of these excursions and of the invasions of friends at great crises in their lives, especially at the hour of death. "Warnings," as they are called by simple folk, which are sometimes received in sleep or in times of mental abstraction, when the mind is not consciously active, would be explained on this hypothesis as having been really produced by an invading spirit, soul meeting soul in that world beyond the material which is peculiarly its own.

These are some of the salient features of the modern theory of multiple personality. And now it may be time to ask what criticism I have to offer of a theory, thus baldly stated, which is attracting the admiring attention of many eminent thinkers at the present time.

Few, I dare say, will be found at the present day to accept the fundamental principle of Descartes' Psychology, *Cogito, ergo sum*—I think, therefore I exist. One would naturally expect to find the subject of thought existing

before the thinking would be even possible—*Prius est esse quam esse tale* is an old self-evident truth. And yet Descartes' dictum is suggestive of an amount of truth, the importance of which cannot be exaggerated in the study of psychology. It is, that the I who think, judge, reason, and freely direct my actions is the same I who weigh 168 lbs. more or less. I think, I wish, I walk, I eat, I sleep : it is of the same I that all these actions of mind and body are predicated. What is this I? It is not the body, nor is it even the mind; but the composite resulting from the specific union of both in the concrete individual who stands before you. *Actiones sunt suppositorum* is a statement which expresses in very definite shape the truth of the specific unity of the principle of all human action. It means, that the actions of my mind and the actions of my body are alike attributable to this being which is mine and not another's. Apart from all considerations of other persons, and of phenomena except those which concern ourselves, we find that an appeal to our own self-consciousness immediately reveals the fact that all acts of the intellect and of the will, all feelings external and internal, are but modifications of one underlying substance which persists the same throughout all variety of change. And although we may speak, as with the greatest propriety we may speak, of a person being completely altered, we readily recognise that the "he" or "she" or "I" to whom we refer is essentially the same, whatever the accidental differences which may manifest themselves. The body may alter its configuration, and vary the matter of which it is composed, as it does within certain periods well known to physiology, so that not a particle of its former composition remains; the mind may develop into the full intellectual vigour of an Aristotle or an Augustine, a Newton or a Kelvin, or it may become deranged and lapse into a state of idiotic imbecility; still the same individual self preserves its numerical and essential identity throughout all vicissitude from helpless infancy to decrepit old age. It cannot surely be memory or consciousness which maintains this permanence, for these are merely witnesses to the unity and continuity of an underlying, unchanging substance of which they are but accidental modifications. Reid, in his *Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, gives an admirable summary of the whole case. He says in part :

"The conviction which every man has of his identity, as far back as memory reaches, needs no aid of philosophy to strengthen it; and no philosophy can weaken it without first producing some degree of insanity. . . . My personal identity, therefore, implies the continued existence of that indivisible thing which I call myself. Whatever this self may be it is something which thinks, and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers. My thoughts and actions and feelings change every moment: they have no continued, but a successive existence; but that *self* or *I*, to which they belong, is permanent, and has the same relation to all succeeding thoughts, actions and feelings which I call mine. . . . The identity of a person is a perfect identity; wherever it is real it admits of no degrees; and it is impossible that a person should be in part the same and in part different; because a person is a *monad*, and is not divisible into parts. Identity, when applied to persons, has no ambiguity, and admits of no degrees, or of more or less. It is the foundation of all rights and obligations, and of all accountableness; and the notion of it is fixed and precise."

Apart from any deep psychological reasoning, would it not appear to that most profound of all philosophers, the plain man, that to substitute consciousness for personality would be to put the act for the agent. If personality, therefore, cannot consist in consciousness, *a fortiori* it cannot be identified with "split consciousness" or a "thread" or "stream" of consciousness; not to speak of such an outrageous contradiction in terms as "unconscious consciousness." And we must also refuse to accept the arrangement of Mr. Myers and his collaborators who, while accepting the reality of the rational soul and retaining its unity, divide the range of its activity into two departments, labelling them respectively the supraliminal and subliminal self. Acts of the soul, conscious or unconscious, supraliminal or subliminal, are and must be transient things, but personality cannot be regarded as something passing; it must necessarily be permanent, unless we are to attach new meanings to old terms merely on our own account. And even we did for the moment grant that the supraliminal

and subliminal selves, which this theory contemplates, constituted distinct personalities, by what name would we call the permanent, underlying composite of soul and body of which these selves are but the superficial modifications?

What, after all, is the necessity for introducing two or more selves or personalities? May not a sufficient explanation be that the same self acts along different lines, consciously or unconsciously, supraliminally or subliminally? We readily recognise, without the aid of a multiplicity of selves, that the soul energises, now as volition, now as intellection; that in the intellect itself there are various lines, really distinct, along which mentation takes place, as those of truth, of beauty, of goodness; and there does not appear to be any more solid reason for attributing to different personalities the acts of waking consciousness and the acts of dream, trance, or hypnotic states, than there is for saying that in the same individual the intuition of the moral order and the intuition of the æsthetic order belong to different persons.

With regard to the application of the theory to dreams, it is boastfully claimed that it is a reversion to savage psychology. We can readily concede the claim, but we must demur when we are seriously asked to believe that the soul really wanders at will through all the places we imagine we visit in sleep. If some of our dream exploits were actual, nature would have to be requisitioned to make some arrangement for the renewal of life such as there is in billiards for playing pool. We must remember that we are living in very material circumstances, that the soul is the life-giving principle of the body, and that if it left it, even for an instant, it would require the exercise of omnipotence to bring it back. And how can we have any proof that these excursions are real seeing that we are not conscious of them? Would the evidence of a sleeping man be taken in any court of justice? Would it be reasonable to expect that it should? If we admit the physical actuality of our dream performances, we must be prepared to accept responsibility for them, for they are the acts of our other self acting normally. I fancy I see myself put in the dock for some of the desperate deeds I have done in nightmare, and defending myself like a blubbering school-boy by pointing to my other self and saying: It was he did it!

Dreams, I admit at once, are very mysterious; so is sleep itself: but however unable we may be to analyse or understand such natural and frequent phenomena, it should be perfectly manifest that the person who goes to bed and gets up in the morning is the same person who has been sleeping and dreaming, perhaps, during the night. If it were a different personality that enjoys the night's repose, how would the unfortunate daylight self ever get refreshed? It is a necessity of our existence that our waking self should sleep; and therefore in sleep it is not a duplicate of our waking personality that is there, but the same personality which a while ago was waking and is now asleep. This would likely be admitted, with a rider that when the normal personality becomes unconscious, removed as it were from the field of operation, the extraordinary energy of the subliminal personality comes into play; for the theory, as I understand it, is based on the assumption that when the activity of the supraliminal self ceases, the subliminal self emerges—a word constantly in use with the defenders of the theory—manifesting that subconscious mentation which is ever going on beneath the threshold of our supra-conscious state. But if this be so, how account for dreamless sleep? And further if the contention were true, it would follow that a person in a swoon should be better able to perform intellectual work than one in ordinary sound health, and that a person who has a really difficult problem to solve should begin by taking a dose of chloroform. In fact, did we become once convinced of the truth of the theory we should all be immediately forming ourselves into suicide clubs. Mr. Gurney, another prominent name in connection with the theory, would, no doubt, commend the expedient, for in *Phantasms of the Living* he tells us that "Death may be, for all we know, not a cessation but a liberation of energy." That death is a liberation of energy is undoubtedly the logical outcome of the teaching.

What seems, however, to tell most forcibly in favour of the theory of multiple personality are the unquestionable facts of hypnotism and the cases of apparently altered personality like those of Félida X, Miss Beauchamp, and a host of others who underwent similar changes.

In regard to hypnotism the strongest case for multiple personality is that of post-hypnotic suggestion; that is, the

execution of something suggested in the hypnotic state, long after the suggestion was made. But in order that this might be accepted as even a pretence at proof, it seems to me that it would be necessary to establish, first, that all memory of the suggestion was lost in the meantime, and secondly, that the hypnotizer was not on the scene when the act was afterwards performed. For if memory remains continuous we have proof of the unity of personality, and, on the other hand, if the presence of the operator is necessary for carrying out the suggestion we have *prima facie* evidence of re-hypnotization. I have searched and searched in vain for a case in which the conditions I have mentioned were verified. But even we did find such a case, would it prove the existence of a double personality in the same individual? It would not: it would at most indicate the absence of evidence either way.

The same applies to trance and apparent alterations of personality arising from shock. It is not true to say that in any of the observed cases memory is lost. There remains in every case an amount, and a very large amount, of the knowledge formerly acquired, a fact which points to a continuous permanence of personality. Nor is it matter for so much surprise that changes of a very marked type should result from severe shock or nervous derangement, when we remember how dependent our minds are on our bodies for the acquisition of knowledge, and that all mental activity is accompanied by brain functioning. It is a well-established fact that the mind is dependent on the brain, not indeed as a cause but as a condition of all valid thought. What more natural, therefore, than to find these extraordinary alterations of mind consequent upon cerebral cataclysms. Our district lunatic asylums unfortunately furnish endless lists of such phenomena.

But surely it cannot reasonably be contended that functioning in the brain or that any passing states of brain or of mind constitute personalities. We may, of course, call them personalities if we wish; but if we do, we have to remember that we are using words in a sense which nobody understands. Nor can it be lawfully argued that the progress of experimental psychology demands an expansion of the meaning of personality in order that it may adapt itself to the new circumstances which have arisen, for whatever

discoveries may be made the term personality, amongst human beings, will still be necessary to signify the permanent, self-subsisting being resulting from the union of body and soul in the concrete rational individual. If then we wrench personality from the meaning which has always attached to it, and make it do duty for something as different as an accident is different from a substance, we must confess that we are, without any justification, giving new meanings to old terms—terms which have a well-defined and well-recognised, and still necessary place in our philosophical vocabulary.

When we lay all speculation aside and take the concrete cases of our own individual selves, is not each of us thoroughly convinced that whether we are under the influence of trance or sleep or insanity, it is all the time true that individually there is only one of us there? You might easily make me believe a great many things, good and bad, about myself; but it would be an utterly hopeless task to attempt to persuade me, in any circumstances, that *I* am my other self.

R. FULLERTON.

The Eve of the Reformation.

IN the reign of Henry VIII. (1509-1547) there were four archbishoprics and twenty-eight suffragan bishoprics in Ireland. In internal parochial apportionment all of them have undergone drastic federalizations of territories and resources, but in external contour only a few of them have suffered any serious change. The archbishoprics remain in number unchanged. The suffragan units have been so rearranged that the number of the suffragan bishops has been reduced to twenty-three. The exigencies of the years that have intervened compelled from time to time in the case of some of the smaller Sees, unions with their neighbours, and diocesan nomenclature has been enriched by the combinations: Kildare and Leighlin, Ardagh and Clonmacnoise. The Archbishop of Cashel rules as apostolic administrator the bishopric of Emly. The bishopric of Galway was then the wardenship of Galway, and the bishop rules, as apostolic administrator, the ancient dioceses of Kilmacduagh and Kilfenora. In Henry's days the unions of Down and Connor, Waterford and Lismore, Ardfert and Aghadoe, Dublin and Glendalough, were not young. They continue—with perhaps the exception of the last—to preserve in public nomenclature the memory of their conjunctions. The bishopric of Enachdune has become so completely merged in the Archbishopric of Tuam, that few beyond its borders remember that the premier See of the Western Province is a union. A similar oblivion has befallen the ancient bishopric of Mayo, which is merged in the diocese of Achonry, although in the 17th century the union was recognized under the appellation, "*Mayonensis et Acadensis*." On the other hand, Cork and Cloyne, then a union, have become distinct dioceses. Further minor adjustments of the ambits of episcopal jurisdiction were effected in some of the dioceses upon the abolition of those monasteries that enjoyed abbatial jurisdiction. Those changes are illustrated in the dioceses of Meath and Armagh, whose

boundaries were widened by the annexation of the parishes which were owned and ruled by the Abbots of Mellifont. Some of them which were in County Meath and contiguous to the diocese of Meath are now ruled by Meath. Those that lay in County Louth now belong to the See of Armagh. Those various territorial adjustments have left the ecclesiastical map of Ireland a less chequered document than one that would accurately outline the multiple bounds of episcopal and abbatial jurisdictions in the fifteenth and preceding centuries.

Thanks to the industry of Maziere Brady, Theiner, and Father Costello, O.P., extensive collections of the records of papal provisions to these various Sees have been made public. They are almost exhaustive for the period of the reign of Henry VIII. On analysis these records yield a fruitful store of information upon the condition of the Irish episcopate at the time when Henry VIII. precipitated upon the Irish Church the most dangerous crisis that it has experienced. Between the years 1509 and 1547, there were about 73 appointments to Irish Sees. About 42 of those appointments were made during the years previous to 1534, while Henry clung faithfully to his allegiance to the Holy See. It will be remembered that until Henry's failure to secure a divorce from Queen Catherine, the Holy See had no more devoted son than he. He enjoyed all the privileges of a rich monarch in whose fidelity the Holy See placed implicit trust. It is not surprising that amongst the privileges handed down to him through a long line of Catholic ancestors, the power of presenting bishops to Irish Sees should have been one of the most important. It is not likely that he exercised this privilege with regard to all the Irish Sees. He certainly enjoyed it in the case of most of them. This will appear the more remarkable when it is borne in mind that during the entire period of Henry's fidelity to the Holy See, the Pale boundary beyond which his English subjects durst not peep, and which protected them from his "Irish rebels," confined almost entirely the region of his civil influence as a ruler in Ireland, to the four obedient shires. It is worth while recalling the bounds of the Pale in 1515. "The English Pale doth stretch and extend from the town of Dundalk to the town of Darver, to the town of Ardee, always on the left side, leaving

the marsh on the right, and so to the town of Siddan, to the town of Kells, to the town of Dangan, to Kilcock, to the town of Clane, to the town of Naas, to the Bridge of Kilcullen, to the town of Ballymore Eustace and so backward to the town of Rathmore, and to the town of Rathcool, to the town of Tallaght, and to the town of Dalkey, leaving always the marsh on the right hand from the said Dundalk to the said town of Dalkey." And yet Henry VIII. writes to the Pope presenting bishops to Sees as far distant from the Pale as Raphoe (1514), Clogher (1515), Clonmacnoise (1515), Ross (1517), Ardagh (1517). Only once during this period does an example of an Irish chieftain appear who ventured to claim any voice in the appointment of a bishop. In 1533 Kilmacduagh fell vacant. The chieftain of the place and the chapter of Kilmacduagh elected a candidate, and presented him for the choice of Clement VII. Their candidate's name is unknown, as another choice was made. It is expressly stated that their presentation and election were annulled and quashed. There can be no doubt, therefore, that Henry enjoyed a real power over the Irish Church. His influence was recognised by Irish churchmen themselves who had recourse to him to secure provisions. It was recognised by the Holy See, which, in the nine cases in which there is record of his request, appointed the candidate he named. It was by no means an advantageous circumstance that the influences of English kings and English churchmen thus interposed in the relations between the Irish Church and the Holy See. The efforts of England were directed to lessening, as far as it was possible, a direct intercourse between Ireland and Rome. As early as 1523, when the idea of an English King in strained relations with the Holy See had not even occurred to men's minds, there were querulous words and sinister thoughts about Irish "Rome runners." It was thought to compel recourse to Wolsey for dispensations which, as Legate of England, he could grant in England to the English Church. It was at least doubtful whether he could grant such dispensations to Irishmen, but doubtful as his power was, there were some in Ireland who were most anxious to see it exercised. And this solely to lessen, if not entirely to destroy, all direct intercourse between the Church in Ireland and the Holy See. Other

English influences of long standing sought to exclude Irishmen from positions of influence and emolument in their own church. The efforts to exclude Irish novices from Irish monasteries were justly annulled by the Roman Pontiff in preceding centuries. But the spirit that framed the laws that sought to have them excluded never was killed. However, in spite of those sinister English influences, the ruling power over the Irish Church was, thanks to the excellent qualifications of the Irish clergy themselves, and to the national spirit which animated them, predominantly in the hands of Irishmen. During Henry's reign scarcely more than twelve out of the seventy-three appointments fell to Englishmen. One was a Scotchman, Wauchop, pre-eminently the greatest churchman of them all. The Englishmen were seated chiefly in the dioceses within the influence of the Pale. In Armagh, Meath and Dublin, the most lucrative of the Irish Sees, the succession throughout the reign was, with one exception, English. There were Englishmen in Kildare, Down and Connor, Leighlin and Elphin. Perhaps also in one or two others. It is clear from the names of the Bishops that the English element was in a small but by no means unimportant minority.

Henry's powers over the Irish Church were not confined to the privilege of presentation. The Temporalities of most of the Irish Sees were at his disposal. When a See became vacant the See lands and all other sources of episcopal revenue were impounded by the State exchequer. During the vacancy the fruits were availed of to swell the revenues of the Crown. When an appointment was made, a royal mandate was issued, granting to the bishop or bishop-elect restitution of all the properties of the See. The sustenance of the bishop was therefore at the free disposal of the monarch, and when he turned his back upon the Holy See he used this power most successfully to thwart the designs of the Pope and to harass the bishops appointed by the Holy See. It would be interesting to know the sources from which the privilege of presentation to Irish Sees was derived. James V. of Scotland enjoyed a similar privilege in the Church of Scotland. He indicated in his letters the sources from which he derived his power when he reminded the Holy Father that it came to him through his ancestors, who obtained from the Popes the privilege that within a

certain period after a vacancy had occurred an appointment could not be made except upon receipt of his letters. Henry VIII. in his letters makes no such recital, but the recurrence of the title, *Dominus Hiberniæ*, and the significant use made of it, persistently recall the famous bull, *Laudabiliter*, which purports to have endowed the King of England with that title. Henry II. received in that document powers over the Irish Church that may, without straining the texts in which they are conveyed, be conceived to have included the privilege here exercised by Henry VIII. and recognized as well founded by the Irish and Roman authorities. Its enjoyment by Henry VIII. and the authoritative recognition with which it was favoured, present, we think, another link to the chain of evidences that favour the authenticity of Adrian's much-disputed Bull. It is quite possible, however, that the privilege may have come to be recognized by the Roman authorities as a growth of custom, but, on the other hand, it is difficult to explain how the Irish chieftains in their unconquered territories would have tolerated the exercise by a civil power which they did not recognize, of an ecclesiastical privilege not founded on more solid grounds than mere custom. The title, *Dominus Hiberniæ*, was universally recognized in Ireland as a papal endowment, and as a token that the terminus of Ireland's temporal subjection was the sovereignty of the Pope. It was only in 1541, when his advisers thought that if the Pope's temporal right to rule Ireland was renounced by an Irish Parliament the way would be made clear to Henry's spiritual supremacy, that Henry caused the title, *Dominus Hiberniæ*, to be revoked, and an obsequious Parliament proclaimed him *Rex Hiberniæ*. These facts are not irrelevant to the present discussion, because the temporal conquest of Ireland was a burning question in Henry's mind. In the Pale it was not completed in his favour until Parliament proclaimed him king. Outside the Pale it was never completed in his reign. Thus the question of Henry's supremacy in Ireland is to be regarded in quite a different light from the question mooted in the same words in England. An extreme skill should have been brought to the framing of an oath of allegiance to Henry that in Ireland would leave no room for ambiguity. An Irishman might with justice

denounce papal authority in potent words, and yet retain the greatest reverence for the Pope's spiritual supremacy. He might be convinced that the Pope's claims to temporal power over Ireland were founded on a forgery and yet in no sense impair his conviction that the Pope's spiritual authority was as wide and as well founded, as the Church built upon the rock. Without having the text of the oath taken by any Irishman before one, it would be rash to accuse him on the mere grounds of having taken an oath of allegiance as guilty of either perjury or schism.

But to return to the constitution of the Episcopate. In the 73 appointments during Henry's reign the representation from the religious orders was surprizingly large. Upwards of 30 of the Irish bishops promoted in Henry's reign were members of the religious orders. All the orders contributed to the composition of the Episcopate. Eleven were Augustinians, including Canons Regular, and Hermits of St. Augustine. Eight or perhaps nine were Franciscans. There were four Dominicans, two Cistercians, two Benedictines, one Carmelite, and one Premonstratensian. The Benedictines and the Premonstratensian were not Irishmen. There may have been others. At the beginning of the year 1534 there were five Augustinian Canons, two Augustinian Hermits, two Franciscans, one Dominican, one Benedictine, and one Premonstratensian seated in Irish Sees. The other bishops were drawn from the ranks of the secular clergy.

Unfortunately, sufficient material is not forthcoming from which to compile an adequate detailed history of the character and lives of the bishops who ruled Ireland at this period. The man has been deemed happy whose annals are tiresome. Had the annals of the Irish Episcopate suffered less from the dreariness of blessedness we should probably have had abundant material handed down. In the successful resistance offered to the doctrines of the Reformation there is contained a sufficiently eloquent testimony to the excellent lives, quick perception of error, and splendid spirit of religion of the Irish bishops. Edmund Campion, the English Jesuit who wrote in 1570, and who set himself to record no flattering account of the Irish nation, describes the Irish as "religious" and as "great alms givers." He refers scathingly to a section of the lower order of the clergy

and people. He writes no adverse comment upon the Irish bishops, but he writes "the same [*i.e.*, the clergy and laity] being virtuously bred up and reformed are such mirrors of holiness and austerity that other nations retain but a show or shadow of devotion in comparison of them. As for abstinence and fasting which these days make so dangerous, this to them is a familiar kind of chastisement." Nations that spend their lives evilly are not in a generation converted to mirrors of holiness and austerity, and although Campion's history was written in 1570, his encomiums were as well deserved by the Irish Catholics in Henry's reign. A writer in the State Papers in 1533 thinks it scarcely necessary to remind his English friend that it was a custom with the Irish to abstain from flesh meat every Wednesday. He then makes a joke at the expense of the citizens of Dublin. The Englishman's propensity to joke about pretexts has not become extinct, but this 16th century joke is founded upon the Irishman's love of abstinence. The people were good, could not have been but good, and a good people are not governed by a bad episcopate. But we have better testimony to rebut the allegation of Henry that the papal power exercised in provisions to Irish benefices had brought the Irish Church to a state of utter ruin and left it in need of his reform. We have the testimony of his own words upon the qualifications of the priests whom he recommended to the Holy See for provision to Irish dioceses and the testimonies elicited by the secretaries of the Pope. Roger O'Malone, whom he recommended for Ardagh (1517), is described by him "*Vir modestus, circumspectione, probitate et doctrina non mediocriter probatus.*" Henry's recommendation and eulogy were not accepted by the Pope without careful scrutiny. They were referred for inquiry, and in the report that in due course was returned to His Holiness he is described "*ex legitimo matrimonio atque honestis parentibus natus, aetatis suae annorum XL., sanus mente et corpore, ac bonae conversationis et famae, in jure canonico bene instructus et literatus ac in sacerdotii ordine constitutus ad ipsius ecclesiae regimen et gubernationem aptus et idoneus.*" He was a Canon of Clonmacnoise and a secular priest. John, Abbot of Fonte Vivo, is recommended by Henry for Ross for his "*intellectis . . . egregiis . . . virtutibus, et imprimis praecipua modestia, probitate et*

doctrina." On the testimony given under oath in Rome by two witnesses, who were Richard, a Cistercian Monk, of Fonte Vivo, and Maurice O'Cullinane, a priest of the diocese of Ross, he was described as born of excellent parents, that he was "honestibus moribus dotatum, doctum in jure et sacra pagina," and the report to the Holy Father sums up his qualifications: "Ex legitimo matrimonio procreatus bonae conversationis, de aetate quae videtur legitima, et litteratura in qua testes dicunt esse bene eruditum et praesertim in utroque jure." Patrick Cullen, recommended for Clogher, is thus described by Henry: "Sacrae theologiae professor ac celebris in eodem Domino Nostro verbi Dei praedicator, nec minus vitae temperantia, morumque ornameto ac circumspectione imprimis probatus." Father Costello quotes an independent estimate of Patrick Cullen's character and virtues from a work on the Augustinian Hermits: "Vir divinis humanisque litteris egregie instructus per magnam vitae sanctimoniam et singularem doctrinam multam sibi in tota Hibernia famam comparavit." Quintin O'Higgins, the Franciscan recommended for Clonmacnoise, Henry found to be "Venerabilem et religiosum virum, doctum prudentem et in vitae integritate probatum." The usual inquiry made by John Mathew, apostolic notary, elicited from Nicholas Houran, an Irish priest of the diocese of Hereford (? Clonfert), that he knew Quintin O'Higgins in Ireland in the province of Tuam, that he was "litteris eruditum, praedicatorem, bonis moribus et fama, aliisque multis virtutibus praeditum." Father Costello translates the Bull dated 1513 of Leo X., in which Cornelius O'Cahan, Bishop of Raphoe, is described "as a *bachelor in decretis* of legitimate age, and of whose many virtues he (Leo X.) had trustworthy evidence." Roderick O'Donnell, Dean of Raphoe, was appointed to Derry in 1519, and testimony was borne in Rome to his learning, to his blameless life and conversation, to his foresight and prudence in matters spiritual and temporal. Christopher Bodkin, who was promoted to Kilmacduagh in 1533, Cardinal Pole, in 1555, found to be "a man born in wedlock, of noble family aged about fifty, skilled in theology and the Canon Law which he had studied at Oxford." David Woulfe, the apostolic delegate, greatly

praises Bodkin, whose skill in the administration of his diocese he greatly admired. There are others in the above enumeration whose credentials we have given, who, like Bodkin, did not always stand staunch in their allegiance to the Pope. But it is not to the question of the individual merits of candidates for bishoprics that we address ourselves so much, as to the qualities that the Holy See sought for in the presentee when the responsibility of providing for the spiritual welfare of the Catholics of an Irish diocese was thrust upon it. We have seen that a prudence was exercised that an Irish Catholic reader would just expect in His Holiness. He provided neither ignorant nor unlearned, nor carelessly living prelates. Neither Henry's reasons for cutting off the Irish Church from the authority of the Holy See, nor his excuse for the abolition of Irish monasteries can be seriously regarded when he could find, apparently without difficulty, men in Irish monasteries and on the Irish mission deserving of the encomiums with which he accompanied his recommendations of them for the onerous responsibilities of ruling Irish dioceses.

The power of the bishop over his clergy and his churches was different in some important respects from the immediate unshackled control which is exercised in the Irish Church of to-day. Just as the monarch stood between the Irish Episcopate and the Pope, Irish laymen and the Priors of the Irish monasteries stood between the bishop and a great proportion of his clergy. The monasteries owned an enormously large number of the parish churches, and their Priors exercised the patronage of them. These possessions and their accompanying rights of advowson were largely the gifts of pious laymen. But besides there remained churches over which laymen continued to retain control, and while the confirmation of lay appointments belonged of right to the bishop, it will be seen that the clergy of such churches owed their livings to the laymen's gift and a corresponding sense of dependence upon lay liberality was bred in them from which, when the interests of religion are considered, it would have been better they had been free. The cataclysm of the Reformation destroyed in the Catholic Church all these bonds of lay dependency. The church that fell into the temporal inheritance of the ancient Irish Church inherited also this legacy of lay control. The

Catholic bishops suffered untold hardships when they were cast out, but if their cathedrals, their manor-houses and their See lands were no longer to be theirs, they found at least one reward for their endurance of the pangs of poverty in the full immediate control over the appointments of their parish clergy, which is a still more valued possession with their successors.

Absenteeism amongst the bishops was an abuse that in England was attended with serious consequences to the discipline of the clergy and the spiritual care of the subject. The evidences of the presence of this abuse in the Irish Church are not frequent, but they apply, as far as can be ascertained, only to the English occupants of Irish Sees. Thomas Halsey, Bishop of Leighlin, is said never to have seen his diocese although he was bishop for six years (1515-1521). In 1518 he was in Rome, and it was said of him that "by his bishopric in Ireland he hath nothing," and he is spoken of as "that poor bishop." In 1528 the diocese of Meath is described by an English pen "as far in ruin both spiritually and temporally owing to the absence of the bishop," Richard Wilson. Robert Blythe, another Englishman, Bishop of Down and Connor, was so long an absentee, without the permission of the Holy See or of his metropolitan, that the Primate was necessitated to exercise the patronage of benefices in that diocese. No such complaints have been recorded, as far as can be ascertained, against Irishmen.

In earthly possessions the great majority of the Irish bishops could not be called wealthy. Compared with their English brethren, many of them were poor indeed. On a famous occasion when the Earl of Kildare was being tried upon certain charges made against his administration as Lord Deputy of Ireland, Cardinal Wolsey, in the course of his speech, twitted the Earl with behaving himself as a king in his dominions in Kildare. The Earl made a crushing retort: "As touching my kingdom, my lord, if you and I had exchanged kingdoms but for one month, I would trust to gather up more crumbs in that space than twice the revenues of my poor Earldom." It would scarcely be fair to place the revenues of Wolsey in contrast with the revenues of even the richest of the Irish Sees. "He held and enjoyed at once the Bishoprics of York, Durham and

Winchester, the dignities of Lord Cardinal, Legate and Chancellor; the Abbey of St. Albans, diverse Priories and sundry fat benefices in commendam," writes Campion. Fortunately materials for a comparison of a more or less satisfactory character exist, in the returns made to the Holy See for purposes of taxation, of the yearly revenues of the bishoprics when the Bulls of appointment were being prepared. In most instances the tax levied, and in many cases the actual revenues of the Sees are noted in the records of appointments. The following tables supply the revenues and taxes of the Sees of Great Britain and Ireland during the 16th century :—

ENGLAND.

Diocese.	Revenue.	Taxation.
Canterbury ...	—	10,000 gold florins
London ...	—	3,000 "
Winchester ...	—	12,000 "
Ely ...	—	7,500 "
Lincoln ...	8,000 gold florins	5,000 "
Lichfield & Coventry ...	—	3,500 "
Salisbury ...	10,000 "	4,500 "
Bath and Wells ...	10,000 "	4,000 "
Exeter ...	4,000 "	6,000 "
Norwich ...	5,000 "	5,000 "
Worcester ...	3,200 "	2,000 "
Hereford ...	—	1,800? "
Chichester ...	—	1,433 "
Rochester ...	—	1,300 "
St. David's ...	3,000 gold florins	1,500 "
Llandaff ...	—	700 "
Bangor ...	—	470 "
St. Asaph ...	2,000 "	460 "
York ...	—	10,000 "
Durham ...	—	8,000? "
Carlisle ...	3,000 "	1,000 "

SCOTLAND.

Diocese.	Revenue.	Taxation.
St. Andrew's ...	10,000 gold florins	3,300 gold florins
Dunkeld ...	3,000 "	350 "
Aberdeen ...	3,000 "	1,250 "
Moray ...	2,000 "	1,200 "
Brechin ...	—	1,600 "
Dumblane ...	—	800 "
Ross ...	1,000 "	600 "
Caithness ...	400 "	600 "
Orkneys ...	200 "	500 "
Glasgow ...	—	2,000 "
Galloway ...	150 "	100 "
Arðvle ...	110 "	110 "
Sodor and the Isles ...	—	660 "

IRELAND.

Diocese.	Revenue.	Taxation.
Armagh ...	4,000 gold florins	1,500 gold florins
Meath ...	2,000 "	1,000 "
Clonmacnoise ...	300 "	33½ "
Clogher ...	—	50 "
Down and Connor ..	—	230 "
Kilmore ..	—	33½ "
Ardagh ...	20 "	33½ "
Dromore ...	—	50 "
Raphoe ...	—	33½ "
Derry ...	—	200 "
*Dublin ...	4,000 "	2,650 "
Kildare ...	—	200 "
†Ossory ...	—	—
Ferns ...	80 "	120 "
Leighlin ...	—	60 or 80 "
‡Cashel ...	—	4,000 "
Emly ...	1,200 "	120 "
Limerick ...	—	300 "
Ardfert & Aghadoe	—	60 "
Waterford & Lismore	200 "	120 "
Cork and Cloyne ...	500 "	300 "
Ross ...	—	33½ "
Killaloe ...	—	100 "
Kilfenora ...	—	33½ "
Tuam ...	—	214 "
Enachdune ...	—	133 "
Mayo ...	—	60 "
Kilmacduagh ...	40 ducats	40 ducats
Killala ...	—	40 gold florins
Achonry ...	—	33½ "
Elphin ...	—	60½ "
Clonfert ...		(in 15th century the tax was 300 gold florins).

* Tax of Dublin reduced in 1523 to 1,000 ducats.

† Tax levied not given for Ossory. Tax paid in Curia, 725 gold florins.

‡ Edmund Butler, upon whom this tax was levied, paid only 300 gold florins.

The juxtaposition of the above lists makes a useful comparison easy. At a glance it is seen that the number of the Irish dioceses almost equalled the combined numbers of England and Scotland. The average area ruled by a bishop was therefore in Ireland smaller than in England or in Scotland. With regard to the tax of 4,000 florins enacted from Cashel, it should be borne in mind that this sum is certainly abnormal. It was the sum levied against Edmund Butler who, as he was a natural son of the Earl of Thomond, sought for and obtained a dispensation "ex defectu natalium." It was to be expected that fiscal difficulties would be thrown in the way of such a candidate for the Episcopate. The English Episcopacy enjoyed revenues that were immensely more wealthy than those of the Irish bishops. The Scottish Sees, although much less wealthy than those of England, were on the whole much more lucrative than the Irish. The wealthiest of the Irish Sees were Dublin, Meath and Armagh. The taxes levied bore some proportion to the staid and chance revenues of the Sees. If the figures in the taxation lists are totted, it will be found that the normal taxable capacity of all the Irish dioceses taken together was not equal to the sum levied against the opulent incumbent of the single English diocese of Winchester. This remarkable result does not warrant the conclusion that the Irish bishops were living on the verge of bankruptcy. During the vacancy of the See of Dublin, from the death of Alen, the Archbishop, July 28, 1534, to 29 September, 1535, Brabazon, the Treasurer of Ireland, accounted for the revenues of the See accruing during that period at £623 5s. 8d. This sum should be multiplied by ten to secure its approximate equivalent in money of the present currency. This revenue accrued in fourteen months. The proportion for one year would equal a sum in present currency of about £5,000 0s. 0d. In Harris's Ware, under the headings of the various dioceses, valuations of the revenues of See lands taken from the King's Books appear. Most of these valuations were taken in the reigns of Elizabeth and James I., and are, therefore, not so satisfactory for our present purpose. However, the figures for some of the dioceses belong to the reign of Henry VIII., and they show that many of the bishops were far from poor.

		Irish.			Sterling.		
Armagh, from an extent taken	1538-9	£183	17	5½	£137	18	0¼
*Meath	1538-9		—		373	12	0
Dublin	1538-9	534	15	2½	401	1	4½
Kildare	1538-9	69	11	4	52	3	6
Ossory	1537-8	100	marks	=	66	13	4
Ferns	1537-8	£108	13	4	81	10	0
Cashel	1537-8	66	13	4	50	0	0
Waterford and Lismore	1537-8	72	8	1	54	6	0¼

* These figures are supposed to include the revenue of Clonmacnoise, but we do not think they do.

The sterling figures in this list ought to be multiplied by ten to obtain the present equivalent value. In these figures no account is taken, presumably, of the incidental revenues of the bishops. No really satisfactory results may be obtained from comparing these English and Irish figures with the Papal figures. If in the Papal list the taxation figures imposed bore a uniform proportion to the revenues, it would be possible to form some estimate of the annual income of the Irish bishops in the smaller and poorer Sees. As the figures show, no uniform standard was observed. It is, therefore, not possible to make a satisfactory estimate. This general conclusion, however, may be drawn that a great number of the Irish bishops enjoyed no more than a mere competence. And if we may argue from the financial condition of the Irish Episcopate in Henry's reign, we may also conclude that the Irish Church did not suffer from the evil influences to which a ponderously wealthy church might be said to have fallen a prey. The revenues of the Irish Church cannot be said to have excited the same greedy temptations to spoliation that amongst other things aroused Henry's desperate avarice in England.

THOMAS GOGARTY.

Who were they who “understood not”?

—Luke ii. 50.

The proposed new translation of Luke ii. 48, 49, 50, as given in this REVIEW for July, 1912, was as follows :—

τέκνον, τί ἐποίησας ἡμῖν οὕτως; ἰδοὺ ὁ πατήρ σου καὶ γὼ ὀδυνώμενοι ζητοῦμέν σε.	Son, why hast thou done to us so? Behold, thy father and I sorrowing have been seeking thee.
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καὶ εἶπε πρὸς αὐτούς, τί, ὅτι ζητεῖτέ με; οὐκ ᾔδειτε ὅτι ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρός μου δεῖ εἶναί με;	And he said unto them : What! ‘Seeking’ me? Did ye not know that at my Father’s must I be?
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καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ συνῆκαν τὸ ῥῆμα ὃ ἐλάλησεν αὐτοῖς.	And THEY understood not the word which he had spoken unto them.
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C. TENSE-TRANSLATION FROM THE GREEK.

ζητοῦμεν, ᾔδειτε, ἐλάλησεν. Luke ii. 48, 49, 50.

A GLANCE at the above Greek text, already given in our first article, will show that the *Textus Receptus*, with its imperfects, ἐζητοῦμεν and ἐζητεῖτε, has been departed from in favour of the two present tenses. In making the change Westcott and Hort, while fully alive to the strength of the opposition represented by Codd. A. C. D., the Vulgate, Tischendorf and the English Versions of 1611 and 1881, have been content to abide by the reading of A¹ and B. The truth is that the imperfects cannot be defended except by those who have entirely overlooked the force of the present and imperfect “continuous” in Greek. There

¹ *Prima manu*. The *tertia manus* is in favour of the reading of the *Textus Receptus*.

is no room here for the fad or fancy of the individual translator. It is a question of the poverty of Greek tense-forms¹ contrasted with the plenitude of Greek concepts of time. There must be a limited number of time-concepts in the human mind as there is a limited number of articulate sounds producible by the vocal organs, but the "science" of Grammar which should deal with the former is even more chaotic than the "science" of Phonetics which treats of the latter. We are not to deny to the Greeks the possession of our differently shaded time-concepts, "I speak," "I am speaking," "I have been speaking," even though all three must be represented by the one λέγω. It may mean any one of these three, and it is the duty of the translator to pick out the one which best reflects the mind of the Greek who writes λέγω. It is the same with the much-used and much-abused ἦν. It may be "was," but it may also be our pluperfect "had been." Of a man who had been thirty years in the city, and then left, we must write, ἦν ἐν τῇ πόλει τριάκοντα ἔτη ὅτε ἀνεχώρησεν. Just as Xenophon says of certain towns which *had once been* the perquisite of Tissaphernes, ἦσαν αἱ Ἰωνικαὶ πόλεις Τισαφερνοῦς τὸ ἀρχαῖον.² "Were" would here convey the wrong idea. In this task of deciding between "was" and "had been" the Revisers are at times happy,³ but not always.⁴

To return to our periphrastic English tense with the participle in *-ing*, and to illustrate the absolute need of it in translation, we may begin with a discussion of Jn. xvii. 9 and vii. 8.

In the former our Lord says, οὐ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἔρωτῶ, where all translators, including the Revisers, have given sore trouble to commentators by imparting a harsh tone into one of the last utterances of Him⁵ who as surely prayed for the world as He died for the world. "I pray not for

¹ Cf. Father J. Donovan, S.J., M.A., in *The Classical Review*, vol. ix., pp. 7-9.

² *Anab.* I. 1, 6.

³ Cf. Lk. xxiii. 53; Jn. ix. 18; Acts iv. 13.

⁴ Cf. Lk. xxiii. 8; Jn. vii. 29. It is open to the grammarian to say that ἦν as a pluperfect means "had been *being*," not "had been" *simpliciter*. This may be granted.

⁵ "Oh, but they say the tongues of dying men
Enforce attention, like deep harmony."—Shakespeare.

the world" sounds like the death-knell of the bulk of mankind. All that Christ says is, "*I am not praying for the world*" scil. *just now*; "*I am praying for them*" (the Apostles); *περὶ αὐτῶν ἐρωτῶ* (*ibid.*) This softens the *prima facie* asperity of the text and re-introduces the tone of mercy.

Still worse is the mistranslation of the Greek present in Jn. vii. 8. In their fussy, and even rude way, the disciples had been importuning Jesus to "come along" and make a grand entry⁷ into the capital. Weary of these worldly arguments, He begged them to leave Him alone and to go up themselves as they liked. To declare that He was not going at all would have given grave scandal to Jews, who considered attendance at Tabernacles next in obligation to attendance at Passover and Pentecost.⁸ Our Lord's answer was οὐκ ἀναβαίνω, "No," or, if we will, "I am not going up," scil. *just now*. The received translation is, "I go not up." The author of the fourth Gospel, who has no difficulty with his Greek present, sees nothing inconsistent in the after action of the Master, who went up later and alone (Jn. vii. 10). Not so Porphyry, who, on the strength of "I go not up," charges our Lord with fickleness, indeci-

⁷ The American "splurge" represents their idea.

⁸ See the Bible Dictionaries.

⁹ It is surely time for translators to know when our Lord said "yes" and when "no." He does not use in the Gospels the words He recommends—*ναί, ναί* . . . *οὐ, οὐ* (cf. Mt. v. 37, James v. 12). When He spoke Greek, He made little use of these forms because by themselves, they were an extraordinary rarity compared to our ever-recurring and compact "yes" and "no" (Cf. Liddell and Scott, and the Concordances.) To say "yes" to a proposal to "go up," He would answer in Greek, ἀναβαίνω; to say "no" to it, He would answer οὐκ ἀναβαίνω. When saying "yea" to Judas and Caiaphas (Mt. xxvi. 25, 64), He could not but use the Hebraistic *סὺ εἶπας*. Biblical Hebrew does not furnish equivalents to our "yea" and "nay." *Chen* is not our "yes" (cf. Jos. ii. 4), and *Lau* is not our "no" (cf. 1. Kings xi. 12; Zach. iv. 5; Amos vi. 10). These two Hebrew forms are very remarkably combined in Num. xii. 7, where the translation is "Not so," and not "No—yes." The Hebraism "thou hast said" is not English; "yes" is. It is time for this incubus to disappear from all English versions. Until it does, our Lord's evidence at His trial will not read aright, and to the irreverent may look like "fencing" or evasion.

sion, and worse.¹⁰ So keenly did Christians feel the accusation that they had recourse to a miserable subterfuge to escape the imaginary danger of an untruth on the lips of Jesus, and proceeded to introduce "a palpable and wilful emendation"¹¹ into the sacred text. Then the copyist in *Codex Vaticanus* (B.) took up his pen and wrote unblushingly οὐπω ἀναβαίνω, "not yet go I up." In vain have scholars like Tischendorf, Scholz, Griesbach, Alford, Tregelles and Scrivener protested against this liberty. B. had spoken in commanding tones to Westcott and Hort, and compelled them to support the unscrupulous scribe who was persuaded by the false meaning he attached to a Greek present, that the veracity of Christ could only be saved by the so-called "easier" but impossible οὐπω. Thus by what looks like a grave miscarriage of justice, οὐκ has been condemned by Westcott and Hort and the Revisers to the pillory of the margin.¹² It is perhaps the worst example in textual criticism of the servility of eminent critics to the undue influence of the written word of a Codex.¹³ Miracles of a non-natural order have been worked on Westcott and Hort by the cult of B., and on Tischendorf by his almost fetish-worship of his "find," the Codex *א*.¹⁴

There are scores of texts in the Bible which suffer, though not so seriously as οὐκ ἀναβαίνω, from the neglect of the "continuous" form of the present tense.

¹⁰ An extraordinary remark on the change of purpose "in the Logos" is made by Sanday, *Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, p. 145.

¹¹ Scrivener, *Plain Introd.*, etc. p. 609; 3rd ed.

¹² The American Committee dissenting

¹³ For οὐκ there stand the uncials *א*, D.K.M.Π., the cursives, 17, 389, 507, 558, 570: the versions, Ital., Vulg., Curet.-Syr., Copt., Æthiop., Armen.; also Cyril Alex., Epiph., Chrys., Porph., *ap.* Hieron., Hieron. For οὐπω are B.L.T. and ten uncials, nearly all the cursives, three Codd. Ital., Peschito, Thebaic (Egyptian), Gothic (Ulflas), the Syr.-Chark., (Philoxenian), and Basil. Cf. Bernstein, *De Charklensi N.T. Trans. Syr.* This Syr.-Chark. is called by Scrivener "a very wretched translation" and "probably the most servile version of Scripture ever made," but he allows it to have much weight as a textual authority. *Op. cit.*, pp. 309, 328. Cf. the invaluable work of De Gebhardt, *N.T. Tisch. Tregell. Westcott-Hortian. Adnot. Crit.*

¹⁴ Tischendorf speaks of the "universa vitiositas" of Cod. B., forgetting that his own is just as full of flaws.

In Mt. ix. 3, οὗτος βλασφημεῖ "the man's *blaspheming!*"¹⁵ is more like the rude interruption of an exasperated audience than "this man blasphemeth." The same may be said of Jn. vii. 20, "Who's *wanting* to kill you?"¹⁶ In Acts xxvi. 28, Agrippa's half-hearted words are best rendered, "thou art almost *persuading* me to turn Christian."¹⁷ It is surprising how these present participles contribute to the vividness of a narrative, the point of a remark or the sting of a rebuke. In a burst of scorn for the wobbling character of the Galatians, Paul says, "I marvel ye are so swiftly *shifting*."¹⁸ In letter-writing, preaching or familiar talk, much sprightliness or pungency is lost by the omission of the participial present. In Rom. i. 9, λέγω . . . οὐ ψεύδομαι is, "I am *telling* you . . . I am *not lying*," and the στενάζομεν of Rom. viii. 23, "we are *groaning*." Yet throughout the Epistles there are only about four instances where the Revisers seem alive to the important function of this truly graphic kind of tense."

Dealing, however, with Luke ii. 48, we are concerned with something more complicated than an English present "continuous," like "I am praying," "I am going up," and its Greek equivalent. To add to the trouble of the translator, both Greek and Latin must be credited with a time-concept, which is expressed in English by the past participle of the copulative with the present participle of the principal verb, thus, μένωσιν may be, "I have *been awaiting* you." Though cumbersome, this periphrastic form is indispensable in our own tongue; and the only way of turning it into Greek or Latin is by the simple present. Thus when a hall door is opened after a long wait and much knocking, the irate caller

¹⁵ "This" is often a clumsy way of translating οὗτος. Cf. οὗτος τί πράττεις; "man alive, what are you doing?" Cf. Liddell and Scott, on the interjectional οὗτος.

¹⁶ Cf. the presents in Mk. ii. 7, vii. 37; Jn. i. 38, vii. 25, xx. 21, xxi. 24.

¹⁷ Cf. Acts ix. 5, xxvi. 25.

¹⁸ Gal. i. 6.

¹⁹ Cf. the presents in Rom. xvi. 17; 2 Cor. v. 12; Gal. i. 10; 2 Thess. ii. 10. This method might well have been extended to other texts. Cf. Rom. xi. 13; 1 Cor. vii. 6, xi. 2; 2 Cor. iii. 12, iv. 15, 17, v. 14, viii. 1, 10; Gal. i. 20, iii. 10, 15, 17; Eph. iii. 14; Phil. i. 3, 8, 9, 15, iii. 12, 14, 18, iv. 11, 17; Col. i. 3, 24; 2 Thess. i. 11, ii. 7; 1 Jn. i. 1, 6, ii. 1, 7, 12.

says to the servant, "I have *been knocking*—(κρούω)—half an hour."²⁰ Though the necessity of this form of tense can be easily demonstrated, the Revisers do not seem to realise it. Thus it happens that the treatment of tense in Grammars is perhaps even more demoralised than that of the antediluvian "Moods," and the un-psychological "Parts of Speech."²¹

Yet why should this be, considering that equivalents for such phrases, as "I have *been seeking*," "I had *been writing*," come readily to hand in Greek and Latin. Thus ἐξεύχην πάλαι is "you have *been boasting long*"; νῦν τε καὶ πάλαι λέγω is, "I say it now and have *been saying* it all along"; οὐ λέγω σοι ταῦτα; is, "Have I not *been telling* you so?"²² Ibi jamdudum habito is, "I have *been residing* a long time there"; "per totam horam eadem jactitas" is, "You *have been making* the same boast for a whole hour"; "crebras expectationes nobis tui commoves"²³ is, "You have *been repeatedly exciting* my hopes of seeing you." In Plato, ἀλλ' ὁ λέγω, τρυφᾷ is, "But, as I have *been saying*, you are uppish."²⁴

The Bible is full of passages where the sense cannot be fully brought out except by this involved but expressive English present. In Jn. viii. 48, "Have we not *been saying* (λέγομεν) well?" points to the fact that the insulting

²⁰ The wrath is not always one-sided. Blepyrus in Aristoph. *Eccl.* 317, complains of "the dirty devil" (ὁ κορσεῖος) who had been knocking at the door.

²¹ Was there ever boy or girl in a grammar-school who had an idea of what the "infinitive mood" means? Perhaps a child knows more about "infinite" in the Catechism than about the "infinitive" of the grammatical text-books. What is an advanced pupil to make of "Regula I. Indicativus sæpe pro subjunctivo et optativo usurpatur?" Hermann's Viger, c. 9. What does it all mean? Perhaps no more than the wild and lawless assertion that the preposition ἐν is sometimes "elegantier" used for σύν, and sometimes "exquisite" for ἐκ, *ibid.* All this is topsy-turvydom more than science.

²² Cf. Sonnenschein, *Gr. Gram.* App. II.

²³ Cic. *ad Att.* i. 4. Cf. Ps. xciv. 10 (Vulg.), "Semper hi errant corde," "These have ever *been a-wandering* in heart."

²⁴ Plato, *op. om.*, p. 193; ed. Stallbaum, 1836. The editor renders this parenthetic ὁ λέγω by "wie gesagt," which is no translation. This sense of λέγω is of very frequent recurrence in Plato. Cf. *De Repub.* x. 1; *Apolog. Socr.*, p. 21 (ed. Steph); and in the same edition, *Protag.*, p. 316; *Gorg.*, p. 465; *Cratyl.* p. 396; *Sympos.*, pp. 178, 186, 192.

language about possession by the devil was one of the popular retorts on our Lord.²⁵ On their way through Samaria, the disciples had been exchanging remarks on the stage of growth of the crops, when Christ interposed, οὐχ ὑμεῖς λέγετε; "Have not ye *been saying?*" In Jn. vii. 21 θαυμάζετε is "Ye have *been a-wondering.*" The μαρτυρεῖ of Jn. i. 15 loses much of its force unless rendered "John hath *been bearing* witness," and the same may be said of Jn. viii. 25, where ὁ τι λαλῶ ὑμῖν is, "What I have *been telling* you"; and of Jn. i. 5, where "the light hath *been shining*" (φαίνει), alone gives the full meaning and pathos; and of 1 Jn. iii. 8, where "the devil hath *been sinning* from the beginning" seems much preferable to "the devil sinneth" of the Revisers.

What has been said of the new reading ζητοῦμεν in Luke ii. 48, could be applied to the displaced imperfect, ἐζητοῦμεν, *quærebamus* (Vulg.), if that form were restored to its position. It would have to be translated, "We *had been seeking.*" Of a position evacuated by the enemy, Xenophon says that the troops of Cyrus occupied the ground "where the enemy *had been keeping* guard" (ἐφύλαττον).²⁶ "Were keeping guard" would convey a false impression, for it is certain the enemy had disappeared. Again, in Luke xxiv. 21, ἡλπίζομεν cannot yield its full meaning until we make the faint-hearted disciples murmur, "We *had been hoping*"; and in Acts viii. 9, we are apt to miss the meaning along with the Revisers, unless we translate the words about Simon, thus, "he *had erst been practising* magic in the city" (προϋπῆρχεν).

After this technical discussion, it becomes easy to understand how some early copyists rejected the present ζητοῦμεν in Luke ii. 48 and substituted the imperfect ἐζητοῦμεν. All they saw in the ζητοῦμεν, now happily restored by Westcott and Hort, was "we seek," and how could Mary say, "Son, we seek thee," when she had met Him in the temple? Thus the imperfect "We were seeking" was dragged in, to the loss of the pathos of the phrase that represents the pained

²⁵ Cf. Jn. vii. 20.

²⁶ *Anab.* i. 2, 22. Cf. Sonnenschein, *Syntax*, § 476. The author shows how ἥρχεν may mean "he *had been ruling.*" More doubtful is his statement that γέγραφε, ἐγγράφειν may be sometimes rendered, "he has been or had been writing." *Ibid.*, p. 46, but see *ibid.* p. 277.

greeting of the Mother—"Son, sorrowing we *have been seeking thee*" (ζητοῦμεν). How the Child took up the phrase and turned it into a kind of verbal interjection, "Seeking!" has been emphasised before, when the English construction was said to be far more lifelike than the round-about and inert substitute for inverted commas—ὅτι ζητεῖτε.²⁷

As to the ᾔδειτε of Luke ii. 49 there is little to say, except that the imperfect sense requires the sacrifice of the "wist" of the Authorised and Revised Versions and the substitution of the drawn-out form adopted by the Douay, "Did you not know?" For a version so literal as the Vulgate it is surprising to find that "Nesciebatis?" "were ye unaware?" is chosen in face of the obviously correct, "Nonne sciebatis?" "were ye not aware [all the time]?"

The last verb on our list of three claims closer attention. It will be noticed that the aorist, ἐλάλησεν (Luke ii. 50), has been translated in this study by the pluperfect "had spoken." Were it merely a matter of taste, little stress would need to be laid on it, but underlying the proposed change there is a principle which may be taken to be authoritatively settled, mainly by the labours bestowed by German scholars on the "plusquamperfectischer-aorist."²⁸ The ordinary English pluperfect, as is now admitted, is not represented by the Greek tense of the same name, but by the aorist. This is not equivalent to the statement found in some grammarians, that one tense is "put for" another. As well assert that the word "midnight" by poetic license is "put for" "noon," a present "put for" a future or an imperfect for an aorist. These things are not interchangeable at random. The aorist ἐλάλησεν, as has been pointed out in the case of the Greek present λέγω or the imperfect ἔγωγε, is, according to the context, susceptible of two renderings, "He spoke" or "He had spoken." It is a remarkable fact that the writers of the New Testament not only provide innumerable instances of the pure classical use of the

²⁷ The Vulgate not only hangs fire in the same way by its use of *quod*, but follows a somewhat discredited tense by its use of the imperfect *quærebatis*, Lk. ii. 49.

²⁸ Cf. Curtius-Hartel, *Griech. Schulgramm*, § 197, 19 aufl.; also Jelf, who is far less satisfactory, in *Gr. Gram.*, § 404; also Sonnenschein, *Synt.* § 483.

imperfect,²⁹ but also illustrate in many instances, and quite as effectively as the best authors of antiquity, the pluperfect force of the Greek aorist.³⁰ Very noteworthy are the three active aorists in Mk. vi. 17 and the passive aorist in Mt. x. 25, ὅτε δὲ ἐξῆλθῆθι ὁ ὄχλος, "après qu' on eut fait sortir tout le

²⁹ Sonnenschein thinks that Attic Greek sometimes equates the aorist with the imperfect, *Greek Gram.*, p. 277. The contention is scarcely possible. The examples taken from Thucydides, Sophocles, and Plato are anything but convincing. In the latter's *Phædo* (57a. ed. Steph.), πῶς ἐτελεύτα; does not mean "How did he die?", but refers to the circumstances under which he was dying. So, too, of κατελάμβανον (*ibid.* 60a.) Those who entered the room saw in succession or were taking in the two figures present, Socrates and Xanthippe. An imperfect "put for" an aorist is an impossibility. More or less defective renderings of the imperfect are too common in the Revised Version. Thus the pathos of ἡδύχοντο in Acts xxvii. 27, when the sailors were longing and praying for daybreak is lost. The same is true of the five imperfects in Jn. v., 16, 18, where St. John is taking a brief retrospect of the persistent charges of the Jews about the continuous breach of the law by Jesus. Much remains to be done with the same tense in Mt. ii. 4, iii. 4, 5, 6, iv. 11, 23, vii. 28, viii. 2, 31, ix. 2, 10, 11, 21, 34, 35, xiii. 57, xiv. 4, 36, xv. 22, xvi. 7, xviii. 28, xx. 11, xxi. 8, 21, xxv. 1, xxvi. 58, 63; Mk. i. 5, 22, 30, 31, 32, 35, 45, ii. 4, 15, 16, 24, 27, iii. 2, 4, 6, 11, 12, iv. 2, 38, 34, 41, v. 8, 9, 10, 24, 32, 40, vi. 6, 13, 15, 19, 20, vii. 17, 36, viii. 32, ix. 11, 15, x. 13, 26, 48, xi. 5, 9, 17, xii. 12, xiv. 56, xv. 19, 41; Lk. i. 24, 62, 64, 65, ii. 3, 37, 41, 47, 52, iii. 7, 10, 14, iv. 1, 15, 22, 32, 36, 39, 40, 41, 42; v. 15, 18, 26, 30, vi. 5, 7, 18, 19, ix. 45, xviii. 39, 43, xxii. 63, 64, xxiii. 5, 9, 21, 23, 27, 34, 35, 39, 42 (It is ἐλεγεν here, not the ἐφη of xxiii. 40), xxiv. 15, 21; Jn. ii. 21, 23, iii. 22, iv. 26, 27, 31, 33, 47, v. 3, 4, vi. 2, 41, 42, 52, 72, vii. 1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 25, 30, 40, 41, viii. 6, 8, 22, 25, ix. 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, x. 20, 21, 39, xi. 54, 56, xii. 11, 13, 17, xiii. 29, xviii. 15, xix. 3, xx. 4, xxi. 18; Acts i. 6, ii. 7, 12, 40, 43, 45, 47, iii. 2, 3, 5, iv. 7, 13, 15, 31, 32, 33, 34; 35, v. 13, 14, 16, 21, 24, 37, vi. 7, 8, vii. 25, 54, 58, viii. 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 17, 25, 39, ix. 17, 20, 22, 24, 26, 29, 31, 39, x. 46, xi. 2, 6, 23, xii. 5, 6, 9, 20, 22, 24, xiii. 5, 8, 42, 43, 45, 49, 52, xiv. 12, xv. 3, 35, 38, xvi. 2, 4, 5, 13, 14, xvii. 6, 16, 17, 18, 21, xviii. 3, 4, 5, 8, 17, 25, 28, xix. 6, 8, 11, 18, 20, 32, xx. 7, 38, xxi. 4, 5, 12, 19, 30, 33, 34, 36, xxii. 2, 20, 22, 30, xxiii. 9, xxiv. 26, xxv. 18, 19, 20, xxvi. 11, 20, 31, xxvii. 27, 29, 38, 39, 40, xxviii. 4, 6, 9, 30. From the nature of the writing the Epistles do not furnish many imperfects. But see Gal. iv. 29.

³⁰ As a rule the Revised Version is happy in its treatment of the aorist, but it is perhaps faultily rendered in Mt. ix. 33, xiii. 47, xiv. 8; Mk. vi. 52, viii. 14; Jn. iv. 45, vi. 22, xxi. 20.

monde," or, "ausgetrieben war," or "*had been put out.*" Properly understood, the aorist in Luke iii. 21, ἐν τῷ βαπτισθῆναι, conveys the idea that not until the waiting penitents of John *had been* immersed, did Jesus approach the banks of the Jordan to offer Himself for baptism.³¹ In Mt. ii. 1, through the neglect of the aorist, γεννηθέντος, the Revisers might lead one to suppose that the learned men from the East had visited the Child immediately after His Birth. Lastly, to take Jn. xviii. 24, if the Authorised Version translation of the aorist, ἀπέστειλεν, by the pluperfect, "*had sent,*" is right, we have an incident in the history of the Passion, recorded outside the line of chronological sequence, whereas if the "*sent*" of the Revised Version be accepted, the transmission of the Accused from Annas to Caiaphas takes its natural place in the narrative.³² This one example is enough to show how much may depend on the proper selection of an English tense to represent the Greek aorist.

No such important issue hangs on our pluperfect rendering of ἐλάλησεν in Luke ii. 50, but it may be fairly contended that the spirit of the original is brought out better by "*had spoken*" than by "*spake*" or "*spoke.*" The learned pundits in the temple, whose ears were not attuned to the *Pater Noster*, had heard the wise Child drop some cryptic words about His proper place at His Father's. After He had spoken, they looked at one another in silent bewilderment. His word, "*My Father,*" fell short of range and went no farther than the carpenter Joseph, who stood before them apparently claiming his son to take Him home. How *could* they, with that father before them, have understood the word that Son "*had spoken*" of the other Father?

THE MEETING OF PARENTS AND CHILD.

It is highly probable that the Child Jesus was engaged in prayer to His Father when the doctors of the law first took note of His intelligent face and rapt devotion, and grace-

³¹ Cf. Bloomfield, *N.T. ad loc.*, and Edersheim, *Life and Times*, etc., I. 282. The point is missed by the Vulgate, Authorised Version and Revised Version.

³² Edersheim would give the preference to the Authorised Version. The latter has the advantage over the Revised Version in the μετέθηκεν of Hebr. xi. 5.

fully invited Him to follow them and listen to a discussion, far removed, we may hope, from those puerile and interminable Rabbinical wrangles which make the reports of debates in the Talmud the dismalest reading in all so-called theological literature.³³ While they sat, He stood—the only position which in Jewish eyes befitted a child when addressed by its elders. Happily there is no reason whatever to trust the interpretation or defacement of this beautiful scene by some modern painters who have forced on the Holy Child poses, attitudes and scowls, better suited to a juvenile prig or uncanny youth or precocious prodigy.³⁴

³³The *Editio Princeps* of the Talmud was printed by Bamberg in Venice, was authorised by Leo X., was afterwards put on the Index, and was finally removed therefrom by Leo XIII. in 1900. For specimens of Talmudic controversy, see the treatise, *Shabb.*, Schürer, *N.T. Zeitgesch.*, pp. 485 sqq. The "horrors" of the Rabbinical theology on the Sabbath have not been exaggerated by Christian writers. A ghastly passage in the *Mishnah* regulating the action of a Sabbath watcher by the side of a corpse has been overlooked. The under-jaw of the dead may possibly fall, the raising thereof would entail "labour." What is to be done? asked the casuists. The watcher is allowed to lift the jaw to its place, on the ground that he will thus prevent a still lower drop and therefore a worse breach of the Sabbath rest—presumably on the part of the corpse. See Rabbis De Sola and Raphall, *Eighteen Tract. Mishnah*, p. 68. The Talmud imposes 39 "restrictions" on the Sabbath (Jastrow, *American Journal of Theology*, Apr., 1898). The figure is below the mark. If a stone is found lying on the bung-hole of a cask on the Sabbath, a man is not permitted to do the "servile work" of removing the weight, but the barrel may be tilted until the stone falls off. Thus the wine is secured for "Sabbath-delight." To the present day some Talmud-fearing Jews will not carry a handkerchief on the Sabbath because of the "burden," but will twist it into a girdle (Ginsburg, *Essenes*, p. 47, in *Transact. Lit. Phil. Soc.*, Liverpool. Cf. *The Sabbath-Breaker* in Zangwill's, *They That Walk in Darkness*. Em. Deutsch, in the so-called epoch-making article in the *Quarterly Review* (October, 1867), stoutly denies that the Sabbath was "a thing of grim austerity." He overlooks the Treatise *Shabb.* The feast-ridden Jews knew better than Deutsch. Jastrow tries, *art. cit.*, to show that the Hebrew Sabbath was the blest derivative of an unblest or "unlucky" day in the Babylonian calendar.

³⁴Some Catholic prayer-books, treating of one of the decades of the Rosary, actually represent the Child as "disputing" with the learned dons in the temple! There is only one thing worse—the same Child gesticulating in the French cinematograph. Of the Child in the temple, St. Greg. Mag. writes: "non docens sed interrogans;" in Ezech. lib. i. Hom. ii.

The Boy Jesus was not haranguing, nor denouncing, nor inciting to controversial strife, but listening attentively and deferentially to grey-bearded men who sat in the chair of Moses. The interest in Him quickened, and soon He was one of a studious circle in a *schola* or lecture-room in the temple. Delighted to have such a listener, the doctors of the law proceeded to instruct Him, and put questions to Him to draw out His knowledge. The questioners speedily realised from His answers that He was possessed of a store of information which He was modestly keeping back, and by which they might well profit. Called upon to develop some of His short and precise answers, He complied with such winsome grace and profound insight into the sacred scrolls submitted to Him, that at a sign from the head of the conference, He seated Himself and proceeded with His exposition of the Scriptures as one speaking with authority to men old enough to be His grandfathers, and spellbound by His appearance and words.

At their entrance on the scene, Joseph and Mary recognised the voice of the Child, before they espied through a break in the ring, the little figure; and far from quickening their pace to approach Him, remained rooted to the spot in amazement. The word in Luke ii. 48 (ἐξεπλήγησαν) is significant, and a good deal stronger than ἐξίσταντο (Luke ii. 47). Some clue to the nature of the "shock" they sustained is furnished by the novelty of a situation which they could not realise at first sight. Here was the Child they had watched times without number, praying to His Father in secret, or silently listening to the teacher in the Scriptural class of the Synagogue-school,³⁵ now making a public appearance and expounding His Father's Word to grave and delighted hearers—and this, too, in a sitting posture³⁶—whereas the same Child had never been known to answer His parents without rising from His seat with a manifestation of respect that impressed even the model

³⁵ Cf. Lyman Abbott, *Evolution of Christianity*, p. 193. These purely religious schools are still zealously maintained by the Jews resident in England, who send their children for secular instruction only, to the "Board" or "Provided" Jewish schools manned by Christian teachers.

³⁶ καθεζόμενον, Lk. ii. 46. Evidently the position made a deep impression on the Mother and was expressly mentioned by her to Luke.

homes of Nazareth, where the little ones were trained to the perfect observance of the great commandment of children, and responded to the training with the exquisite deference, which till recent times, was the characteristic of Jewish youth. The quick eye of Mary marked the sudden transformation of the retiring Child into the authoritative Teacher. A new inflow of maternal pride flooded her soul, while a low-murmuring ground-swell of fear told her that this first display of His teaching power was not to end here in these peaceful surroundings, but would, sooner or later, provoke opposition and be fraught with danger to her well-beloved Son. Already the point of the sword of Simeon's prophecy was making itself felt in her heart.

There was a pause, as both the Child and the ancient men unrolled the sacred documents to consult a passage which He had quoted. Mary moved noiselessly to the fringe of the group, and nothing daunted by the chilling stare that met the intruding woman,³⁷ addressed her appeal to a Heart that she knew was easily stirred to compassion. "Son, why hast thou done to us so? Behold thy father and I sorrowing have been seeking thee."³⁸ As she spoke, her Child handed back the rolls to the clerk in charge and rose to comfort her. Did she not know where He was that eternity of three days? No shade of His meaning was lost on the two who, with the avidity of faith, took to themselves every word that came from the mouth of God. With the other hearers, it was different. *They* understood nothing of the rejoinder of their youthful Hearer who, bowing low to the venerable old men, went away with Mary and Joseph to be subject to them in Nazareth.

MARY THE NARRATOR AND LUKE THE AMANUENSIS.

Oratio Directa and Obliqua.

Commentators are too apt to forget that expressions which sound to us ambiguous were perfectly clear to the reporters who first took down the words warm from the speaker's lips.

³⁷ Compare the entrance of the other and sinful Mary into the company of the Pharisees at table. Lk. vii.

³⁸ Lk. ii. 48.

As an illustration, we may take the case of a classical scholar who was invited by the master of a middle form to hear him teach in his school-room where boys clever and dull were gathered together. The answers returned by the large "tail" present made a melancholy impression on the visitor. Speaking to a friend later, he mentioned the brighter section and their quick apprehension of the teaching of the master. Soon, however, he reverted to the sadder aspect of the scene and remarked, without any formal introduction of a new nominative, but with an air of depression that left no doubt as to whom he meant: "*They* did not take in the explanations one bit." The use of the stressed pronoun may or may not have been in accordance with the canons of correct speech, but its meaning was unmistakable, thanks, not to rules, but to the emphasis of the actual speaker and the immediate perception of the actual hearer.

If Mary said to Luke: "*They* understood not," our contention is, that when Luke wrote her words he knew with certainty that it was the perplexed doctors she referred to.

But did she say "We" or "They"? If the former, she must have said, in *oratio directa*—

A { οὐ συνήκαμεν.
Non intelleximus.
We understood not.

If she spoke of the non-understanding doctors present, she must have said, again in *oratio directa*—

B { αὐτοὶ οὐ συνῆκαν (Luke ii. 50).
Illi non intellexerunt.
THEY understood not.

Which is the more likely phrase on Mary's lips, A. or B.? The former would be her confession of her own ignorance and her husband's, the latter her sigh over that class, who being as yet untaught, were impervious to the words of her Son touching His Paternity, and who, when that Son spake in riper years and with clarion tongue

of His Sonship, stopped their ears and hardened their hearts.³⁹

In the *oratio obliqua* of the great classical writer of the New Testament, the συνήκαμεν of Mary's *oratio directa* given under A. would necessarily be turned into συνῆκαν, that is, Luke would have written of Mary and Joseph what we actually find in Luke ii. 50.

Still keeping to the *oratio obliqua*, if Luke heard from Mary that it was the *doctors* who failed to understand, the very same phrase that appears under B. would pass from her lips to his pen—αὐτοὶ οὐ συνῆκαν (Luke ii. 50).

Again, which is the more likely alternative?

As to the last pronoun, αὐτοῖς (Luke ii. 50), it must refer, as all admit, to Mary and Joseph. Hence what Mary said in *oratio directa*, was—

{ ἐλάλησεν ἡμῖν
Locutus erat ad nos.⁴⁰
He had spoken unto us.

On turning this into the *oratio obliqua* Luke would be obliged to make one, and only one change—the substitution of αὐτοῖς for ἡμῖν.

According to this plea for a new exegesis, Mary's whole sentence in *oratio directa* now reads—

{ αὐτοὶ οὐ συνῆκαν τὸ ῥῆμα ὃ ἐλάλησεν ἡμῖν.
Illi non intellexerunt verbum quod locutus erat ad nos.
THEY understood not the word which He had spoken
unto us.

And Luke's whole sentence in *oratio obliqua* is as we find it in the New Testament—

{ αὐτοὶ οὐ συνῆκαν τὸ ῥῆμα ὃ ἐλάλησεν αὐτοῖς (Luke ii. 50).
Illi non intellexerunt verbum quod locutus erat ad eos.
THEY understood not the word which He had spoken
unto them.

³⁹ "He not only brake the Sabbath, but also called God his own Father, making himself equal with God" (Jn. v. 18). "If I had not come and spoken unto them, they would not have had sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin" (Jn. xv. 22). "If ye were blind, ye would have no sin: but now ye say, We see: your sin remaineth" (Jn. ix. 41).

⁴⁰ Very rarely the Vulgate uses the dative after *loquor*. The ordinary construction is as above.

The old tradition of the friendship between the Mother of Jesus and the Beloved Physician, her amanuensis, stands unshaken. They were often together, speaking of the Child, his eyes fixed on the sweet, sad face of the childless *Dolorosa*, as she recounted the well-remembered tale of one of her greatest sorrows. Perhaps, as she spoke, the hand of the scribe was feeling for his painter's brush. Unconscious of his gaze, Mary was thinking of those who knew not her Son nor the time of their visitation, who thought they saw, but whose eyes were holden, while the lowly pageant of the Word made Flesh was passing unnoticed across their field of vision. When Mary spoke to Luke, the doctors of the law had had their day and turned it into night. Then she murmured, "Ah, *they* little understood the word He had spoken unto us"—and the memory of her husband, long departed, smote her afresh.

In the language of the Greeks, with its stately impersonality and studied recoil from emotional display, the spirit of Mary's sigh could not be exactly reproduced; but her friend and amanuensis took up his stylus and wrote what we now read.

The whole of the foregoing argument is sure to incur the discredit which is popularly attached to "special pleading." That it is, because it cannot be otherwise in a matter where one man stands literally *contra mundum*. On the grammatical basis of the new exegesis and translation, the present writer has laid much stress, but he does not presume to hope for the general acceptance of his hypothesis, unless the opposing scholar is equipped, like Bishop Westcott,⁴ with the reverent spirit which is essential to the successful study of the character of Mary and of the Evangelist who has been called in these pages her best biographer.⁵ *Pectus facit interpretem.*

MATTHEW A. POWER, S.J.

Edinburgh, 1912.

⁴ "In the original, there is not the least tinge of reproof or severity in the term [*γυναι* of Mary]. The address is of courteous respect, even of tenderness " (Westcott on Jn. ii. 4). It was refinement of feeling even more than erudition that made Bishop Westcott the great commentator he was.

⁵ See the first article in this REVIEW, July, 1912.

Some Economic and Theological Aspects of the Catholic Teaching on Usury.

IN a former issue of the IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY¹ I discussed the historical evolution of the Catholic teaching on usury. The Scholastics held that in the contract of *mutuum*, in virtue of the loan itself and apart from extrinsic titles, no profit could justly be exacted. The object of this contract being something that is consumed in its first use, the use and substance go together in such a way that no charge can be made for the use as distinct from the substance; the whole value of the object is its value in its first use, and equality is re-established if an equal quantity of the same value is restored. Now, in the minds of the Scholastics money could be regarded simply as a medium of exchange; money had not as yet assumed the characteristics of capital. Hence in their days money as such was morally consumed in its first use and was therefore the object of the contract of *mutuum*, so that apart from extrinsic titles the lender could not justly demand any profit or interest. The Scholastics acknowledged the existence of many extrinsic titles, such as *damnum emergens*, *lucrum cessans*, *periculum sortis*, *poena conventionalis*, a long period during which the money was lent, labour and the civil law. These various extrinsic titles were not all admitted without controversy, but in the course of time they came generally to be recognised as justifying interest on borrowed money. The Scholastics also held that there were other contracts besides that of *mutuum* in virtue of which lawful gain could be made by the investment of money, and notably by the purchase of rent-charges, by partnership, and by the triple contract.

The Scholastic theory found its best official exposition

¹ Cf. IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY, Jan., 1910.

in the *Vix Pervenit* of Benedict XIV., which was promulgated in 1745. This encyclical professed to give the certain doctrine about usury, and, though not an infallible document, is of great authority. In five propositions it laid down the certain doctrine about usury:—(1) Usury, which has its seat in the contract of *mutuum*, consists in this, that a person, in virtue of the loan itself, which of its nature demands merely that as much must be restored as was lent, exacts more than was received by the borrower, and thereby contends that profit over and above the sum lent is due by reason of the loan; every profit of this kind is unlawful and usurious. (2) Usury cannot be legitimised by the facts that the profit is moderate, that it is sought from the rich, and that the borrower devotes the money to profitable enterprises. In virtue of the loan itself, nothing can be taken over and above the amount lent, and all such profit must be restored. (3) With the contract of *mutuum* there can be extrinsic titles which justify profit; and there are other contracts besides *mutuum* by means of which money can be invested so as lawfully to yield an annual income, or to carry on commerce from which a just profit can be acquired. (4) In these various contracts equality must be observed, otherwise injustice is committed and restitution must be made. (5) It is false and rash to suppose that, at all times and in all places, these extrinsic titles, and these just contracts which are different from *mutuum*, are present so as to justify profit on the investment of money, because in many cases charity demands that the money be lent gratuitously, and in many circumstances there is no room for the extrinsic titles or the just contracts.

In connection with the Scholastic theory about usury, thus confirmed by the official authority of Benedict XIV., Protestant writers frequently bring the charge that it hampered commerce by preventing the circulation of money which was necessary to enable people to safeguard and extend financial operations. Without money economic stagnation is sure to exist, and the ecclesiastical legislation on usury prevented a great many industrious citizens from acquiring the ready cash which they needed to carry on profitable enterprises. As Lecky puts it in "The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe," vol. II., p. 262:—"As it is quite certain that commercial and industrial

enterprise cannot be carried on upon a large scale without borrowing, and as it is equally certain that these loans can only be effected by paying for them in the shape of interest, it is no exaggeration to say that the Church had cursed the material development of civilisation. As long as her doctrine of usury was believed and acted on, the arm of industry was paralysed, the expansion of commerce was arrested, and all the countless blessings that have flowed from them were withheld."

It is all very well for Lecky to talk about the countless blessings that flow from the development of industry and commerce, but there is another picture which the Middle Ages present to the student of economic history. Money was borrowed, for the most part, not for the carrying on of productive industry and commerce, but for consumption, to meet oppressive taxation, to tide the agriculturist over a bad season, or to counteract the effects of extravagance. Agriculture was the principal avocation of the Middle Ages, and was practised, not for the sake of putting the fruits on the market, but for the support of the agriculturists themselves. In these circumstances the money-lender was far from a blessing. "Agriculture was the all-important occupation—and agriculture carried on for the supply of the wants of each group of producers themselves, and not for the market. Where money was borrowed it was, in the vast majority of cases, not for what is called productive expenditure, but for consumptive; not to enlarge the area of tillage, or to invest in trade or industry, but to meet some sudden want due to the frequent famines, or to oppressive taxation, or to extravagance. The money that was lent was money for which it would otherwise have been exceedingly difficult to secure an investment. The alternative to lending was allowing it to remain idle. There was, moreover, so little loanable capital that those who had control of it could demand any interest they pleased; they were so few in number that each had practically a monopoly in his own district; and when there were several money-lenders in a neighbourhood, they were usually united by a tie of race which served as a sufficient 'combination' against the Gentile or the native. The result of such a power, in the hands of unscrupulous men, was that the creditors tended

to fall completely into their grasp. . . . In India the village usurer is constantly a source of trouble to the administration; all over central and south-eastern Europe he is a curse to every district to which he comes; and in Austria and Russia his mischievous energy is one of the main causes of the Anti-Semitic movement. A modern banking authority, by no means in sympathy with mediæval ideas or their modern exponents, has nevertheless declared that in what he calls 'an agricultural, semi-barbarous community,' 'the money-lender does more harm than good.'"²

There were comparatively few trading centres in Europe, and in these there was no practical restriction to the borrowing of money at a reasonable rate, for some of the extrinsic titles which were held to justify interest were presumed to exist or other contracts besides *mutuum* could be used. As Ashley says :—"The total result of the movement of thought was this : that any merchant, or indeed any person in a trading centre where there were opportunities of business investment (outside money-lending itself), could with a perfectly clear conscience, and without any fear of molestation, contract to receive periodical interest from a person to whom he lent money; provided only that he first lent it to him gratuitously, for a period which might be made very short, so that technically the payment would not be reward for the use, but compensation for the non-return of the money."³ Hence in centres of trade as much money as was needed could be borrowed for interest on the fulfilment of a slight and insignificant technicality, and commerce was not in the slightest degree hampered. It is no wonder that Ashley concludes : "Speaking of the middle of the fifteenth century, . . . we may fairly say that these methods satisfied business needs, and that there was no strong demand on the part of those engaged in trade for the repeal of the usury prohibition. It is altogether misleading and unfair, then, to speak of the prohibition as putting obstacles in the way of the employment of capital. So far as wealth was intended to serve as capital, it found

² Ashley, *An Introduction to English Economic History and Theology*, vol. i., p. 435, 4th ed.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 402.

ways open for its employment—ways which were adequate for the time, and against which the Canonists had not a word to say.”⁴ Professor Cunningham agrees with Professor Ashley. “It is commonly supposed that narrow-minded ecclesiastics laid down an arbitrary and unjustifiable rule against taking interest, and that they thus hampered the growth of trade. The rule was not arbitrary, but commended itself to ordinary common sense and it did not hamper trade. The limits which were laid down in regard to money loans were not so narrow as modern writers appear to suppose, and every encouragement was given to men who could afford it, to make gratuitous loans for definite periods, as a form of Christian charity. And it may be confidently affirmed that no real hindrance was put in the way of material progress in the then existing state of society by these restrictions.”⁵ Professor Marshall, also, says that “we are perhaps apt to lay too much stress on the condemnation by the Church of ‘usury’ and some kinds of trade. There was then very little scope for lending capital to be used in business, and when there was, the prohibition could be evaded by many devices, some of which were indeed sanctioned by the Church itself.”⁶

It would be surprising if enterprising theorists on economics did not drag in the Jesuits in some way that would tend to discredit the Order, and Lecky does not fail to add his share to the apparently agreeable task. “The casuistry of the Jesuits,” he says, “was soon applied to the subject, and two or three circuitous ways of obtaining interest became popular, which gave rise to long and virulent controversies.”⁷ The Protestant writers tell us that the laws of the Church were an obstacle to material progress because, on account of them, it was impossible to get sufficient money for commercial purposes. When it is pointed out that there were many lawful ways in which the needs of the age were sufficiently met, they try to cut the ground from under our feet by asserting or hinting that

⁴ Op. cit., p. 438.

⁵ See *The Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, vol. ii., pp. 74-87.

⁶ *Principles of Economics*, i., p. 28.

⁷ *The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe*, ii., p. 267.

these ways were mere subterfuges which were scarcely consistent with our principles. Had they taken care to study the controversies, they would have seen that the "circuitous ways of obtaining interest" were perfectly consistent with our principles and with the economic conditions of the time. They were not the result of any discreditable casuistry; they were the result of serious thought on the part of ethical teachers. Professor Ashley, who is a better exponent than Lecky of the history of economics, says of one of these methods: "The mediæval practice and theory of partnership have been explained as primarily due to the effort to escape from the operation of the usury law. But recent research has shown that this is a gross exaggeration. The practice and the legal doctrine grew up independently out of the needs and circumstances of the earlier Middle Ages, and had reached a complete shape before any serious effort was made to enforce the prohibition of usury in ordinary business life. The effort to enforce that prohibition did indeed, as we shall see, prevent certain developments of the practice of partnership which might otherwise have taken place; but it did not create the practice, nor did it contribute in any positive manner towards its modification. We have not, then, to trace a series of adroit subterfuges, introduced or apologised for by the canonists in order to meet the necessities of commerce; we have rather to observe the way in which the canonist doctrine, as it gradually formed itself, treated a practice which was already established."^{*}

We may conclude, then, that the canonist doctrine on usury did great benefit to the agriculturists of the Middle Ages by saving them from the rapacity of the money-lender, placed no obstacle in the way of legitimate trade since there were various ways suitable to the time in which profit could be acquired from the investment of money, and did not invent these ways as ignoble subterfuges to meet the necessities of commerce.

The industrial development which the second half of the eighteenth and the first quarter of the nineteenth centuries witnessed, demanded careful consideration from the

^{*}Op. cit., p. 413.

authorities of the Catholic Church, with the result that the Roman Congregations began to give favourable replies to various questions concerning the lawfulness of gain derived from a loan of money.⁹ The first of these replies was given by the Holy Office in 1830, which said that confessors were not to be disturbed in conscience (*Non esse inquietandos*), who gave penitents the benefit of the opinion which favoured the receipt of interest on money lent to merchants engaged in profitable transactions if a promise were given that they would abide by any decision which the Holy See might come to on the question, and who also gave absolution to people who *bonâ fide* did not confess the sin of usury even though it were well known that they were in receipt of profit from the loan of money. This was the precursor of many decisions of varying import, so that there can no longer be any doubt about the lawfulness in practice of taking a moderate interest on a loan of money, whether the receiver is in good faith or in bad faith, whether the title of the civil law is available or not, and whether the money is lent for profitable enterprises or for the acquisition of goods for consumption. How are we to explain this attitude of the Church and reconcile it with the more stringent regulations of former days? It is hardly necessary to say that many Protestant writers hold that it is impossible to reconcile the present teaching of the Church with its former doctrines; to Lecky there was question "of discarding the past" and of "breaking the authority of the Church."¹⁰ Even amongst Catholic theologians no small amount of controversy has arisen on this subject, and it may be useful to review, however briefly, the principal theories which find favour with theologians:

(1) Some theologians, especially in France, maintained that there is no difference between the present teaching of the Church and its former doctrine, because the phrase "*Non esse inquietandos*" means that the Church desires penitents now to be treated with mildness, not because their actions are objectively less sinful than similar actions formerly were, but because at the present day it would be imprudent to urge obligations which would not be fulfilled.

⁹ Cf. I.T.Q., Jan., 1910, pp. 15-19.

¹⁰ Op. cit., pp. 266, 270.

The recent decisions of the Roman Congregations, according to this view, give no approbation to the modern system of interest; they imply nothing more than toleration or connivance at the lesser of two evils. Morel in his "*Du Prêt à intérêt*," and Modeste in his "*Le prêt à intérêt, dernière forme de l'esclavage*" are responsible for this theory. But the opinion scarcely harmonizes with the dignity of the Church as teacher of faith and morals; nor does it correspond with the meaning attached by the stylus curiæ to the phrase: *Non esse inquietandos*. According to St. Liguori this phrase "means not mere toleration but a positive permission";¹¹ so it is at least *probable* that there are sufficient ethical reasons to justify the modern system of charging moderate interest on a loan of money.

(2) A more specious view of the case was maintained by Ballerini, *Opus Morale*, vol. III.; Pars III., n. 280-348. He said that, in judging of the morality of lending money for a price, it is necessary to consider the intention of the contracting parties. They can intend to lend and borrow gratuitously, and in this case the contract arranged between them is the contract of mutuum in which no profit can be charged in virtue of the loan itself. They can also intend to lend and borrow for a price, and in this case the contract entered into is the contract of letting, and a reasonable price can be taken for the money. Now, formerly the intention of the contracting parties usually was to lend and borrow money by means of the contract of mutuum, and the Church was right in insisting on the gratuitous nature of the transaction; but now-a-days the contracting parties intend to lend and borrow money by means of the contract of letting, and the Church rightly allows a moderate price for the transferred benefit. Accordingly there is no contradiction between the Encyclical *Vix Pervenit* of Benedict XIV. which speaks of the gratuitous nature of the contract of mutuum, and the recent decisions of the Roman Congregations which do not mention the contract of mutuum and which leave to theologians the task of discovering the basis of their favourable teaching.

¹¹ S. Liguori, *Theologia Moralis*, t. iii., n. 765.

A weak point in this theory is its failure to take into account the fact that in mediæval times the lender and the borrower agreed that interest should be paid on the loan; such an agreement was of itself sufficient to prove that they had the intention of entering not into a gratuitous but into an onerous contract; at most the contracting parties might have employed the wrong name for their contract, by using the term "mutuum" instead of "letting," with the result that the Church would have launched its prohibitive decrees against a mistaken name, while all the time the contracting parties were doing nothing that could in the slightest degree be reprehended. Again, the Fifth Lateran Council stated that usury is unlawful because "gain is sought to be acquired from the use of a thing not in itself fruitful, without labour, expense or risk on the part of the lender,"¹² so that from the nature of the object of the contract, and not directly from the contract itself, the Church derived its teaching that usury is illicit, and considered that, apart from extrinsic titles, the loan of money was essentially a gratuitous contract. Moreover, the Scholastics drew their conclusion that usury is unjust from the nature of money; they maintained that, money being consumed in its first use, no charge can be exacted for a loan unless there are extrinsic justifying titles. This argument applied universally to money regarded as a mere medium of exchange—as so many coins of the realm—and did not allow for any distinction between the contract of mutuum and other contracts. It seems, then, that the Ballerini theory does not meet the historical facts of the case, does not explain the action of the Church in condemning usury, and does not fit in with the scholastic argument about the injustice of usury. Indeed, Ballerini candidly confesses (n. 285) that many sayings of the theologians seem clearly opposed to his doctrine.

(3) Following on the footsteps of Correur and of Cardinal de la Luzerne, some theologians¹³ make a distinction between money lent for consumption and money lent

¹² Cf. I. T. QUARTERLY, Jan., 1910, p. 2.

¹³ v.g. Jannet, *Le Capital, la Spéculation et la finance au XIX. siècle*, c. 3, ii., iii.

for productive purposes; for the former no interest can be taken apart from extrinsic titles; for the latter interest can be taken. No contradiction exists between mediæval and modern theology, because formerly money was usually lent for consumption, and there were no extrinsic titles to justify interest on this money except in individual cases; at present, however, a very considerable amount of money is borrowed for productive purposes, and there usually are extrinsic titles by reason of which interest can be taken for money lent for consumption.

This view does not agree with the teaching of Benedict XIV., who lays down in the Encyclical *Vix Peruenit*, that usury is not justified by the fact that the borrower devotes the money to profitable enterprises; nor does it agree with the generally accepted teaching of theologians that no man can justly be made to pay for a benefit which is his own, in this case for the profit which the borrower's position has enabled him to make; nor does it sufficiently realize the modern function of money as capital which makes it virtually fruitful and gives it as such its price like any other marketable commodity no matter whether the borrower uses it for consumption or for production. The best that can be said for the opinion is that, in the hands of Cardinal de la Luzerne, it opened the way for the modern teaching of the Roman Congregations, and can, with some important modifications, be made to suit the modern economic functions of money.

(4) Gury¹⁴ thinks that the decisions of the Roman Congregations can be explained by the title of the civil law which at present permits moderate interest on a loan of money. The difficulties against him are, in the first place, the reply of Holy Office (31st. August, 1831) to the Bishop of Viviers,¹⁵ from which it is evident that the favourable decision of 1830 was given independently of the title of the civil law; and, in the second place, the uncertainty as to how far modern legislators mean to affect conscience by their permissive laws in regard to interest. For instance, in the case of these countries, as a rule the law permits interest in the sense that it will not interfere with the agreement between the lender

¹⁴ *Theol. Mor. I.*, n. 863, 864.

¹⁵ Cf. I. T. QUARTERLY, Jan., 1910, p. 16.

and the borrower unless the contract is harsh and unconscionable. A negative permission of this kind cannot be regarded as an exercise of *altum dominium*—the sole way in which the civil law gives a *special* title to interest. If the law does not exercise its *altum dominium* for the public good, it is a title of interest merely in so far as it supposes other titles already to be available.

(5) In his famous work, entitled *De Justo Auctario ex Contractu Crediti*, Van Roey propounds at length, and with great learning, the theory that the Roman Congregations permit interest on money, because at the present day, on account of the prevalence and the risks of investments, there is nearly always a presumption that extrinsic titles exist, so that it is not necessary in individual cases to prove their actual presence. Formerly, however, there was no such presumption of extrinsic titles; these were exceptional, and needed proof in each case. There is a change, then, in the economic world but not in the teaching of the Church.

So far as it goes, this theory seems to meet the economic and theological aspects of the question, but the drawback is that it does not go far enough. It is certain that there are even at present a great many cases where there can be no presumption of extrinsic titles; many people have no desire or intention of employing their money to any considerable advantage; they prefer, for instance, to leave it in their current accounts or on deposit in the bank. If these people are induced to lend their money at, say, 4 per cent. on gilt-edged securities, where is the presumption of extrinsic titles? There is no *damnum emergens*, *lucrum cessans*, or *periculum sortis* worth talking about. Yet it would be difficult to order these people to restore the 4 per cent. or even that part of it which is in excess of the interest to be obtained on a deposit in a bank. The recent decisions of the Roman Congregations lead us to believe that "non esse inquietandos" is the official reply that would be given if the assumed case were submitted for solution. One defect, then, of Van Roey's theory is that it is not sufficiently universal in its application. Another drawback of the theory is its failure to admit that money has now a new function by reason of which it is virtually fruitful, because the modern owner of money has the means of production under his control in a way

which was impossible and inconceivable in the Middle Ages. Van Roey does not acknowledge this present day virtual fruitfulness of money, and thereby puts himself into collision with nearly all economists and with the majority of modern theologians.

(6) There remains the opinion which theologians generally maintain, and which seems to give a satisfactory solution of the difficulties of the case. Lehmkühl,¹⁶ Vermeersch,¹⁷ Tanqueray,¹⁸ Antoine,¹⁹ and Noldin,²⁰ point out that at the present time any man who has money can with the greatest facility purchase productive goods; from the economic point of view he is virtually in the same position as if he had these goods. This facility in no way depends on the fortunate circumstances of the individuals who purchase productive wealth; it is inherent in the money in virtue of modern economic customs; it is the capacity of money and not of this or that person who happens to have the money. There is, then, in money itself at the present day an inherent power which for all practical purposes makes it equivalent to fruitful property. People who possess the money might not use it for the acquisition of productive goods; they might employ it, for instance, in the purchase of mere luxuries of dress or fashion; but that would not prevent it from having the general capability of being easily converted into land or into shares in industrial or commercial societies. Because of this important function of money as virtual capital, it has its market price, arranged by common estimation and the laws of supply and demand just as the price of any other marketable commodity is determined; and that price is the just price of the use of money if there has been no unfair interference with the market. It is this function that makes ready cash more valuable than future money; since the ready cash can easily be devoted to productive purposes it necessarily is of greater value than money which can be employed only when in the future it comes into possession; the possibility of immediate profit

¹⁶ *Theologia Moralis*, I., n. 1314.

¹⁷ *Quaestiones de Justitia*, n. 375.

¹⁸ *De Virtute Justitiae*, n. 902.

¹⁹ *Economie Sociale*, p. 534-533.

²⁰ *De Praeceptis*, n. 576.

is absent in the case of future money and this possibility is of appreciable value. At the present day, then, the Roman Congregations are right in permitting a moderate interest to be exacted for the loan of money.²¹

It was not always so. In mediæval times there was no general facility of turning money into fruitful goods; for the generality of people it was simply a medium of exchange; as the economists say, money had not then assumed the characteristics of capital. In individual cases the facility did undoubtedly exist; but individual conveniences cannot be taken as the basis of a general price; at most they can serve as the basis of compensation for the actual loss, either present or future, of the individuals who give up their peculiar advantages. The Church, then, was right in declaring money to be sterile in former times, so long as it admitted extrinsic titles which could be proved in particular cases. It was also right in acknowledging the presumption of these titles in great centres of trade; in those exceptional communities money had already begun to have the function of capital, and as such to have a just market price for its use.

Evidently, in this theory the mediæval and the modern doctrines of the Church do not contradict one another; there has simply been a change in economic circumstances; there has been no change in ecclesiastical principles. There has been a development of the principles because of their application to new circumstances; but the principles themselves have always remained the same.

That this view of the case is no mere invention of casuistry can be proved from the statements of eminent scientists. Professor Ashley, for example, having described the nature of capital and the conditions of the Middle Ages, continues:—"So long as the conditions remained which have just been described, the canonist

²¹ Fr. Vermeersch looks on the contract by which money is now borrowed as the contract of "*mutuum*." Fr. Tanquerey considers that it is a new and peculiar contract which may be called a "*contract of credit*." Others regard the contract as that of "*letting*." This controversy does not seem to be of much practical value; the main point is that money is now virtually capital, and as such has its market price for the use which is transferred from the lender to the borrower. For this use an equivalent future sum is not a sufficient price; it does not compensate for the loss of capital during the loan period.

doctrine was but 'the legal,' and, it may be added, the ethical 'expression of economic conditions.' 'It implies,' as the German economic historian, Arnold, long ago said, 'that money had not yet the characteristics of capital.'

"But with the growth of trade, and the increase of opportunities for investment, money began to have 'the characteristics of capital;' it began to represent a force from the employment of which its owner could expect to obtain a revenue, in ways other than by loans for consumption. Trade found out these ways for itself, first and foremost by the practice of partnership; then by the purchase of rent-charges; and again by the employment of loans bearing interest after a certain period of gratuitous use. This last method was under the ban of the Church so long as it was but the cloak for loans for purposes of consumption furnished by lenders who had no real opportunity to make an equally profitable productive investment; then, when it could be fairly urged that it was but an alternative to another and productive investment, the disapproval was withdrawn. There is no reason whatever for supposing that capital was craving to find employment in the way of ordinary loans, and that it only adopted these methods as subterfuges pointed out by the canonists. In European countries even now the larger aggregations of capital are not secured simply by borrowing. Those methods were what trade spontaneously found out for itself; the canonists did no more than examine and justify them."²

Of course, the fundamental question remains: why does ownership of capital give a right to the profit arising from its use? This, however, is a question which is discussed more appropriately in connection with Socialism. Suffice it to say that, Socialists apart, economists and ethical teachers unanimously hold that ownership of capital gives a claim in justice to profit. These differ considerably among themselves in assigning the basis of this claim, but their unanimity in admitting the right makes it unnecessary to deal at length with the subject in connection with our present discussion.

J. M. HARTY.

Maynooth.

² Op. cit., p. 437.

Life of St. Columbanus.

THE undersigned, who have been appointed by the Standing Committee of the Irish Bishops, desire to bring to the notice of the public the very liberal offer made by a distinguished American ecclesiastic whose laudable purpose it is to have a Life of St. Columbanus worthy of the saint and his labours, and worthy of his native country, prepared and given to the world.

The proposal is contained in the following letter, which, we think, gives a good general idea of what the work ought to be :—

“ I was pleased to learn from your letter of April 25th that the Standing Committee of the Irish Bishops has accepted my offer of two hundred pounds as a prize for the best Life of St. Columbanus to be ready for the year 1915. In respect of the prize I submit the following :—

I. I desire that the name of the donor be kept secret until he consents that it should be revealed. This will save him various little annoyances.

II. I think that there should be only one Committee and that one established by the aforesaid Standing Committee of the Irish Bishops. I have full confidence in their knowledge and judgment.

III. If none of the lives submitted reach the standard of the Committee the offer of the prize, it seems, ought to be null and void.

IV. The life should be in English, and considerable credit should be given to literary form and excellencies, for

V. The hope is to present the Irish people and their descendants with a work at once scholarly and popular, in the best sense of that word.

VI. It goes without saying that the work would be critical and would embody the best results of all modern writers who deal with the sources of the Saint's life and the period it embraces.

I would like to see a good philosophico-historical presentation of the entire period from a religious, social, and economic point of view, with St. Columbanus always well in the centre of the work. I would like to see the literary and artistic culture of contemporary Ireland set forth in the work, always with due subordination to the life and labours of the Saint. All dry and technical scholarship (chronology, topography, etc.) should be greatly condensed, and only its results given, or at the most thrown into that part of the introduction dealing with the original sources. The body of the work should be luminous, orderly,

and in every way attractive. Nothing could please me more than to see this great Saint the subject of the best hagiographical work in English. I dictate this in haste, amid many cares, and in order to send an immediate reply to your communication, so that as little time as possible may be lost in getting down to work."

At the first meeting of the Committee held in St. Patrick's College, Maynooth, June 23, 1912, it was agreed :—

(a) That competitors should furnish the Committee with six type-written copies of their manuscripts, such copies to be forwarded to the Secretary not later than December 31st, 1914.

(b) The real names of the competitors should not be signed to the manuscript, but for purposes of identification they should be forwarded to the Secretary in separate envelopes which shall not be opened until the prize has been awarded.

(c) In the opinion of the Committee the proposed life of St. Columbanus should form a volume of 400 octavo printed pages.

(d) The competitor to whom the prize of £200 may be awarded shall retain his full rights of ownership, but he must publish his essay at his own expense, and in a style satisfactory to the Committee. The book should be published for the Centenary Celebrations of St. Columbanus to be held in November, 1915.

(e) The Committee undertake to pay to the successful competitor £100 as soon as the award shall be made, and the remainder on the satisfactory publication of the book.

(f) The Committee are of opinion that suitable illustrations would add considerably to the value and popularity of the work.

(g) Another prize of £50 may be given to the writer of the essay that shall be awarded second place, provided that in the opinion of the members of the Committee it reaches a very high standard of excellency.

(h) The judgment of the Committee is to be accepted as final on all matters relating to the competition.

✱ JOHN HEALY, D.D., *Archbishop of Tuam.*

M. F. COX, P.C., M.D.

J. F. HOGAN, D.D., *Vice-President, St. Patrick's College, Maynooth.*

GEORGE SIGERSON, M.D., F.N.U.I.

JAMES MACCAFFREY, Ph. D. (*Secretary*).

Decisions of the Biblical Commission.

COMMISSIO PONTIFICIA DE RE BIBLICA.

I.

DE AUCTORE, DE TEMPORE COMPOSITIONIS ET DE HISTORICA VERITATE EVANGELIORUM SECUNDUM MARCUM ET SECUNDUM LUCAM.

Propositis sequentibus dubiis Pontificia Commissio "de re Biblica" ita respondendum decrevit.

I. Utrum luculentum traditionis suffragium inde ab Ecclesiae primordiis mire consentiens ac multiplici argumento firmatum, nimirum disertis sanctorum Patrum et scriptorum ecclesiasticorum testimoniis, citationibus et allusionibus in eorundem scriptis occurrentibus, veterum haeticorum usu, versionibus librorum Novi Testamenti, codicibus manuscriptis antiquissimis et pene universis, atque etiam internis rationibus ex ipso sacrorum librorum textu desumptis, certo affirmare cogat Marcum Petri discipulum et interpretem, Lucam vero medicum, Pauli adiutorem et comitem, revera Evangeliorum quae ipsis respective attribuuntur esse auctores?

R. : Affirmative.

II. Utrum rationes, quibus nonnulli critici demonstrare nituntur postremos duodecim versus Evangelii Marci (Marc. XVI. 9-20) non esse ab ipso Marco conscriptos sed ab aliena manu appositos, tales sint quae ius tribuant affirmandi eos non esse ut inspiratos et canonicos recipiendos; vel saltem demonstrent versuum eorundem Marcum non esse auctorem?

R. : Negative ad utramque partem.

III. Utrum pariter dubitare liceat de inspiratione et canonicitate narrationum Lucae de infantia Christi (Luc. I.-II.), aut de apparitione Angeli Iesum confortantis et de sudore sanguineo (Luc. XXII. 43-44); vel solidis saltem rationibus ostendi possit—quod placuit antiquis haeticis

et quibusdam etiam recentioribus criticis arridet—easdem narrationes ad genuinum Lucae Evangelium non pertinere?

R. : Negative ad utramque partem.

IV. Utrum rarissima illa et prorsus singularia documenta in quibus Canticum *Magnificat* non beatæ Virgini Mariae, sed Elisabeth tribuitur, ullo modo praevalere possint ac debeant contra testimonium concors omnium fere codicum tum graeci textus originalis tum versionum, necnon contra interpretationem quam plane exigunt non minus contextus quam ipsius Virginis animus et constans Ecclesiae traditio?

R. : Negative.

V. Utrum, quoad ordinem chronologicum Evangeliorum, ab ea sententia recedere fas sit, quae, antiquissimo aequae ac constanti traditionis testimonio roborata, post Matthaeum, qui omnium primus Evangelium suum patrio sermone conscripsit, Marcum ordine secundum et Lucam tertium scripsisse testatur; aut huic sententiae adversari vicissim censenda sit eorum opinio quae asserit Evangelium secundum et tertium ante graecam primi Evangelii versionem esse compositum?

R. : Negative ad utramque partem.

VI. Utrum tempus compositionis Evangeliorum Marci et Lucae usque ad urbem Ierusalem eversam differre liceat; vel, eo quod apud Lucam prophetia Domini circa huius urbis eversionem magis determinata videatur, ipsius saltem Evangelium obsidione iam inchoata fuisse conscriptum, sustineri possit?

R. : Negative ad utramque partem.

VII. Utrum affirmari debeat Evangelium Lucae praecessisse librum *Actuum Apostolorum* (Act. I. 1-2); et quum hic liber, eodem Luca auctore, ad finem captivitatis Romanae Apostoli fuerit absolutus (Act. XXVIII. 30-31), eiusdem Evangelium non post hoc tempus fuisse compositum?

R. : Affirmative.

VIII. Utrum, prae oculis habitis tum traditionis testimoniis, tum argumentis internis, quoad fontes quibus uterque Evangelista in conscribendo Evangelio usus est, in dubium vocari prudenter queat sententia quae tenet Marcum iuxta praedicationem Petri, Lucam autem iuxta praedicationem Pauli scripsisse; simulque asserit iisdem

Evangelistis praesto fuisse alios quoque fontes fide dignos sive orales sive etiam iam scriptis consignatos?

R. : Negative.

IX. Utrum dicta et gesta, quae a Marco iuxta Petri praedicationem accurate et quasi graphice enarrantur, et a Luca, *assecuto omnia a principio diligenter* per testes fide plane dignos, quippe *qui ab initio ipsi viderunt et ministri fuerunt sermonis* (Luc. I. 2-3), sincerissime exponuntur, plenam sibi eam fidem historicam iure vindicant quam eisdem semper praestitit Ecclesia; an e contrario eadem facta et gesta censenda sint historica veritate, saltem ex parte, destituta, sive quod scriptores non fuerint testes oculares, sive quod apud utrumque Evangelistam defectus ordinis ac discrepantia in successione factorum haud raro deprehendantur, sive quod, cum tardius venerint et scripserint, necessario conceptiones menti Christi et Apostolorum extraneas aut facta plus minusve iam imaginatione populi inquinata referre debuerint, sive demum quod dogmaticis ideis praeconceptis, quisque pro suo scopo, indulserint?

R. : Affirmative ad primam partem, negative ad alteram.

II.

DE QUAESTIONE SYNOPTICA SIVE DE MUTUIS RELATIONIBUS INTER TRIA PRIORA EVANGELIA.

Propositis pariter sequentibus dubiis Pontificia Commissio "de re Biblica" ita respondendum decrevit.

I. Utrum, servatis quae iuxta praecedenter statuta omnino servanda sunt, praesertim de authenticitate et integritate trium Evangeliorum Matthaei, Marci et Lucae, de identitate substantiali Evangelii graeci Matthaei cum eius originali primitivo, necnon de ordine temporum quo eadem scripta fuerunt, ad explicandum eorum ad invicem similitudines aut dissimilitudines, inter tot varias oppositasque auctorum sententias, liceat exegetis libere disputare et ad hypotheses traditionis sive scriptae sive oralis vel etiam dependentiae unius a praecedenti seu a praecedentibus appellare?

R. : Affirmative.

II. Utrum ea quae superius statuta sunt, ii servare censi debeat, qui, nullo fulti traditionis testimonio nec historico argumento, facile amplectuntur hypothesim vulgo *duorum fontium* nuncupatam, quae compositionem Evangelii graeci Matthaei et Evangelii Lucae ex eorum potissimum dependentia ab Evangelio Marci et a collectione sic dicta sermonum Domini contendit explicare; ac proinde eam libere propugnare valeant?

R. : Negative ad utramque partem.

Die autem 26 Iunii anni 1912, in audientia utrique Rmo Consultori ab Actis benigne concessa, SSmus Dominus noster Pius Papa X. praedicta responsa rata habuit ac publici iuris fieri mandavit.

Romae, diei 26 Iunii 1912.

FULCRANUS VIGOUROUX, Gr. S. Sulp.

LAURENTIUS JANSSENS, O.S.B.

L. † S.

Consultores ab Actis.

Book Reviews.

The Science of Logic. An Inquiry into the Principles of Accurate Thought and Scientific Method. By P. Coffey, Ph.D. (Louvain), Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, Maynooth College, Ireland.

When Kant remarked that the science of Logic had neither advanced nor receded a step since the time of Aristotle, he was responsible for a statement more creditable to his philosophical humility than to his grasp of the real meaning and import of Aristotelean Logic. In truth, Kant himself initiated a peculiar view of the scope of Logic, as the science of the pure form of thought, which differed in essential respects from the Aristotelean theory. This so-called Formal Logic, owing, it must be supposed, to the easy-going historical methods of the time, came somehow to be identified or confused with the traditional Logic. And it is only in comparatively recent times, through the work of such men as Trendelenburg, Prantl, Zeller and the rest, that the true scope of Aristotelean Logic has been revealed. In England the Kantian tendency is admirably illustrated by the logical writings of Sir William Hamilton—those lengthy, varied and even at times entertaining tomes, familiar or unfamiliar to students of a bygone time. Hamilton, a man of wide but unorganised erudition, had learned to appreciate the completeness and subtlety of the later scholastic logicians. He was familiar with the works of the Nominalists—Occam and Buridam and the rest—but was apparently unaware of the fact that these writers had broken away from the main scholastic tradition, and represented the decadence of medieval speculation.

On the other hand, the direct line of English thought had always been favourable to empiricism. But the empirical school, masterly as the work of Hume had been upon the epistemological side, had made no serious effort to deal with logical problems as a whole. This was the task undertaken by Stuart Mill, and accomplished with such remarkable ability, that, especially in Inductive Logic, we still live within the circle of his extraordinary influence. Mill's Logic has been severely and, indeed, justly criticised, but its influence is still very great, and some of our recent logicians as *e.g.*, Venn, though critical and cautious, remain Millites *pur sang*. The Neo-Kantian tendency is strongly represented amongst recent English logicians, forming, in fact, the opposing camp to the empirical school. Its most masterly exposition is to be found in Mr. Bosanquet's *Logic*, a suggestive book when one has overcome the initial difficulties of its abominable style. Mr. Welton's *Manual of Logic* belongs, perhaps, to the same general tendency, but borrows so freely from such varied sources that it is difficult to place it definitely in any school.

It is into this logical milieu that Dr. Coffey's book enters. "It attempts," as the Preface tells us, "in the first place, to present in a simple way the Principles of the Traditional Logic expounded by Aristotle and his Scholastic interpreters; secondly, to show how the philosophical teachings of Aristotle and the Schoolmen contain the true basis for modern methods of scientific investigation, inductive no less than deductive; and finally to extend, rather than supplement, the traditional body of logical doctrine by applying the latter to some logical problems raised in more recent times." This is an admirable programme. The leading principles of Aristotelean Logic are so clearly conceived that, especially in the sphere of Deductive Logic, little genuine advance has been made upon them. The Logic of Sigwart, which may be taken to represent the highest point of modern logical achievement, is in its main outlines Aristotelean. But to the scholastic no task is more important than that of bringing his principles and methods into close and living touch with the problems that agitate modern thought. The advance of the physical sciences especially has opened up new and difficult problems that scarcely existed for the medieval mind, and Dr. Coffey is certainly wise in "dwelling at greater length upon the presuppositions of induction, because the theory of induction has not yet secured from scholastic writers the amount of attention its growing importance would seem to demand."

It would be impossible here to enter at length into the details of Dr. Coffey's very exhaustive treatment of the general problems of Deductive Logic. These problems have, to some extent, become stereotyped, but the student will find that no point of importance has been omitted, and that the general literature to which Dr. Coffey refers in his Preface has been judiciously employed. His treatment of the so-called "Laws of Thought" follows upon the lines generally adopted by recent logicians. From the Aristotelean standpoint some justification is needed for the acceptance of either the Principle of Identity or of the Principle of Sufficient Reason as logical principles at all. Aristotle did not accept the Principle of Identity as distinct from the Principle of Contradiction. Its present position in Logic is due rather to the influence of Leibniz. The same is true of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which was certainly unknown to Aristotle as a logical principle. It is not a logical principle in the same sense in which the Principle of Contradiction is a logical principle, and in manuals of Logic its position is normally rather ornamental than useful, being introduced in the approved style in the opening chapters and afterwards allowed an *otium cum dignitate*.

Dr. Coffey's treatment of the Immediate Inferences is clear and lucid, but he seems inclined, in agreement with Mr. Joseph, to deny the inferential character of many of these processes. The decision of this very momentous question depends very largely upon what inference is taken to mean. Dr. Coffey tells us that: "We are commonly understood to have drawn an inference when we have made some *distinct*

step or advance in thought from our first judgment; when we have made *explicit* something that was not explicit, something that was *not part of the meaning* of our first proposition; when our second proposition may be said to express *a new truth* or *a new judgment*, and not merely the original judgment in different words" (vol. i., p. 231). And he concludes that: "Judged by the principle in question, obversion can scarcely be said to be a real inference—at least if the negative term be understood as purely negative. It is rather a verbal change." In this matter Dr. Coffey and Mr. Joseph seem upon the whole to agree with the late Professor Bain that these so-called Immediate Inferences are often merely verbal restatements of the original proposition. But the idea that inference demands what is called "*a new truth*" or "*a conscious advance in thought*" is not merely difficult to work out in practice, but highly dangerous theoretically. This view of inference inevitably brings about a confusion between the standpoint of Psychology and that of Logic, which is fatal not merely to Immediate Inference, but to Mediate Inference also. This is just the fallacy that underlies Mill's attack upon the syllogism. Mill in fact appeals to our commonsense to say whether or not the truth that "Socrates is mortal" is to us a "*new truth*," or when we conclude it from the truths that "All men are mortal" and "Socrates is a man," whether we have made any genuine advance in thought. Of course, we have not, and novelty is precisely the quality that it conspicuously does not possess for the ordinary mind. If "*novelty*" or "*advance*" were necessary to inference, a reasoning might be an inference to-day when unfamiliar, and cease to be an inference to-morrow when its novelty had worn off.

Dr. Coffey agrees with Mr. Joseph (this theory originally comes from Mr. Bradley) that there are other mediate inferences besides the syllogism. How this position is to be reconciled with Aristoteleanism or Scholasticism it is not easy to determine. To the scholastic mind the syllogism certainly appeared as the only possible type of mediate inference. Nor is there much consolation in the rather egregious remark of Mr. Welton, who, having adopted the position that certain arguments (the so-called "Logic of Relatives") are not syllogistic, informs us in cavalier fashion:

"The syllogism remains, then, as the one type of deductive reasoning, and should not be discarded on account of the existence of these other valid inferences, *whose scope is not very great*, and whose want of generality must always make them of but little importance."

De facto, the scope of these arguments is very great, so great indeed, that if we decide that they are not syllogistic, then we must regard mathematics and the bulk of the physical sciences as falling outside the scope of syllogistic logic altogether. This can be seen from the fact that one group of arguments that is regarded as non-syllogistic, comprises mediate inferences "from judgments which express each a time or space relation between two objects of thought." The vast importance of such judgments as these need not be insisted upon. One remembers

how Kant maintained that mathematical judgments and reasonings are not discursive, but intuitive. The notion that the "Logic of Relatives" falls outside the sphere of syllogistic inference rests upon a misconception as to what the syllogism was intended by Aristotle to be. It is of vital importance to realise that Aristotle did not regard the syllogism with its orderly array of major and minor premises and conclusion as representing the process normally taking place in the minds of thinking individuals. No one except, perhaps, that much-to-be-commiserated person, a teacher of Logic, forms orderly syllogisms of this type. Even in verbal argumentation they are seldom employed except in that process termed, by a curious misuse of language and ignorance of history, the scholastic method. A man whose internal mental economy was made up of syllogisms would be a psychological monstrosity. And yet nothing is more frequent than to find elaborate criticisms of scholastic Logic based upon this extraordinary misconception. Cardinal Newman's celebrated attack upon syllogistic reasoning in his *Grammar of Assent* turns upon the idea that the actual process taking place in the mind of this or that individual is not like a syllogism in *Barbara*, but is rather of an intuitive character, like an Illative Sense; something closely allied to the gift of calculating boys, or the intuitive perceptions of a great general, or the stroke of insight of an inventor or a mathematician. So Mill informs us that reasoning is from particular to particular, and that the village matron will prescribe for her neighbour's child, moved thereto simply by a consideration of the similar case of her Lucy. And Mr. Bradley, considering the very inferences now in question, concludes that the syllogistic analysis misrepresents the actual process of inference, which is better regarded as "a construction followed by an intuition." These theories rest upon a confusion between Psychology and Logic. Aristotle and the scholastic logicians certainly maintained that all mediate reasoning is syllogistic. Syllogism is simply the scientific analysis of what is necessarily involved in all valid reasoning. If any argument is valid this is its analysis, this is what is necessarily involved in it logically. And if any so-called reasoning is incapable of being scientifically analysed in this fashion, then that reasoning is false. It is just the extraordinary achievement of Aristotle that he succeeded in discovering the necessary scientific form of all proof, and if any argument can be shown to be valid and at the same time non-syllogistic, then Aristotelean Logic collapses, and we must endeavour (like Mr. Bradley and Mill) to construct some new type of logical theory. Logic, as a scientific theory of proof, is not *immediately* concerned with what actually takes place in the mind of the village matron. She may mentally perambulate from the case of her Lucy directly to the case of her neighbour's child. This is exactly the reason why an inquest upon the neighbour's child is sometimes required. Logic is concerned with the scientific analysis of what is necessary for valid reasoning, and it will be found that if the said matron has reasoned at all, then her reasoning is capable of being analysed into this scientific form in which its validity or invalidity at once become apparent.

From the scholastic standpoint the most interesting portion of Dr. Coffey's work will naturally be his account of Induction. A developed theory of Induction could not, from the nature of the case, be part either of Aristotelean or Scholastic Logic. Here new ground has to be broken. And it is a matter of no little interest and importance to discover how our general logical principles will meet the problems with which inductive reasoning inevitably presents us. Here we have no fixed and definite theory which we can pronounce offhand to be the scholastic theory, although the general framework into which our solutions must be fitted is evident enough. Dr. Coffey's treatment of these inductive problems is thorough and complete, although I should not be inclined myself to accept some of his conclusions. A very interesting chapter is devoted to the Uniformity of Nature, which may be regarded as the most important of what are called the "presuppositions" of Induction. The logical importance of this so-called principle is due historically to the work of Mill. And, although since the publication of Mill's Logic much discussion has centred around this principle, it cannot be said that a definite and satisfactory solution of the problems involved has as yet been reached. In the first place there is no consensus of opinion as to what the principle means, or how it is to be enunciated. Sometimes it is regarded as equivalent to the Law of Causation or the Law of Sufficient Reason, and we are told that it should be called the Unity of Nature. Dr. Coffey thinks that the best formulation is the following: "The same physical causes, acting in similar circumstances, produce similar results." From the scientific standpoint this formula seems to be open to serious difficulties. What precisely is meant by "*similar circumstances*" and "*similar results*?" What precise degree of "*similarity*" is required, and what is meant by "*similarity*"? Then what is meant by the "*same*" cause, for if we exact entire "*sameness*," it is evident that our principle is useless for "*the same cause*" in this sense never recurs. Following Cardinal Mercier, Dr. Coffey distinguishes between a hypothetical and a categorical use of this principle. The former, he regards, as self-evident, the latter apparently as needing proof. Of the hypothetical form of the principle he gives two enunciations which are essentially different: (i.) "If, or whenever, or wherever, the same physical (non-free) cause acts in *similar circumstances* (and therefore unimpeded, not interfered with by other causes), it will always produce the *same sort of effect*" (p. 94, vol. ii.). (ii.) "If (whenever, wherever, as often as) any physical cause acts in the *same circumstances*, it will produce *similar effects*" (p. 96, vol. ii.). Both these formulations he regards as "*axiomatic, analytic, self-evident.*" Apart from the vagueness of the formulation and the immense difficulty of understanding what is meant by "*the same circumstances*" and "*similar circumstances*," one need have no difficulty in admitting the self-evidence of the principle as so formulated. If different effects followed, I suppose we should feel compelled to assert that the cause was not "*the same*" or the circumstances were not "*similar.*" This hypothetical principle is

obviously of no importance for Induction because it is incapable of application. The vital problem arises about the categorical form of the principle, namely, "(a) in asserting that *there are and have been and will be such causes in existence*, and (b) in proving that the various cases which we allege to be actual instances illustrative of the principle are indeed such" (vol. ii., p. 96). Here we are concerned, however, no longer with a principle, but with a question of fact. It seems perfectly obvious that this so-called categorical form of the principle cannot be a "presupposition" of Induction because (so far as one can understand it) it is Induction itself. This is simply a statement of the task of Induction. Induction is concerned with the problem of discovering uniformities in the concrete. That the world presents uniformities is simply a matter of fact—it cannot be shown by any *a priori* argumentation that it must present them. That having observed one piece of iron lengthened by heat, there will be other pieces also we cannot prove. Our specimen might very well be unique. That there are other pieces is simply a fact, and in no sense a necessity. We can very easily conceive a world perfectly orderly and uniform, a rational unified system, but totally unlike our world, presenting no uniformities like our regular successions of day and night, the seasons, natural kinds, and so on. Such a world would, no doubt, be too difficult for our human apprehension, but it need be neither irrational nor impossible, nor even improbable. Our world, *de facto*, is not of this type, although Dr. Mellone, apparently in a moment of inspired renunciation, vouchsafes the perturbing information that: "We have NO GROUNDS for affirming that the sun must rise to-morrow morning" (vol. ii., p. 97), a statement which might have admirable religious, but could only have lamentable logical results. The problem of "Uniformity" is merely complicated by the introduction of the notion of free agents and of God. The introduction of the latter cannot, it seems to me, be saved from an obvious *petitio principii*. Are we to abandon henceforth the scholastic argument from the order of the Universe to the existence of God, for if you wish to prove God's existence from the fact that the universe is a uniform orderly system, you cannot prove that the universe is an orderly system because of the existence of God? The introduction of free agents involves a curious *hysteron proteron*. The obvious problem is to show that, in spite of the general uniformity revealed by the inductive sciences, free agency is still possible, but here, before we can start upon our inductive investigations at all, we find ourselves compelled to show that there are such things as "necessary," "natural," "non-free" causes.

Dr. Coffey treats of all the customary problems of Induction in great detail, and I regret that I cannot here follow him into the many interesting points he raises. The student will find a fund of important and well-arranged information. Personally, I should not be inclined to allow anything like the same value to the so-called "methods" of Mill, as Dr. Coffey appears to do. He formulates them after the same fashion as Dr. Mellone. But the question as to how and why these

"methods" find a place in Logic at all requires careful consideration. Mill thought that they occupied in Inductive Logic much the same place as the syllogism did in Deductive Logic. No one would now consider such a claim. But recent manuals on Logic devote considerable space to abusing these methods, pointing out their manifold defects, and finally retaining them in a kind of uncertain but honourable position. Who will inform us what they really are, or what they really do? Are they a logical analysis of inductive proof, and if not, what business have they masquerading in our logical text-books? In reality they seem much on a par with the hints on method which one might find in the introduction to a scientific text-book—much like Newton's "*Regulae Philosophandi*," for example, which find a place in Logic, not through any intrinsic right, but for traditional reasons.

And here I must conclude. This work of Dr. Coffey's can be recommended to the student, not merely for the extraordinary amount of positive information it contains, but also because he will find it a stimulus to independent thought and critical reflexion upon logical problems.

D. O'K.

Searching the Scriptures. Rev. T. P. Gallagher, S.T.L., B.C.L.
Gill & Son, Dublin. 1912.

The author's purpose is, he tells us in his Introduction, to explain the cause which led the people of Israel to believe that the world's Redeemer would spring from them, and conversely to demonstrate the goodness of the claim of Jesus of Nazareth to be the world's Redeemer. The work is an admirable defence of our faith against the attacks of higher criticism. As may be, therefore, anticipated, it consists of two parts, one of which treats of the Messianic prophecies in the Old Testament and the other of their fulfilment in the New. The first and the main part is entitled "*Searching the Scriptures*"; the second, which summarizes the conclusion arrived at by an extensive and thorough investigation, has for its title "*The Scriptures Searched*." It is the refrain or counterpart of the other. The headings of the three chapters which compose it almost suffice to give our readers an idea of its contents. I. "*The Result*," is an admirable survey of the attributes of Christ and His Church. II. "*The Result Confirmed*," contains a selection of Rabbinical explanations amply sufficient to show that they agree with Christians in interpreting many passages of the Old Testament as predictions about the Messiah and His Kingdom. III. "*Jesus Christ the True Messiah*" presents evidence of the fact taken from the Gospels. It would be difficult to find in any language another modern work in which both the Jewish anticipations and the Christian fulfilment of them are so skilfully portrayed. Owing to the exigencies of controversy with the higher critics, the learned author never assumes the inspiration of Scripture, but, while viewing it merely as a body of

historical documents, he has succeeded in demolishing the pet theories of Davidson, Cheyne and others.

It is quite true that recently some of the critics have taken up new positions, but in order to refute them it is only necessary to give a new application to the principles so clearly enunciated and so copiously illustrated by Father Gallagher. The vagaries of higher criticism are somewhat bewildering to the casual reader, but a careful study has enabled him to analyse them, to describe them exactly, and to demonstrate their futility.

By far the most valuable portion of the Old Testament consists in its Messianic prophecies. Consequently against these in particular the attacks of Rationalists are directed. And in order to do away with Moses and the prophets they have evolved the phantom personages whom they call J.E.D., etc., and also their multiples, J.¹, J.², etc. In speaking about these creations of fancy, the critics are so confident and so communicative, that an inexperienced reader might imagine that the critics really believed in their existence. But as regards a Professor in a certain English University, a critic of world-wide fame, who may fairly be taken as representative, the following fact speaks volumes. A few years ago one of the students who attended his lectures on *Isaiah* or some other book, went to his room in order to get an explanation or a proof of something that had surprised him. In reply to questions seriously put, the professor blandly smiled and said: "Not one of the critical theories is worth a straw. It really does not matter what I may have said on that point, for I hold nothing, but you know I must say something new!"

It is almost too much to hope that Father Gallagher's excellent volume will reach the hands of those who are continually presenting to the public some theory hitherto undreamed of. But on principle they appear seldom or never to read books by Catholic authors. Nevertheless signs are not wanting to show that in England, as in Germany, the fabric of higher criticism is crumbling to pieces. The new positions are indications that their authors are aware of its untenableness.

It is well to have the truth presented in so attractive a form as we find it in the volume before us. Some of its pages are models of style. All are marked by clearness and cogency. When we consider the great amount of matter condensed in them, we cannot help making a comparison unfavourable to some of the critics, Budde and Wellhausen, for instance. It should also be mentioned that Father Gallagher does not, in his defence of truth, confine his attention to the Messianic prophecies quoted in the New Testament. As a comparison with the works by the specialists, Reinke and Bade, etc., shows he comments either explicitly or incidentally on nearly all the predictions of this class. From this fact alone, readers may form an idea of the study requisite for the production of his volume. No one that peruses it can fail to perceive the wide reading and the scholarly attainments of the author. Of his accuracy and discrimination, it will be enough

to mention this instance. In the long array of texts which he quotes as being Messianic, one looks in vain for the beautiful but often misapplied passage in the third chapter of Baruch. Some scholars who ought to have known better looked upon it as a convincing proof. With this remark we take our leave of a fascinating essay which will undoubtedly be welcome to a large class of readers.

R. WALSH, O.P.

Christ's Teaching Concerning Divorce in the New Testament. An Exegetical Study, by Rev. Francis E. Gigot, D.D., Professor of Sacred Scripture in St. Joseph's Seminary, Yonkers, N.Y. Author of several works introductory to the study of the Holy Scriptures. Benziger Bros. 1912. Pp. 282. \$1.50.

In his preface Dr. Gigot tells us that his study of this question "was undertaken with the intimate conviction that a thorough investigation of the earliest documents of Christianity would supply a clear vindication of the indissoluble nature of Christian marriage, as distinctly maintained by the living tradition of the Roman Catholic Church, and solemnly proclaimed by the Council of Trent. With this in view, the writer has examined the various passages of the sacred books of the New Testament which set forth Christ's teaching regarding divorce. He has pursued the study of these passages on strictly scientific lines, using every means at his disposal to ascertain the exact meaning of Our Lord's words concerning the sacred character and binding force of the marriage tie. And the undoubted result of his inquiry is to the effect, that Christ's Law condemns as adulterous remarriage after separation of husband and wife who have consummated their valid conjugal union."

The work consists of nine chapters. The first chapter gives a summary of the discussions and conclusions contained in those that follow. The second deals with Our Lord's teaching on divorce as recorded by St. Mark; the third with the same teaching as recorded by St. Luke; the fourth and fifth with the same teaching as represented by St. Paul; the sixth with the version of that teaching given in St. Matthew's account of the Sermon on the Mount; and the last three chapters are devoted to a discussion of the famous and difficult passage, Matt. xix. 3-12. Then follow two appendices, one maintaining that there is thorough harmony between Matt. xix. 3-12 and Mark x. 2-12, the other examining the meaning of the Mosaic legislation concerning divorce contained in Deuteronomy xxiv. 1-4. The work concludes with a printed copy of the ordinary form of a Jewish Bill of Divorce, a bibliography, and three indexes.

The learned author is to be congratulated on the successful completion of a work much needed at the present time, when in so many even Christian countries the indissolubility of the marriage tie is wantonly set at naught. It is wholesome to go back to Christ's teach-

ing and learn the truth from Him Whose word, whether in the domain of dogma or morals, must ever remain the standard of orthodoxy to all who sincerely call themselves Christians. With much in Dr. Gigot's work we are well pleased. His exposition of the passages bearing on divorce from SS. Mark, Luke, and Paul is full and satisfactory, and the same can be said for his treatment of the passage occurring in the Sermon on the Mount; he shows learning and acumen, and a just appreciation of the gist and bearing of the various texts and contexts. But we confess we are disappointed with the discussion on Matt. xix. 3-12, though three whole chapters are devoted to it. We regret this the more because this is really the crucial text on which Protestants base their doctrine of divorce for adultery. Our author, indeed, shows clearly that the whole context of Matt. xix. 9—both what precedes and what follows—demands that consummated Christian marriage be regarded as absolutely indissoluble; but when he comes to deal with Matt. xix. 9 itself, he appears to us to throw no light on its difficulties nor even to attempt any adequate explanation. Yet it is just here, among all the passages of the New Testament dealing with the subject of divorce, that honest, scientific explanation is necessary if our Protestant brethren are to be convinced.

Dr. Gigot is satisfied that the ordinarily accepted reading of Matt. xix. 9 is "undoubtedly genuine" (p. 187, note); but if it be, we would respectfully suggest that it requires much more explanation than he has given it. To our mind, the ordinary reading is all but certainly spurious, and we believe that we ourselves proved its spuriousness almost to demonstration in articles published last year in this magazine.¹ As we have mentioned these articles, and as there is question of a reading of vast importance, in regard to which one is naturally anxious to be able to back up one's own judgment by another more authoritative, perhaps we may be permitted to state here that a distinguished scholar, very prominently connected with Biblical work in Rome, wrote to us in reference to those articles to say: "I have read and studied them, and I believe that your contention that Matt. xix. 9 has been changed is certainly correct. In fact, I cannot see any way out of the conclusion to which your argument leads."² Be this as it may, it would certainly have been very desirable to have the question of the true reading of this very difficult and deservedly suspected text thoroughly gone into in a work like the present. If, as we believe, the common reading is wrong, then the whole Protestant case for complete divorce on account of adultery falls to the ground, for there is no other text of the New Testament that lends it even a semblance of support; and then Matt. xix. 9, like Matt. v. 32, simply mentions adultery as the chief cause justifying separation.

¹ See I. T. QUARTERLY, January, 1911, p. 74, sq., and April, 1911, p. 172, sq.

² As we have not asked his permission, we do not venture to give our distinguished correspondent's name, but it is one of great influence and weight.

Dr. Gigot may reply to us that he is supported by the vast majority of critics and commentators in accepting the ordinary reading. That is so, we admit; but minorities may sometimes be right, and at least they may fairly expect, when the question is important, to have their arguments answered before their conclusions are waved aside. In saying all this our object is not so much to point out what we consider the weak spot in this able and learned work, as to fasten attention on the very important question of the true reading of a most difficult and most controverted text. We trust, therefore, that the learned author will not take amiss anything we have said. We wish his work a wide circulation, and we congratulate him on having put English-speaking students of Scripture under yet another obligation to him.

J. MACRORY.

S. Thomae Aquinatis, Doctoris Evangelici in Evangelia S. Matthaei et S. Joannis Commentaria. Tomus Primus, Evangelium secundum Matthaeum; Tomus Secundus, Evangelium secundum Joannem. Editio Secunda. Augustae Taurinorum, Typographia Pontificia eq. Petri Marietti, 1912. Tom. I., pp. xxiv. + 408; Tom. II., pp. 518. Price of the two vols. in paper, 6 fr.

No commendation of these valuable commentaries is needed; the name of the Angelic Doctor is sufficient guarantee of their worth. It is enough, then, to call attention to the appearance of this second edition. We could have wished the print larger, but it must be admitted that, though small, it is very clear. The price is exceptionally moderate.

There is a learned introduction by Fr. De Rubeis, of the Dominican Order, proving that the commentary on Matthew is rightly to be ascribed to St. Thomas as its author, and not, as some held, to Peter Scaliger. Fr. De Rubeis also shows that the commentary on John, though only partly written by the Angelic Doctor, was all corrected and approved by him.

J. MACRORY.

St. Augustine. The "Notre Dame" Series of Lives of the Saints. Sands and Co., 1912. Pp. x. + 294. 3s. 6d. net.

We heartily commend this book to our readers. We regard it as a gem of its kind, and even those already familiar with the life of the immortal Bishop of Hippo, will peruse these pages with profit and pleasure. Not that we learn anything new about St. Augustine or his writings—our author evidently had no such object in view—but the chequered story of a great and eventful life is told afresh with such charm and human pathos that the work is far more interesting than many a novel. One great excellence of the book is that the author draws largely from St. Augustine's writings, and allows the Saint, as

far as possible, to tell his own story. And what a story it is! Of early and long-continued adhesion to the Manichean errors, of toilsome search after truth, of gross sensual indulgence for many years in the midst of intellectual pursuits, of serious and repeated moral lapses, of the stings of conscience that never allowed him to rest happy in sensual pleasures, till at last the ceaseless prayers and tears of his great mother, Saint Monica, the influence of St. Ambrose, and the grace of the Holy Ghost, triumphed over all obstacles, intellectual and moral, and won him to God and to the Catholic Church. How he afterwards for forty-three years championed his new faith against the Church's many adversaries: Arians, Manicheans, Donatists, Pelagians, is generally known, and perhaps it is for this reason that our author devotes what some may consider too little space to this portion of his subject. No indication is given as to who the author is, but whoever he is, he has given us a beautiful popular sketch of one of the Church's greatest saints.

In the frontispiece there is a good reproduction of Scheffer's famous picture, "St. Monica and St. Augustine." We wish the work a very wide circulation. No one can read it without feeling the better for it.

J. MACRORY.

Introductory Philosophy. A Text-Book for Colleges and High Schools. By Charles A. Dubray, S.M., Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy at the Marist College, Washington, D.C. Pp. xxii. + 624. Longmans. 1912. 10s. 6d. net.

"Dr. Dubray's aim in this volume is to lead the student by easy approaches into the field of philosophy and to show him its divisions with their several problems, and the solutions these have received. . . . The efforts which have been made in recent years to provide the beginner in philosophy with a text-book suited to his needs are justified both by the importance of the subject and by the requirements of educational method. . . . The books that have so far appeared have, each from its own point of view, distinct advantages, either as outlining the history of philosophical problems, or as setting forth the claims of rival systems, or as explaining the principles which serve as the foundation of some special system and a basis of criticism in discussing variant theories. An introduction that will combine these several utilities seems to be our present need." We quote from a brief preface by Dr. Pace, of Washington University; and we believe that the present volume successfully combines the utilities just referred to. Though not too bulky, it covers the whole ground of the philosophical curriculum in a manner necessarily elementary and compendious, no doubt, but at the same time clear, orderly and suggestive.

In the *General Introduction*, extending over twenty pages—a masterly piece of exposition for the beginner—we are asked to commence with *Psychology*, or the *Empirical Study of the Mind* in its three main

departments of Knowledge, Feeling and Willing (pp. 22-204). Then come the normative sciences of those three departments, namely, *Logic* (pp. 205-265), *Aesthetics* (265-280), and *Ethics* (280-360). We are next introduced to Speculative Philosophy proper, or Metaphysics, in its three great branches of *Cosmology* (pp. 422-457), *Rational Psychology* (pp. 458-510), and *Theodicy* (511-541), by the highly important section on *Epistemology* (pp. 362-421). Some sixty pages (pp. 542-600) are devoted to *Outlines of History of Philosophy*; and the work is completed by an *Index*, and a very useful *Appendix* containing a list of topics appropriate for papers and discussions.

It will be observed that psychology receives a relatively detailed treatment, especially the descriptive portion. Of the other branches little more than the elements are set forth: the scope and limits of the work forbade a fuller treatment. Everywhere the exposition, as far as it goes, is clear and simple. It is meant to serve as a basis for further development in the lecture-hall; and it is sufficiently suggestive to foster and encourage personal effort on the part of the student: he is obliged to find examples to illustrate the principles and conclusions throughout. The author's work, too, bears the impress of much personal effort; he has not borrowed from others; and he has used a large discretion in the mode of arranging and treating the various topics. The results are admirable so far as they go; we only wish they could have been amplified.

The writing of a good text-book, embracing so many branches of philosophical study, is a very difficult undertaking for any one individual. The clearness and condensation requisite for any text-book are at the command only of one who has thoroughly mastered his subject; and it is not easy for any one individual to acquire such a mastery of the whole field of philosophy. The ideal text-book would require the collaboration of three or four experienced teachers of the respective branches expounded in the present volume. But in the absence of such a *desideratum* we believe that Dr. Dubray's work will prove exceedingly useful. We anticipate for it a widespread popularity.

The printers and publishers are to be congratulated on the attractive appearance of the book. We have noted only one typographical error—at p. 598, 7th last line.

P. COFFEY.

Histoire de la Philosophie Ancienne: Antiquité Classique; Epoque Patristique; Philosophie médiévale; Renaissance. Gaston Sortais, Ancien Professeur de Philosophie. Pp. xviii. + 627; cloth, 6 fr. Paris: Lethielleux, 1912.

We have in this volume an exceptionally valuable text-book at a very moderate price. The author has written a systematic treatise on philosophy in two volumes. He purposes to complete the series by two volumes on history, of which the second, on the modern period,

is in preparation. The one before us has very much to recommend it to the student. Clearness and precision mark every page. The logical connexions of successive views and systems are indicated throughout. The student is not confused by heavy masses of detail, for only the leading philosophers and systems of each succeeding epoch are studied; those of the second rank are briefly mentioned, and there is just enough of biographical matter to sustain the reader's interest. Of course, one cannot expect exhaustive criticisms or discussions even of the main systems in a text-book which is meant to supplement a systematic treatise: the Catholic student, the student of philosophy according to the scholastic tradition, does not study his philosophy out of an historical text-book; but what he has a right to expect in such a text-book he will find to his satisfaction in Professor Sortais' work. In the first and second epochs Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and St. Augustine naturally demand and receive the fullest share of the author's attention. The influence of Platinus, too, is rightly emphasized. We note that the author agrees with Professor De Wulf in regarding Scotus Eriugena as anti-scholastic; but does not give this important figure in the early Middle Ages the prominence that would seem to be his due. St. Anselm's exposition of human freedom would also have deserved a mention. The fifty pages devoted to St. Thomas are all that could be desired. The author has profited by the extensive researches of the last quarter of a century into the domain of mediæval philosophy: they have enabled him to put before the reader a surprisingly vivid picture of the seething intellectual activity of those reputedly stagnant Middle Ages. It is, however, in the Renaissance period that the author has done some of the most useful work in the present volume. Renaissance philosophy is still largely a bewildering, unexplored chaos. Hence the special value of his hundred and seventy pages on this period—followed by twenty-five pages of bibliography in small, closely-printed type. Besides the dwindling scholastic currents in the monastic cloisters and the Spanish schools, the author likewise sets forth all the leading anti-scholastic currents as well: Humanism, the new pagan Platonism and Averroistic Aristotelianism, the revivals of Stoicism and Atomism, Naturalism, Eclecticism, Theosophism, Scepticism, Protestant philosophies, the new social and political systems, and the remarkable achievements of the pioneers in astronomy and the physical sciences.

Finally we have to call attention to what is a remarkable and exceptional characteristic in a book of this kind: the extraordinary richness and up-to-dateness of the bibliography throughout. The author supplements the special bibliographies annexed to each chapter by a thoroughly well-arranged supplement covering no less than seventy-six closely-printed pages of bibliographical matter. So that the student who wishes to extend his studies has here a complete and reliable key to even the most modern philosophical literature. This enhances the value of the book enormously, and represents a great deal of painstaking and exemplary industry. There are also two

separate indexes, one of matters in the text, the other of authors' cited in the bibliography. The author is to be congratulated on the production of such a volume, and we trust the promised volume on modern philosophy will reach the same high standard of workmanship.

P. COFFEY.

The Catholic Encyclopædia. Vol XIV. Simony—Tournély. London: Caxton Publishing Company. New York: Robert Appleton Company. Price 27s. 6d. Pp. xv. + 800.

The fourteenth and second last volume of *The Catholic Encyclopædia*, which has just been published, contains many articles of absorbing interest, not only to students of theology, but also to the general reader, and foremost amongst them are articles that deal with various social problems. "Sociology," by Dr. Kerby, explains the meaning, aims and methods of the science of sociology. It shows the relations between sociology and kindred sciences, such as economics, politics, science of religions, law, ethics and history. Unfortunately, sociology, in so far as it has been developed on the metaphysical side, shows a marked tendency towards Agnosticism, Materialism and Determinism, but Christian sociology is advancing. The article on "Socialism," by W. E. Campbell and L. A. St. Lawrence Toke, glances at the history of the movement, examines its philosophical and religious tendencies, and determines how far these may be, and actually have proved to be, incompatible with Christian thought and life. The materialistic tendency of Socialism, its deterministic doctrine, its denial of the right of private property in the means of production and distribution, and its general tendency, as shown in the anti-Christian spirit of its leaders, manifest its incompatibility with Christian ideals. "Socialistic Communities," by Dr. John A. Ryan, gives a list of the societies which maintain common ownership of the means of production and distribution. "Syndicalism," by Fr. Husslein, S.J., discusses mainly the programme of revolutionary syndicalism towards the formation of which three influences combined: revolutionary unionism, Anarchism, and Socialism.

There are other articles in this volume which have an interest for students of ethics and kindred sciences. "Slavery," by P. Allard; "Ethical Aspects of Slavery," by Dr. Fox; "Spiritism," by Dr. Pace; "Moral Theology," by Fr. Lehmkuhl, S.J.; "Sin," by Dr. O'Neill, O.P.; "Speculation," by Fr. Slater, S.J.; "Telepathy," by Dr. Dubray; and various articles on Temperance and Temperance Movements, especially the article on "Temperance Movements in Great Britain and Ireland," by Fr. Keating, S.J., are worthy of consideration.

The important articles on Scriptural subjects are numerous. We may mention "Epistles to Timothy and Titus," by Fr. Aherne; "Psalms of Solomon," "Synagogue," "Epistles to the Thessalonians" and "Tobias," by Fr. Drum, S.J.; "The New Testament,"

by Fr. Durand, S.J.; "The Old Testament," by Fr. Merk, S.J.; "Temptations of Christ," by Dr. Gigot; "Solomon" and "Syria," by Dr. Oussani; "Talmud," by F. Schühlein.

In Dogmatic Theology and Philosophy we call attention to "Dogmatic Theology," by Dr. Pohle; "Dogmatic Theology—Christology," by Fr. Maas, S.J.; "Teleology," by Dr. Dubray; "Soul" and "Spiritualism," by Frs. Maher, S.J., and Bolland, S.J.; "Soci-nianism," by Dr. Pope, O.P.; "Supernatural Order," by Dr. Sollier; "Syllabus," by Fr. Haag, S.J.; "Space" and "Substance," by Dr. M. de Munnynck; "Time," by Dr. Nys.

There are many other articles in the volume which deserve notice, but we can mention only a few of them which will serve as examples: "Ecclesiastical Statistics," by Dr. Baumgarten, and "Statistics of Religions," by Fr. Krose, S.J.; "Spain," by Dr. Amado; "Sweden," by P. Wittmann; "Switzerland," by Dr. Kirsch; "Sydney," by Mgr. O'Haran; "Symbolism," by Fr. Thurston, S.J.; "Three Chapters," by F. Bacchus; "Stonyhurst College," by Fr. Irwin, S.J.; "States of the Church," by Dr. Schnürer; "Talleyrand," by Dr. Gautherot.

There are twenty-four full page illustrations in this volume, four coloured plates, and three maps.

J. M. HARTY.

St. Patrick: His Life and Teaching. By the Rev. E. J. Newell, M.A.
2nd ed. Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge.
Price 2s. 6d.

This volume on St. Patrick is one of the series known as "The Fathers for English Readers," published by the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge. It is a popular manual based largely on Dr. Todd's "St. Patrick, Apostle of Ireland," and without any great pretence to scholarship. And yet the book is not without a certain amount of value. Some of the views of the author are striking and well supported, and some of the condensations given either in the text or in the notes are valuable epitomes of the researches of distinguished authorities on the subject. Mr. Newell rejects the commonly accepted date for the arrival of St. Patrick in Ireland (432) and prefers the year 438, but the arguments he brings forward either in favour of his own dating or against the commonly accepted opinion on this matter are neither striking nor original.

It is amazing, too, how any man with pretensions to a knowledge of the literature of the period could seek to deny that the Irish Church founded by St. Patrick had any connexion with Rome. If St. Patrick came to Ireland and founded an independent Irish Church, where, we ask, did he get the model for such a foundation? Was it in Britain, the home of his fathers, whose bishops sat side by side in the Councils of the fourth century with the bishops of the Universal Church, all of whom looked to Rome as the head of the Christian world? Was it

from St. Germanus, the devoted friend and subject of Pope Celestine? Was it from his masters at Lerin's or Arles, or did he learn it during the course of his wanderings in Gaul, Italy, and the islands of the Tyrrhenian sea? All the arguments that might be adduced from St. Patrick's writings or from nearly contemporary sources are calmly set aside by Mr. Newell as forgeries of a later age. This is supposed to be a sufficient answer to all critics, or if there should still be persons stubborn enough to doubt, the argument of silence is brought forward as an irrefutable proof that St. Patrick wished to have nothing to do with Rome. Mr. Newell, too, is alarmed by other distinctly "Roman" practices, such as the reverence paid to relics, that might be discovered in very early Irish literature, and thinks that there must be some anachronism about these. Why? Is it because the practice of paying reverence to relics was not customary from a very early age in the Church? If Mr. Newell thinks so we beg to refer him to the studies of competent Protestant scholars on this subject.

It is a great pity that a little book which in many ways has much to recommend it should be marred by such blind opposition to Rome, and it is a puzzle to know how Mr. Newell could ever have set down several of the statements made in his book on this subject. Possibly the fact that he was writing for the Society, which is given above as the publishers of his book, might give some help in the solution.

JAMES MACCAFFREY.

The Neighbourhood of Dublin. Its Topography, Antiquities, and Historical Associations. By Weston St. John Joyce. Dublin: M. H. Gill and Son, Ltd., 1912.

The author of this book, Mr. Weston St. John Joyce, the son of the distinguished Irish writer, Dr. Joyce, is already well known as a most reliable authority on all matters concerning the topography, antiquities and historical associations of Dublin and the adjacent districts. Camera in hand, he has time and again travelled on foot over every inch of the ground that he describes in this volume. His descriptions are not, therefore, second-hand. They are the impressions of a man who has seen what he describes in all seasons and under all kinds of weather conditions. For this reason they are always interesting and accurate; and though the author can lay little claim to the raciness and humour which makes some of our Irish guide books so entertaining, yet he is possessed of a peculiar charm of style which captivates the reader and carries him on imperceptibly from chapter to chapter.

But it would be wrong to imagine that Mr. Joyce's work is a mere popular guide book. He realised fully, as is said in the introduction, that "it is desirable to associate history with topography," and hence he waded patiently through most of the old records concerning the places he described, and picked out from these everything that was likely to throw light on the subject or to interest any of his readers.

Quite apart from its other merits, the many quotations given from, and the frequent references to books and papers, etc., the very names of which are unknown even to many scholars at the present day, would make the volume a very desirable one in any library. Over one hundred and twenty excellent illustrations are inserted, many of them being reproduced from the photographs taken by the author.

Mr. Joyce says that he was "induced to write the book in the hope that it may stimulate greater interest (in the beautiful surroundings of our metropolis) in those who already know the charms of our surroundings, and excite it in those who do not, and that it may be the means of enabling others to enjoy the pleasures I have derived from rambling among the many picturesque and interesting places in the Neighbourhood of Dublin." We can only hope that the book will have the large circulation it deserves, and that it may help to make the people of Dublin understand the beauty spots of their own district.

JAMES MACCAFFREY.

Promptuarium Theologiae Moralis Universae. By the Rev. Camillus Colli Lanzi. P. Marietti, Torino. Pp. viii + 434. 1912. Price 5 fr.

Disputationes Theologiae Moralis. By Dr. Arthurus Cozzi. Same publisher. Pp. 399. 1912. Price 3.50 fr.

These two works, brought out by the same publishing firm, are valuable contributions to the study of Moral Theology. They differ in style, manner of treatment and, to some extent, in subject matter, but for the purpose the authors have in view are both equally effective.

Fr. Lanzi's work covers all the subjects generally discussed in Moral Theology text-books. The author is a missionary priest who some years ago conceived the idea of gathering from all sources the best that had been written by Catholic moralists and putting it in compact form at the service of others in a position similar to his own, keeping in mind especially those who had to undergo a *concursus* or similar examination. The intention has been carried out in a praise-worthy manner. There is hardly a superfluous word in the book: no attempt is made at fine writing or nicety of style: in fact the whole work reads like a series of notes for lectures rather than a treatise in the ordinary sense. Definitions are given in concise form: the practical conclusions in connexion with each point discussed are stated, and generally supported by a few arguments briefly put: the later decrees of congregations, and other matters with which priests whose regular course in Moral Theology was completed years ago are not likely to be very familiar, are given in a way that attracts attention, while the ordinary commonplaces and the more theoretical problems are relegated to a very secondary place. The book is not likely to be consulted very much by students who have no previous knowledge of the subject, nor will it repay study by anyone who is anxious for a scientific treatment of any particular problem. But for those who

have already gone through the ordinary course and would like to have the results of their labour summarized in convenient form, the work is sure to be one of great interest and profit.

The second volume—by Dr. A. Cozzi, Professor of Philosophy and Moral and Pastoral Theology in the College of the Propaganda in the Argentine—is of a different type. The subject-matter is less extensive, embracing merely the Decalogue, the Precepts of the Church and the tracts on Justice and Restitution: but the treatment is more elaborate and slightly more scientific. It may be questioned whether the volume will give the student as good a grasp of the subject as he will get from a study of the corresponding sections in a work like Fr. Lehmkuhl's, but undoubtedly the method of treatment is more interesting and the style more attractive to the ordinary reader. St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus are taken as the two great authorities and the work is largely based on their teaching: but the other chief writers on Catholic morals, especially those of a more recent date, are awarded all due prominence. Numerous examples are given in illustration, and the local laws of continental countries and of the Argentine and Latin America generally are freely drawn upon in support of the opinions the author maintains. He wrote mainly, of course, with a view to the needs of his own countrymen, but practically all he has said will be of interest to students of Moral Theology everywhere. It would hardly serve any useful purpose to discuss the merits or the demerits of the author's opinion on the numerous debatable questions raised: though the arguments are urgently put, they differ very little from those of his predecessors: in fact the author is generally content to hold the balance between contending authorities without asserting his own personality more than a conscientious chronicler should.

The practically simultaneous appearance of these two books is a welcome indication of the interest taken in the subject, and both, we are sure, will be highly appreciated by the Catholic priesthood.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

L'Egoisme Humain. Par A. Lukan. A. Tralin, 12 Rue du Vieux-Colombier. Paris, VIe. Pp. 167. 1912. Price 3 fr.

M. Lukan published some time ago a work entitled "*La grande Loi Sociale de l'Amour des Hommes.*" This may be described as a companion volume—a companion volume, but at the same time a contrast. In the previous work he had dwelt on the Evangelical law of charity and shown how its ideals could be realized, and actually are realized, in the individual, family and social life of the Christian world of the present day. The volume before us gives the reverse side of the picture. In a series of chapters, dealing with "*The Heart and Thought of the Egoist,*" "*Egoistic Types,*" "*The Egoism of Fathers, Mothers and Children,*" "*Egoism in Social, Political and National Life,*" the author paints the deplorable consequences of the spread of a selfish spirit in modern life—

the principle of "Everyone for himself" without consideration for the trials and sufferings of others.

Needless to say, the treatment is a little bit one-sided. A lecture or sermon on the ravages of a particular vice in a community is not likely to give a perfectly full account of the whole actual conditions, and a book on the subject is pretty sure to be marked by the same defect. The impression conveyed must, as everybody understands, be checked by a reference to thousands of facts which do not exactly suit the writer's purpose. To judge from this volume alone, one might be pardoned for thinking that the law of Christian charity had come to be completely forgotten, and that a more than pagan selfishness had become the universal dominant motive force in the Christian world of the twentieth century. All that, of course, is very untrue: in fact, the author supplies the corrective in his previous book and in the admissions he makes in his Preface to the present one. But it is useful to have the darker side of life sometimes painted in striking colours, even at the risk of forgetting for the moment that any other side exists. Evils are not likely to be remedied unless their existence is emphasized in a way that will strike the imagination. And certainly it must be said for the author that he follows this particular vice in its varied manifestations throughout the whole domain of human activity and throws a pitiless light on it wherever he finds it lurking in unexpected shapes.

We can hardly help feeling that most of the pessimistic passages are suggested by the present day conditions of France, especially as regards family life. The insistence with which he dwells on French statistics in regard to divorce, the falling birth-rate and the devices for race suicide, furnish sufficient grounds for the conviction. And while it is sad to reflect that the public records of a professedly Christian nation quite justify the dismal outlook of the eloquent reformer, it is consoling to remember that all nations are not quite so bad, and that a study of our own in particular, in connexion with the very points mentioned, might have led the author, had he lived among us, to brighten a little several of the more gloomy pages of his jeremiad.

We can only hope that the book will produce a good effect among those for whom it is principally intended, and do its part to prevent the decay of a noble race by disclosing clearly the causes from which it is likely to spring.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

Psychology Without a Soul. A Criticism. By Hubert Gruender, S.J., Professor of Psychology of St. Louis University, St. Louis, Mo. B. Herder, 1912. Pp. 262. Price 4s. net.

Father Gruender continues in this volume that form of scholastic propagandism which in his *De Qualitatibus Sensibilibus* he declared to be particularly needed at present: monographs on special problems of philosophy. *Psychology Without a Soul* is a vigorous attack on the scientific pretensions of those psychologists who analyse conscious life

into states of consciousness and interpret these states as inactive accompaniments of physical events. Our author calls such psychologists materialists: materialism being, he insists, that doctrine which acknowledges nothing substantial in this visible universe except matter. These materialists do not, it is true, belong to the older Büchner school: they resent the title of materialist; they call themselves psycho-physical parallelists. But Father Gruender points out that their denial of a substantial spiritual soul in man makes them, in the traditional meaning of the term, materialists.

Against these psycho-physical parallelists, Father Gruender defends the claims of Rational Psychology. An enquiry into the origin of the Psychology Without a Soul forms a useful introduction to a trenchant criticism of its unfounded claims. Genetic psychology, as expounded by materialistic evolutionists, has not a shadow of evidence, paleontological or otherwise, in its favour: primitive atoms of mind-stuff are figments of the imagination. A doctrine of atomistic hylozoism may be indispensable to a thorough-going philosophy of evolution, but that indispensability is proof neither of atomistic hylozoism nor of thorough-going evolution. Having shown that there is no evidence in any credible theory of evolution against the existence of the soul, Father Gruender proceeds to consider in turn the bulwarks and the stumbling blocks of Materialism. The great bulwark of Materialism is the harvest of fruitful knowledge gained since modern psychologists, eschewing metaphysical deductions, adopted biological methods of observation and experiment. These real advances in the field of experimental psychology cannot be denied. Neither has a scholastic the slightest motive for questioning or belittling them: Father Gruender points out how well the new facts fit into the traditional philosophy. But when experimenters overstep the limits of their researches and construct systems of philosophy on such insufficient bases, our author enters a strong protest. Experimental psychology has brought nothing to light which gives even a semblance of justification to materialistic teaching: it has only detailed that knowledge of the connection between mental and bodily activities which is, and always has been, the common property of mankind. Above all, it has not removed those facts and principles which Father Gruender calls the stumbling blocks of Materialism: The Perception of Abiding Personal Identity; The Superiority of Rational Thought to Sense Perception; Perfect Psychological Reflexion; Free Will. The constructive portion of the essay opens with a thorough analysis of these facts, and concludes with a convincing demonstration of the existence of a simple, spiritual soul. The book is, as this resumé shows, written along traditional lines. No new facts. No novel arguments. But the personal note, kept up from the first page to the last, makes both the criticism and the defence entertaining reading. By his solid and popular treatment of one of the fundamental doctrines of scholastic psychology, Father Gruender has done good service to the Philosophy of the Schools.

J. O'NEILL.

Notes.

In our October issue of last year we published important decisions of the Biblical Commission in reference to the Gospel of St. Matthew. We desire now to call attention to similar decisions given above in our present issue, p. 476, in reference to the Gospels of SS. Mark and Luke and the Synoptic Question. As the decisions are given fully above, it is not necessary to do more here than outline their substance. In reference to the second and third Gospels the Biblical Commission has decided:—

1. That evidence both external and internal forces us to affirm with certainty that Mark, the disciple and interpreter of Peter, and Luke the physician, assistant and companion of St. Paul, are truly the authors of the Gospels respectively attributed to them.

2. That the reasons by which some critics seek to prove that the last twelve verses of the Gospel of Mark (Mark xvi. 9-20) were not written by Mark himself, but added by another hand, are not such as to justify the assertion that those verses are uninspired, nor such as to prove that Mark is not the author.

3. That it is not lawful to doubt about the inspiration and canonicity of Luke's account of the Infancy of Christ (Luke i., ii.), of the appearance of an angel comforting Jesus and the sweat of blood (Luke xxii. 43-44); and that it cannot be shown by solid reasons that these accounts do not belong to the genuine Gospel of Luke.

4. That the canticle *Magnificat* is to be attributed not to Elizabeth, as in some very few early documents, but to the Blessed Virgin herself.

5. In reference to the chronological order of the Gospels, that it is not lawful to withdraw from the traditional view that Matthew wrote first in his mother-tongue, next Mark, and then Luke; and that this view is not inconsistent with the opinion asserting that the second and third Gospels were written before the Greek Matthew.

6. That it is not lawful to postpone the date of composition of the Gospels of Mark and Luke until after the destruction of Jerusalem, nor even to maintain in the case of Luke's Gospel, on the ground that the Lord's prophecy about the destruction of that city is there given more definitely, that it was composed after the siege had begun.

7. That we must hold that the Gospel of Luke preceded the Acts of the Apostles (Acts i. 1-2); and since the latter was completed at the end of St. Paul's Roman imprisonment (Acts xxviii. 30-31), that the Gospel was not composed subsequent to that time.

8. That, on account of evidence both external and internal, we cannot prudently call in question the view which holds that Mark wrote in accordance with the preaching of Peter, and Luke in accordance with the preaching of Paul, and which asserts at the same time that these

Evangelists also had at hand other sources worthy of credit, either oral or already consigned to writing.

9. That the narratives of Mark and Luke, whether in regard to words or actions, are rightly entitled to that full historical authority which the Church has always ascribed to them, and that they cannot be regarded as even partly destitute of such authority.



In reference to the Synoptic Question the decisions are substantially as follows:—

1. That provided the decisions of the Biblical Commission in regard to the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke be respected, it is lawful to exegetes, in order to explain the mutual similarities and dissimilarities of these Gospels, to discuss freely and to appeal to hypotheses of tradition, either written or oral, or to hypotheses of the dependence of any one on its predecessor or predecessors.

2. That those are not to be regarded as respecting the aforesaid decrees of the Biblical Commission who readily embrace what is commonly called the *two-document* hypothesis, which strives to explain the composition of the Gospel of Matthew and of the Gospel of Luke chiefly by their dependence on the Gospel of Mark and on a so-called collection of the Lord's sayings; and hence that they are not free to propound this hypothesis.



The great importance and far-reaching scope of these decisions is evident, and we may confidently hope that their effect will soon be apparent in a desirable steadying of the views of some Catholic scholars in questions of Gospel criticism. Happily our Irish schools of Scripture will have no need to reconsider their position in view of these decisions, for, so far as we know, they have always steadily maintained the views which the Biblical Commission now authoritatively enforces.



The particulars regarding a scheme for a Government grant in aid of Irish secondary schools are now available and will require careful scrutiny on the part of those who wish to maintain the freedom of the Catholic Colleges. According to the scheme a grant of £40,000 is to be given. This will be distributed by way of grants to schools which comply with certain conditions in proportion to the amount received by the said schools under the Intermediate Education Act in the preceding year. The conditions are:—(a) Each boys' school is to have not less than one registered lay teacher at a minimum salary of £120 a year for each forty boys on the rolls, and each girls' school is to have not less than one lay assistant teacher at a minimum salary of £80 a year for each forty girls on the roll. (b) All such lay assistants shall be entitled to six months' salary in case of dismissal—except on account of grave misconduct. (c) A register of secondary teachers is to be set up forthwith

according to a scheme to be drawn up by a Committee consisting of representatives of the Intermediate Board and of the Universities of Ireland, and to be appointed by the Lord Lieutenant.



The fact that since the famous speech of Mr. Birrell during the Education debate on the 31st July, hardly a word of protest has been heard in public, and that, with the exception of *The Irish Educational Review*, hardly a paper or journal has dared to offer a word of criticism, is enough to fill one with misgiving for the future of Ireland. (This was in press before the very able and moderate statement of the Catholic Headmasters was published.) Here, we have a system of secondary schools built up out of private resources, owned as ecclesiastical property, to the building of which the Government never contributed one penny, and yet Mr. Birrell has the audacity to insist that the men through whose energy this system was built up and maintained must make way now for lay teachers unless the schools are to be deprived of their share of the public grant. In the old days when the Government refused to give a penny for the secondary education of Catholics, and when every effort had to be made in order to build up a school system, priests, both secular and religious, were brought in as teachers, and had to be content in many cases with their food—very plain food at that—as their sole remuneration. The same is true of the religious bodies of women who took charge of the education of the girls. Neither the clergy nor the nuns had any wish to exclude lay teachers or to monopolise the teaching profession for themselves, but the want of funds made the employment of lay teachers impossible. This is the sole explanation of why the schools of the country are to a large extent in the hands of the clergy and of the religious orders of women.



But now that the Government has been shamed into giving us about one-third of what it was bound to give had we been treated in the same way as England or Scotland, Mr. Birrell insists that the men or women who built up the schools must make way for the lay teachers. Remember we do not object to the fact that the minimum salary of £120 should be fixed for lay teachers. We have always maintained that their position was a very difficult one, and we have every sympathy with them in their efforts to improve their salary and standing. But we object entirely to the distinction drawn between lay teachers and clerical teachers. It is a new and dangerous feature to introduce into Irish public life, and the fact that newspapers supposed to voice the Catholic opinion of the country have nothing but praise for a scheme the very essence of which is this discrimination between clerics and laymen is in itself significant.



In many cases the diocesan colleges are also the diocesan seminaries. Now, the seminary is the one place above all others that must be under

the sole control of the bishop. That is one point on which the Church is most determined, namely, that the seminaries for the education of the clergy must be under only ecclesiastical control. This is of prime importance. Now, according to Mr. Birrell's regulation the bishop who has his seminary staffed with fully qualified priests must dismiss one or two of these priests in order to introduce lay teachers if he wishes his college to get a share in the grant; and who knows but next year, or at least in a short time, he will be called upon to dismiss two more when the grant is increased? Once the principle is conceded that the Government can dictate to the owners and managers of the schools, built from private resources and owned by the Church, what class of teachers they are to employ under threat of being cut off from the educational funds the consequences are likely to be serious.



What is true of the seminaries is equally true of the schools built by the religious orders of men and women. They were good enough to teach while the State held aloof and teaching was underpaid drudgery, but once the Government has begun to awake to its duty of doing something for education they must make way for the lay teacher, and the proposals of the Government are praised in Irish papers as "liberal." It is high time that a calm and reasoned statement of the whole case should be prepared and circulated for the instruction of Irish Catholics. Most of them are in utter ignorance of what lies behind these proposals or of the dangerous contentions which they are likely to introduce into Irish life. We have no hostility to the lay teachers. On the contrary, we are strongly of opinion that their positions should be improved. But we think an arrangement could be arrived at in a friendly conference between Catholic managers and teachers without introducing the principle of penalising either the clergy or the nuns because they have taken upon themselves certain religious obligations.



The whole scheme shows the utmost contempt for the men who built up the Catholic schools. A register of teachers is to be drawn up, but by whom? One would have thought that on this matter, at any rate, the Catholic bishops or Catholic headmasters might have been allowed a voice. But no. The scheme for the register is to be drawn up by a committee composed of representatives of the Intermediate Board and of the Universities. The Intermediate Board is supposed to be composed half and half of Protestants and Catholics; Trinity College is entirely Protestant; the Queen's University is entirely Presbyterian and the National University is pretty well divided if all the constituent colleges be taken into account. Lord Aberdeen is to select a committee from all these bodies and this committee will determine who is to teach, for example, in our Catholic seminaries. Surely it is high time for us to bid good-bye to make-shifts and to return to some fixed Catholic principles before

it is too late. We have gone too far already along the lines of un-denominationalism. Unless people understand the correct principles on this question there is the gravest danger for the future of religion in this country.



With all Ireland, we mourn the death of Father Matthew Russell, S.J., whose saintly life and literary attainments have been a guiding light in many an Irish home. He was born in 1834, and was the second son of Arthur Russell, of Seafeld House, Killowen, County Down. He was a nephew of Dr. Russell, the venerated President of Maynooth, and a brother of Lord Russell of Killowen. He was a student of Castleknock College and of Maynooth. In 1857 he joined the Jesuits and was ordained a priest in 1864. In 1873 he founded the *Irish Monthly*, of which he remained editor till the end. In the pages of this magazine, many brilliant writers, Protestant as well as Catholic, found eager hospitality. W. B. Yeats, Frances Wynne, Alice Furlong, Dora Sigerson-Shorter, Katharine Tynan, Hilaire Belloc, Rosa Mulholland, are only a few of the many writers who helped to obtain for the *Irish Monthly* a warm welcome through the length and breadth of the land. Father Russell's writings, especially his graceful verse, had a charm all their own. Amongst his best known works were:—"Idylls of Killowen: A Soggarth's Secular Verses"; "Vespers and Compline: A Soggarth's Sacred Verses"; "Little Angels: A Book of Comfort for Mourning Mothers"; "Madonna"; "Behold Your Mother"; "Sonnets on the Sonnet"; "St. Joseph's Anthology"; "St. Joseph of Jesus and Mary: Priedieu Poems in his Praise"; "Emmanuel"; "Communion Day: Fervent Words Before and After"; "Lyra Cordis"; "Alone with God"; "Moments Before the Tabernacle"; "Altar Flowers"; "At Home Near the Altar." May he rest in peace.



The death of Father Albert Poncelet, following so soon after the death of Father de Smedt, is a severe loss to the community of the Bollandists. For a great number of years he was responsible in a large measure for the publication of the *Analecta Bollandiana*, and during those years contributed to it himself most valuable dissertations, critical studies, editions of texts and reviews of books. He gave great assistance to future scholars by his catalogues of the Latin Lives of Saints to be found in the public or private libraries of Italy, France, Germany and Austria. For years he had been at work on a volume of the *Acta Sanctorum Belgii*, and in order to verify his researches on this subject he undertook a voyage to some of the libraries in Italy and France. But during the course of this voyage he took ill and died.



An article contributed by Mr. Charles McNeill to the *Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland* (vol. xlii., pt. ii.), on the "Affinities of Irish Romanesque Architecture," will well repay perusal. He

suggests that the foreign influences at work in the production of the Irish Romanesque style are to be traced, not to England or France, but rather to the Rhineland. In proof of this suggestion he points to the facts which go to prove conclusively the close connection existing between Ireland and Germany in the ninth and tenth centuries, as well as to the close resemblance between certain features in the architecture of Cormac's chapel and of churches in Cologne and the Rhineland. He does not profess to write as an architectural expert, but hopes that some person gifted with the necessary training would examine this theory.



The *Month of Mary*, for the use of ecclesiastics, is a translation from the French work of Renaudet, and is published by Herder. It costs, in cloth binding, two shillings. It has been composed solely for the use of clergy or clerical students. "In it there is proposed for each day of the month some trait of the life of the Blessed Virgin, first as an object of veneration and love, secondly as a model of some virtue of our holy state, and finally as a motive of confidence." After each meditation "some examples of devotion to the Blessed Virgin, which have been left to us by holy persons of our own state of life, and particularly those of modern times whose lives are widely circulated, so that, if desirable, recourse can be had to them for further details and greater edification." In the supplement are given the Psalms, Canticles and Hymns generally sung during the Month of Mary.



In 1878 was published in the *Zeitschrift für Romanische Philologie* a poem on the canons of the Gospels, beginning with the words "Quam in primo speciosa quadriga." The author of the poem was unknown. Professor Wilhelm Meyer, having discovered some new manuscripts, published a new edition of it (1912), and pointed out that the style of versification showed clearly that the author was from Ireland. He adduced also good reasons to show that it was written in the seventh or eighth century. The Benedictine Father de Bruyne, by the aid of certain other manuscripts, has discovered recently the name of the author. It is no other than the noted Irish writer Aileran the Wise, whose death is put down generally to the year 664. On the other hand, Mr. M. Esposito publishes an edition of this poem ("Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy," Vol. XXX., Section C., No. I.), in which he attributes it to an Irishman named Laurentius or Lorcan. Which is correct?



The death of Gabriel Monod, the President of the historical and philological department of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes and the editor of the *Revue Historique*, is a distinct loss to students of history. Though his own range of activity was too wide to allow him to produce any really first class book, yet his wonderful gifts as a teacher, his almost universal

knowledge and his excellent method of work served to turn out generations of students from Ecole des Hautes Etudes, who were destined to become famous as historians, and who without a single exception were willing to admit their indebtedness to their early master. M. Monod was reared as a Protestant but from a very early period in his life he practically abandoned all dogmatic beliefs. This did not, however, influence in the slightest his attitude towards the Catholic students attending his classes. He was scrupulously careful never to say or do anything that could wound their susceptibilities, and more than once in recent years he took the field in the defence of the religious orders in France, against the injustice of the Separation of Church and State, and in favour of liberty of education.



The annual report of the *Seminaire Historique* of Louvain University affords a glimpse of the excellent work which is being done in that institution. Amongst the subjects selected for special treatment during the past year were:—Photius as Patriarch and Theologian, Manichaeism in the West in the first centuries of our era, The Principality of Liège and the Eucharist from the ninth to the fifteenth century, Jansenism in Belgium till 1654, Some Thoughts on Sacramentaries, The Statutes of the Premonstratensians, English Refugees in the Netherlands during the reign of Elizabeth, and the Reforms of Joseph II. in the Austrian Netherlands. The very complete biography attached to each discussion will be very useful to all readers of this report.



One of the most interesting articles in the fourteenth volume of *The Catholic Encyclopædia* is "Statistics of Religions," by Fr. Krose, S.J., whose reputation as a statistician assures us of the substantial accuracy of his calculations. Taking the census as carried out in various countries between 1900 and 1909, he tells that in Europe there are 188,577,058 Catholics; 106,200,177 Protestants [these include all branches of Christians not belonging to the Catholic or the Greek Orthodox churches]; 113,735,718 Greek Russian Orthodox Christians; 9,795,877 Jews; 8,648,395 Mohammedans; and 1,050,061 others and undenominational.



In Asia there are 12,661,498 Catholics; 2,354,817 Protestants; 13,806,000 Greek Orthodox Christians; 745,000 Jews; 155,100,000 Mohammedans; 210,000,000 Brahmins; 125,000,000 Buddhists; 240,000,000 Confucianists and Ancestor Worshipers; 49,000,000 Taoists and Shintoists; and 16,870,000 other Heathens.



In Australia and Oceania there are 1,244,055 Catholics; 3,997,047 Protestants; 16,867 Jews; 20,000 Mohammedans; 70,000 Buddhists; 1,112,000 Fetish Worshipers and other Heathens; and 174,000 others and undenominational.

In Africa there are 2,689,839 Catholics; 2,634,660 Protestants; 5,823,989 Oriental Christians; 573,635 Jews; 43,299,445 Mohammedans; and 71,000,000 Fetish Worshippers and other Heathens.



In America, North and South, there are 87,614,635 Catholics; 70,868,923 Protestants; 1,858,372 Jews; 2,622,000 Heathens; and 6,089,219 others and undenominational. In British North America there are 3,017,231 Catholics; 4,332,769 Protestants; 60,000 Jews; and 50,000 Heathens. In the United States there are 14,347,027 Catholics; 65,000,000 Protestants; 1,777,000 Jews; 500,000 Heathens; and 5,500,000 others and undenominational.



In the world there are 617,972,918 Christians, including 292,787,085 Catholics; 186,055,624 Protestants; 127,541,718 Christians belonging to the Greek Russian Orthodox Church; 8,974,989 Oriental Schismatics. There are all told 12,989,751 Jews; and 930,355,120 Mohammedans, Brahmins, Buddhists, Ancestor Worshippers and Confucianists, Taoists and Shintoists, Fetish-Worshippers and other Heathens, and others and undenominational. Thus the total number of Christians amount to 39.6 per cent. of the entire population of the earth. Of these, 47.4 per cent. belong to the Catholic Church, 30.1 per cent. belong to various Protestant Churches, 20.6 per cent. belong to the Orthodox Greek Church, and the remainder are Oriental Schismatics or belong to sects not separately mentioned—Raskolniks, Jansenists, Old Catholics, etc.



Messrs. B. Herder and Co. have published a second edition of the *Metaphysica Ethica* of Father Gredt, O.S.B. This second edition is revised and enlarged and thus improves on the first. The author writes from a purely Thomistic standpoint; his knowledge of the principles of scholasticism is evidenced on every page. His style, too, reminds us of the clear and orderly exposition of the medieval masters. We are sure that the qualities which ensured the success of the previous edition will not fail to obtain for the present volume an equally deserved popularity. Price 7s. sewed; 8s. cloth.



Father Frick's *Ontologia*—Herder: sewed, 2s. 9d.; cloth, 3s. 6d.—has reached its fourth edition. Many additions, particularly with reference to modern errors, have been made, so that the fourth edition is a trustworthy and up-to-date presentation of the leading doctrines of Ontology.



Messrs. Longmans, Green and Co. have published a number of reprints of the late Professor William James, under the title "Essays in Radical Empiricism." Professor Perry, who acts as editor, tells us he was governed in his preparation of the volume by two motives: on

the one hand, he was anxious to make accessible certain important articles not to be found in Professor James's other books; on the other hand, he sought to bring together essays treating systematically of one independent and fundamental doctrine. The volume is, therefore, not a collection, but a treatise: a treatise of metaphysics setting forth within brief compass the doctrine of "radical empiricism." James spoke of his own philosophic attitude as "empiricism" because he was content to regard his most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future experience: he spoke of it as "radical empiricism" because, unlike so many of those half-hearted empiricists who defend positivism or agnosticism or scientific naturalism, he does not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experience has got to square. This philosophic attitude of radical empiricism consists (1) first of a postulate, (2) next of a statement of fact, (3) and finally of a generalised conclusion. The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience. The statement of fact is that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so than the things themselves. The generalised conclusion is that, therefore, the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure. Such are the main outlines of that radical empiricism which Professor James came towards the end of his life to regard as more fundamental and more important than pragmatism. He believes that such a philosophy harmonises best with a radical pluralism, with novelty and indeterminism, moralism and theism. He is not sure that all these doctrines are its necessary and indispensable allies. Still he looks forward to the day when empiricism, hitherto associated through what he believes some strange misunderstanding with irreligion, becomes associated with religion.

The volume is, as everything from Professor James's pen, interesting reading. Useful also for the student who wishes to keep in touch with contemporary thought. But its freshness and its fascination cannot conceal the defects of a theory of knowledge that frankly challenges all principles of logic.

Theological Articles in the Reviews.

IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD. July, 1912.—**Rev. C. Gelderd**, 'Modern Ideas on Darwinism.' **His Grace the Archbishop of Dublin**, 'Two Famous Irish Marriage Cases.—III.' **Rev. D. O'Keefe**, 'Pragmatism.' **Rev. W. H. Kirwan**, 'Some Celtic Missionary Saints.' **W. H. Grattan Flood**, 'The Episcopal Succession in Clonmacnoise.' August, 1912.—**His Grace the Archbishop of Dublin**, 'Two Famous Irish Marriage Cases.—IV.' **John Ayscough**, 'A Novelist's Sermons.—V.' **Canon Lennon**, 'Saint Teresa of the Child Jesus.' **Rev. W. H. Kirwan**, 'Some Celtic Missionary Saints.' September, 1912.—**Rev. R. Fullerton**, 'In Fraudem Legis.' **Rev. J. Rickaby, S.J.**, 'Virtue under the Generic Form of Health.' **Rev. D. O'Keefe**, 'Pragmatism.—III.' **J. Ayscough**, 'A Novelist's Sermons.—VI.' **Rev. J. P. Rushe, O.D.C.**, 'The Scapular Confraternity.' Correspondence. Documents. Notices of Books.

STUDIES. June, 1912.—**G. O'Neill**, 'The Earlier Legend of the Hermit and the Angel.' **J. A. Hartigan**, 'Nationality and Religion in Ancient Judea.' **W. J. Ryan**, 'The Rationalist Press and Herbart.' **J. Gwynn**, 'The Intolerance of a Church.' **A. J. Rahilly**, 'In Reality.' Bulletin. Notes. Reviews of Books.

ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW. July, 1912.—'Flavian: A Clerical Portrait.' **F. O'Connor**, 'Father Prout.' **L. Senfelder**, 'Over the Desert to Convent St. Catharine. Practical Hints to Tourists.' **L. E. Dobrée**, 'Father Carlton's Offerings. A Clerical Story.' **F. P. Donnelly**, 'Something More about the Tiresome Sermon.' **A. Dease**, 'The Old Priest's Vespers and Complin.' **Analecta. Studies and Conferences. Criticisms and Notes.** August, 1912.—**J. A. McClorey, S.J.**, 'Pulpit Eloquence and the Supernatural.' **H. T. Henry, Litt.D.**, 'The Latest Proposal in Calendar Reform.' **W. H. Grattan Flood**, 'Thomas à Kempis as a Hymn Writer.' **W. D. Strappini, S.J.**, 'Babylonian Legislation 4,500 Years Ago.' **J. B. Ceulemans**, 'Studies in American Philosophy. III. The Modern Schools: Kantism in America.'

THE CATHOLIC WORLD. August, 1912.—**L. M. Phillips**, 'Islam.' **A. MacMahon**, 'The Pardons of Brittany.' **H. Hull**, 'Glimpses of the All-Beautiful.' **L. I. Guiney**, 'Lovelace and Vaughan: A Speculation.' **W. Elliott, C.S.P.**, 'Spiritual Reading.' **F. P. Duffy, D.D.**, 'What Do the Methodists Intend to Do?' New Books. Foreign Periodicals. Recent Events. September, 1912.—**T. J. Gerrard**, 'Sanctity and Racial Betterment.' **J. Ayscough**, 'A Scamp's Probation.' **Max Turmann, LL.D.**, 'The Social Apostolate in France.' **L. I. Guiney**, 'Digby Dolben.' **C. St. John**, 'San

Gimignano and Its Treasure.' **J. Faber Scholfield**, 'The Newman of Norway—Knud Krogh-Tønning.' **J. A. Ryan, S.T.D.**, 'The Abuses of Private Land-ownership.' **J. L. O'Brien**, 'René Bazin.'

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY BULLETIN. June, 1912.—**Fr. Paschal Robinson**, 'The Personality of St. Clare.' **William Turner**, 'St. Thomas of Aquin.' **John Webster Melody**, 'Heredity and Environment.' **A. Lang**, 'Dr. Bolling's Reply.' [Discussion regarding the Homeric question.] Book Reviews. Miscellaneous. University Chronicle.

THE MONTH. July, 1912.—**Rev. S. F. Smith**, 'Newman's Relation to Modernism.' **M. l'Abbé Devoghel**, 'A Note on the Belgian Elections.' **Rev. H. Thurston**, 'A New Witness to the Loreto Tradition.' **L. M. Leggatt**, 'Those of His Own Household.' [Translated from the French of René Bazin.] Miscellaneous. Reviews. Short Notices. Books received. August, 1912.—**Rev. C. Wilmot**, 'The Zambesi Mission.' **J. Britten**, 'Protestant Partingtons.' **Rev. John Gerard**, 'Catholic Persecution.' [Some instructive thoughts on the traditional attitude of the Catholic Church towards religious error.] **H. Somerville**, 'How to work Social Study Clubs.' **Rev. H. Thurston**, 'Christianity in the Far East. I.—St. Thomas in India.' **L. M. Leggatt**, 'Those of His Own Household.' [From the French of René Bazin.] Miscellaneous. Reviews. Short Notices.

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